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A SERIES OF PAPERS SELECTED FROM THE PERIODICAL AND OTHER LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, HOLLAND, ETC.

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I.—ROMANISM AND RATIONALISM AS OPPOSED TO PURE CHRISTIANITY.*

BY JOHN CAIRNS, D. D., BERWICK.

The history of the human race, considered as a religious development, is the history of a struggle on the part of Unbelief and Superstition against each other, or against that divine form of religion which is appointed to supplant both. Man is inexplicable, on any system of philosophy which does not afford large room for the working of a religious element in his being; an element which, never long dormant, may at any time awake, and awe into subjection all the other principles of his nature. There cannot be a greater misconception of Christianity than to imagine that for the first time it introduces the religious principle into the history of the race, or the experience of the individual, and invests it with authority. There is a belief in the supernatural; a faith in things unseen and future before either Moses or Christ; and the design of revelation is not to create in man a religious nature, but to rectify and control that religious nature which the Fall has not destroyed, but only perverted and cast loose from its true centre. The religious tendencies and workings of fallen humanity may all be comprised under the one name of *Superstition*,—a very unhappy name, as it throws no light upon the thing itself, but which may become significant to us if we regard it by a play upon its Latin etymology, as denoting the wreck of religion which has survived the Fall. Before the Fall, man's religious nature and tendencies rested in their proper object,—a God truly known, and loved both for what He was in himself, and in relation to the creature. The introduction of sin, being the introduction of darkness and error into man's views of God, destroyed love to Him, as seen in his own proper character; and as the Fall also necessitated the assumption of a hostile or penal attitude on the part of God, it disturbed the flow of grateful affection which his benefits had before produced. Light and love, the twin principles of primeval religion, thus became darkness and fear, the presiding spirits of man's religion in his fallen state, and the chosen agencies whereby the dominion usurped over him by the Tempter was confirmed. The true God was no longer known, and even if He had been known, He would not have been loved through the

* A Lecture delivered in Glasgow and Edinburgh.

hardening influence of transgression, and the irritating effect of penalties upon a disobedient nature. But the religious principle in man remained active as ever, and the results of its operation, under the twofold influence of darkness and fear, were the manifold forms of ancient idolatry. Many theories have been framed to account for the origin of Idolatry, such as these: that the gods were deified men; that they were personifications of the powers of nature; or that they were the creations of a poetical fancy. These theories are all radically worthless, because they overlook the working of the superstitious principle. This makes it inevitable that man should have a religion, and equally inevitable, since he cannot create a religion in the strict sense, that the object of his worship should be the original divine character, hidden indeed by ignorance, debased to the likeness of man himself, and even of inferior creatures, and withal darkened and overcast by fear, but everywhere preserving fragments of its original unity, vestiges of its deep truth, and shadows of its awful majesty. This view, which I cannot here develop at greater length, will explain the idolatries of Egypt, of India, and the East, of the classic nations of Greece and Rome, and likewise the paganism of the Teutonic races, as so many mis-readings and distorted reminiscences of the one aboriginal faith of humanity. The institutions of priesthood and sacrifice, and the rights of lustration and purification, which, of course, cannot be referred to man's religion before the Fall, are probably to be traced to the usages of worship appointed by God after the Fall, which were practised by the founders of different nations according to tradition, and then handed down to their descendants to be misunderstood, depraved, and caricatured in the growing darkness.

The development and reign of superstition is the prevailing feature in the religious history of all nations. But there gradually arises—there exists in fact from the beginning—an antagonistic influence by which superstition is limited and held in check. This is *Unbelief*. It manifests itself in two very different forms. There is a higher unbelief which attacks what is false in superstition; and a lower unbelief which attacks what is true. The higher is an effort of the religious principle to purify itself by the employment of reason. It lays open the inconsistency of the creed, of the rites, and of the ceremonial of superstition with the deeper religious principles on which it is itself based, and attempts

a religious reform by abridgment, or simplification, or refinement of the vulgar faith. Such was the unbelief, or, if you will, the rationalism of Socrates and his successors, in relation to the Greek paganism, and of other philosophers who flourished still later in the decline of the Roman Empire. The lower unbelief again attacks even what is true in superstition, its fear, its sense of guilt, its faith in the operation of unseen avenging powers; and not liking to retain God in its knowledge, even in the dwarfed and degraded representations of superstition, seeks to explode all faith in his living agency and influential connection with men. Such was the unbelief, or, if you will again, the rationalism, only darker and more ungenial, of Epicurus and his school, of the sceptics, and of many eminent persons, such as the elder Pliny, in the later ages of ancient heathenism.

This struggle between superstition on the one side, and unbelief, in its two forms, on the other, which I have alluded to as waged on the field of Greek and Roman paganism, has been carried on more or less in every false religion under heaven. Sometimes the one side has triumphed, sometimes the other. In the classical world, the prevalence of literature, on the whole, gave the victory to unbelief, and this also has been the case with the modern Chinese; whereas the Hindoo system of superstition has kept its ground both against the serious and frivolous rationalism of its native impugners. In the Mahometan religion, as is well known, there has been the same opposition of the devotees and the freethinkers, though the latter have always been in the minority. Among the ancient Jews, when superstition, adding to and corrupting a divine but imperfect religion, had overlaid and buried it, the same conflict arose between the disciples of superstitition, the Pharisees, and the leaders of unbelief, the Sadducees; of the latter of whom we cannot but believe that some, at least, were actuated by higher than mere skeptical motives, and had the same keen sense of the errors of tradition which is displayed by the modern Karaites in rejecting the Talmud.

One of the most melancholy features in this struggle of superstition and unbelief among the religions of nature, is the total impossibility, by any series of such collisions and reactions, of restoring the true knowledge and worship of God. Before rationalism could effect this among such nations, two things would be necessary: first, that a superstitious system should contain at

least all the elements of the true religion, and then that reason should be able to separate these unerringly from the corrupt admixtures by which they were overlaid. Each of these conditions is manifestly impossible, and it has even been found that the higher rationalism, however justly applied, by shaking the faith of the vulgar in religious notions and practices which rested solely on tradition, has done the work of the lower unbelief, and led the way to absolute irreligion. Then again, after a triumph of this kind more or less extended, superstition has revived through the inherent necessity of satisfying in some shape the religious principle; and by a natural reaction against the previous indifference, it has revived in a form more fantastic, more degrading, or more bloody than before. New conflicts are thus provoked, and the result is that superstition, frequently wounded and sometimes slain and buried, puts forth more revolting excrescences in place of its lost members, or rises from the dead to perform more strange and portentous antics than ever upon its fresh grave.

In the midst of this downward progress of the ancient world, with a frivolous unbelief ever becoming more impious, a generous unbelief ever more melancholy and despairing, and a superstition sitting over against both, and, like the priests of Baal, invoking its gods with more fanatical cries and barbarous lacerations, the great remedy was introduced, and the religion of Jesus, in the midnight of the world's spiritual history, began its course. The gospel was at once a perfect republication of the original religion—the religion of man as a creature; and was a final development of the religion of mediation—the religion of man as a sinner. Everything that was precious among the relics of superstition was preserved; while the yearnings and longings of the human heart for deliverance from sin and return to God, which superstition could never meet, were gloriously satisfied. The incarnate God at once revealed and reconciled the Father; and became the way, the truth, and the life; the Light of the nations, the universal guide of the erring into the paths of peace. The moral basis of superstition was thus taken away; and, at the same time, while everything that was well founded in the earlier unbelief was conceded, yet such was the evidence, both external and internal, of the divinity of the religion of Christ which it brought with it into the world, that skepticism also lost

all rational foundation. Happy would it have been for mankind if, when the darkness thus passed away and the true light shone, all had been willing to walk in it and to continue in it, persuaded of the divine origin of Christianity, satisfied with its simple method of reconciliation to God through the incarnation and sacrifice of His own Son; and while contented with nothing less, aiming at nothing more, than to pay the grateful debt of obedience to the God of redemption, and to walk in the exercise of love, and the performance of spiritual rites of worship with all the brotherhood who had been thus enlightened and sanctified. But alas! the very depravity of human nature for which the gospel was the cure, not only hindered the action of that gospel, but reacted upon it, to deteriorate its healing properties; and the history of the so-called Christian world, is mainly the history of the joint attacks of superstition and unbelief upon Christianity; just as the history of the world before Christ is the history of their attacks on one another. In this contest we cannot allow that either has any truth on its side, as we were willing, nay bound to do, before the advent of the gospel. Every true religious want of man is met by Christianity; and there is no room for superstition to enlarge with its human and incongruous additions. Every part of Christianity is divinely authenticated and symmetrically coherent, meeting some religious want; and there is no room for unbelief with its negative criticisms and mutilations to take any part away. Hence we shall unhesitatingly regard superstition and unbelief, in relation to Christianity, as both perverted manifestations; the one being more the perversion of the heart through fear; the other the perversion of the understanding through pride; and without going here into any more refined analysis of their nature and tendency, shall speak of them as while both radically mistaking Christianity, yet mistaking it in opposite directions, the one laboring more to corrupt it by false appendages, the other to destroy it by unauthorized curtailments and simplifications. And in the remainder of this lecture, the plan which I shall follow is to select the salient aspects of Christianity as a religion, and after showing in general how every one of these aspects meets some essential religious want of our nature, to exhibit the operation of the two hostile influences as equally mistaking the gospel provision for the want in question, and as abridging it by defect, or overlaying it by excess. I shall, in this

lecture, forbear to speak of any other superstition or unbelief than wears the Christian badge and name. Hence my illustrations must be drawn chiefly, on the one hand, from the heresies of the Christian Church, these being mostly products of that unbelief which, as arising from the false application of reason in rejecting what is genuine and vital to Christianity, is commonly called *Rationalism;* and, on the other hand, from the corruptions of the Church of Rome, which is the finished development of *Superstition.* It is not a sketch which I am to attempt of the struggle of pure Christianity with open infidelity, or with such foreign superstitions as Mahometanism or Mormonism; but of the intestine war with each series of evils within her own pale. According to the scheme thus laid down, I shall now proceed to consider the reaction of Rationalism and Superstition upon Christianity, in *four* points of view; *first*, as a system of revelation; *secondly*, as a system of mediation; *thirdly*, as a system of morality or sanctification; and, *fourthly*, as a system of spiritual association and fellowship.

I. Look, then, *first*, at Christianity as a *system of Revelation.* If anything can be regarded as proved beyond reasonable dispute by the history of the world's religions, it is the necessity of some revelation that should dispel the uncertainties of all honest inquirers respecting God's nature and designs, and man's duty and destiny, and correct those deplorable mistakes into which few will deny that superstitious forms of religion have fallen. There must be some voice of God, some oracle, some heaven-descended truth superseding all other oracles, prophecies, or alleged divine communications, by bearing visibly on its front that evidence of celestial birth which they cannot produce. Now Christianity *is* such a revelation, proved to be divine by its indubitable miracles and prophecies, by its godlike tone and style, and by the superhuman greatness, depth, and wisdom of its contents. Further, it was necessary that this revelation should be in a book, and that book complete and entire, otherwise there would have been no definite standard, and no security against change in the transmission of the divine message from age to age. Now the Christian Scriptures form such a book, attested by sufficient evidence to be the genuine, uncorrupted, unmutilated depository of such a revelation. And once more, it was necessary that this book, while refusing to bend to human reason, should be capable of interpre-

tation by human reason, and *that* of every individual man, as a message from God to *him*, for the understanding and right use of which he alone was responsible; and such a book the Bible is, asserting its own absolute infallibility, and yet leaving its interpretation to all who 'seek out the law of the Lord and read.' A supernatural communication, a perfect canon, a self-interpreting Bible: these seem to be the three great wants of man in regard to revelation, which Christianity, as a system of revelation, fully meets and satisfies.

Look, now, at the way in which Rationalism and Superstition have in turn dealt with these three foundation-principles of Christianity as a revelation. Rationalism, even within the Church, has advanced so far as to deny that Christianity is a communication from God in any supernatural sense at all. To this startling length the divines of Germany, commonly called Rationalistic, while professing to believe in Christianity as from God, have, for more than half a century, now gone. It is the first time, so far as I am aware, in the history of Christianity, that such a denial has been connected with the Christian profession; and that alleged disciples of Jesus and his apostles have maintained that he and they only spoke in God's name as Zoroaster or Mahomet, or any other person of strong natural religious temperament and sensibilities. This denial of all miraculous influence at the birth of Christianity has found favor with some of our English Unitarians, as well as with their brethren in America; and it almost seems as if the disciples of Priestley and Channing, who, whatever their other shortcomings, at least held Jesus for the divinely inspired prophet of immortality and something more, were about to discard their old teachers, and to regard the Savior as divested not only of divinity, but of divinely-enlightened humanity, at least humanity divinely enlightened in any other sense than were Socrates and Plato, or the idols of modern hero-worship, whose names I shrink from pronouncing in conjunction with His who comes from heaven, and is above all.

While Rationalism has only lately, and in certain quarters, among which I grieve to have to speak of the Church of England, proceeded to cast off altogether the supernatural claims of Christianity, it has long, and in many directions, endeavored to shake the authority of the received Bible as in all its parts an authentic record and perfect canon. I shall not enter into details

on this subject. Generally speaking, for it would be uncandid to make the assertion universal, the denial of the canonical authority of certain parts of the Bible has sprung from a reluctance to accept their testimony to doctrines opposed to Rationalism. Thus, as the Sadducees of old rejected the books posterior to those of Moses, because they taught the doctrine of a future life, so the Ebionites of the second century disowned the opening chapters of Matthew and Luke because they taught our Lord's miraculous conception, which these religionists denied; and nothing has been more common than for the so-called Rational divines of Germany, though here and there have been honorable exceptions, to set aside books from the canon in the face of all evidence, because destructive of their tenets, just as a juryman is summarily challenged by a counsel because suspected of an adverse leaning. Of this practice, unhappily, Luther set an example in rejecting the epistle of James, because he falsely supposed it to be inconsistent with justification by grace; and this unwarrantable act of his in this department, like the burning of Servetus by Calvin, has drawn after it a long train of evils, his name being employed to sanction on the Continent such wanton ejection of books and parts of books from the sacred Scriptures, as Luther would have been the last to rank within the bounds of fair inquiry and historical criticism.

But Rationalism not only denies the inspired authority of the Scriptures in general, or mutilates and abridges them by false processes of criticism: it exalts reason to a place in the interpretation of what remains and is acknowledged to be authentic, inconsistent with submission to the mind of God. If the starting-point or elementary idea of revelation is denied, it is not easy to allow the Bible to speak its own language. What is supernatural and mysterious is in danger of being explained away, and the testimony of the Creator adjusted to the preconceived notions of his creatures. Thus how often has it been attempted even by Christian divines to explain the fall of man as an allegory, and the temptation of our Lord as a vision; to account for the miracles of Moses, at least the passage of the Red Sea, and the descent of the manna in the desert, on natural principles; and to resolve such moral miracles as the conversion of Paul into the reaction of the mind from one extreme to the other. It is matter of notoriety that eminent professors of Christian theology in Germany,

sincere after their kind, have represented our Lord's death on the cross as only a swoon from which he recovered in the grave, and that others, in some respects orthodox, have endeavored to render his mighty works more credible by supposing him to be endowed with an extraordinary gift of animal magnetism. Some prophecies are admitted to deserve the name, but others are rejected as requiring too great a strain on faith; and everywhere the mental habit of these divines, like a spring pressed down, tends to throw off the load of revelation externally cast upon it. As an example of how the peculiar doctrines of the Bible are likewise diluted or rejected, it may be mentioned that the eminent writer De Wette, who latterly recoiled from his earlier extremes, maintains that there can be no atonement, because the Prodigal Son is represented as received without any; though he might quite as well have maintained from that parable, that men return to God without any solicitation from Him at all. So is it with other doctrines: Satan is an oriental metaphor; the Spirit of God is a personification and not a person; and sin is a necessary transition from a lower to a higher moral state, which, when it has served its purpose, shall be done away by Christ in all creatures. Thus what we regard as the plainest doctrines of the Bible are overruled and counter-checked by violent interpretation. Rationalism, for the most part, does not dare to say 'That is the Bible doctrine, and it is absurd;' for this is the watchword of infidelity, though even here Rationalism and infidelity have lately shaken hands. It generally says, 'If that were the Bible doctrine it would be absurd;' and then it proceeds to torture the plain language, to read between the lines, and to look at all the peculiarities of Christianity with the diminishing end of the telescope, until mountains become mole-hills; and the only remaining wonder is, that strains so magniloquent should be employed by sacred writers to adorn such feebleness and commonplace as remains when the rugged grandeur of revelation has vanished. On this subject a volume might be written, and it would be a very melancholy one. The most strained and unnatural constructions ever put by special pleaders upon human laws have, I grieve to say it, been exceeded in these interpretations of what is still called the Word of God; and the Christian Church still suffers from this refusal to accept the ordinary and literal meaning of Scripture as that which God intended, when he made use of hu-

man language, and directed his inspired agents to use all plainness of speech.

If we now turn from this misuse of the revealed Word, we shall see how widely superstition has erred on the opposite side. If Rationalism leaves only a minimum of inspiration, superstition in the Church of Rome affords a surplus. The fatal error of that Church, so far as Scripture is concerned, consists in claiming for the Church in all ages that inspiration which only belonged to the days of prophets and apostles. Hence, *three* signal mistakes exactly opposite to those of Rationalism. For, *first*, the inspired Bible is received not on the ground of its own supernatural evidence, but because the Church vouches for it as the Word of God. And *secondly*, the Church in the exercise of this usurped power has seriously corrupted the Bible which it professes to guard, adding to it the legends of the Apocrypha, and sanctioning all the errors and mistranslations of the Vulgate as of equal value with the original, and further exalting to a co-ordinate rank with the written word the whole mass of tradition as floating in ecclesiastical usage, or as embodied in the canons of councils, so that the Romanist Bible is voluminous, unfixed, and infinite, comparable almost to a Serbonian bog, in which the true Scripture is dragged down and sunk by the leaden and earthy matters to which it is attached. And *thirdly*, the Church denies to this Bible, thus placed on a wrong foundation, and thus falsely enlarged, all power of self-interpretation, and refuses to her laity and even her inferior clergy all unfettered liberty to read it, and much more to judge of its meaning for themselves, reserving to the infallible oracle in the Church, wherever that may be situated, the exclusive power of determining its sense, unbound by any rules or principles of ordinary interpretation which they are competent to apply in self-defense. It thus appears that Rationalism and Superstition, starting from diametrically opposite points, tend to almost the same result so far as the strict idea of revelation is concerned. The last word of the one is, "The Bible is not wanted:" the last word of the other is, "The Bible is not sufficient." Both agree in denying its authority, its perfection, and its use. Both invest it with the honors of royalty; and then retract the homage, while they smite it and lacerate it, and pierce its most sensitive organs, leaving it, indeed, the name of a revelation, but denying it the reverence due to a final and conclusive

message from God. There is no remedy for these evils in the struggle of Rationalism and Superstition with one another. They will never compromise their differences in a just assent to the claims of the Bible as the middle term between them. That just assent—in other words, Christian faith—can only come from a higher region; and till the spirit of God be poured out to enlighten men in their need of a message from heaven, and to open their eyes to the claims of the pure unadulterated Word, so long will Rationalism and Superstition pass the Bible by, on opposite sides, or only appeal to it to confirm the dictates of reason, or to strengthen the foregone conclusions of authority. There is this point of accordance in their apparent conflicts—a common preference of the human to the divine, and it would be to take an unphilosophical view of human nature to imagine that these forces will ever neutralize each other, like the height of one wave and the hollow of another, so as to leave a smooth sea whereon the bark of revelation may glide along to convey its heaven-sent treasures.

II. The *second* aspect of pure Christianity in which I now proceed to consider the joint effects of Rationalism and Superstition upon it, is as a *system of Mediation*. The mediatorial scheme is the essence of Christianity. 'No man cometh unto the Father but by me.' To us 'there is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus.' The deep-felt want of mediation in the human breast is written on the history of all false religions, and is the great truth which they all embody. Priests, sacrifices, intercessors, solemn rites of prayer by selected individuals holier than their fellows, are all due to this felt derangement of man's relations to God, and are an imperfect kind of mediation—a deep confession of the need of it rising from the inmost heart of humanity. Perhaps it may be said without presumption, that no revelation would meet man's need, if it did not provide *three* things: a genuine scheme of mediation, a scheme visibly complete, and a scheme easily available. These three qualifications are united in the Bible system. There is a genuine mediation by the incarnation of the Son of God as God's delegate and man's representative. There is a visible completeness in his work as Mediator, for his obedience and sufferings stand in relation to God as a full and perfect sacrifice and atonement, the

efficacy of which is no mystery, but obviously rests on his dignity as God, imparting to his righteousness an unlimited worth for man's redemption. And there is the most direct availableness of this work of the Mediator for acceptance with God, inasmuch as it is the *faith* of the sinner, and not any more difficult requirement which is laid down as the means of justification. An incarnate God, a perfect righteousness, a free justification; this is the glorious threefold cord of the Bible system of mediation. Observe now how Rationalism loosens the fibres of that cord, and how Superstition, seeking to incorporate and interweave fresh threads with them, in effect equally destroys their texture. And first of Rationalism.

Rationalism denies and eliminates from the Bible the true and proper basis of mediation—the divinity of the Mediator. Hence result all the forms of the Arian heresy, as this prevailed in the fourth and fifth centuries in the ancient churches; in the beginning of the eighteenth century in England, both in the Church and among Dissenters; and on the Continent, in France, Germany, and Holland, to our own times. Socinianism is but the logical result of the Arian premises, and hardly does more violence to Scripture, while it pays more homage to reason. The modes of belief which corrupt the great doctrine of the Incarnation are innumerable. But they all equally conflict with mediation in the true and proper sense. If it be not God himself that has laid hold of humanity in the person of Christ, the gulf is not overleaped. There is a show of mediation; but there is after all nothing but higher creatures exerting themselves for lower, and they do not effectually lay their hand either on the offended God or the offending sinner.

Further, Rationalism destroys the visible completeness of Christ's mediation by mutilating the Scripture doctrine of atonement. This has been done in a great variety of ways. Either the atonement is in substance denied, and then Christ is a mere prophet or king, a sufferer but not an atoner, which is the common Socinian doctrine; or the atonement is represented as a display simply of love without any vindication of justice, which is the view of the German divine Schleiermacher and his followers, and of Mr. Maurice and others among ourselves; or it is regarded as a suffering for sinners accepted for them by God's mere good will and pleasure, without any visible reason for its employment,—

the opinion of many English divines of the last century. Now, it is obvious that in all these cases, the essential property of atonement, the bearing of penal displeasure against sin by a substitute qualified to bear it, is left out; and not less the rendering of honor to the law by the obedience of such a substitute. The doctrine of a moral adaptation in the sufferings and obedience of a divine person, who acts as a substitute for sinners, to lay the foundation of their escape from wrath and admission to glory, is repudiated or slurred over; and thus there is no visible completeness in the Mediator's work, no point of repose for a guilty conscience, nothing to justify the cry of victory on the cross, 'It is finished!' or to make the way into the holiest of all more manifest. Christ is the herald of reconciliation, but not the author of it; or if the nominal author, there is no coherence between his work and its results.

The *third* essential property of the Bible scheme of mediation, as not only genuine and visibly complete, but likewise easily available, is also compromised by a Rationalistic theology. Instead of immediate and free justification, on the ground of the atonement and righteousness of the Mediator, Rationalism brings in more difficult, and, indeed, impracticable conditions. For grace it substitutes merit; for faith works; and the less that it gives to the Mediator the more does it ascribe to the sinner; either the performance of the duties of a mitigated law, which Christ has died to lower, or sincere obedience to the law as the means of being benefited by the work of Christ, or at least the exertion of faith as a meritorious work, which from its own virtue justifies the soul. Thus the availableness of Christ's mediation as open to all from the beginning, and as requiring only a simple act of reliance to place every believer under its gracious shadow, is fatally interfered with; and the essential freeness of justification, the living pulse of the apostolic Christianity, and the vital breath of the revived gospel of the Reformation, is so clogged and pressed down by the dead weight of self-righteousness, that the gospel becomes another gospel, and ceases to be the gospel of Christ.

So much for the blindness of Rationalism to all that is distinctive and glorious in the gospel scheme of mediation, as regards its basis, its essence, and its mode of being turned to account. Not less injuriously does Superstition misconstrue and pervert this

grand system. It cannot be said, indeed, that Romanism, which may here be taken as the type of all other superstitions, denies and sets aside in express words, the Mediator, any more than it denies and sets aside the Bible. But with its uniform fatal tendency to add and supplement, it obscures and virtually nullifies the essence of Christianity. There is *first*, a fundamental doubt in the entire Romish system of the *genuineness* of Christ's mediation, a doubt opposite to that of Rationalism; for while Rationalism explains away the Saviour's divinity, Romanism mistrusts his humanity, and introduces the Virgin, the saints, and even the angels, as nearer and more familiar mediators than Christ, which would be utterly impossible if the doctrine of his true manhood were held in its fresh simplicity, according to the Bible representations of the incarnation. The deepest principle of superstition thus comes to light—distrust of God; and hence Godhead coming near in Christ arrayed in the living and warm attractions of human love is disbelieved and recoiled from, and the natural heart still seeks to break the awful distance, by throwing in other mediatorial agents at successive intervals. On another side the same doubt of the genuineness of mediation is expressed in the place assigned to the priesthood. The felt need of something *human* between man and God, in addition to the humanity of Jesus, obviously discredits that humanity, and thus militates against the true faith of the incarnation.

Not less is the visible *completeness* of the Mediator's work imperiled and vitally injured by Romish superstition. I need not dwell on a subject so well known as the so-called sacrifice of the Mass. The other misshapen features of that tenet I shall not touch on. I only remark that the doctrine of Transubstantiation, which is so far a counterfeit of the mystery of the Incarnation, visibly imports that that incarnation once for all was not complete; and that the offering up of this transubstantiated Christ in alleged sacrifice by a self-styled priesthood, as visibly imports that his offering of himself on the cross once for all was no valid and conclusive atonement. The repetition of the sacrifice as under Judaism is a confession of its incompetency; and the so-called elevation of the Saviour in the host is thus in truth his deepest degradation. His righteousness also, as the ground of justification, is fatally trenched on by the ascription to the Church of a treasury of merit, such as the supererogatory works

of saints; and thus, partly by the sacrificial repetition, or I had almost said travesty of His own work, and partly by the juxtaposition of the works of creatures with his, the glorious completeness of his divine atonement and obedience, as the essence of mediation and the basis of hope, is almost as entirely hid from view as in the systems of Rationalism.

Not less mournfully, perhaps even more so, is the *availableness* of Christ's mediation compromised in the Church of Rome. Something of the nature of a personal atonement is required in order to be interested in that of Christ; penance, fasts, austerities, bead-rolls of prayer here, and purgatorial fires hereafter. Further, justification is adjourned to a distant day, until the sinner be advanced in goodness; and in order to afford the possibility of a beginning and continuance of this development he must first come to the Church before he can reach the Saviour; and he can obtain the seed of grace which will grow up and issue in his justification through her sacramental rites alone. The most superficial observer can discern how utterly destructive this legal and ritual justification is of the free grace of the gospel; and will notice how extremes meet—the Rationalist recoiling from the cross as needless, and falling back on good works as *his* hope, the Romanist turning back from it as insufficient, and alighting upon the same make-shift, which is, indeed, the only resource of our blinded nature. Heathenism thus returns into Christianity under two kindred forms. The Rationalist says, 'Man must obey God for his own salvation;' the Romanist, 'Man must suffer for himself ere he can be saved.' The basis of the one is groundless confidence before God; the basis of the other is groundless fear before him; but they alike displace God's own scheme of mediation, and substitute for it, as a more effectual expedient, the efforts or the sufferings of man himself, thus recalling the weak and beggarly elements of paganism, which the appearance of Christ was designed forever to supersede and sweep away.

III. I now proceed to speak of Christianity in the *third* place as a system of *Morality*, and shall endeavor to be still more brief than under the foregoing heads. What man needs, and what the Bible presents, is a system of morality which shall begin with adequate correctives to man's felt depravity, which shall supply irresistible motives to obedience, and which shall present a

perfect rule or standard of excellence. The grand agent by whom depravity is corrected is the Holy Spirit. The grand motive to obedience is the love of Christ. The grand rule of perfection is the moral law, enjoining supreme love to God and equal love to man. None of these grand principles of evangelical Christianity but has suffered sore damage at the hands both of Rationalism and Superstition. Here I shall look at their effects simultaneously, and not as before, in succession.

The influence of the Holy Spirit as the only source of regenerate character, the only adequate corrective of man's fallen tendencies, has been almost universally denied or overlooked by a Rationalistic Christianity. It was so in the Pelagianism of the fourth century; and in that period of English Church history which preceded Methodism, and of Scottish Church history known by the name of Moderate, the same deplorable omission very generally prevailed. The Christian virtues were expected to grow upon the stock of nature; and any change corresponding to the Bible ideas of conversion, such as a new birth, a new creation, a resurrection from the dead, was decried as in the last degree, mystical, enthusiastic, and fanatical. Now this Bible mystery which Rationalism then sought to cut away, Romanism has unnaturally overlaid and exaggerated. The need of such a change is not denied in that Church; on the contrary it is insisted on; but then unhappily it is bound and tied down to the outward forms of the Church, more especially to baptism; and the dogma of baptismal regeneration is the result. It is not saying too much to affirm that this doctrine in all its parts, which arrogates for an apostolically descended priesthood the power infallibly to transmit the Holy Ghost by external channels, is as injurious a claim with regard to that blessed agent as the profession to transubstantiate bread and wine into the body and blood, soul and divinity of the Saviour is with regard to Christ. And the result here is the same as there, for superstition grasping at too much secures nothing; and as the bloodless sacrifice of the mass has no power to take away sins, as its own repetition shows, so the regeneration of water has no power to change the heart, as the absence of external fruits, and even the apostasy of persons thus regenerated notoriously testifies; and thus the likeliest effect of the *opus operatum*, the legerdemain of the spiritual magician, is to seal up its subjects in unregenerate

security. It is hard to say whether a regeneration disclaimed by Rationalism, or a regeneration materialized by Superstition, is the most injurious misreading of pure Christianity. The same remarks apply to all the other sacraments of the Church of Rome, in which the grace of the Holy Spirit, admitted in words, is ignored in practice, and a meaningless external ceremony called a sacrament, which renews nothing, corrects nothing, is dignified with the name of a channel of sanctification.

The influences of the Spirit, in their genuine sense, being thus abstracted from Christianity, *its motives to holiness* fare no better. The grand and stupendous motive of gratitude which runs through the whole Bible, and is expressed in the words, "We love him, because he first loved us," has almost no place, either in Rationalism or Romanism. Rationalistic Christianity can only expatiate on the dignity of virtue, the prospect of reward, the certainty of punishment, and other weak and inefficient commonplaces of pagan ethics, or at best borrow some gleams of light and warmth from the example and human sympathy of the Saviour, which shed over the wintry scene nothing better than the glow of a December sun, and cannot break up its frost-bound rigors. While, on the other hand, Romanism, though admitting the Saviour's work on the cross, and even in its hymns celebrating his love, places its votaries at such a distance from its warm breath, behind the freezing barrier of Church rites and works of righteousness, that the impression of gratitude is too faint to melt the heart, and is speedily overcome by the severities of penance, the terrors of purgatory, and the gloom of judgment, which speak a pardon not yet bestowed, a heaven not yet opened up by the shedding of Christ's blood. The fatal postponement of justification in the Romish system is destructive of grateful and childlike obedience. We all know what Luther and others made of the keeping of the law, when under this *regime* of bondage; and it must be affirmed that the Rationalist's legal hope, and the Romanist's legal terror, are equally destructive of the loving, confiding impulses of true Christian morality. The confession and absolution, too, of the Romish Church turn away the gratitude and confidence of her members from Christ to the priesthood; and as there is no direct contact with a holy God in these exercises, their effect, so far from being sanctifying, as all experience testifies, is demoralizing,

and relaxes even the hold of the other motives which Romanism still retains.

Look now here once more at the influence of the two false principles on the *moral standard* of Christianity. The tendency of rationalized Christianity has always been to bend the rigidity of the law into accommodation to human weakness. It is no paradox that those divines who have most exalted morality as the alpha and omega of Christianity, have taught a lower morality than the fanatics and enthusiasts who drew their inspiration from the cross. The duties of man to man have been exalted, while the duties of man to God have been forgotten; and these moral systems have decided many questions of casuistry with a dangerous laxness, which would have been impossible under the light of that awful revelation which comes from Calvary, and under the prompting of that finer moral instinct which is formed in the soul by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Romanism presents, at first sight, a totally opposite spectacle. There is in this religion an apparent renunciation of all terms with the flesh, and an absolute victory over it, as we see in the whole monastic system of mortification and seclusion from the world, together with the vows of celibacy, poverty, and obedience; and the entire doctrine of saintly perfection and works of supererogation looks at first blush like the very chivalry of virtue—the moral law carried forward to its heroic and golden age. But alas! we find here as everywhere else in the history of superstition, that excess in one quarter implies defect in another. The laity—the vulgar, for whom no such sublime standard is erected—are permitted to rely on the vicarious morality of the saints and the perfected, or more than perfected, ones; and thus the unity of the moral law, which demands perfect obedience from all, is destroyed; and further, human nature, unable to sustain itself at the sublime hight to which it is carried, falls back into the abyss, and, as the abuses of the monastic system and of enforced celibacy too well attest, the apparent victory over nature ends in a more humiliating defeat. After all, the higher stages of virtue in the Church of Rome are purely imaginary. Works of supererogation cannot exist. It is impossible to pay to God or to man more love than the law demands; and the very idea that God can be satisfied with less than perfection introduces a fatal laxity into the whole moral system, so that here, as at so many

other points the exaggerations of Superstition and the extenuations of Rationalism conspire to one result. I will not, indeed, charge on the *superstition* alone of the Church of Rome the melancholy perversions of *morality*, which we find in the *policy* of that Church, such as, that the end sanctions the means, that no faith is to be kept with heretics, and that the interests of the Church are paramount to all other laws and obligations. These are the results of worldliness rather than of superstition. Only it cannot be denied that superstition, turning away attention from simple duties to self-imposed forms, making virtues which God never made, setting up one rule for the laity and another for the priesthood, and teaching that the perfections of one class in some sense cover the shortcomings of another—does thereby confound all right moral distinction, and opens a door to excesses and atrocities under the mask of religion, which paganism never equalled, and which make the annals of Rome's supremacy, and still more of her contests for preeminence, one of the darkest pages in the moral history of the world.

IV. In a few words, I shall complete this sketch by turning your attention to the action of Rationalism and Superstition upon Christianity considered as a system of *association* or *fellowship*. Christianity is not a religion of isolated units, but of masses. Man's nature demands a social religion; and Christianity is the most social of all religions, because it has the noblest center of attraction, and the most glorious power of gathering all around that center. The Bible settles *three* great vital questions in regard to the Christian society: Who shall belong to it, which is the question of discipline; What shall be the relation of its members to one another, which is the question of office or government; and what their union shall consist in, which is the question of worship. A single glance will show how seriously here, as everywhere, the fundamental arrangements of Christianity have been encroached on or subverted.

Take *first* the question of *discipline*. Christianity requires all saved persons to make a visible profession of their Christianity by joining the Christian society, and ordains that none who appear to be saved shall be excluded. This is the unity of the visible Church, resting on, and pre-supposing the deeper unity of the invisible. Now Rationalism attacks in many cases this position of the need of a visible Church. It is satisfied with silent

conviction, and recoils from connection with any external society, despising forms and positive ordinances, and exalting the invisible at the expense of the visible. This has been, in all ages, the danger of philosophizing Christians. In this spirit the Unitarians, and to some extent the Friends, otherwise remote enough from them, unite; and of late the Plymouth Brethren have arisen to make this their watchword, and to preach the demolition of the visible Church, as everywhere in a state of apostasy. On the other hand, the Church of Rome, with the uniform tendency of superstition to materialize everything, and to incorporate and intertwine the external and internal, identifies the visible Church with the invisible, and denies in effect that there are Christians before there is a visible Church. Hence men do not enter the visible Church because they are Christians, but enter it to become so; and, as a necessary consequence, there is no salvation out of the pale of the Romish Church, and certain salvation to all who remain in her communion, and do not obstruct the efficacy of her rites by mortal sin. The tremendous responsibility thus resting upon the visible Church which has falsely claimed to be the only birthplace of souls, instead of the nurse of souls already born from above, acting upon the fears of Superstition, has led the visible Church to claim such prerogatives as would guarantee salvation, viz., infallibility, sacramental efficacy, and exclusive catholicity. Otherwise there might be saints beyond the pale of the visible Church, or unsaved persons left within it, both of which alternatives were excluded by the supposition. This superstitious exaltation of the visible Church as that to which all true Christians must *belong*, soon changed to the formula as that by which all true Christians must be *made*, is the first fatal error of Romanism, as a Church—an error generated before Romanism was formed into a system, an error as old as Cyprian in the end of the third century, but which soon developed itself into full-grown Popery, with its exclusiveness, its false uniformity, its assumption of the divine prerogative to bind and to loose, to shut and to open, not the door of communion on earth only, but what on this theory comes to the same thing, the gate of the kingdom of heaven. Thus while Rationalism slights the visible Church, Superstition all but deifies it; and both miss its grand ends—to rally Christians together round a common standard, to display their union to the world, and to enable them to watch over each other's souls, and to walk in love in so far as they are agreed.

Take now the nearly allied question of *office*, or the relation of the members of the Church to one another. According to pure Christianity office rests on spiritual gifts, and is simply the exercise of these, with the consent of the Christian society, for mutual edification. Order and liberty are harmonized in willing subjection to the appointment of Christ, the only head and ruler of His Church. It is the tendency of Rationalism to set aside the appointments of Christ in these matters, to adjust or create offices according to a fancied expediency, or even to hand them over to the control of a worldly power, in return for certain apparent advantages, to the detriment or destruction of the free self-agency of the Christian body, according to the laws of Christ. The extreme of this is Erastianism, and I use the word in no party sense, believing that enlightened Christians everywhere desire to repudiate the thing, though they differ as to what should be called by the name. Here, again, Romanism exalts, and, by exalting, corrupts, what is essential in Church-office. It is led to this extreme by the doctrine of the visible Church, just developed. The visible Church indeed might wield all its tremendous prerogatives without having any special office-bearers, or at least any permanent ones, like a Committee of Public Safety, which changed its members from time to time. But superstition eagerly lays hold of what is tangible and palpable; and, as the Christian Church began with the apostles, succeeding office-bearers were exalted to their rank; the decent form of ordination was transmuted into a magical rite believed to transmit supernatural virtue, and a priesthood thus arose qualified, as the representatives of God, to dispense the salvation which could alone be found in connection with the visible Church. The superstition of the multitude was wrought upon by representing connection with the Church as connection with these office-bearers; and as the unity ascribed to the Church required a center in the eyes of superstition to which it might cling as with a death-grasp, the Bishop of Rome, partly from the misunderstood words of our Lord to Peter, and partly from the influence of the metropolis of the world, in which he had his seat, became the vicar of Christ on earth, and that spiritual despotism was consolidated, which made him and his successors the uppermost links in a grand electric chain of spiritual despotism which sent its vibrations through the heart of every slave of superstition to the extremities of the earth, and was believed to extend also to heaven

and hell and the imaginary region that lay between. Thus while Rationalism has slighted Church office, and left it to be tampered with by foreign powers, Romanism has despotically magnified it, so as to transform it from a ministry into a saving priesthood; at once subverting the prerogatives of Christ, and lording it over his heritage.

Look, finally, to the *worship* of the Church, as exhibiting another field for the agency of these corrupting influences. Christian worship is the expression of devotional feelings to God, and the exhibition of his truth to the world in certain forms appointed by himself, so as to secure the strengthening of right principles in Christians, and the extension of them to others. Rationalism, little alive to the value of such worship, has tended to discourage it by the coldness of its tone, has frowned upon its frequency and fervor, and in some cases mutilated its parts; as, for example, by denying the permanent obligation of baptism and the Lord's supper, or of the day on which Christian worship is commonly conducted. The Church of Rome, again as before, exalts worship so as to transform and destroy its character. It is not only a means of grace, but, certain extreme contingencies guarded against, the certain channel of grace. To take part in the sacrifice of the mass, the beginning and middle and end of Romish worship, is to perform a saving act. And hence superstition employs in this service all that is imposing and gorgeous to work upon its own feelings, and make itself believe its own illusion. The religious shadow of temples, with the dim light of tapers, the slow and measured movements of priests, the waving of censers, the tinkling of bells, the chanting of solemn music, with the pealing depth of the organ, the awe-struck prostration of every knee, while the symbol of a present deity is raised on high,—all this, in minds prepossessed from their infancy in favor of these rites, must make a strong impression on the sense and imagination, and the natural religious sensibilities, which is almost certain to be mistaken for pure devotion, the more especially that it may contain some better elements. Though the prayers are in an unknown tongue, it too is looked on as sacred and the tongue of the whole Catholic Church; and, muttered as they are and inaudible to the ear of the worshipper, they are the utterances of mighty and awful beings who have power with God, whose incantations can liberate the dead from penal fires, and whose words of benediction

can blot out the darkest sins of the living, not only from the records of conscience, but from the judgment-books of God. Alas! this splendid shadow! to a superstitious temperament, how fascinating! what is it but the fabric of a vision, or rather a phantasmagoria, only too grateful to those fallen beings whose interest it is to intercept the personal, intelligent, saving communion of the souls of men with Him who will save men only by light and knowledge, and who, as a Spirit, must be worshipped in spirit and in truth! Thus, again, Romanism, like Rationalism, misses its aim in worship. The one expects little, and is not disappointed; the other expects much, unspeakably too much, for, seeking it at the altar, and not at the Bible and the Throne of grace, it stumbles on amid the gloom and shadows of a worse than Levitical economy, and never attains the deep and hallowed joy of those who draw nigh to God 'with a true heart, in full assurance of faith, having their hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and their bodies washed with pure water.'

I have thus endeavored, in a very cursory, and, I am afraid, a too general manner, to survey somewhat of the vast field embraced in my subject. I could add many general reflections of a practical nature, of which the topic before me is very suggestive. I shall content myself with two.

First, Let us beware of supposing that Rationalism and Superstition are confined to any school of divines, whether in Germany or England on the one hand, or to Papal countries on the other. Every one of us is naturally a Rationalist or a Romanist, or a compound of both; and though we may fancy ourselves perfectly free from it, there is too much of the old leaven still clinging to us all. I cannot enter into the high denunciatory strain in which Rationalism and Popery have sometimes been attacked, as if they were not so much the sins and errors of men as the works of incarnate demons, which can only be traced to deliberate irreverence, lying, or priestcraft on the part of their abettors. This shows great ignorance of ourselves; great want of fairness and charity towards our erring brethren! There may be, and I fear is, much perversity in Rationalism, much priestcraft and conscious tyranny in Romanism. Where these are apparent, let us not shrink from condemning them in appropriate terms, after the example of Him who spared neither Sadducee nor Pharisee. But let us also think of the pride and unbelief of our own minds, and of our own difficulties in embracing some of the doctrines of

Christianity; and let us charitably believe that the Rationalism of not a few may be the ascendancy of similar difficulties not yet in their minds overcome. Let us think of the formalism of our own spirits—of our readiness to trust in external things, in rites, in sacraments, in church privileges—of our remaining distrust of God's love and free grace in Christ; and let us charitably think that the Romanism of not a few may be the lingering effect of similar tendencies, in them more powerful, or from which the Spirit of God has not yet set them free. Let us testify against both evils, loudly and earnestly as we will; but let us speak the truth in love, and in the spirit of Him whose words should never be forgotten—'They know not what they do.' Let the melting tones of compassion and prayer be mingled with the stern controversies of the times in which we live; and then the witness we bear will not be less acceptable to God, nor less effectual in reclaiming those who are ignorant and out of the way.

Secondly, It is only by the establishment of God's truth that Rationalism and Superstition can be finally overthrown. As I have already remarked, though mutually repellent, these antagonist powers are not mutually destructive. Errors never totally obliterate each other. That is the prerogative only of truth. It was confidently stated in the end of the last century that infidelity had conclusively abolished Popery; but many have lived to see the formidable reaction which belies all such expectations; and if any imagine that Popery has now materially diminished the infidelity of the Continent by way of reprisals, they will be equally mistaken. In our own country, as on the Continent, no conclusive victory is to be gained by fighting the battle against Popery with the weapons of mere negation and protest, with such sarcasms of journalists, and scoffs and mockeries of our lighter literature, as were current during the Papal aggression, and are revived in the present contest with Ultramontanism. These may do valuable political service, may even expel religious error for a time; but they will not generate Christian faith; they will not keep the door shut against the return of superstition. Nothing will cure the inevitable tendency of superstitious minds to relapse into error but the pre-occupation and satisfaction of their hearts with the truth; and if a wide and prayerful diffusion of gospel truth is not attempted in the present struggle against Popery, the tactics of its political antagonists may be triumphant, and we may even seem to overrun the enemy's country and level

his strongholds; but we shall make no stable conquests. Those who expect the downfall of Popery from political combinations and unbelieving reactions against it, without relying on the Bible and the missionary, will once more be disappointed; and if we wish at last to succeed, we must strive to convert the political recoil of France and Italy into a vital, earnest, and insuppressible religious reformation. Let us cherish interest also in that reaction against Rationalistic Protestantism which has been for years extending itself both in France and Germany. Let us pray for the spread, in the National Churches of these lands, of the revived evangelism which is returning after many aberrations, not only to the Incarnate Word, but what is more to the written Word; and seek that the difficulties which the revival is encountering in the land of Luther from a revived sacramentalism and superstition, may also be overcome. Let the Churches of Britain be also prepared for those contests with unbelief at home which have come so unexpectedly upon themselves, and which are so bravely waged by a multitude of loyal defenders of the faith in that Anglican Church where they have begun; and let them not only strive to conquer in the field of argument, which is comparatively easy, since the champions of Rationalism can only build up their counterfeit temple like Julian out of its own repeatedly blasted ruins, but let them aspire to the more difficult success of reproducing the moral signs and wonders of the Bible before men's eyes, in works of faith and labors of love, which shall prove that the presence of Israel's God is in the midst of us, a pillar of heaven-descended glory, and not an emanation of the desert in which it moves. Thus shall we be equipped in the armor of righteousness on the right hand and the left, and shall not only guard our own lines, but bear the standard of salvation into new territories; and whatever be the future struggles and reactions of Rationalism and Superstition, and of that kingdom of darkness and error which is wide enough and catholic enough to comprehend them both, we shall at least do something to accelerate their downfall, and to introduce a happier age, when these shadows shall not as now be cast far and wide over the field of living experience, but shall be reflected only from the dim and fading page of Church history, as the mists and vapors of morning, which the gathering light and heat of pure Christianity has at length dispersed and chased away.

II.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY AS AN INDUCTIVE SCIENCE.*

There are few things which have been more keenly debated than the value of what has been called "Systematic Theology." Yet one thing is certain—that there is scarcely any study on which so much thought and learning, time and toil have been expended. If all the ponderous tomes, in which theologians have endeavored to arrange in methodical form and logical dependence the dogmas of their several systems, were built into a pyramid—with such solid slabs as the "Summa Theologiæ" of the redoubted Thomas Aquinas for the base, and the last attenuated epitomes of Rationalistic "Dogmatik" for the apex—we should stand aghast at the prodigious pile. It would be a formidable looking fabric if only a single copy of each work contributed to it; but if all the copies of all the editions were incorporated into it, the pyramid of Cheops itself would dwindle beside that enormous structure of paper rubble and dead men's brains.

And perhaps not a few would say that, as it would rival any of the pyramids in magnitude, so none of these last could be of less practical value; their interior inscribed with hieroglyphics more hopelessly dark, or filled with more exquisite specimens of mummy. Be this as it may, such enormous expenditure of ingenuity and patient, persevering toil proves, at least, the strong attraction which the subject must have had for the minds of men. Nor, even if such prodigality of thought and labor were (as far as we could see) thrown away, would it be possible to gaze on so many thousands of cubical feet of printed thought, and remember how each sentence, which enters into it, must have been slowly elaborated, and set in its place with toilsome effort, without feelings akin to those with which we look on some huge coral reef—the enormous solid structure of the tiny architects, whose ephemeral life and feeble powers seem so out of all proportion to the magnitude of their Cyclopean works.

But there is also another thought which suggests itself as we gaze in fancy on this pyramid of books. Whence came they? What evoked them all? What led such a multitude of men to spend laborious days and nights in this manufacture of "systematic" or "dogmatic" theologies? It is strange, yet true, that —though the writers have too often well nigh forgotten the

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avowed source of their own lifelong toils, and the limits of speculation which it should have imposed upon them—the germ of all this prodigious activity was one little book, not a tenth of the size of these gigantic tomes to which it thus gave birth: that is—the Bible.

"How is this?" one is ready to ask. Surely, if there were no other evidence that the Bible cannot rank with any other book and that it is vain for men to try to reduce it to that level, this alone would be sufficient proof of it. Either that book is altogether unlike other books, and exerts a spell which no other book can, or mankind must surely be mad.

Perhaps it may be said by some—even by some of those who take the former of these alternatives—that though this prodigious number of books were all evoked by the Bible, yet most of them make such preposterous additions to it, or wander into such deviations from it, that, if they could be got together in one heap, the best thing to be done would be to invite a second Caliph Omar to make combustion of this theological Alexandrian—simply applying his one concise critical canon in favor of the Bible instead of the Koran: "Either these books contain what is in the Bible, from which they are professedly drawn, or they do not; if they do, they are needless; if they do not, they are pernicious."

Few, however, would be prepared to go this length. And for ourselves, so far from sympathizing with the indiscriminate outcry, often made against systematic theology, we believe that whether it be useful or pernicious must depend entirely on the definition given of it, the limits assigned to it, and the principles on which it is prosecuted. To all who admit the Bible to *be*, or even (according to the distinction of a modern school) only to *contain* a Divine revelation, we do not think it difficult to show that a legitimate systematic theology (in spite of much modern clamor against it) is a most legitimate branch of inductive science, and of the highest value not only to every Christian minister, but to every private Christian in proportion as he may have leisure or means to study it.

With one class, indeed, of modern objectors, and whose clamors against systematic theology are loudest, it were vain to argue—those, we mean, whose theory of the Bible makes any such study at once superfluous and impossible; whose excisions and rejections are such that there remains no more material for "systematic theology;" who reject summarily all the supernat-

ural, whether miracle or prophecy; who reject all the dogmas which discriminate Christianity from every other religion; who (thus far only certain) leave in avowed and, indeed, desired doubt the facts of apostolic history and the traits of apostolic doctrine. It is not wonderful that these should exclaim against systematic theology. Having reduced the Bible itself to a chaos, it is not surprising that they should deny that anything systematic can be evoked out of it.

But if those who acknowledge the Bible to be or to contain the revealed Word of God differ in their opinion of the value of this species of theology, if some depreciate it and others contend for its importance, this in all probability arises from their looking on the same thing under different aspects—on the "golden and silver sides of the same shield," like the two knights in the fable. In one sense, we should contend as heartily as any for the futility of all systematic theology; and in another, and as we deem more just conception of it, we should be disposed to say it is not easy to exaggerate its value and importance, or to see what reason any man can have for quarreling with it.

Sometimes what has been been vaguely called "systematic theology," has been supposed to aspire to the determination, at least *probable* determination, of many of those transcendental mysteries which at last inevitably encounter us in the field alike of philosophy and religion; and of religion, whether natural or revealed: mysteries involved in the very conceptions, all inadequate, to which theology introduces us. An Infinite Spirit; His inscrutable essence and attributes; His universal government, extending over all worlds—how can these but be transcendental subjects of speculations to creatures of such limited faculties as ourselves? If then it be the supposed province of systematic theology to determine such questions as the *modes* of the Divine existence—the origin and permission of evil under the government of such a Being—the harmony between Divine prescience and human freedom, and numberless other mysteries (which so far from puzzling theology alone, are equally puzzling to philosophy also, and have from the earliest times exercised man's fruitless ingenuity), we must think systematic theology to be an impossible vanity. All that is given to man—philosopher or theologian—to do in relation to most of such questions as the above, is modestly to *conjecture:* and in relation to many of them, if we would be

modest indeed, not even to do that. It is, we admit, no more possible to construct a satisfactory theology than it has been found to construct a coherent philosophy, on these transcendental subjects; into the presence of which, as already said, we are at last inevitably brought, in whatever direction we speculate—in philosophy, whether physical or moral; in theology, whether natural or revealed.

Again; if, confining the province of theology to the volume of Revelation, it be pretended that it is the office and prerogative of "systematic theology" to give the *rationale* of all the mysterious facts contained in it, or even *fully* to develop its transient glimpses, its partial segments of great truths into perfectly defined shapes and symmetrical forms, it were equally justice to call "systematic theology" a vain and visionary science. In the volumes of Revelation and Nature we see (as in so many other respects, so here also,) a close and instructive analogy. We are adequately assured of certain facts; but as to the theory of those facts, their relations to one another, or their harmony with one another, we are often left to conjecture and dispute. Nay, many of the great mysteries in both volumes are of the very same nature and order, only presented under another aspect. The origin of evil, for example, lies in as deep a shadow in the Bible as in the volume of Nature; the inscrutable character of God—the veil which shrouds the essence of the Infinite Intelligence—His modes of existence and operation—are just as impenetrable as are those modifications of the Divine Essence, which Revelation obliquely discloses to us; while all the difficulties connected with the controversy (ancient as human speculation) respecting liberty and necessity find their counterpart in those which are implicated with the mysteries of grace and free will. *Facts*, some of them seemingly paradoxical, and the *nexus*, the harmony which we vainly try to explore, are made out legitimately in both departments; but their *rationale* singly, and their theoretical harmony, one with another, lie beyond us. And no wonder; for in both cases the truths revealed to us have their roots implicated with deeper and more general truths, with other and "secret things that belong to God." We see but small segments of a vast plan. We are in the condition of the old astronomers, who thought the earth fixed in space and the heavens revolving round it. Viewing the planets from this false centre, they

thought these orbs strangely erratic; now swift, now slow, now advancing, now stationary, now retrograde; but when once they adopted the true theory and viewed their motions from the true centre, the Sun, it was seen that all these illusions vanished; it was seen that the planets neither paused nor went back, nor strayed from their path, but moved all in one direction and in their appointed orbits, with that perfect regularity which justifies those beautiful metaphors which speak of the "mystic dance" of heaven and the "music of the spheres."

Sometimes a truth seems, as it were, revealed only incidentally, and because some knowledge of it could not but be involved, and therefore partially unveiled, as a condition of revealing something else. This seems to be the case with the fact of some threefold distinction in the Divine Essence, to which we give the inadequate name of the "Trinity," and perhaps with other facts connected with the Divine attributes and operations, of which we catch only glimpses in the process of revealing to us the designs and method of God's love to us. The clouds which otherwise worthily conceal those *arcana* which it is the glory of God to conceal, are partially lifted aside in making us acquainted with those blessed truths "which belong to us and to our children;" else they had been still concealed. Sometimes, again, a fact is revealed, merely as such, while the mode is utterly impenetrable; as, for example, the fact of the resurrection. We might easily multiply illustrations, but it is needless. In a word, the attempt to give complete logical development and logical symmetry to the facts of Revelation, would be to trace a vast edifice, of which only certain detached parts were open to our inspection, or to lay down a perfect chart of a country, when the fountains of its rivers lie remote in untracked deserts, and the summits of the mountains are enveloped in perpetual cloud.

If, therefore, by systematic theology, be meant a theology which attempts such impossible achievements, we may well admit that it can exist only in name.

It must be also conceded that, as theology has been too often prosecuted, by those who have compiled what are called "systems," from the days of the Fathers and the schoolmen down to our own, there has been but too much reason for the reproaches that have been cast upon it. The presumption and the curiosity, the pride and impatience of the human intellect,

in all parts of the Church, and in every age, have too often beguiled theologians (but not theologians alone, philosophers just as much) to speculate in realms inaccessible to our approach; to guess where we cannot know; to show the reason of ultimate facts instead of humbly acquiescing in them; to essay the demonstration of the undemonstrable, and the solution of the insoluble. Nothing, indeed, but innocent intention on the part of the authors can protect, from the charge of blasphemy and impiety, a thousand dissertations, which offer crude and foolish explications of the most tremendous problems. It is impossible to read many of the audacious speculations, in which men have indulged respecting the Divine Essence, its mode of existence and operation, the relations of the Persons of the Godhead, the constitution of Christ's Person, the Divine decrees, and other equally impenetrable themes, without shuddering as if we saw a Jew prying into the ark, or lifting the veil of the "holy of holies" to gaze with presumptuous eyes on the light of the Shekinah. Their authors have the excuse which may be extended to many of the writers of the old "dramatic mysteries," that they did not *intend* to burlesque sacred "subjects." But that is all the apology that charity can make for them.

It is in the Schoolmen that we find such questions in the greatest excess, as they also adventured into all sorts of discussions on other subjects not less intractable, though less presumptuous. With their license, indeed, of *assuming* their principles, metaphysical and physical, from which they then deduced their logical conclusions, what could withstand their powers of analysis? What could escape the subtlety of those "seraphic," "angelical" and "irrefragable doctors?" They were equally at home, whether they chose to expatiate on the constitution of the celestial hierarchies or the nature of the beatific vision, or the relation of a pure spirit to local extension; or contented themselves with the humbler achievement of laboriously proving (as one of them did) "That things possible and things impossible are not the same;" or, as one of their satirists represents them, discussing "how many angels can stand on the point of a needle;"* or the subtle question, "Whether besides the real

* This is simply a ludicrous form of, not one, but several subtle questions (substantially the same), which Aquinas discussed, in all sober seriousness, in that enormously voluminous "Angelography"—extending through forty or fifty huge and

being of actual being, there be any other being necessary to cause a thing to be?" There is no question whatever, which by *their* method would seem beyond determination—unless, indeed, it had been this: "How came such foolish dreams as they often indulged in, to enter human heads except when on their pillows?"

But though such discussions were most abundant in the scholastic theologians, their example was an evil legacy to after-times; and long after the Bible had been drawn out of "the dusty corners" (as Milton has it) "to which profane falsehood" had consigned it, the same habit of presumptuous speculation to a great extent continued, and infested multitudes of the tomes of systematic theology, of Protestant no less than Catholic divines. A great part, in truth, of the labor of succeeding theologians has been to cart away these oppresive loads of misapplied subtlety and learning—if we ought not rather to say of folly and ignorance; to shuffle off the "mortal coil" in which they had swathed and all but suffocated God's truth. The recovering of a genuine Biblical theology has been like the exhumation of some beautiful

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closely printed folio pages, into which his fertile logic is enabled to expand the few brief hints dropped in Scripture, as to the nature, powers, and functions of angelic beings. In several distinct and elaborate demonstrations does his invincible dialectic deal, not only with the questions as to whether more angels than one can occupy the same point of space, but with the equally subtle question, whether an angel can be present in two or more places. But perhaps the most amusing of all his discussions of this nature, are those in which he deals with the subject of guardian angels. Among other points, he undertakes to dispute as to whether the laborious official of the skies has his charge committed to him from *birth*, or only from *baptism;* and if previous to baptism, whether the arduous duty begins while the infant is yet in the womb of his mother. On the whole, he seems inclined to decide, in the last case (and no doubt there is economy in it), that there is not a separate guardian for mother and child, but that one tutelary angel may do for both. We would not, by these remarks on the vagaries of the scholastic theologians, be supposed to detract from the high intellectual qualities, profound knowledge, and astonishing deductive powers of many of these Titans of the Middle Ages. The gigantic shades of Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Anselm cannot pass before the imagination without inspiring a feeling of veneration. But the question here is not as to their genius, erudition, or industry, about which there is no dispute, but about the application of all these. We should be very sorry, indeed, to say of these men, as Pym said of Strafford, "That God had given them great talents, of which the Devil had given the application." But it may be safely said, that nature had given them vast resources, which a chimerical ambition and a frivolous subtlety too often perverted to worse than no purpose. In such cases, the greater the powers, the worse; for as Bacon says, "The swifter the runner, the further he will go wrong, if he sets out in the wrong direction."

antique statue from the sand which had long buried it; or the uncovering of some piece of exquisite tessellation from the accumulated rubbish of ages. When we find, for example, a Protestant divine, like Whitside, so devout, so childlike, so calm, so learned, determining (because he would give *system* to his work on the "Covenants") that the "sacraments," even to Jesus Christ, "as a man, were seals of the Covenant, and *augmented* His confidence in the Father's promises," instead of resting content with our Saviour's simple declaration at his baptism, that by sweet submission in this and in all things it became him to give us a "perfect pattern," and to "fulfill all righteousness;" when we find the same theologian deciding against certain other divines, equal in learned extravagance, that the mystery of the Trinity was certainly known to Adam in the state of innocence; and deciding with scarcely a doubt, that the world was created at the period of the autumnal equinox,—a proposition which it is really impossible even for an Irishman to comprehend;—when we see such a man thus dealing with points which it is impossible for man to deal with at all, or which, if he could deal with them, are, like this last, too frivolous to be dealt with, we may easily conceive what would be done by men of less ability, learning, and modesty. Nor is it, in truth, easy, except we have some familiarity with theological literature, to believe to how great an extent a more correct theology has consisted in *unlearning*, an art no less difficult, as human nature is constituted, than that of *learning:* or how much, after reading many a prodigious tome of ancient theology, it should be our first business to—forget.

Nevertheless, we have no scruple in saying, that there is ample place for a theology worthy of being called "systematic," the claims of which, it may be feared, in these latter days, and in part as a natural reaction against the presumption and frivolity of the older systems, have been too much neglected. It is a theology called "systematic," not because it can often demonstrate *a priori* the truth of its articles, nor reduce them to one perfect and symmetrical logical system, nor exactly trace their implications with one another and with *other* truths of which the source is hidden from us; but because it is "systematic" in the sense in which "astronomy," or "chemistry," or "geology," or any other of the sciences of "instruction" are so, to all which the same objections apply:—that is, as astronomy or chemistry is a systematized

view of certain classes of facts in the external world, whether a perfect *rationale* of these facts can be given or not (generally it cannot), so systematic theology is a systematized view of the facts respecting God and our relations to Him; and a systematic *Christian* theology is such a view, obtained by induction, of the substantial contents of Revelation. Chemistry, like theology, does not prove its principles *a priori;* and, like theology, it finds no lack of inexplicable mysteries when it proceeds to consider the ultimate facts it discovers, in relation to the *unknown* properties of matter with which they stand connected: its most searching analysis still leaves it in utter darkness with respect to the molecular structure of matter, and in little less as regards the *rationale* of the facts of chemical affinities. Still, it is a systematic exhibition of certain classes of phenomena, and of unspeakable value as far as it goes; and it is much the same with theology.

There is a strict analogy, relatively to us, between the forms in which God presents us with the products of His wisdom and goodness, whether in the volume of Nature or of Revelation; as also in the conditions under which, in either case, He teaches us, His feeble creatures—for our own improvement—slowly to spell out and piece together the alphabet of that highly complex language in which His manifold wisdom speaks to us. The *immediate* end of all His works and of His word is practical; and therefore the phenomena co-exist in all sorts of intricate combination. Science may be made *out* of them, but they were not *primarily* made for science. Thus, in the external world, the obvious practical ends answered by it required that the phenomena which form the many sciences of human analysis, and which must be submitted piecemeal to man's microscopic eye, should exist inextricably intermingled, and in the closest juxtaposition. If the phenomena of astronomy, of botany, of chemistry, of geology, and so on, existed apart,—if, indeed, we could imagine such a thing,—the life, the order, the beauty of the universe would be at an end; it would be turned into a museum, and we ourselves, if we existed at all there, could only exist in our *elements*, inclosed in boxes and bottles, exhibiting the lamentable trophies of analysis; or, if we existed entire, could exist only as fossil remains,—the *specimens*, and not the *spectators*, in that scientific chaos. Nevertheless, it is necessary, from the limited nature of man's intellect, if he is to have the benefit of science at

all, to take the separate classes of these phenomena, as if they existed apart, and observe, insulate, and systematize them into the sciences. It is even so with the Bible: the complexity and the infinitely varied and intermingled character of its contents are worthy of the complicated and diverse purposes for which it was constructed by Him who intended it to be, not simply a perspicuous, logical abstract of the great truths which constitute its essential value as a revelation to guilty man, but an exhibition of those truths in forms in every way adapted to minister to the spiritual wants and aspirations of universal humanity; the Book of all time and of every land; which was to be adapted to all the faculties of human nature, and all the intellectual and moral varieties in individual men; capable of arresting, not the intellect alone, but the memory, the imagination, the affections, and the heart; which was to contain spiritual aliment for the wisest and the weakest among us,—wisdom here so profound that the deepest intellect cannot exhaust it; there, so easy that the child cannot miss it; aphorisms which may well employ the meditative powers of a Bacon, or a Pascal, and poetry which could kindle the fancy of a Milton; parables which even Bunyan's allegories cannot equal; and narratives forming such a picture of human life that the learned and the ignorant, the rude and the polished, age and childhood, the happy and the sorrowful, may hang over them with equal delight, as they see reflected in that mirror the image of their own various nature, and the methods of Divine Providence in dealing with it; narratives so diversified that hardly a human being can be placed in circumstances to which he cannot find a parallel in that storehouse of touching and most instructive examples. It was to be a Book which should exhibit the most various truths in the most various forms,—"line upon line, and precept upon precept,"—so as both to be its own best commentary, and bid defiance to any essential tampering and corruption; it was to be a Book which, over and above all this, should contain within itself, in its very structure, in its undesigned harmonies of part with part, and in remote coincidences with the history of that world with which its own is implicated, some of the very chief proofs of its own superhuman origin; and, lastly, which was to be composed in such a style (everywhere generically the same, while yet bearing the specific imprint of the different minds that were employed upon it) as to adapt itself with flexible ease to every dialect of man, and justify the saying

that, "while mortals have many languages, the immortals have but one."

No wonder that the Bible, if answering all this variety of ends, should, like the outward universe, be exceedingly complex in its structure, and various in its contents; and that these last, like those of the material world, should exist in seemingly glorious confusion. But it is confusion like that of Eden, where was every tree that was good for food, or that could minister to beauty and delight; not planted, we may be sure, with the stiff formality of a little Dutch garden, but as described in the glorious words of him who sang it as if he had seen it:—

> "Flowers worthy of Paradise,—which not nice art
> In beds and curious knots, but Nature boon
> Poured forth profuse on hill, and dale and plain,
> Both where the morning sun first warmly smote
> The open field, and where the unpierced shade
> Imbrowned the noontide hours."

Nevertheless, as it is absolutely necessary and infinitely useful to man, to consider the classes of external phenomena *as if* they existed apart, and systematize them into his sciences, so it is necessary and useful to the theologian to perform the same task in relation to the Scriptures; to analyze for himself its precise logical contents, modestly to trace their relations and coherence wherever and so far as he can, and to co-ordinate them with one another in their mutual relations; in a word, to elicit a system or fabric of truth from the analysis of the entire contents of Revelation. It is useful, indeed, to all men, in some tolerable measure, to have done this; but it is essential, we hesitate not to say, to him whose life-long task it is, to be the interpreter and expositor of the Word of God to his fellow-men. By this means only will he form a just idea of the *proportionate* importance of the various elements of Divine truth, and be able to preach it to his flock according to the analogy of the faith; to know the ratio, as regards frequency and prominence of exhibition, in which he is to insist on different topics,—a point of unspeakable importance; for we are never to forget that since one truth is the complement of another, and the limitation of it, it is possible to teach truth itself with all the results of error; possible to make men Antinomians by preaching only the unadulterated truth that "all salvation is of grace," and to make men Pharisees by preaching only the antagonistic truth that "faith without works is dead."

Again; in this way, and in this only, will the preacher be preserved from that very frequent and pernicious source of error which is found in a strained interpretation of some two or three texts, without considering in what way all other passages bearing on the same subject throw light upon them and limit them. And it was for this reason, as well as for others, that we said, a little while ago, that in our judgment the reaction against systematic theology, as a science of induction, has been mischievous. Complete abandonment of mind to exegesis *alone* has, we have no doubt, led to many transient errors and paradoxes, and to many a transient heresy too, which a wider comparison of the contents of Scripture would effectually have obviated. We would not be misunderstood. We hold as firmly as any can, that the genuine method of attaining a just Biblical theology is by *exegesis*—by the aid of the grammar and lexicon; by answering the question, "What is the *meaning* of this or that text?" interpreted not by our preconceived notions of the rational or the probable, but by the entire laws and usages of the language in which the words are written; and, for that reason, we have always thought that *exegesis*, though it holds of both, yet holds more nearly of *philology* than *theology*.

But when exegesis has done its proper work on the elements of theology, it is still necessary, if we would see how they are related and co-ordinated—how they limit and illustrate one another—that we should take these separate "polished stones," and see what fabric it is they compose; in other words, make an induction of the most important truths, and as viewed in their mutual relations and subordination, out of the contents of Scripture. If we would have a clear notion of the sum of the results, or the relations of one truth to another, this is necessary. Now the two processes are very distinct, though the one is the complement of the other, and they are both constantly exhibited in the treatment of secular literature. For example, after exegesis has done its utmost for every sentence in every dialogue of Plato, there would still remain the question, which has tasked the utmost energies of many a great thinker, "What is the entire system of philosophy which the diversified writings of the Greek philosopher were intended to propound?" And, in relation to *this* object, many an accomplished grammarian has proved but a sorry commentator.

Without this patient induction, the man of a few texts is apt

to be in the same position as the man who is prejudiced in his exegesis by the preconceptions of a narrow system of theology. Extremes meet; and both these men, in different ways, though for a similar reason—namely, the want of a comprehensive induction from Scripture—commit the same error, *i. e.*, they hastily look about for reasons which shall support a preconceived and partial hypothesis; and if texts look another way, every sort of adroit artifice or open violence of criticism—coaxing and the thumbscrew by turns—is exercised upon them, to break their refractory spirit, or bend them to compliance. But it is only as the key turns in all wards of the lock that we know it fits; and, in like manner, when the results of interpretation fairly quadrate with every Scripture statement on the same subject, then, and then alone, may we be perfectly satisfied with them.

It would be impossible, within the limits of this article, to enumerate, even in schedule, the doctrines which, in our judgment, constitute a system of genuine Biblical theology. But we firmly believe—and the most cursory inspection of very diverse "systems" of theology confirms the fact—that where the Scriptures are received in their integrity, where a considerable portion of them is not sponged out by a preliminary process of criticism, there is little difficulty in determining what are the cardinal articles of such a theology. These stand out, clear and luminous, from a fair induction of passages, whatever difficulty and obscurity may attend less important articles; and nothing avails to dim them but the breaking of the lamp in which they shine. We firmly believe in the proposition, that points are revealed in Scripture with a clearness proportioned to their importance, and that the most momentous can hardly be missed. And accordingly, in direct refutation of a recent diatribe, the object of which was to show that the interpretation of Scripture has been hitherto hopelessly discordant and contradictory—that the best thing to do is to forget the past, burn all systems and commentaries, and begin *de novo*—we find that, in the great majority of cases, the attempts to disengage, by fair induction, the contents of Scripture, exhibit approximate agreement in by far the most momentous articles. The great majority of systems, however they may differ in minor points, and however they may differ even in the complete theory of those in which they agree—however defective they may seem in the eyes of some, and however encumbered with unauthorized additions in the eyes of others—incontroverti-

bly maintain the great central *facts* (as we deem them) that "God was in *Christ* reconciling the world unto Himself;" that in Him we have the brightest mirror of Divine perfections—the reflection of the Divine glory full-orbed—but especially of those moral perfections about which the oracle of Nature is either ominously silent, or speaks only in whispers and faltering accents; or which are made known but doubtfully in the chequered light and shade of a world where the justice and mercy of God seem contending for the mastery, and often at variance both with themselves and with one another; that He came to dispel those shades, and to make known to us the Father in revelations "full of grace and truth;" and not only so, but (and above all) to exhibit these contending attributes in their fullest energy, as well as their brightest luster; to conciliate the claims of both by the voluntary oblation of Himself as "a sacrifice" and "propitiation" for the "sins of the world," and make perfect justice and perfect mercy equally victorious; and, lastly, that of the benefits of this stupendous invention, all may accept who will,—the only requisite being that confiding faith and thankful love which are evinced, as faith and love naturally will be, by trusting His "power to save," and gratefully "keeping His commandments." These, together with the personality of the Divine Spirit and His gracious offices—absolutely necessary for aiding us "in every good word and work," but freely offered to all who will accept them, and exerted in harmony with the laws of our moral nature, not in violation of them—are, as we believe the truths, that is *facts*, which makes the Gospel that which it professes to *mean* and to *be*, "glad tidings" to a creature who is full of guilt and sin, and, therefore, of fear and sorrow: truths which have ever arrested, and will ever arrest, the attention of guilty man in spite of the ten thousand prejudices, both of intellect and heart, which the Gospel encounters when it summons his acceptance of it; truths which, if they be retained in the New Testament, leave the *essence* of the Gospel still there luminous on its page, though subordinate truths may be mutilated or misunderstood; and which, if they be taken away, leave it a riddle-book of incoherencies in which language seems to be employed, not to convey thought, but to conceal it, and which must be systematically mistranslated before it can be understood!

There are two views of scripture according to which an inductive Biblical theology is possible; a third (as intimated at the com-

mencement of this article) in which it is inconceivable. The two first, with some minor differences, to which we shall refer presently, agree in accepting the Bible, the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, not only as containing *a* revelation somewhere and in some shape or other, of which different drafts, infinitely varied indeed, may be, and have been given by the boasted "verifying faculty"—for alas! what this man's verifying faculty verifies, that man's falsifies—not only *a* revelation hidden there, about as hopelessly as a needle in a bundle of hay, but *the* one revelation which is to be gathered by diligent efforts from a conscientious study of it as a whole, and as *substantially*, throughout, the word of God; having, of course its *more* important and *less* important parts, its comparatively trivial and its inestimably significant facts; but all of use as connected either with its structure, its evidence, its history, or its doctrine, and profitable for instruction, and for correction in some way or other; to be interpreted, therefore, when we have its undoubted text, with conscientious diligence, allowing each thing its due weight. In this light it is difficult to over-estimate the importance of this induction, for it is but the true extrication and methodical arrangement of the great truths which make up the whole counsel of God; in the order of their importance, and as inter-connected and inter-dependent.

We have used the word *substantially* above, because we do not intend to imply that every *iota* of the Bible, as we have it, is infallibly true. Even supposing it was originally so, it is not so now. God has given us no guarrantee that we ever heard of, that He would work a stupendous miracle, or rather an illimitable series of daily miracles through all ages, to secure the Bible from any of the ordinary sources of corruption which inevitably attend the transmission of ancient writings. And the huge accumulation of various readings, and manifest corruptions of small portions, show distinctly that He never designed to work any such miracles. Whatever causes therefore may have operated to obscure the text or corrupt some passages in Plato or Livy, we must expect to find casting similar shadows on the Bible; and so we find it. Of any such portions we are called upon, as in other cases, by an enlightened and patient criticism, to endeavor to recover the true text, though probably in some of them we never shall recover it. But, then, all literary history shows that that does not interfere with the just application of the words "substantially true" as applied to the entire Word of God. We know that such corrup-

tions and errors are always within very moderate limits, and that no man supposes he has not the substantial text of Livy or Tacitus on account of any such errors and corrections.

There is also another theory, which though we do not think it the most probable, nor free from liabilities to abuse, we acknowledge to be capable of being held with the entire reception of everything that can be considered substantial in the contents of the Scriptures, viz., that God may have permitted even the apostles to fall into minute errors of no real importance in their statement of facts. We do not advocate the theory indeed; but we admit a man may hold it, and yet receive everything that is essential to Christian faith. To many it may not seem *a priori* incredible that God may have permitted even those who were the revealers of His Will, in points not essentially connected with their message, to evince, since they were by nature fallible creatures, something less than infallibility; that He should allow the treasure which was, at all events, to be contained in earthen vessels, to retain some tinct of the receptacle to which it was committed. If this were so, it would be (it is argued) only in analogy with the general fact that God does suffer some remaining imperfections to attach to all the forms of good. We hesitate indeed, ourselves, to indorse such a theory, because we do not see sufficient proof of its truth, or sufficient necessity for embracing it in preference to the previously mentioned, and, as we deem it, better hypothesis. As we see that the discrepancies charged, on this theory, are for the most part very trivial and insignificant, so we do not know (as already said) the absolute limits to which error may have crept into particular texts in the course of transmission and transcription; and we *do* know that many of the alleged difficulties have been resolved, and many of the apparent contradictions reconciled by more extended research. From that we gather confidence to believe that others will be resolved if we have only patience to wait for further light, and we hold that it is our duty to wait with patience for it, without any absolute assertions on the subject. We think it more modest and reverential, not hastily to talk about the "blunders" of writers, respecting whom, all engaged in this controversy acknowledge that a Divine hand had been employed to mould them to His will, at all events to an indefinite extent; many of whose expressions, too, seem to claim an immunity from error in their statements, and whose writings are visibly impressed by many characteristics which belong to no other

book in the world. We see, as a matter of fact, that they have characteristics which, though in part *human*, are also mainly such as man,—but especially such men as the problem restricts us to,—never could have displayed. As we look at any, even the best, writings of the Fathers,—at any, even the best of the Apochryphal gospels,—at any, even the best of the remains of the Jewish mind of that day, we see plainly that those who produced them were no more capable of constructing any one of the Four Gospels, still less all four, than a savage could have built St. Paul's. Nay, we see that the most powerful minds of that age never achieved anything to be compared with these wonderful documents. We see, also, that while the New Testament abounds in characteristics which cannot attribute to the mere mind of man in any age, far less to the human mind in that, and least of all to such minds as belonged to the Jews of that day, it has exercised an influence such as no other document ever exercised, and triumphed over an amount of hostile criticism such as no other documents ever resisted. It does not, therefore, seem to us reverent, under such circumstances, nor in accordance with what the sacred writers seem to claim for themselves, to adopt such a solution as that of original "blunders," except under such a logical necessity as we cannot yet find. But that it is possible to hold such a theory without limits which leave every *important point* in the Gospel revelation secure, we have no manner of doubt. If it were *proved*, for instance, that the "old cloak which St. Paul says he had left at Troas was really left at Miletum, and that his memory had tripped, or if, by an inadvertence, Stephen said "Sychem," when he really meant another place, it is impossible to deny that, if the theory of the intrusion of error into the *original* documents, be confined to cases in which *such* discrepancies are found, the rejection of such passages could not make the smallest appreciable difference to the value of the New Testament; impossible to deny that if a man who held such a theory issued an expurgated edition of the volume, it would be to all intents and purposes the same as the *Textus Receptus*. But then it is essential that the theory should be applied honestly, and in exactly the same way as we apply the same principles to any other work. Now, what is our method in these cases? We reject that, and that alone, which we can *demonstrate* to palpable contradictions; things which not only appear to be so, but which no *hypothetical* or imaginary conditions can reconcile.

We thus eliminate small portions of nearly every historical work; but the substantial facts, all that are of importance, may remain just as they were. But if such minute errors were made an excuse for rejecting all the main facts of the history, the "substance" of it, all criticism would cry out against it; it would be felt to be extravagantly absurd. If, for example, it were pretended that the great events of English history were all problematical, because there are at each epoch and in every historian some minute discrepancies which no man can reconcile; it it were affirmed, because the story of Alfred's visit to the camp of the Danes, and that of his "burnt cakes," were probably myths, or mere fictions, that therefore it was doubtful whether he conquered the Danes at all, or whether the great events of his reign may not be rejected as myths too,—every one would protest against such skepticism. And, similarly, if it were argued that because the story of Cromwell's intended departure for the American colonies at so critical a period of his fortunes, or that of his being a profligate in youth, is perhaps fabulous, that therefore we cannot be sure that he ever became Protector, or achieved the other great things which are usually attributed to him, this would be felt by everybody to be an outrage on all historical criticism,—skepticism gone mad. But there is no danger of any work of ordinary history being so treated. It is only to the Scriptures, only to the historic portions of the Bible, that men apply any such curious canons of judgment: only here that minute errors (supposed, for argument's sake, to be demonstrated) are adduced for the purpose of diffusing general suspicion over the whole!

But if not content with such a theory—which, as we have admitted, may be and often is held within safe limits—a man says, as is often said in our day, and by those who yet will have it that they are Christians, that their "verifying faculty" is at liberty to reject as much of the Bible as it pleases; to proclaim its history full of errors and fables, its miracles inventions or myths, its *characteristic* doctrines all illusions of fanaticism; that Jesus Christ died, indeed, like other mortals, but that He never wrought a miracle in His life, and never rose again from the grave—then we admit that there is nothing left, out of which a Biblical inductive theology, in the sense we have been treating of it, can be constructed. Rather, every man is left at liberty, not to interpret revelation, but in reality to construct it for himself; and how variously men construct it, the thousand perfectly arbi-

trary theories which Rationalism has given us at the present day sufficiently show.

Yet it is sometimes urged, by those who thus nominally retain the Bible, though they reject everything in it that is characteristic; you mistake us and misapply your arguments. The old controversy with Infidelity is dead and buried; the arguments once used against it are in vain urged against us. We are Christians; we accept the Bible; we merely reject what our "verifying faculty" does not deem credible. Not Christians! Why, we only deny the supernatural—that miracles were ever wrought—that Jesus Christ, therefore, ever rose from the dead—that He died for the sins of men—that He ascended on high—that He will ever come to judgment. We deny only such incredible facts as these; and as to doctrine, we deny only those mystical dogmas which Paul and John taught; doctrines which we do not deny they taught, but simply think they were doting when they taught them. But do we deny the *moral* doctrines? Do we not admit that "we are to do to others as we would that others should do unto us,"—as we find *also* stated by heathen moralists? Not Christians! "Do you take us for Infidels?" Surely a Christian, in any usual sense, might well reply to any one who argued thus: "Why, my good friend, what *are* we to take you for even on your own statement? What *else* did any Infidel deny than just what *you* deny, and what Infidel ever received less? Did Voltaire himself reject anything except all the miraculous narratives, and all the mystical doctrines of the Bible? and did he not receive as many of its moral truths—however little he might practice them—as he found affirmed *also* by heathen moralists? You vehemently contend for the *name* of Christian, but surely he was more consistent in laying it aside." No wonder that those who plead that they believe the Bible, and yet thus tear it to tatters, and give all its most significant leaves to the winds, should declaim against all "systems of theology."

In truth, their object is to equalize all drafts of religious dogmas, and to make it a matter of indifference whether men receive this or that. A spurious charity is to cover the multitude of theological errors, and leave it just the same whether men receive or reject even as cardinal a fact as the resurrection of Christ, of which St. Paul nevertheless says, that if it be not true, then is the Christian's hope vain, and his own preaching also vain!

III.—THE CITATIONS FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT BY OUR LORD AND HIS APOSTLES.*

BY DR. J. J. VAN OOSTERZEE, PROFESSOR IN UTRECHT.

No attentive reader of the Scriptures can have failed to observe that *many declarations of the Old Testament are declared in the New to have been fulfilled in Jesus, which in themselves appear not only to admit of, but even absolutely to require an entirely different explanation.* In Hosea ii: 1, we read, "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt." Both the nature of oriental poetry and the connection oblige us to refer the words "my son" to the people of Israel. Yet Matthew, after relating the flight of Jesus into Egypt, assures us that this took place, "that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet;"† and it seems as if the Evangelist—quite arbitrarily, we had almost said—understood by the "Son" no one but Christ to be meant. In Ps. lxix: 26, David pronounces the solemn curse upon miserable traitors: "Let their palace be desolate, and let there be no dweller in their tents;" and we do not dream that he can have any other one in mind than his guilty contemporaries. Yet Peter not only refers this passage to an entirely different subject, but also thus explains it: "This scripture *must* needs have been fulfilled, *which the Holy Ghost by the mouth of David spake before concerning Judas*, which was guide to them that took Jesus." These passages are sufficient to illustrate our meaning. Numerous instances of a similar kind will immediately occur upon a little reflection to every reader. We are thus at once apparently brought to a dilemma. It seems as if we must either in our reverence for the declaration of our Lord and his Apostles, abandon the undoubted results of the purely historical interpretation of the Old Testament, or else if we refuse to surrender them, contradict the Apostles and even in some cases the Lord himself.

There have not been wanting those, especially within the last hundred years, who have pronounced in favor of the latter position, and declared the opposition to be unavoidable. They main-

* Translated from *Christologie van het Oude Verbond*, door J. J. VAN OOSTERZEE. Rotterdam, 1855–1861. 3 deelen, 8vo.

† Matth. ii: 15.

tain that the more strictly the Old Testament is examined on scientific principles and in accordance with the rules of interpretation universally recognized, the less possible does it become to admit the explanations given in the New Testament. They point to the *allegorical* interpretation employed by the learned in the days of Jesus, and regard it as beyond dispute, that the writers of the New Testament, in every respect children of their time, stood also in this respect upon the level of their age, or rather shared in its narrow views. They claim, therefore, that we ought not to wonder if even the Apostles and Evangelists make the writers of the Old Testament say something else than what the results of philological and historical interpretation show they *did* say: and they demand that in the interpretation of the prophetical scriptures we shall not be positively bound by the very pious indeed, but certainly also the very arbitrary conceptions of the writers of the New Testament.

Is a single word necessary to show that such an irreconcilable breach between faith and science is fatal to both? Supposing even, what we do not admit for a moment, that the writers of the New Testament did really follow a perverse and arbitrary interpretation of their day, it is evident at a glance that the difficulty is not wholly, much less satisfactorily, solved. For our Lord himself plainly stood in the same attitude towards the Old Testament with his first witnesses, and the same objections can be made to the manner in which he himself employed it, as against the light in which they have placed it. When Jesus at the Paschal Supper declared concerning Judas,* that in him the Scripture was fulfilled: "He that eateth bread with me hath lifted up his heel against me," although David in the 41st Psalm had certainly not thought of Judas, the same difficulty arises as when we find Peter applying a verse of the 69th Psalm to the betrayer of his master. We have no choice left, therefore, except either to deny that Christ is *the truth*, in his explanations also of the Scriptures, or as disciples to sit at his feet and there learn the deep sense of the prophetic word. How others may judge, I know not, but for myself I cheerfully confess that I would rather review, distrust, if need be modify our principles of interpretation, than admit for one moment that He did not understand the Scriptures, who is

* John xiii: 18.

their everlasting centre. When the Lord explains the Scriptures, it is fit that his disciples yield a simple and implicit faith!

"It is not necessary to come to this," some exclaim. "Let men merely cease to regard as *explanation* of the Old Testament what is nothing but edifying *citation* and *application*. When Jesus and the Apostles say, that by this or that event a Scripture prophecy is *fulfilled*, they only mean that a passage of the Scriptures can be exceedingly well *applied* to it, although in itself considered and explained, in accordance with the original design of the author, it has quite another *sense*." It will be observed that we have here to deal with the so-called accommodation system, which, first developed under the influence of Semler and his followers, has been openly adopted and defended by the Rationalists and Semi-Rationalists of Germany, and more recently in our own country. This theory deserves commendation, so far as it may be regarded as a well meant endeavor to solve the difficult problem in such a way as shall neither do violence to the sense of prophecy, nor directly contradict the declarations of the Lord and his Apostles. We will even not deny that several citations from the Old Testament in the New, must be explained as the advocates of the accommodation theory affirm. So far, there is truth, even in an otherwise dangerous error, but this is all the homage we can pay to it. Who can help feeling that on this system the strongest expressions of the New Testament, in respect to a positive *fulfillment* of the Scriptures, are diluted and weakened to the last degree? Does "*in order that*" signify nothing more than *so that*, and is the declaration of a distinct *design* merely the pointing out of a very remarkable, but in this view, merely *accidental* agreement and occurrence? And is it not extremely arbitrary to understand the significant sentence "in order that might be fulfilled," as barely meaning: "then took place something of the same kind with the (otherwise entirely different) event, of which the Old Testament speaks?" Is not, in this way, the higher unity of the several events, when compared with each other, as well as the organic connection of the Scriptures, thrown into the shade? Does not the strength of the evidence for the divine origin of the Gospel, drawn from fulfilled prophecies, become thus either wholly or in a great measure broken? Can it indeed be satisfactorily explained why the Evangelists and Apostles so frequently appeal to the Old Testament, if its predictions *have*

properly no essential relation to the events with which they are *brought* into connection? And if it is absolutely necessary thus to bend and twist the Old Testament, before Christ can be found in it, has it not thereby, for the Christian, lost its chief value?

Not a few of the church fathers, and many expositors in later times, have felt this, and proposed another method of solving the difficulty. They adopt the theory of a *double* or *manifold* sense of the Scriptures, and maintain that along with the *literal*, a *spiritual* sense of the prophecies must be assumed and traced out—that besides a *lower*, the words have a *higher* or *deeper* meaning. Thus they seemed undoubtedly to have avoided a great difficulty, but it was only unfortunately by raising another still more serious. For where do the Scriptures themselves give the first hint that their words have such a double or manifold sense? Where are the infallible signs by which the spiritual, in distinction from the literal, design of the writers can be determined? And how, if this principle is once admitted, shall we ever arrive upon firm grounds at the real meaning of the Spirit, and be able to guard against the pious vagaries of our own fancy?

We feel, therefore, that another way must be taken, since the harmony between the declarations of the Old and the quotations in the New Testament can never, by such means, be established. Let us begin by making a *distinction*. Not every use of the Old Testament in the New must be regarded as a designed *quotation:* nor does every quotation prove that the writer saw an actual *prediction* of the person and work of the Lord in the passage he quotes. Not unfrequently an Evangelist or Apostle gives utterance to his own thoughts in the language of ancient prophets or seers, in order to invest them with a form at once dignified and familiar to his readers. Thus Paul, for instance, in speaking of the righteousness which is of faith, introduces the words:* "Say not in thine heart who shall ascend into heaven? or who shall descend into the deep? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart." This passage, borrowed with a slight change from Deut. xxx: 11–14, he employs, not with the design of giving an historical explanation of the words of Moses, but to show that the word of faith exhibited the same *character* as that

* Rom. x: 6–8.

which is distinctly commended in the words of the law. So, to take another illustration from the same chapter (v. 18), he says of the heralds of the gospel: "Yes, verily, their sound went into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world." The passage, it is plain, is taken from the 19th Psalm; but can it be supposed that Paul did not know as well as any one that David was not there speaking of the heralds of the gospel who proclaim the majesty of God in the kingdom of grace, but simply of the heavenly bodies which declare his greatness in the realm of nature? Numerous similar passages occur, and careful attention both to the manner in which a quotation is made, and to the spirit and design of the New Testament writers, is necessary to guard against being misled by the mere sound of the words, and assuming as Messianic predictions what they themselves never regarded as such.

There still remains, however, a very large number of passages, to which no such explanation applies. We refer to those in which it is affirmed in so many words: "All this was done *in order that* the Scripture might be fulfilled," "This is that which was spoken by the prophet," "This Scripture *must* be fulfilled," and the like, which are used to point out to us as predictions what, in themselves, perhaps, show no trace of any such deep meaning. On the other hand it cannot be questioned that, by these phrases, not merely a highly remarkable *event*, but a divine purpose is declared; and that the Lord, and his witnesses, intend to give not simply an edifying application, but a true *explanation* of the Old Testament passage in question. What now, let us inquire, is the meaning of the declaration that a scripture is *fulfilled?* A fulfillment takes place, whenever what is said or predicted, *is made actual;* literally, when whatever is not yet entirely full is filled or made full. Accordingly the fulfilling of a scripture may occur either at once and perfectly in some event, or gradually in successive steps and periods. In the latter case we say, *that every momentary fulfillment of a prophecy bears in itself the image and germ of one to come.* That the word "fulfill" must be understood in such an elastic and ideal sense is the result to which modern Biblical science, as held by believing theologians has been steadily coming. Thus a distinguished theologian of our times,* in a work prepared for the use of intelligent

* O. von Gerlach, Neues Testament, Matt. ii: 16.

Christians says, "the word *fulfill*, in this and similar passages, does not mean that the language quoted contains a prediction which becomes actual *only* in the present case. On the contrary, every divine declaration contains a thought which is fulfilled, whenever it is to a greater or less degree realized. Thus all the words of God, which collectively are all predictions, steadily become more and more gloriously fulfilled, and each earlier fulfillment, as here in the people of Israel, is a type of the later." This conception of the *fulfilling*, we believe, gives the right key to the explanation of many mysterious passages of the Scriptures. And they who accept it stand where Jesus and the Apostles stood—upon the *typico-symbolical* ground.

Let us now illustrate our meaning, and demonstrate the correctness of our opinion by a few examples. In a conversation with his disciples, our Lord gives the reason why he speaks in parables, viz.: the stupidity of many among the people. "And in them," he said, "is fulfilled the prophecy of Esaias: by hearing ye shall hear and shall not understand, and seeing ye shall see and shall not perceive."* Did our Lord, forgetting for the moment, as Paulus maintains, in what connection the words stand in Isaiah, and with what intent they were placed upon his lips,† intend to say that the prophet in this place predicts the state of the Jews in a subsequent age, and does not describe the character of his own contemporaries? or, does he find out a merely accidental agreement between the earlier and later Jews? No; He calls attention to the fact, that the Jewish people in the different periods of its history has remained *the same*, so that the fathers might stand in a moral sense, as types and symbols of the children. In no other way can it be explained, how it was possible for our Lord to see a fulfillment of this passage in the multitude of Galilee,‡ John in the Jews of Jerusalem,§ Paul in his countrymen at Rome.‖

Take another example. In Mark ix: 13, we find our Lord declaring John the Baptist to be the second Elias, and adding: "I say unto you that Elias is already come, and they have done unto him whatsoever they listed, *as it is written of him*." How, we inquire, where is it written in so many words in the Old Testament that not only Christ, but also his forerunner must suffer? The

* Matt. xiii: 14. † Isaiah vi: 9, 10. ‡ Matt. xiii: 14, 15.
§ John xii: 40. ‖ Acts xxviii: 25.

person and the work of the second Elias we find announced in Malachi, but not a line of his sufferings and wrongs. And yet our Lord affirms that what actually befel him *was written* about in advance. How can this be explained except by assuming that before the mind of Jesus all the hostility which the Old Testament records against earlier prophets, and among the rest the persecution of Elias by Jezabel, stood as a symbol and type of what had befallen his forerunner and friend?

The Apostles stood upon the same ground. Hence the *freedom* with which they cite the language of prophecy, not caring so much, it is well known, for the *letter* as for the *spirit* of these ancient oracles. In this way alone can it be explained how Péter —to take for the sake of clearness a case already mentioned—can find in the 69th Psalm a prediction of Judas, although everything compels us to believe, that David had in mind only some vile contemporary. In that miserable man, the Apostle sees the wretch preeminently shadowed forth, who sold his Master to his enemies and his own soul to perdition. On the same platform must we also stand, if we would comprehend the Old Testament in the spirit of Christ and the Apostles. Or shall we suppose that their interpretation was an *arbitrary* one, and ask, what evidence there is that the writers of the New Testament *were correct* in seeing in a word or fact in the Old Testament, such a foretoken and emblem? The question admits of a prompt and satisfactory answer. *First*, the old dispensation, in its very nature, pointed forward to a future one. It stands before us like a firmly rooted and wide spreading tree, of which every bough becomes the fruitful mother of other branches, while the Christ must be regarded as the crown of the majestic trunk. He is the central point of all, as well as the end of the earlier revelations of God. For the sake of Him, as the last and highest end, everything contained in the Old Testament was spoken, shadowed and done. Is it therefore an arbitrary assumption that many scriptures, before he appeared, and even before the moment they were written, had begun to be fulfilled, or had a good and intelligible sense, which yet were fulfilled and perfectly realized in him? But *secondly*, God holds in the guidance of all his servants a firm and unchangeable course, and observes in the developments of his counsels, a rule from which he never varies. He employs suffering to raise them to glory; He makes them great by humiliation, and causes them to

triumph by apparent defeat. Is it then arbitrary to behold in the sufferings of Elias, a type of what the Baptist experienced, or in the conflicts of David a symbol of what the Messiah must endure? In all ages, darkness resists and shuns the light. Is it not natural, therefore, that the revelation of the power of sin on a smaller scale, under the old dispensation, should also become the image and mirror of the same thing in its extremest manifestation, when the light of truth in Christ rose before the world? *Thirdly*, the old Testament itself gives numerous intimations that it must be understood in this typico-symbolical sense. We have only to think for instance of the constantly recurring designation of the Messiah, not merely as *David's Son*, but as *another David*. As we cannot suppose that the Prophets conceived of a resurrection, and return to earth of David himself, we are obliged to conclude that in these passages the Messiah is called, in a typico-symbolical way, by the name of his illustrious predecessor. More might be added, but we prefer to point to the significant declaration of our Lord concerning himself, "I am the truth," and to the promise of the infallible instruction of the Holy Spirit, made and fulfilled to his disciples. Is it credible, we ask, that our Lord and his apostles have placed the Scriptures in such a light, that when carefully examined, with the sober and honest application of their testimony and declaration, nothing but an *ignis fatuus* is left?*

Let us not be understood, however, as affirming that no *predictions*, properly so called, of the person and work of the Lord occur in the Old Testament. We shall see in the sequel that there are numerous passages, which point to no one but Him who appeared to take the place of the shadows of the law, and to fulfill in himself the highest expectations of the prophets. There are declarations of the Old Testament, which were fulfilled at once; there are others which did not even begin to be fulfilled, till the fullness of times had come. But this we claim, that men cease to deny the Messianic character of an Old Testament passage, because it received an application, though merely a preparatory one, before Christ appeared. We demand, in the name of our Lord and his apostles, that on their authority, a more extended signification be allowed to the prophecies (although entirely distinct from a double

* Jer. xxx: 9. Ezek. xxxiv: 24; xxxvii: 24. Hos. iii: 5, al.

word sense) than is given by a relatively exact, but one sided and narrow historical interpretation. And if, to this testimony of Him and his ambassadors, be now added that of the believing church through many ages; if it appears that a passage in the Psalms or Prophets has been universally understood, for sixteen or seventeen centuries as referring to the Christ, and was never explained in a lower sense till a later period and under the influence of a growing unbelief, we feel disposed to attach to the voice of the past, great though not undue importance. Firmly convinced as we are of the truth of the Protestant principle in respect to the worth of tradition in the region of interpretation, we yet rejoice that here too, at least in the main, our faith may accord with that of the one holy, universal Christian Church, and we regard it as highly improbable, that the spirit of truth, who alone guides into the understanding of the Scriptures, should not have absolutely spoken in the unanimous conviction of believers in all times and ages, respecting the way in which the Scriptures bear witness of Christ.

IV.—ISAAC TAYLOR.*

The Epping branch of the Great Eastern Railway has opened up one of those regions of retirement and beauty with which London is surrounded. Striking out from the main line at Stratford, it seems all at once to leave the roar of Bishopsgate, and the looms of Spitalfield, and the workshops of Mile End, and the marshes of Bow, and the dull muddy waters of the lea, as far behind as if they were hundreds of miles away. As it skirts the forest of Epping, and touches at Snaresbrook, Woodford, and Leyton, it passes by sequestered nooks and unfenced commons, stately cedar trees and wide spreading oaks, modern villas and old-fashioned mansions, wattled cottages and scattered villages. Pushing onwards into the western division of Essex, it takes the wayfarer through a district whose cornfields and pasture lands are as rich as any that lie within the whole range of the home counties; whose slopes, though less lofty and breezy than those of Sussex, are gentler and better wooded; whose lanes, in quiet, rural loveliness, may be fairly compared with many of the charming lanes in Devon; and whose general aspect announces that combination of wealth and refinement so frequently presented near the great thoroughfares that issue from the metropolis. At present it extends no further than Ongar.

As we entered that quiet little country town, the air was fragrant with the perfume of the jessamine and the roses that clustered by the doors and windows of many of the tidy, comfortable-looking houses that form its chief line of irregular street; and a bright July sun was shining cheerfully on the ample meadows, and the golden grain, and the copse-covered uplands, and the grey church towers that filled the landscape all around. A few minutes' pleasant walk brought us into the adjoining parish of Stanford Rivers, which is so purely rural as not to contain a single cluster of houses entitled even to the name of hamlet. It was veneration for one whose works had made the names of Ongar and Stanford Rivers familiar to one of the most thoughtful and intelligent sections of English readers that impelled us to make our pilgrimage thither. We went to see where the "Natural

* From the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, January, 1866.

History of Enthusiasm" was written. We went to look upon the scenes in the midst of which the author of that history passed his long life literary toil. We entered the pulpit of the little square chapel of which his father was the minister half a century ago, and in which, we believe, his own voice was sometimes heard as the preacher. We read the simple writing on the stone that marks the earthly resting-place of his beloved sister Jane, in a corner of the small plot of ground on which the chapel stands. We paused before the old country house by the way-side that had been his home for forty years, and we laid up in memory a picture of the green vale that lies behind it, and of the wooded heights that bound the view from its study windows. We stood by the grave in which, but a few weeks before, his body had been reverently laid, and we plucked a leaf from one of the rose trees which affection had planted there after the burial of his wife. The others bore only withered leaves; so that in looking upon his quiet resting-place beneath the shadow of the old church at Stanford Rivers, we had in our eye at once a sign of the death of the seed that is sown in the grave, and a symbol of the bright consummate flower in which that seed will appear when "this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality." And when we left that peaceful churchyard and returned by field-paths to the train that was to bear us back from Ongar to the hurry and the toil of London life, we carried away the conviction that the lot of Isaac Taylor had been cast in the midst of scenes congenial with the tastes and habits of his mind, and in truest harmony with the great purposes to which he had devoted his life.

On the 17th of August, 1787, Isaac Taylor was born at Lavenham, in Suffolk; and there the first nine years of his life were passed. In 1796, he was taken to Colchester, where his father held the pastoral charge of a Non-Conformist congregation. When little more than a youth, he went to London to pursue the artistic career for which he had been designed. There, however, through devotion to his profession, and with studies which he greatly loved, his health became so enfeebled that he had to reside, almost continuously during six years, in the milder climate of Devon and Cornwall. Arrested thus in the outset of his career, he divided his time, so far as his strength allowed, between mechanical invention, for which he had a wonderful faculty from

his boyhood, and the companionship of books, to which he was passionately attached all his life long, and of which Sir James Stephen has represented him as saying, "There they stand, my much-loved books, eloquent or silent at my bidding, pleasant when I am pleased, melancholy when I am sad, animating when I am languid, leaving no sorrow unsoothed, no mood and temper of my mind unexpressed, no science uninterpreted, no art unadorned,—bringing me into hourly intercourse with all the nobler spirits who have sojourned in this world, and with those whom the Author of all worlds has inspired to give us some intimations of our origin, our destiny, and our hopes." He was still in early manhood when he found himself once more in the charmed circle of his father's dwelling, then at Ongar. And there, turning aside from the path on which he had entered as an artist, he gave himself to that life of studious retirement and literary production in which he remained for more than five and forty years, with rare honor to himself, and with high advantage to his generation.

It is impossible to tell what the result would have been had his training for such a life been different from what it was. No Eton or Harrow nourished him in his youthful days, guided the development of his opening powers, and introduced him to the poets and orators, the historians and philosophers, that are recognized amongst the wisest teachers of mankind. No college at Oxford or Cambridge will be proud of his name. His portrait will hang in none of their halls. No stranger will be told of his favorite walks on the banks of their rivers. That might have been if he had known them, and had passed beneath, and caught away the genius of their learned places. But he knew them not, and he received no direction, no impulse, no aid from the influences with which they surround their favored sons. His education was obtained at home. His genius was nursed at home. His tastes were formed, his dispositions were moulded, his imagination was quickened, his intellect was cultivated, his heart and conscience were warmed and purified, and the foundations of all his great attainments were laid under the eye of his father, and in the bosom of his father's family,—a father whose fame has been thrown into the shade by that of his more celebrated son, and a family whose daughters, by verse and story, have shed the gentle power of Christian truth and love into not a few of the youthful minds that people the happy homes of England. But, in spite of all the lim-

itation and defects that may be fairly enough alleged as belonging to that training, it proved sufficiently wide and comprehensive to bear him up to that eminence on which he stood in a great measure alone, and where he was confessedly entitled to the respect and the gratitude of all who can appreciate brilliant talents and extensive erudition sanctified by the word of God and prayer, consecrated to the highest interests of mankind, and employed with effect for the defence and confirmation of the gospel. For, although no one, looking over the wide range of his works, need hesitate to say that he is not faultless, that he has left some compositions that do not rise above mediocrity, or that he has not risen to the height of service reached by some men of a more fiery genius, and of a more resolute and practical power ; still, on the other hand, we imagine that few will deny that in one field of thought and of literature he has as yet no equal ; that he has left a name among the Christian philosophers of England that will be had in long and honored remembrance, and that he has done a work to which the friends of Christian truth and Christian life in England, and in other lands will acknowledge themselves indebted for a long while to come.

Mr. Taylor's studies led him far into the great domain of mental science. He was once on the eve of making the professed teaching of that science the main business of his life. In 1836, the difference of three or four more votes in his favor, would have made him, and not Sir William Hamilton, the occupant of the chair of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. He might not have carried to that post the same extensive acquaintance with ancient and modern philosophy as his distinguished rival, nor the same commanding force of intellect, nor the same mastery of the principles and process of reasoning, nor the same facility of clear, and condensed, and vigorous expression, nor the same aptness to leave the mark of his own mind on the direction given to speculation and sentiment regarding the questions that have been so long associated with mental phenomena, and their relations to the material world. But he would have carried to it a literary reputation far higher than is usually achieved by those who are elevated to similar chairs in the Scottish universities. He would have taken to it the true philosophical temperament and the true philosophical habit. He would have enriched it with the fruits of a profound life-long study of the human mind, not in its

elemental constitution merely, and not in its modes of acquiring knowledge of the things that lie outside of it merely, but over and above all that, in its higher life, and in its connection with the noblest interests affecting the progress and happiness of mankind. He would have made it strong with the influence that springs from exalted character, and from unflinching devotion to the verities that are most surely believed among us. He would have set it aglow with the warmth of a heart beating in sympathy with every thoughtful, earnest student, and with the beauty with which his lively imagination and refined taste could adorn every subject he handled. It is idle to conjecture, now, what service he might have rendered to Scottish youth and to Scottish metaphysics, had he climbed to the chair Sir William Hamilton reached; just as it is vain to regret, what he never regretted, that he lost the opportunity of becoming, in the college of Edinburgh, a living expositor of logical and intellectual science. Of one thing, however, we are assured that he would have waited long, and thought deeply, before sullying the dignity of that office by representing the non-conformist ministry in England as "the bondage of a pastorate in the meeting house," and describing the non-conformist churches in England as standing "in the stern isolation of puritanical dissent." Sure we are also that he would not have been hasty to set forth "the profession of the Christian ministry" as disagreeable to a mind of that order which loves "an independent expression of profoundly-seated convictions," and to sneer at the grave matters now moving so many churches, under the flippant designation of "this modern age of ecclesiastical schism, and narrow controversies about systematized theological doctrine." Neither the catholicity of his spirit, nor the charity of his heart, nor the justice of his judgment, nor the reverence he bore to the faith of his fathers, nor the grasp that his own mind took of Christian truth and of the obligations devolving on those who are specially called to the promulgation of that truth, nor the estimate he formed of the questions agitating the Christian world in these days, would have permitted him to do that.

Though Mr. Taylor did not enter the Edinburgh chair, he made direct contributions to that branch of philosophical study, in aid of which that chair was founded. It would be easy, we think, to gather up many of these contributions as they lie, in an informal way, through those works to which Mr. Taylor appears

to have given the best of his strength, and with which it is most likely that his name will be longest associated. And we can hardly doubt that it would be both a pleasant and a profitable task to classify the contributions so found, and to ascertain their relative importance and value. That, however, is aside from our present purpose. We mention it simply because of the conviction that it is difficult to name a voluminous writer of modern times, who, apart from a professed application to the philosophy of the human mind, has done more than Mr. Taylor has done in the cause of that philosophy, by the extent and accuracy of his observations, the skill of his analysis, and the careful conscientious use of the inductive method. Our object in this reference is the much humbler one of simply pointing to those works in which Mr. Taylor has avowedly taken his place in the ranks of scientific authorship on mental phenomena.

The first of these works is "Elements of Thought," published so long ago as 1822. His object in writing it was to impart elementary explanations and instructions on subjects connected with the intellectual faculties. And a very happy effort it is towards that object. Clear, condensed, and illustrative, it is still an admirable book to put into the hands of those who are entering on an examination of the human mind, and seeking to make themselves acquainted with the chief instruments of human knowledge.

That was followed at a wide interval by Mr. Taylor's book entitled "The World of Mind." This was the fruit of his meditations during the leisure moments and leisure hours of five and twenty thoughtful years after the publication of his "Elements of Thought"—years through which "the principal subjects of intellectual philosophy had been constantly in his prospect." Although in this book he treated the same subject as in the "Elements" in a somewhat different order, and on a much more extensive scale, he gave it forth as of an elementary character, and he meant it to be employed as an instrument of education during the later years of a course of study. He did so, not because of any extravagant notion he entertained regarding the influence which a more general and serious attention to intellectual philosophy would exert on politics, and religion, and social life; but because of the more sober and practical belief that such attention could not fail to prove an efficient means of giving refinement to taste, and expansion to the reason and understanding.

Few people, we imagine, could be more sensible than he was, that the world of mind would be the home of thought only to a few, and, to quote his own words, that it would specially become such "if the breadth, the height, the depth of this universe of life were fairly opened up, and if, in the place of the evanescent subtilties of a cold analysis, there were brought before us the boundless objects of that great system throughout which the energies of conscious life are in course of development." And yet it would be difficult to name many who have done more than he has indirectly done to lead multitudes into the study of mind, and to impart to them that exactness of thought, and that force of intellectual faculty which naturally flows from even an informal entrance on that study. Let opinions on that point, however, be as diverse as they may, there can be no question that his object in the publication of "The World of Mind" was simply to furnish an introduction to the study of mental science.

In this work Mr. Taylor has indulged in great copiousness of diction. He has been extremely careful to point out and explain some of the nicer distinctions that have come in his way. He has supplied numerous and long illustrations of the processes by which we obtain the ideas denoted by abstract terms, of the ways in which the intellectual and moral faculties are developed, and of the consequences to which their different modes of development lead. He has gone into minuteness of detail respecting the methods in which we arrive at knowledge, and faith, and the assurance of truth, and the conviction of duty, and respecting the character and power of the emotions and feelings to which these give rise. He has dwelt largely on what he calls "the breadth of the world of mind," that is, of those indications of mind of which we are cognizant beyond the region of our individual consciousness, and of our intercourse with those like ourselves; indications so manifold that they may be found throughout the whole of that commonwealth which he speaks of as including "all those orders of beings that are endowed with sensibilities, and with powers fitting them to be put in trust, individually, of their own well being." From some points of view these characteristics of this work may be judged excessive, and out of keeping with the cold severity that is occasionally supposed to be the proper distinction of a scientific treatise. But from Mr. Taylor's own point of view, we do not think so. They afford an aid to

study, which a loftier and more ambitious style of teaching denies. They throw a garniture of beauty over a field which is too often represented as a dry and barren waste. They impart a glow of life and sympathy to a domain in which it is sometimes supposed that no interests lie, and no objects around which the imagination and affections can gather. And when they are taken in conjunction with other admirable qualities abounding in it, they make Mr. Taylor's "World of Mind" a work which, in freshness and independence of treatment affords a most pleasing contrast to many works of its class, and in the wisdom of its arrangement, the soberness of its speculations, the firmness of its hold of the ultimate facts of human nature, and the living glow of its humanity, constitutes a most valuable introduction to the philosophy of intellect and morals. Its closing words are worthy of the consideration even of those who know that philosophy best.

"In the earliest pages of this volume, the writer was careful to exempt himself, from the imputation of attaching any exaggerated importance, in a practical sense, to his subject, Mental Philosophy. The world is ruled by forces that are far more substantial than are those of intellectual science. Nevertheless, intellectual science must be allowed to have a real value of its own; and it would be a serious error to disallow its claims as a main element in education. These claims rise in importance when it appears that errors of malignant quality are rioting around us; and that they do so in default of that training of which a genuine philosophy should be the guide and impulse. Allowing then to intellectual philosophy a place of real, though not paramount importance, in its bearing upon the advancement of a cultured people, and assigning to it its due position of honor as the *theoretic center* of the national mind, there is reason enough for one wishing to see this branch of learning receiving improvements, and especially for desiring that its doctrines may be brought into conformity with truths that are more sure than its own axioms. But this we may regard as certain, that, while the influence of intellectual philosophy upon national progress may never show itself to be much more than what is just appreciable, the reactive influence of national progress upon intellectual philosophy will not fail to be beneficial in a very marked and decisive manner. Those, therefore, who are occupied in this department of labor,

may take the comfort of believing, that although they ought not to aspire to mend the world with their philosophy, the world itself, if it be in course of improvement, will, at each stage of its advancement, assuredly amend their philosophy."

"The intellectual, the moral, the political (or economic) advancement of a nation, inclusive always of the steadiness of its adherence to Christianity, and its practice of the Christian virtues, will always be bringing before the popular mind some object of the highest moment, and of the most urgent necessity, relating to the welfare of the masses of the people. The energies of leading minds, borne forward by the force of practical good sense, will find, as if instinctively, the solid ground of truth in morals, and in social science. There will be a diffused right reason, prevailing throughout the educated classes, which will effectually discourage and exclude vague and monstrous speculations concerning the first principles of human knowledge. If at this moment, those spurious philosophers were to be named, which, in times past and lately, have seemed to threaten morals and religion, and to throw us (as to speculative belief) into the abysses of atheism or universal doubt, it might safely be affirmed, as to each of them in its turn, that, though it should never meet its overthrow in halls of learning, it must evaporate as a mist on the walks of life, if only men are *moving forward* under the guidance of those same unchangeable principles. Freed from paradox, and unfathomable mystifications, and brought up from its metaphysic depths, and pursued and taught in the neighborhood of those great movements which must attend the progress of man in society, then, and while it is laid open to influences of this salubrious order, the philosophy of mind shall perhaps win for itself a place much nearer than at present it occupies to the forces of light, heat, life and power in the social system."

In spite of himself, Mr. Taylor became an essayist. We say, in spite of himself, for there was so much unity in the plan of his literary career, and he was so much set on giving an aspect of completeness to the works to which he put his hand, that we cannot help thinking he was averse from that fugitive and fragmentary style of writing with which an essayist in modern times is so often forced to content himself. But, from the days when he was drawn into it, along with Robert Hall and John Foster, and Josiah Conder, till the close of his life, it was the

species of composition to which a large portion of his life was applied. In that class may be comprehended works so varied in their character as his "Saturday Evening," "Logic in Theology, and other Essays," "Ultimate Civilization, and other Essays," Lectures on "Spiritual Christianity," and on "The Spirit of the Hebrew Poetry." Yet through all these, and others not included in that list, there may be traced the workings of a mind which was bent on overpassing the limits within which these confined it, and which was struggling hard, even within these limits, to give a concrete and finished form to the material with which it had to do.

No one would claim for Mr. Taylor, in these Essays, Bacon's "wonderful talent for packing thought close, and making it portable." Neither can they be said to possess the grace and elegance, the facility and invention, the pathos and the power, that made Addison the greatest of English essayists. Nor do they show that wonderful breadth of knowledge, that classic choice and arrangement of words, that unvarying clearness and force of style, and that penetration of judgment and authoritativeness of conclusion, which have raised the essays of Lord Macauley to a height of excellence that none else in this age have reached. And, not to mention names of lesser note, and of more recent date, they are not marked by the sheer force of intellect, and the strong grasp of principles, and the sustained cogency of argument, that distinguish the essays of John Foster.

Nevertheless Mr. Taylor's essays are, for the most part, of considerable excellence. Gathering, in some cases, around the spiritual character of Christianity, and in other cases around the influences of Christianity on the social life of men; at one time letting in the light of history on remote ages of the Church, and at another examining the present condition of the Church, or anticipating its future prospects; dealing here with the doctrines of the gospel, and there with its ethics; touching on one side the philosophy of revealed religion, and handling on the other side the principles of biblical interpretation,—they are occupied with matters of enduring interest. As might be expected in a field so wide, they are not all of equal merit. For the most successful treatment, they required a greater variety of gifts than are usually combined harmoniously in one person. And it must be acknowledged that in several instances they are deficient in ease

and simplicity, in directness and force, in point and emphasis. Had they been more limited, they would likely have been more effective. Had they been less elaborate, they would likely have been more attractive. Had they shown less regard to the minuter shades of thought, and the more explanatory forms of speech, they would likely have commanded a wider circle of readers, and left upon those who read them a deeper impression of their author's genius. But, for the calm, meditative thought of one who lived apart from the noisy ways of men; for the deep insight of one who combined extensive erudition with keen observation and subtle analysis; for some of the most mature and precious fruits of Christian wisdom; for profound convictions; for earnest purpose; for deep feeling; for comprehension; for many fine touches of fancy; for pithy sayings, entitled to be called aphorisms; and for steady aim and aspiration after a purer and happier condition than the world or the church has yet seen,—they are worthy to be known.

The vigor of Mr. Taylor's style may be seen in the following very short extracts: Speaking of Socinianism, as it is propounded to the most intelligent, the most free, and the most religious people in the world, he says that it "proves itself to be—what none will listen to—a theory which the poor turn from in contempt! a doctrine that inspires its converts with no zeal! a system that can neither walk, nor run, nor stand among competitors! a belief that scatters, not gathers; that desolates, not blesses! a phantom of silence, gloom, emptiness, coldness, despondency!" Referring to the moral faculty, he writes: "This belief in conscience is not an opinion which I may continue to profess, or may cease to profess, in consequence of the reading of a book, or the hearing of a course of lectures; it is a permanent element of human nature,—it is common to mankind in all times and countries. This instinct flushes the cheek of every sensitive child, and it prevails over the laborious sophistications of the philosopher. This belief is cherished as an inestimable jewel by the best and the purest of human beings; it is bowed to, in dismay, by the foulest and the worst; its rudiments are a monition of eternal truth, whispered in the ear of infancy; its articulate announcements are a dread fore-doom ringing in the ears of the guilty adult. You say you can bring forward a hundred educated men who, at this time, will profess themselves to be no believers

in a moral system; but I will rebut their testimony by the spontaneous and accordant voices of as many millions of men as you may please to call for on the other side."

As a specimen of Mr. Taylor's descriptive power, the following sketch may be quoted:—

"Let us think of the group of which Jerome's brief notices furnish the outlines. On a rugged, pathless descent of the rocky region, which is within a day's journey of the Holy City, we see a company advancing:—there is that accomplished theologue,—the terror of Vigilantius, and of all such like heretics, but the courteous companion of orthodox ascetic ladies: it is Jerome who leads the way. Under the blaze of a Syrian summer's noon he rides an ass; he has drawn his monk's hood far enough over his face to throw his sharp, prominent features, into a half shade, which Rembrandt would have caught at. At a little distance in the rear,—and she also riding an ass,—follows the graceful descendant of the heroes of Livy's fabulous books; it is the lady Paula. She defies the scorching beams, and she welcomes her sufferings as a sort of martyrdom; by her side, or lagging a little in the rear, and she also seated on an ass, is the fair nun, the pupil of Jerome in Greek and Hebrew. She stoops and languishes, but she will not be girl enough to utter a petulant murmur. Yet it was not thus that Eustochium was used to pass along the broad ways of Rome; yet all now is right in her mind, and she enjoys inward peace; then follow the attendants, with a wild Arab or two, hired as guides and guards; these, wrapped in their mantles, and poising their long lances on their shoulders, muse as they go, or muse not at all; but if they do muse, it is upon the whim—so unintelligible—which prompts such persons to endure such a journey, only to gaze at stones!

"If we turn from this scene, and look toward the western world, we may see the humble—the haughty—St. Martin, lounging on a divan in the palace of a Cæsar, his low-bred presbyters and deacons, reclining on velvet, to the right and left of him. Kneeling at his feet, and not daring to raise her eyes so as steadfastly to gaze upon the saintly visage,—kneeling at the feet of this monk, there is an empress,—and this empress all but spurned."

His power of surveying a field, and of estimating the forces required for its culture, may be noticed in the following quotation:

"The work that is henceforth to be done by honest and Chris-

tian-hearted men in India, and in China, is of a new order, and it is incomparably more arduous than hitherto (or at all in modern times) Christian ministers have been called to engage in. It is a work for which no sufficient preparation has been made, either within the inclosures of the English Episcopal Church, or among the communions around it. But it has this one conspicuous prognostic; the work is such that it will create the men who are to do it, and the work, once engaged in, will train them for their duty. But if it be asked, "What is there in the present position, or in the aspect of affairs in India, or in China, which differs much from the now well understood conditions of missionary enterprise, all the world over? the reply might be of this sort: The Christianity of England will henceforward have to maintain itself, and to make progress, as it stands related, first, to the ancient paganism; secondly, to the Christianized paganism of Rome; thirdly, to European atheism; and then, as related to these three, in their present peculiar condition of convalescence, and of tacit compromise, the issue being a combination of elements that is too intimate and too *natural*, to be broken up otherwise than by the power and mercy of heaven, specially put forth. But when we say this, the practical inference is the same as it would be if, as in relation to purely secular interests, everything depended upon our skill, industry, sagacity, and forecasting of the probable course of events. The course of events throughout the Eastern world will not fail to be such as shall call up a new class of men,—in Europe, (may we say it?) in Britain—to meet it; and thus, the reaction of the East upon the West will be more remarkable than is the action of the West upon the East."

Some of the best characteristics of his thought and expression are found in the following well weighed and important sentences:

"Every part of the duty of the minister of religion is more easy than to maintain, in vigor, the spirit he needs as the reprover of sins and the guardian of virtue. It is easy to teach the articles of belief, and easy to illustrate the branches of Christian ethics; it is easy to proclaim the Divine mercy, and easy to meet and assuage the fears and sorrows of the feeble and afflicted. But to keep in full activity the Power of Rebuke, demand qualities of a rare sort. It is utterly fruitless to turn from side to side in search of substitutes for these qualities. The preacher may, for example, avail himself of abstract demonstrations by means

of which to vindicate the unalterable rigor of the Divine government. He may prove irrefragably, that the Supreme Ruler of the moral system can never pass over transgression, but must needs exact the appointed penalty, either from the transgressor or from his substitute. The erudite argument, for any effect it will produce, might as well have related to the motions of the planets. Or, feeling the incongruity of abstruse reasoning, when addressed to the commonalty of mankind, he masters all the resources of eloquence. He is, in turns, descriptive, pathetic, indignant; he flames, he weeps, he astounds the hearer by the prodigious accumulation of his phrases, and of his figures of terror. Idle labor! Even while the walls are ringing with those sounds of alarm, the covetous man, in his corner, is mentally counting his gold; the eye of the vain and prurient is darting from object to object of illicit attraction; the envious and malign is brooding on new calumnies, to be propagated at the church door; the ambitious is plotting the destruction of his rival; and the fraudulent and rapacious are, in cogitation, stretching the net for the feet of the unwary. And yet every rule of the most approved rhetoric has been observed; yes, and every intelligent hearer goes away amazed at the skill and power of the preacher; and the preacher, too, was sincere in his endeavors!"

"Ah! but to speak efficaciously of the holiness and justice of Almighty God, and of its future consequences; to speak in modesty, tenderness and power, of the approaching doom of the impenitent, is altogether another matter, and one that must be left to those whose spirits have had much communion with the dread majesty on high. As the punishment of sin springs, by an ineffable harmony, from the first principles of the Divine nature, and infringes not at all upon benevolence, so must he who would rightly speak of that punishment, have attained to a more intimate perception of the coincidence of holiness and love than language can convey, or than can be made the subject of communication between man and man. This knowledge belongs to the inner circle of the soul, the center which the rational faculty does but imperfectly penetrate; it is a sense or emotion of the immortal essence, conveyed to the spirit by the Father of spirits; and only conveyed, in any considerable degree, where much meditation and prayer, and abstraction from earthly passions, open the way to its reception and entertainment. All other elements of

devotional sentiment may lodge in the heart sooner than this. Hence it is that, on this point, more conspicuously than on any other, ordinary teachers are at fault; and not a few, honest to themselves, and abhorrent of pretension or artifice, avoid almost entirely a subject on which they feel themselves to be unprepared to speak with seriousness and energy."

Mr. Taylor is fairly entitled to be ranked as a Christian apologist. He dearly loved the comparative seclusion of his life. The habit of his mind was contemplative, not polemic. His sensitive nature was vexed by many of the occasions, and by much of the language of strife and debate into which good men and true were dragged. More than once he shrank from the accomplishment of some favorite design, through fear that the storms of contention and the disturbing forces of partizanship would hinder him from doing justice to his theme, and mar, if not altogether destroy, the usefulness of his work. He repeatedly alluded to the mischievous influences so often attendant on controversy, and did not hesitate to say that controversy, inevitable though it be, spoils whatever it touches, and that the controversy of the church with the impugners of the first truth of Christianity, has quite chafed the resplendent surface of revealed religion, so that the impression we should otherwise have received from the gospel narrative, is vastly impaired. A vision of peace was that in which he most fondly indulged. A time of rest and tranquillity, during which the Church of Christ would be free to enter on her proper joys, was the time he most eagerly anticipated. Still he was not averse from the wearing of armor and the poising of weapons when the day of battle came. He was not a craven and a coward when fears were lying in the way, and when foes were mustering against the cause of truth. With the courage peculiar to the time and the place in which his service was needed, he came forth to take his share in the contest for the faith once delivered to the saints. And, from the very quietness of the position in which his days were spent, from the serenity of the height from which he looked down on the field of struggle, from the profoundness of his belief, from the freedom and independence of his mind, he derived some important qualifications for acting a part as a champion on the side of pure and undefiled religion.

The appearance of "*Tracts for the Times*" drew Mr. Taylor into the lists where great issues are fought for. The ecclesiastical

movement, of which these tracts were both an effect and a cause, was a manifest decline from the faith of the Reformers, and an approach to the ritualism and ceremonies of Rome. Its direct tendency was to disparage the sacred Scriptures as the supreme rule of faith and manners; to unduly elevate the character of church-power, and to place that power in some single, irresponsible center; to ignore and set aside the vast multitudes of Christian people who could not claim, or who did not care to claim, for themselves a ministry vested with the mystic charm of apostolical succession; to restore a vicious theory of sacramental administration; to substitute the emotions of sentiment and taste for a religion of truth and spiritual joy; and, generally, to draw men back into the bondage and darkness of popish superstition. And one of the designs of its abettors was to create the persuasion that this was only a revival of primitive Christianity, and that the steps being taken to secure it had the countenance and support of those whose claims to be regarded as the fathers of the Christian church were undisputed. Their attempts in this direction found shape in the famous tracts. And it was in order to meet these attempts that Mr. Taylor girt his armor on, and came forth to the high places of the field.

Few men were more competent than he for the defence on which he then entered. His long and intimate acquaintance with patristic literature, his habitual study of church life, ancient as well as modern, his penetration into the springs of ecclesiastical thought, and feeling, and action, and his singular freedom from the disturbing influences that so often prevail around controversialists, fitted him, beyond most of his contemporaries, to repel the attacks made on Protestant truth, and worship, and practice, under the guise of support from the writings of the fathers. And nobly and well did he meet the foe. When the arduous character of the work involved in it is taken into account, and when the utmost allowances are made for whatever is defective and one-sided in it, his "Ancient Christianity" will long remain a monument of his learning, and skill, and prowess; just as the ecclesiastical records of the time in which it was written will bear emphatic witness to the effectiveness of the public service it accomplished, and to the consideration it received at the hands of an adversary no less famous than Dr. Newman.

But another time of trial came. The Romanising tendency

within the bosom of the English Church gave place, in a large measure, to the Rationalistic tendency. Men rose up to question the reality and completeness of the inspiration of the sacred volume, to impeach the integrity of its records, to represent its living truth as lying imbedded in the midst of fabulous and spurious narratives, to eliminate the miraculous and supernatural from its contents, to explain away the sacrificial character of the death of Christ, and to separate the grounds and elements of religious life from all that has been most commonly regarded as distinctive of Christ's holy evangel. One of the latest developments of the course on which such men entered, is found in Dr. Colenso's work on the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua; a work whose conclusions would not, in Mr. Taylor's judgment, if followed out to their proper issue, leave a remnant of our faith in the Bible as an authoritative source of belief in matters of religion. As one of the "intelligent laity," to whom, in that work, Dr. Colenso appealed, Mr. Taylor came forth in reply. And, without entering into the detail called for by what he happily called "these formidable applications of school arithmetic to Biblical interpretation," he met Dr. Colenso's attack with a rejoinder, which, in respect of earnestness and dignity, of keenness and power, of common sense and broad argumentative comprehension, is worthy to be regarded as a model of controversial writing of the class to which it belongs. It cannot be doubted that those who have been careful to make themselves acquainted with the literature springing out of Dr. Colenso's unhappy and mischievous production know Mr. Taylor's "Considerations on the Pentateuch."* And therefore we do not further refer to it, so far as Dr. Colenso is concerned.

But those who would ascertain what Mr. Taylor has done to counteract that movement which has given birth to works like Dr. Colenso's critical writings, must read and study his "Restoration of Belief." He saw that it was a movement tending to loosen or subvert all religious belief. He was convinced by signs, both in literature and in society, that it was a movement in progress, the property of which was to accelerate itself at a rapid rate. He held that the speculations from which that movement took its rise, differed in little beside their wording, from the pro-

* This able paper will be found in the *Theological Eclectic*, Vol. II, 1865.

fundities of the Oriental and Alexandrine philosophy, as uttered and edited by the several classes of Gnostics, Manichees, and others; and that the real issue to which it was being pushed forward, was Christianity or Atheism. At the same time, no one saw more clearly than he did that there was a growing loyalty in the religious attachments of the people of this country, a growing depth of religious feeling, and a growing power of religious life. And no one cherished more thankfully and more firmly than he did the persuasion that the cause of gospel truth had nothing to fear, that the hour of darkness that threatened to cover the gospel firmament would not come on, and that Christianity would continue, not only as heretofore, to "satisfy her poor with bread," but to send out broken meat to her enemies, to the end that they might not starve. Nevertheless, he knew that it was incumbent on the defenders of the faith to meet the new forms of assault directed against it, and he took a very enlarged and comprehensive view of the line of defence which it was necessary for them to adopt. And he himself came forward, in virtue of a title long before made good, to bear a part in the momentous task to which they were called.

In his "Restoration of Belief" he has not done all that he would have done had longer life been granted to him. But he has made a noble contribution to the Christian argument. He has put the historic element, and the miraculous element, and the personal element, that is, personal as to Christ, in the New Testament Scriptures, in an aspect in which they have been seldom looked at, and in which they combine with fresh power against those modern attacks which would not only break down some bulwarks of the Christian faith, but overthrow its very citadel. He has done this with a warmth of heart, and intensity of purpose, and magnanimity and boldness of faith, far more profuse than are generally found in argumentative treatises. And he has thrown into the accomplishment of it so much logical power, and Christian sagacity, and philosophic grasp, and literary excellence, as to make this, in our judgment, one of the ablest productions that have come from his prolific pen, a work that will rank with his "Natural History of Enthusiasm," and his "Physical Theory of another Life." If the time of sifting, of which he has spoken towards the close of his "Restoration," should come, we anticipate that what he has done will go far to prepare many for pass-

ing through it, and for doing, and daring, and enduring, whatever God and His truth may require; and we believe that it will continue long in the estimation of his countrymen, as one of the most devout and energetic defences which modern times have set up on behalf of that Gospel of which he has eloquently said, with regard to its influence on England:

"It is the Gospel that has wrought itself into the national temper, and has moulded us so much to its own fashion. It is the Gospel which has planted in our bosoms that sense of individuality, that seriousness of conviction, which despotism dreads, and can never crush. It is this deep belief, and this sense of the authority of truth, which has come to be a national characteristic, and which is the ultimate guarantee of our liberties, religious and political. It is this Gospel that has given us our higher tone of domestic virtue, our relish for home, our home-bred feelings, and our true idea of personal delicacy, and our sense of individual importance, consistently with individual modesty. It is thence, and from the vernacular diffusion, and the daily usage, and hearing of the Scriptures, that we have drawn the power and point, the simplicity and the majesty, the tropical richness, the rhetorical opulence, and the fervor of our conversational style and public oratory."

We must now turn aside from the notice we intended to take of the works of Mr. Taylor, on which his title to a peerage in the republic of letters so conspicuously rests—works embracing his "Natural History of Enthusiasm," "Fanaticism," and "Spiritual Despotism,"—works in which he filled up parts of a plan of exhibiting the several principal forms of spurious or corrupted religion—works in which he appeared as the philosophical investigator into the principles and practices out of which sprung some of the greatest mischiefs from which the Christian Churches have suffered. But we cannot turn aside from them without venturing to express the conviction that these works deserve attention now, and that it is impossible to read them in the light of events with which many churches are familiar at this day, without feeling that they contain not a little seasonable caution and direction, mingled with some seasonable warning and rebuke.

The Church of Christ needs men to guide in council, and to lead in action; she needs men of prompt decision, and of rapid

movement; she needs men for the rough and every-day work of the field given her to cultivate; she needs men whose sympathies are called forth by the close fellowships that are formed in the great and busy thoroughfares of life; she needs men ready to cast themselves into those currents of thought and of progress whose resistless flow makes epochs in the life of nations, and in the history of mankind. But she needs other men besides these. She needs men of gentle nature and elevated mind, men of peaceful ways and contemplative habits, men of literary culture and scientific thought, men of extensive learning and undoubted genius, men whose calling is to occupy a region where they can calmly and comprehensively survey the movements in the great territory of truth and religion, and whence they can speak words to which all will listen; and yet men who, in the day of trial, can do exploits in contending for the faith once delivered to the saints. To this latter order of men Mr. Taylor belonged. In this order he long held a foremost place, and rendered most manifold and signal service. Resting from his labors now, his works will be held in grateful remembrance for many days to come; and his name will be fondly cherished as the name of one whose simple faith, and humble, godly life were in close and constant alliance with those quiet studies and toils which have given him a very high and serviceable reputation as the Christian Philosopher of Stanford Rivers.

W. B.

V.—STRAUSS'S NEW LIFE OF CHRIST.*

BY PETER BAYNE.

David Friedrich Strauss is to devout Christians of this generation what Voltaire was to good people in the end of last century and the beginning of the present, the Lucifer of the skeptical apostacy, the chief of those contemporary "Antichrists" who, according to the Apostle John, were "many" in the first century, and who have not ceased to be many in the nineteenth. The Critical Examination of the Gospel History by Strauss is the most important of those treatises in which the catholic view of the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ has been contested within the last sixty years. More than any other it has directed the speculative activity of authors who have written with the same purpose; more than any other it has determined the mode of counter-fighting on the Christian side. Dr. Strauss has listened to the criticisms of friend and foe upon this book for a quarter of a century, and he has recently issued another upon the same subject, embodying and re-affirming the distinctive proposition of the earlier work, that the supernatural element in the memoirs of Jesus is mythical. In other respects the two books differ. In justice both to Dr. Strauss and to the subject I must, in considering the new book, keep in view what was done or attempted in the earlier treatise.

Some people have a compendious way of dealing with books like these, which they not only adopt themselves, but insist that it is the duty of every one else to adopt, namely, to utter a shriek of horror and to pass on. But this is not wise. As Antichrists are always with us, it is probable that they are here for a purpose; and it is better to use them, in the way of learning from and being admonished by them than merely and ignorantly to abuse them. Dr. Strauss has special claims to fair and earnest treatment. He is no scoffer like Voltaire, measuring the universe with the plumb-line of a jest, and sneering down all impassioned and self-sacrificing nobleness, from that of a Mary of Galilee to that of a Joan of Arc. He professes—and we have no right to question his sincerity—to seek truth alone, and to aim not at the destruction of

* From the *Fortnightly Review*, May 15th, 1866.

Christianity, but at liberating the spiritual ideas which it enshrines from the dogmatic and quasi-historical cerements in which, as he says, they have been bound. He does his work, moreover, in no perfunctory, plausibly superficial, merely popular and taking manner. Having assayed to prove the mythical origin of the evangelical histories, he has labored indefatigably in the execution of his task. His volumes bear the impress of honest toil of brain. His knowledge of Scripture may be commended to the emulation of the clergy. If the mythical theory has not been established by Dr. Strauss, it will never be established. Such assailants of catholic Christianity ought, I think, to be the means of incalculable benefit to the Church, and never were the benefits they may confer so conspicuous as in the present day. For it has become evident to all thinking minds that the time has arrived when the marriage between intellect and faith must be solemnized, or a disastrous divorce proclaimed between them—intellect to go its own way into atheism, faith to sink and darken into superstition. The Church must be either wide awake or stone dead—somnolency is no longer within her choice. To make the masculine intellect of the time her own, or to become an isolated and obsolete phenomenon among the entities of living civilization,—that is the necessity laid upon her. We have not to look beyond the frontiers of Europe to observe the spectacle of a dead Church. Ultramontane Romanism has defied science, assumed an attitude hostile to the progressive intellect of the time, met reason with allocutions and anathemas. What is the result? Behold it in the city of Paris. A severance between religion and all that religion ought chiefly to influence. On the one hand, women and children worshiping in churches; censer-swinging, organ-blowing, monk-and-nun processioning: on the other hand, grown men, regardless of all this as of a baby show, maddening in the race for riches, or obliterating, in unblushing sensualism, in brazen-fronted and limitless debauchery, those distinctions by which society has put a guard around female chastity and connubial faithfulness, and confounding *beau monde* and *demi monde* in one hideous Bacchanalian revel.

Does not the effete spiritualism of the one picture render only the more loathsome the wallowing sensuality of the other? To such a state the Christian church in England must come if, exalting mental sloth, which—by judgment of nature and Scripture —is deadly sin, into virtue, it reviles intellect as the child of the

devil, relaxes its grasp on the ruling and forceful elements of society, and shrinks from the duty expressly appointed it in the New Testament of rendering a reason for the faith that is in it. When the brains are out, a Church will die—there is no help for it.

In the original work of Strauss upon the Gospel history, little or no effort was made to realize the character and individuality of Christ as an historical personage. Jesus, we were given to understand, represented the idea of humanity; which idea consists in the union not of an individual, but of the race with God. "Humanity," wrote Strauss, "is the union of the two natures—God become man, the infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude. . . . It is humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven, for from the negation of its phenomenal life there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a personal, national, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the heavens." In the new book this really imposing, if not very intelligible, theory of the person and mission of Christ is discarded; and Strauss falls back upon an individual Messiah, endeavoring to reproduce the historical Jesus, to divest him of the magnifying and coloring mists of legend, and to set him before us in his true dimensions. In this Dr. Strauss has not been successful. Meager, lean, and shrivelled is the historical Jesus whom he reproduces. Not less did the dim and boneless phantom evoked by the witch of Endor resemble the living Samuel, than this Christ of Dr. Strauss resembles Jesus of Nazareth. Negative criticism is the Doctor's power, and the habit of negative criticising appears to have completely destroyed his constructive faculty. He has so long used the chisel to cut, that he cannot use it to mold: when a feature seems almost finished, some stray word awakens the destructive propensity, and, with a short fierce blow of the hammer, it is not finished, but struck off. You would say he grudges his Christ even the frost-bitten personality he accords him; and never does he warm into enthusiasm for the Hebrew Socrates, thin and pale, who stalks, in feeble, somnambulistic movement, along his page. As a whole, I should say that Strauss's work on the Gospels displays more solid ability and genuine application than that of Renan; but the historical Christ of Strauss is inferior, as an artistic portrait, to the historical Christ of the eloquent Frenchman. The constructive capacity of Renan is considerable;

he overflows with modern sentiment; and his skill in biographic narrative is that of an accomplished literary artist in a nation which boasts that its literary artists can tell a story better than any in Europe. Renan knew how to throw out his Christ against a Titianesque back-ground of blue Galilean hills; to imbue him with an interesting tenderness and gentleness, half-feminine, half saintly, and to cast around him something like a breathing human form. The sublime of sentimental enthusiasm has never been more felicitously embodied than in the Christ of Renan. But the Jesus of Dr. Strauss is merely a superior Rabbi, a maker of judicious remarks, sententious, sermonizing, full of wise saws, and with a turn for parable; a most meager, ghost-like, unsubstantial, and unsatisfying Christ.

It must indeed be admitted that the new work is in many respects inferior to the old, less dignified in style, less elevated in tone, in form less scholarly, in spirit less manly. Almost all that is good in the new is derived from the old; but there is much that is good, or at least respectable and presentable, in the old which we miss in the new. The truth is, though Dr. Strauss is profoundly unconscious of the fact, he has been somewhat soured by the success of Renan, and the noise made about a book which he saw to be, in comparison with his own, a flimsy performance. He formally extends the hand of fellowship to the Frank, but he whiffs aside his theory of the raising of Lazarus with the air of a gruff schoolmaster putting away the slovenly thesis of a schoolboy; and he hardly disguises his contempt for the French sentimentality to which he traces that acceptance of the Gospel of John as historical which he pronounces the organic fault of Renan's book. One cannot help thinking of the relation between Strauss and Renan as somewhat similar to that described by Carlyle as subsisting between Frederick William of Prussia and George II. of England: the former a man of parts, but uncouth and heavy-footed; the other a pretty gentleman, of high airy ways, and with much lace and bedizenment upon him, but at bottom a far lighter article. I hope it is not disrespectful to the Herr Professor, but my imagination insists obstinately on representing him under the similitude of a wild boar of the German woods, strong tusked, indomitable, grubbing at the roots of the forest oaks, looking up now and then, with jerky grunt of much contempt, at high-flying rationalists like Ewald ("eagle of Göttingen," grunts Strauss,) or sentimental

poetizers like Renan, and then sinking his head in the ground again, and going at it with invincible snout and tusks of great ferocity.

But besides the half-suppressed yet painful consciousness that Renan has had the chaplet which should have graced his own brows, Strauss suffers from the general conviction that he has been a hard-used man. The clergy have been against him; theologians have disputed his right to be called a theological teacher; and the laity have not been on his side. The generous candor with which Neander recognized his openness and love of truth—a fact of which Dr. Strauss might have made mention, but does not—appears to have had few imitators. His experience, on the whole, has been that of a theological Ishmael. It is impossible not to perceive that he writes as an injured man; and an injured man, besides being naturally disagreeable, labors under well-known disadvantages both in the apprehension and the communication of truth. Hence, there is not in these volumes that comparatively enjoyable sense of sky and air, that glow of sunny warmth, of which you are conscious in the earlier book; and the author falls into certain errors and contradictions which he avoided on the former occasion. It will be right to present one or two instances of these.

In his new book Dr. Strauss shows himself exceedingly incensed against the clergy. It is hardly too much to say that he tries to excite the commonalty against them. To get rid of the clergy is a reward held out by him to incite us to get rid of miracles. Clerical opinion in theological matters is represented as utterly worthless, on the ground that the interest of the priesthood is too directly involved to admit of their judging fairly. This is not worthy of Dr. Strauss. He has got hold of a poor half-truth, and he parades it as if it were a whole truth. Every guild or profession is biassed in favor of abuses from which it derives influence, honor, or bread. You do not expect lawyers to aid in the cheapening of legal proceedings; retrenchment in the military expenditure is not looked for from the colonels in the House of Commons; and neither the lawyer nor the soldier has more jealously guarded the privileges of his order than the priest. It is nevertheless indisputable that every profession is the highest authority on its own affairs. You consult the works of great lawyers if you wish to master the principles of law; you turn to famous captains if

you mean to study the art of war. Why so? Because though greed is a characteristic of humanity professional and unprofessional, there is a heat and force of nobleness in all but the basest souls to raise the intellect, when engaged in the contemplation of important subjects, to an elevation, from which the flesh-pots of interest, lost in the expanse of landscape, become no longer visible; while the mountain-ranges of principle, seen in their mass and grandeur, fill the prospect. Man is bad enough, but not so bad that one in a thousand of those theologians who have devoted their lives to contemplation of the great themes, God, freedom, immortality, has been a mere special pleader for his order. The idea that Christian theologians, Origen, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, incapacitated by professional bias to give an opinion, must stand aside while a few modern philosophers condescend to explain Christianity, is too paradoxical to command the assent of sober minds. Dr. Strauss would never have taken up with such a tap-room argument, if the intellectual placidity which reigned in his first work had not been disturbed. He has some apology in the fact that the Ultramontane priesthood in Roman Catholic countries, levying war to the knife against culture, and a large proportion of the Protestant clergy in Germany, state-fed and slavishly subservient to the power that feeds them, present unfavorable specimens of their class; but in both the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches of the Continent there are large-minded and open-minded clergymen to be found; and in this country, as every reader is aware, the clergy have not only their honored representatives in every branch of secular knowledge, but number in their ranks our ablest, boldest, most earnest, and most honest inquirers in theological science.

Of perhaps less importance, but forcibly illustrative of the slipshod workmanship into which the unreflecting and cynical vehemence of Dr. Strauss has betrayed him in his recent volumes, is a contradiction in which he involves himself. He makes his appeal—so he informs us in the outset—from clergymen and theologians to the German people. There is nothing, he declares, in his opinions or his mode of stating them, respecting which working men cannot form a rational and intelligent conclusion. When it comes in his way, however, to maintain that belief in the historical facts of Christianity cannot be indispensable to genuine religious faith, he avers that only a very small part

of the human family can have a well-grounded belief on those subjects. Scholars and critics, men familiar with the original tongues of Scripture, and versed in the literature of the periods when the Scriptures were composed, are alone qualified to satisfy themselves on the historical question. This is a plain contradiction. If working men are able to ascertain whether Dr. Strauss is right or wrong, they are able to ascertain whether the evangelical narratives are historical or legendary. I agree with Dr. Strauss in his affirmative, and disagree with him in his negative. After what has been done by critical theologians within the past century; after the thorough sifting which every part of the question has undergone; after the marshalling and re-marshalling, discussing and re-discussing, of the classical passages from early Christian and Pagan authors; any intelligent man, who will honestly take the trouble, is, I am convinced, qualified to satisfy himself, rationally and conclusively, what is fact and what fiction in the narratives we possess of the life of Jesus.

The distinctive feature in Dr. Strauss's new work, as has been said, is its presentation of what the author believes to be an historically correct account of Christ's life and character. The introduction of this feature makes an organic change in the logical structure and framework of the book. While Jesus entered, so to speak, into the system of its argument as the idea of humanity, not as a living man, of whom goodness or badness, veracity or mendacity, could be predicated, the question of his connection with those miracles which it was the main intent of Strauss to prove mythical, was unimportant. An idea cannot speak either truth or falsehood; an idea can neither judge correctly nor be mistaken; an idea cannot be interrogated touching the part it has played in any series of transactions. But when Jesus is brought upon the scene as a real person, Dr. Strauss is bound to show that the origination of the myths involves nothing inconsistent with the character of the Christ he portrays. Laying it down as an axiom, preliminary to his entire argument, that miracles are impossible, he must make it clear that Jesus never mistook his so-called miracles for facts, or asserted them to be such, knowing that they had never taken place.

What, in its essentials, was the character of Christ according to Dr. Strauss? He was morally sound; so upright in heart that Dr. Strauss rejects as untenable the theory that he could

even have adapted himself to play a part. He was, in the second place, shrewd and intelligent, of quick, sure insight, and strong "common sense." Moral soundness, intellectual sanity, —these have to be reconciled by Dr. Strauss with what appears at first sight to be the overwhelming evidence that Christ *said* he had raised the dead.

I have no idea that Dr. Strauss practises an intentional evasion, but I cannot help thinking that he has not only passed lightly over this vital point, but is haunted with a half consciousness that he has done so. Elsewhere he fights on all occasions with vigor, but his best hope seems to be to mask his line in this quarter, and to draw off from it the attention of his assailants. His exhibition of differences in the narratives of the Evangelists is clever; his parallels between the evangelical miracles and those of the Mosaic and prophetic dispensations are ingeniously selected and skillfully disposed; the logical arrows, tipped often with the cold, keen steel of irony, wherewith he penetrates the armor of the Rationalists, go uniformly to the mark; but when we ask how his view of some Gospel story, which he has been explaining as a myth, is to be reconciled with his conception of the historical Christ, no clear or satisfactory answer is forthcoming. Yet I must press Dr. Strauss here, for here is the key to his position. If I can break his line at this point, the rest of his troops—the multitudinous array of objections, which he throws out to right and left—must fall back and vanish as they best can. How to dispose of them may be a curious, but cannot be an important, question. What part, I ask, had Jesus of Nazareth in the construction of these myths? Did he, rigidly moral and eminent in common sense, as Strauss declares him to have been, *profess* to work miracles, or did he not?

In point of fact, I believe the whole controversy respecting the Divine origin of Christianity to turn upon this question. It takes precedence even of that of the resurrection, which Dr. Strauss fixes upon for the main discharge of his critical artillery. The resurrection, by the nature of the case, must be attested, not by Christ himself, but by those who saw him after he rose from the grave. Of what he did during his life, however, Christ is the best witness. The word of a sane and truthful man, "I raised the dead," is a more direct and powerful attestation of the fact than the evidence of half a dozen witnesses of whose veracity or,

faculty of observation, we may have no guarantee. Above all, in treating of the *life* of Christ, which Strauss professes to do, the ascertainment of what he said or did before going into the grave is more important than discussion of the evidence adduced by others that he rose from it. In his elaborate attack, indeed, upon the proofs of the resurrection, Dr. Strauss does not appear to me to have succeeded. Both Christians and skeptics have handled those proofs in a way which I cannot but think erroneous and misleading. The former, working in the chains of their theory of verbal inspiration, have tormented their brains to produce an artificial uniformity in the Gospel narratives of the occurrence. The latter, influenced probably, though in an indirect manner, by the inspiration theory—by the idea that, if they made out a sufficiency of minor variations to disprove *it*, they disproved the fact of the resurrection—have dwelt upon the confusion and variation in the Gospel accounts as though these told in their favor. Yet any one accustomed to the valuation of historical evidence will, on reflection, admit that when several witnesses affirm a particular fact, one almost infallible test of their correctness is, that their statements are confused and various in matters of detail. Only when the statement is concocted beforehand are the witnesses of a tale unanimous. The variations in the evangelical account of the resurrection, turning, as they do, upon sequence of time, number of persons, order of incidents, are precisely and convincingly those which, supposing the witnesses to speak the truth, we should have had, and which, supposing them not to speak the truth, they could not possibly have invented. Norton points out with his usual force and felicity, that by precisely the same kind of argument as skeptics bring forward to discredit the narrative of the resurrection, the assassination of Cæsar could be proved to have never occurred.

But, as I said, it is not the evidence of the resurrection which affords in my view the strongest position that can be taken up by one who maintains the supernatural origin of Christianity; and I must recall Dr. Strauss from his comparatively irrelevant discussion of the proofs of the resurrection to a consideration of the accuracy of the description he has given of the living Messiah. Dr. Strauss, of course, feels that he must prove either that Christ professed to work miracles, and was mistaken, therefore that he was a bewildered enthusiast, or that he professed to work miracles

and spoke falsely, therefore that he was an impostor, or that he was misunderstood by his disciples, and never seriously laid claim to the power of working miracles. Conscious, I suppose, of the extreme difficulty of maintaining either of the two first hypotheses, Dr. Strauss has made an effort to establish the third. Whether he has been successful I now proceed to inquire, and it is evident that our estimate of the value of his book will depend upon the answer obtained to the inquiry.

It is related by Matthew and Luke that, upon one occasion, Christ was formally applied to for a statement of the grounds on which he based his claim to be the Messiah. John the Baptist, languishing in prison, his faith tried by the disastrous termination of his ministry at a time when, as he had concluded, the Messiah was actually present in the land, sent two of his disciples to Christ with this direct query:—"Art thou he that should come, or look we for another?" The reply of Jesus was formal, complete, and deliberate: "Go and show John again those things which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk; the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear; the dead are raised up; and the poor have the Gospel preached to them."

Dr. Strauss accepts these words as historical. He does not suggest that they have undergone any modification. As we now have them, they were spoken by Jesus Christ. The reader would do well to realize this fact, and to realize that it is admitted by Dr. Strauss.

Nevertheless, as simple-minded Englishmen may be startled to learn, Dr. Strauss will not allow that Christ asserted his ability to work miracles. The miracles referred to were, it appears, of a spiritual character. Jesus, thus argues Strauss, refused on several occasions to show signs and wonders, and it would be inconsistent in him to have told the disciples of John that he could wield supernatural power. He referred only to spiritual miracles, to "moral effects of his doctrine." He said virtually, "I am daily opening, in a spiritual sense, the eyes of the blind, the ears of the deaf, making the lame walk uprightly and nimbly, and giving new life to those who are morally quite dead. He who sees how much more worth these spiritual miracles are will take no offence at the want of material ones; but only such an one is capable of receiving the salvation which I am offering to mankind, and is worthy of it."

The proof, then, on which Dr. Strauss rests his interpretation

of Christ's words is simply this—that, since Christ told the scribes and pharisees that he would not show them a sign from heaven, this affirmation of his having raised the dead, if it means what the words import, would be in "sheerest contradiction" to his general practice.

Can this be called a proof? Is it inconceivable, is it unlikely, that Christ might at one time have reasons for working a miracle, and at another have reasons for not working a miracle? In no one instance does Christ say that he *could not* do miraculous works; for certain specified and quite sufficient reasons he sometimes refused to exert the power which he never disclaimed, and to those who thought that exhibition of power alone could be a revelation of God, he always returned a refusal. That Christ should have declined to countenance gross Hebrew notions of power-worship ought not to be incredible to Dr. Strauss, and that he should have returned a different answer to the messengers of a perplexed but faithful and honored disciple, from that which he gave to men who treated his claims with insolent contempt and regarded his person with intense hatred, is neither inconsistent nor surprising. The objection adduced, therefore, by Dr. Strauss to the literal interpretation of Christ's words is trivial, and, putting it aside, we are able to apprehend without bar the overwhelming force of the reasons for taking them to mean what they seem to mean. It might be sufficient to ask Dr. Strauss how, if the words used do not affirm the possession of miraculous power, a form of expression could be devised by which ambiguity would be avoided? Or I might content myself with inquiring how Christ, in connection with whom, according to Strauss, there "cannot be a question of adaptation, of playing a part," should have used language which, as he must have known, his audience would understand in a literal sense, and should thus have lent himself to the diffusion of a radically unsound and pernicious view of his character and Messianic mission. Or, once more, I might beg Dr. Strauss to tell me what profit there can be, in any instance, in puzzling over the words of one who, confounding spiritual and physical in this fashion, can apply language only to the construction of riddles insoluble by ordinary understandings. But there is no need even of these considerations. They would have applied to the statement of Christ if it had terminated with the assertion of his power to

work miracles,—if the sentence had ended with the word "dead." But, after enumerating his miracles, Christ adds, "And to the poor the Gospel is preached." According to Strauss, every preceding clause was an intimation that the Gospel was preached to the spiritually poor. Who could, in this sense, be poorer than the spiritually blind, the spiritually deaf, the spiritually lame, and leprous, and dead? What Gospel could be preached to them or to others in addition to that which opened the eyes of the spiritually blind, unstopped the ears of the spiritually deaf, and caused the spiritually dead to live? Dr. Strauss declares that Jesus—the historical Christ in whom he believes—was distinguished by the brevity, pertinency, and force of his manner of speech; how then can he impute to him the inconceivable tautology which is implied in this interpretation of his answer to the messengers of John the Baptist? Dr. Strauss must give up his historical Christ and fall back upon the idea of humanity. His new theory hampers him intolerably,—puts him under a constraint which it is painful to contemplate. So long as he was conscious of no necessity to accommodate the words of Christ to the character of an historical Jesus, it did not even occur to him that these words to the Baptist's messengers could bear any but their obvious sense. "John the Baptist," he wrote in his first book, "on hearing of the *works* of Jesus, sent to him with the inquiry, *Art thou he that should come?* Jesus, in proof of the affirmative, merely appealed again to his miracles."

But besides this passage relating to the message from John, which is found without any substantial variation both in Matthew and Luke, there are several in the evangelical narratives in which Christ is represented as laying claim, in terms as explicit as language can supply, to the power to work miracles. Christians and anti-Christians have agreed in referring to Jesus as having *professed* to work miracles. In one word, the proposition that the Founder of the Christian religion deliberately declared that he was capable of suspending the laws of nature—that he could create food for multitudes, and recall the dead to life—is as well established as that Jesus of Nazareth ever appeared in this world.

I must call the attention of Dr. Strauss to the singular interest and importance of this circumstance. "In the long series of ecclesiastical history," asks Gibbon, "does there exist a single

instance of a saint asserting that he himself possessed the gift of miracles?" It is a pertinent question,—quite adequate to the task of discrediting the whole series of ecclesiastical wonders. Given an honest man, of even partial sanity, you will on reflection find it an unlikely thing that he should imagine himself possessed of supernatural power; and if you refer to the history of honest enthusiasts, you will discover that they have not, even when under severe temptation, been the victims of this delusion. Mahomet, it is now well known, never asserted that he could work miracles. Edward Irving, impressionable both as a man of genius and from the intense agitation of feeling in which he lived, nay, astonished that his fervor and sincerity received no direct recognition from heaven,—a recognition which he firmly believed to be accorded to the poor creatures who raved and gabbled around him,—nevertheless maintained a clear consciousness that he possessed no miraculous gifts. The more closely we examine the history and character of Jesus, the simplicity and spirituality of his teaching, his profound appreciation of the grandeur of moral, as distinguished from physical force, his intense truthfulness and tremendous denunciation of hypocrisy, insincerity, and pretence, the more astounding will it appear to us that, if he possessed no miraculous power, he should have *said* that he possessed it. The limits of this article forbid my entering upon this examination; which, indeed, I have made the subject of a small treatise.* Suffice it to say that, having carefully investigated the possible hypotheses by which Christ's averment that he had opened the eyes of the blind and raised the dead, might be accounted for on the supposition of his not having done so,—the hypothesis of moral delinquency, the hypothesis of intellectual weakness, the hypothesis of some singular modification of fanaticism, enthusiasm, or monomania; the exclusion of each and all of them appeared to be so convincingly established, that I should distinctly feel it a greater demand on my credulity to believe that he did not, than that he did, work miracles. Having looked Hume's argument in the face—and Hume's argument, expressly adopted by Strauss, is essentially the argument of Mr. Baden Powell and Professor Tyndall—I deliberately affirm that it would seem to me a greater miracle that Christ did not, than that he

* *The Testimony of Christ to Christianity.* Boston, 1862. 18mo.

did, raise the dead. The one miracle requires me to believe that there is a spirit in the universe,—a Spiritual Force which, in the right time and season, can act in one or other of two modes, which we little creatures, knowing in strict scientific estimate *nothing* of either, call the natural and the supernatural; the other miracle would require me to overrun and annihilate every conception I have formed of the acting of human character, the bearings of human motive, the existence of truth, sincerity, honor, the capacity of man to observe and attest, and, therefore, the very possibility of an origination of science. I do not cease to believe in nature when I cease to believe in the absolute inviolability of physical sequence; but I should rather cease to believe in nature than cease to believe in man—and in God.

With Dr. Strauss, however, my controversy is settled. His theory of the historical Jesus is, that he was morally reproachless, intellectually shrewd and sagacious, incapable of playing a part; and this theory is shattered upon the fact—which has, I submit, been established—that he deliberately laid claim to a power which Strauss affirms him not to have possessed.

I have not yet touched upon the mythical theory. The distinctive feature in the new work, with which I am primarily concerned, is its description of the historical Jesus, and this I have shown to be unsatisfactory. But the mythical theory, which formed the staple of Dr. Strauss's earlier book, enters as a component part, and one of great importance, into the present work. It is incumbent upon me, therefore, to give account of it.

A few persons—such is the mythical theory of the origin of the evangelical history—saw in Jesus the Jewish Messiah, and convinced themselves that all which, according to their interpretation of Old Testament prophecies, was to be expected of the Messiah, met in him. "However notorious throughout the country" —these are the words of Dr. Strauss—"it might be that Jesus was from Nazareth, still, as the Messiah, the son of David, he must have been born in Bethlehem, for Micah had so prophesied. Jesus might have uttered words of severe reproach against the desire for miracles on the part of his countrymen, and these might still be living in tradition; but Moses, the first deliverer of the people, had worked miracles, therefore the last deliverer, the Messiah—and Jesus had of course been he—must likewise have worked miracles. Isaiah had prophesied that at that time

—*i. e.*, the time of the Messiah—the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall hear; then will the lame man leap like a deer, and the tongue of the stammerer speak flowingly: thus it was known in detail what sort of miracles Jesus, having been the Messiah, must have performed. And so it happened that, in the earliest Church, narratives might, nay, could not fail to be, invented, without any consciousness of invention on the part of the authors of them." Unconscious invention is one of those things which the English mind fails to apprehend distinctly; the fine tentacles of an intellect trained in the philosophic schools of Germany, are required for the firm grasping of such an idea. But let that pass. Dr. Strauss explains further that the Messianic myths had been growing up from the time of the Babylonish captivity and earlier, and that what remained to be effected, after the coming of Christ, was merely "the transference of Messianic legends, almost all ready, to Jesus." The greater part of the fictions thus associated with Jesus, "became connected with his history during the period of about thirty years which intervened between his death and the destruction of Jerusalem;" and if we press for still more exact definition of the limits of time within which the Christian myths received their final shape, they cannot, we are informed, transcend "the interval extending to the beginning of the second century, the most distant period which can be allowed for the origin of even the latest of these Gospel narratives, and for the written composition of our Gospels." Such, derived partly from the earlier, and partly from the later work, is a statement, as advantageous to Dr. Strauss as I can make it, of the mythical theory. With as much brevity as possible, I shall state a few of those reasons which induce me to consider it untenable.

It must be admitted, first of all, that the parallelism of which Strauss makes so much is no figment of the imagination. Between the miracles of the Old Testament and those of the New there is a certain amount of correspondence, and many of the latter fit in remarkably well with the predictions of the Hebrew seers. This, however, is not denied by Christians, and the evangelical writers, instead of disguising the fact, lose no opportunity of exhibiting and insisting upon it. But there are deviations in the miraculous narratives of the New Testament from those of the Old which Dr. Strauss is bound to reconcile with the mythical hypothesis.

The popular imagination, acting consciously or unconsciously, may do much; but there are some things of which it is not capable. It would be absurd to impute to popular imagination nice apprehension of moral distinctions, exquisite appreciation of spiritual truth, superiority to all that extrinsic grandeur which popular imagination specially affects. How, for example, could popular imagination have hit upon that modification of the passage in the second book of Kings in which Elijah is represented as calling down fire from heaven to burn up more than a hundred men, which we meet with in the Gospels? Elijah, one of the greatest of the old prophets, was, according to Strauss, one of the chief of those prototypes on whom and whose history the mythical Christ —that is, the miracle-working Christ—was modeled. The myth-creators or transferrers of the early Christian age made it one of their aims to show Jesus in every instance superior to Elijah. It is recorded in the second book of Kings that Ahaziah, King of Israel, earnestly desirous to see the prophet, sent successively two captains of fifty with their fifties; that both of these and their fifties had been burnt up; that a third, sent also by the king, approached on bended knee, beseeching that his own life and the lives of his men might be spared, and that Elijah was then directed by the angel of the Lord to go with them. This is the material on which the imagination of the early Christians had to work. What was the product of their fantasy? A Samaritan village had refused to entertain the Saviour. "Lord," said his disciples, "wilt thou that we command fire to come down from heaven and consume them, even as Elias did?" He replied thus: "Ye know not what spirit ye are of. For the Son of Man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save." Not lightning now, but light. Is this the work of popular imagination? Does the mythical faculty diminish instead of magnifying, remove instead of adding circumstances of adornment and effect, prefer the spiritual to the material, and the unseen to the seen? To the popular apprehension Jesus would have been insulted by the villagers and vanquished by Elijah. The end of the "myth," in which the Gospel narrative parallels the Old Testament miracle, is in these words, "They went to another village." How pitiful would this ending have appeared to popular imagination, and especially to the popular imagination of Jews!

Look for one moment at this narrative as we have it in the

Gospels. It must either be historically correct, or an invention of the myth-creating Christians of the early age. If it is historically true, the evangelical narrator was able, in a most tempting instance, to avoid embellishment and to confine himself to fact, and thus affords a strong presumption that in other cases of a similar kind he would prefer reality to fiction. If the narrative is an invention, devised for the purpose of exhibiting Christ as superior to Elijah, how comes it that the mythical faculty, severely denying itself all recourse to miracle here, should, in other instances, invent miracle? Dr. Strauss may take which alternative he prefers. If the first, I shall ask him to explain the *existence* of the Gospel myths; if the second, I shall ask him to explain their *manner*.

Dr. Strauss will, perhaps, object that the spiritual element in the myths of the New Testament is due to the personal character of Christ. But he will not affirm that the Jews of the immediately pre-Christian era expected a *spiritual* Messiah. The Jews assuredly looked for a Messiah, and it is one of the best ascertained facts in history what manner of Messiah it was they expected. By a succession of rebellions, the most desperate and sanguinary in the history of the world, rebellions in which, inspired by their idea, the little brotherhood of Jews joined in death-struggle with the stupendous power of Rome, and put the conquerors of the world to their mettle, the Hebrews of that time announced that they looked with maniacal intensity of eagerness for a conquering Messiah, one who should smite the cities of the Gentiles as David smote Rabbah, and put Greek and Roman, as David put the children of Ammon, "under saws, and under harrows of iron, and under axes of iron, and" make "them pass through the brick-kiln." The annals of the world for two centuries, from the days of Theudas to the days of Barcochebas, from the days of Herod to the days of Hadrian, are red with the blood of massacre and the carnage of battle in which the Jews attested their conviction that the Messiah who was to save them would be a temporal deliverer. Whatever Messianic myths the Jews had ready to be transferred to Jesus, were sure to represent him not as a spiritual, but as a material conqueror. If I grant, however, that the impression made by the spirituality of Christ's character and teaching was powerful enough to disenchant his followers, and to open their eyes to the fact that the Messiah was to be a

spiritual king; would not this same impression, I ask, secure them against the delusion of supposing Christ a worker of miracles, if he was not? In their original conception of the Messiah two ideas had been blended, that he was to be a conquering monarch, and that the miraculous power which he was to possess would be used to further his conquering schemes. The strength of the conviction that the Christ would work miracles depended on the belief that his miracles would make his armies irresistible, and cause the walls of Rome to fall as the walls of Jericho had fallen. Once their minds were divested of the former idea, they would be under little or no temptation to cling to the latter. Dr. Strauss's theory of Christ is that in the pure spirituality of his conception of his mission, he disclaimed equally the design of conquest and the capacity of miracle. Why should his followers—how *could* his followers—understanding and accepting the one position, set their imaginations to work to substitute for the other a vast mass of fiction?

Take another illustration of the work of the early Christian phantasy, transforming the legends of later Judaism and transferring them to Christ. I refer to the narrative of the temptation. Such a narrative, Dr. Strauss inform us, was to have been looked for. Temptation is a stock incident in mythical histories. Adam and Eve were tempted. Hercules had his twelve labors. Abraham was tempted to offer up Isaac; the Israelites were tempted in the wilderness; the faith and courage of young David were tried by Goliath the Philistine. The whole life of Jesus was, to be sure, a series of temptations, yet how strong, thinks Dr. Strauss, must the inducement have been to "separate off a single solemn act of temptation," and "to delineate it with dramatic picturesqueness!" The narrative of Christ's temptation, as we now have it, was, he affirms, the result. Let the reader turn to that narrative, deliberately peruse it, and, contemplating it merely in its poetical and ethical aspects, estimate the power of that genius which produced the myths of Christianity. For its poetry, I may remind him, that it afforded Milton the plan and skeleton of "Paradise Regained," a poem of extraordinary sweep and magnificence, pronounced by Macaulay as superior to any poem that has since appeared, as "Paradise Lost" was superior to it. I may refer him to the chastened splendor of the whole narrative, in its imagery, its accessories, its linguistic presentation, its Greek-like

avoidance of extravagance, glare, and false adornment; I may point to the Divine dignity of Christ in every change of the situation and scenery, and to the majestic fitness of gradation by which climax rises over climax till the baffled tempter departs. Of its ethical meaning I need only say that it consists essentially in a profoundly spiritual conception of the mission of the Messiah, a conception in which power, even supernatural power, is subordinated to supreme realization of the idea of duty, a conception in which the miracle-working potency is apprehended as quite secondary in relation both to the evidence and the exhibition of the Messiah's power. If the myth-creating faculty produced the narrative of the temptation as a preface to the history of Christ's life, it placed before its fables of miracle a fable from which any ordinary reader might conclude that miracles were superfluous. If Jesus Christ had nothing to do with the composition of this narrative—if, in fact, he did not furnish in minute detail the materials from which it was constructed—the world has lost the name of one of her greatest men, and there was a *second* Christ in the days of Jesus of Nazareth.

It is of importance that we realize in full distinctness the fact that, on the hypothesis of Dr. Strauss, the Christianity of the New Testament is something entirely different from the Christianity which Christ actually promulgated. The reality has become extinct; the fiction has survived. There must have been some persons, however, who actually witnessed the career of Jesus, and it must have been difficult to induce them to accept a version of his life so extravagantly altered as that put forth by the mythical party. The Jews, on the other hand, of the dominant faction, would greet with scorn and rejection those fine tales about the Galilean teacher. Strauss suggests that the Apostles, who of course knew better than to believe the myths, may have striven to discredit them within the circle of their immediate influence, but he adds that they were not ubiquitous, and could not check the mythical people in districts where they did not happen to be present. That is to say, Christianity, as we now have it, originated in those parts of Palestine where Jesus was *not* known, and the persons who *did* see him received far less credence in testifying of him than those who did *not!* The success of these last was astonishing. "They triumphed," says Norton, whose strong sense and vigorous logic makes terrible play among these

paradoxes of Strauss, "they triumphed signally. They are the true authors of Christianity. It is to them that we are indebted for working without restraint from fact. The Gospel of the Infancy, the Gospels. Their fictions have supplanted the real history of Christ, the original testimony of eye-witnesses, and have become the foundation of Christian faith. Nor is this all. Keeping themselves out of view, they have had complete success in putting their stories before the world as resting on the authority of the Apostles and their associates—in making them responsible for the marvellous tales. The whole Christian world has believed that these stories proceeded from the Apostles and their associates. But it was not so. They proceeded from another party among the followers of Christ, a party that does not appear in history, the existence of which is irreconcilable with all remaining records and memorials of the times when it is supposed to have flourished, utterly irreconcilable with all probability, and which, therefore, was unknown to the world before its discovery by Strauss."

It affords weight to these considerations, and in fact clinches the whole argument, if we reflect upon the limits of time within which those marvellous transpositions took place, and the mythical or miraculous narratives of the Saviour's history arose. Our notes of time, as we have seen Strauss himself lay them down, are precise. Thirty or thirty-five years sufficed for all this imaginary creation. The words of Strauss are "about thirty years." From an historical point of view such a phenomenon is incredible. All the myths known to us were the growth of ages. The Egyptian, the Indian, the Greek mythologies were trees which came to leaf and flower and fruit in a thousand years. The operation of the human mind by which these were formed is subtle and protracted. It is a psychological mystery. Men who distrust theory, like Mr. Grote, are chary of attempts to explain it, and confine themselves to description. With the faith of a true Hegelian in his speculative faculty, Strauss solves the enigma off-hand. The mystic web of legend and tradition has for him no wonders. Nature reveals all her secrets before the mirror which he holds up to her, and spins off the whole Christian mythology, from threads which he is able to trace and unravel, within little more than a quarter of a century.

It does not assist Strauss to refer to the character of the gene-

ration by which the myths are supposed to have been produced. Myths are a growth of the spring time of nations; when life has yet the free, elastic force, and intellect the inexperience, of childhood; when the future is yet a land of promise, flowing to the eye of hope, with milk and honey; when faith is spontaneous and skepticism unknown. The age in which the evangelical narratives were composed was the reverse of all this. A time of decrepitude and debasement; religion stunted into superstition or petrified into formalism; intellectual power attenuated into subtlety; vice rampant, shameless, sensual, cruel; the only homage paid to virtue, the homage of hypocrisy. A restless, feverish, discontented time, especially in Palestine; seething with fierce exasperations; Gentile hating Jew; Jew longing to crush Gentile like potsherd under a wheel. A time of dying nationalities and rotting civilizations; when all grandeur had departed from the ancient faiths; when the thunders of Sinai had died down into quibbles; when the star-worshipers and light-worshipers of the desert had become magicians; when prophecy had long been mute; when philosophy, ceasing to "lean on heaven," had degenerated into sophistical hair-splitting. In such times men are strangers to that heroic mood in which myths are either imagined or believed, and it is inconceivable that in such a time the Christianity of the New Testament should have arisen from the *distortion* of the history of a simple Rabbi of Galilee. That was not an age to imagine the Jesus of the Gospels.

The *coincidence* of the several miraculous incidents of the life of Jesus, as narrated in the Synoptical Gospels, and, where the ground gone over is the same, in the fourth Gospel, is in itself sufficient to exclude the idea of their having had a mythical origin. Nothing so Protean as a myth. "No two dreams are like." What scholar shall say where precisely the genuine and authoritative edition of any one of the myths of Greece is to be found? Every author who details the myth gives a new version of it. You might dispute for years on the question what were the twelve labors of Hercules. In the Gospels there is exactly that amount of coincidence which distinguishes history from myth, and exactly that amount of divergence which distinguishes true tales from fabrications. Peruse first a few of the so-called myths of the New Testament, and then turn to any mythological literature known, Indian, Greek, Scandinavian, and

see whether the idea that the former originated in the same way as the latter will hold its ground. It would, I think, be safe to rest the whole question upon this coincidence in the Gospel narratives. The manner of the writers is that of the historian, not of the poet or romancer; of Herodotus, not of Homer. The mythical faculty is far too bold and fertile of invention to confine itself to identical features in repeated narratives of the same affair. It is the popular memory which, in an age when instruction is oral, treasures up the words or deeds of a revered teacher with the exactitude of leaves and shells preserved in amber.

I might fitly close this discussion, did space permit, by practically exhibiting, in actual examples, the fancifulness and license of genuine Christian myths dating as near the time of Jesus as they can be procured. The *play* of imagination becomes at once evident in their composition—the sportive, illimitable productivity of the faculty when with its enchanted mules, and wandering maidens, and sentimental anticipations of modern romance, is as different from the evangelical narratives as the Arabian Nights' Entertainments. The *Protevangelion*, imputed to one of the brothers or cousins of Jesus, is as successful an *imitation* of the manner of the synoptic Gospels as we shall find, but its miracles are not likely to be confounded with those narrated by the Evangelists. "I looked up into the air,"—this is Joseph's account of what he witnessed about the time when Christ was born,—"and I saw the clouds astonished, and the fowls of the air stopping in the midst of their flight. And I looked down towards the earth, and saw a table spread, and working people sitting around it, but their hands were upon the table, and they did not move to eat. They who had meat in their mouths did not eat. They who lifted their hands up to their heads did not draw them back; and they who lifted them up to their mouths did not put anything in; but all their faces were fixed upwards. And I beheld the sheep dispersed, and yet the sheep stood still; and the shepherd lifted up his hand to smite them, and his hand continued up. And I looked into a river, and saw the kids with their mouths close to the water, and touching it, but they did not drink." Compare the Gospel miracles with that.

If the preceding view is correct, we are bound to pronounce the mythical theory not only erroneous, but extravagant; and

shall learn, without surprise, that the judgment of scholars has been almost unanimous against it. Dr. Strauss has to complain pathetically of the contempt with which Ewald refers to him, and the erudite and liberal Norton pronounced the theory, "an outrage on common sense."

The mythical theory of the life of Christ being, then, untenable; the Rationalistic theory having been long in the sear and yellow leaf, and being now trampled scornfully into the dust by Strauss himself; and the only other theory, on the side of unbelief, which can be broached, namely, that Christ was a conscious impostor, having never been distinctly stated, far less reasoned out; it is permissible in me to fall back upon the theory of the Christian church catholic, and to maintain that frank acceptance of the evangelical record of Christ's life, miracles and all, draws less upon credulity than any theory which is before the world. At the basis of all serious argumentation on the anti-catholic side in recent times, is the proposition that miracles are impossible. The impossibility of miracle was supposed to have been proved in the Kantian school of metaphysics, and is vehemently insisted upon by the scientific materialists of our day. Strauss lays it down absolutely that the account of a miraculous occurrence cannot be historical. If we believe—and I hold that conclusive grounds can be adduced for believing—that a miracle is in the nature of things possible, and that miraculous attestation of the authority of a Divine revelation was to have been expected, an immense proportion of the skeptical speculation of the last quarter of a century, respecting the life of Christ, will fail to have any effect upon us. The catholic theory, in truth, is no theory at all, but a candid abstinence from efforts to explain away the facts. I am not going to enlarge upon this version of the life of Jesus, but I cannot help specifying, as one of its singular recommendations, that it presents a complete and symmetrical interpretation of the circumstances of the case. It can afford to give all due weight to the facts on which Dr. Strauss rests his theory, because they are accounted for on its own hypothesis. He elaborates with the utmost care and attention the proof that a parallelism exists between the miraculous narratives of the Old Testament and those of the New; but instead of being startled by this demonstration, catholics can ask whether, seeing that Christianity stands to Judaism in the relation of flower to tree,

seeing that the same Spirit was the author of the grand outlines of both, this parallelism is astonishing. Another point on which Dr. Strauss strongly insists is, that the synoptical Gospels delineate one Christ, and the Gospel by John another. He thrusts the fourth Gospel indignantly aside; its character of Jesus he pronounces inconceivable and inconsistent with that of the other Gospels; its author he regards as a dreaming, dawdling, yet infinitely conceited and egotistical personage, whose moral faculty was a pietism malignant enough to rot away the fiber of truthfulness and honor, and whose intellectual faculty was a sublimated cunning. But if Christ was all that Christians call him, it is not strange that his personality should hae impressed different men in different ways, and that the discourses of the fourth Gospel should have been delivered. A comprehensiveness of soul and mind, such as is not elsewhere presented in history, characterizes the Jesus of the Gospels. On what may be called the man-ward side of his personality much has of late been written. Several of those seeds which He planted two thousand years ago in the field of civilization have come above ground in our century. That He irradiated with spiritual light the whole Jewish economy; that He anticipated and prepared the utmost possible development of virtue between man and man, by absorbing all duty to our neighbor into one transcendent passion of human brotherhood; that He was superior not only to all sensual incitements, but to every form of ambition which has actuated great and noble men, short of that pure ardency of desire for the blessedness of the universe which may be reverently said to be the ambition of God;—this has been forcibly brought out by recent authors. But what may be called the God-ward side or aspect of Christ's personality, has been comparatively overlooked, neglected, and left to the unscientific handling of the pulpit. This has been partly a cause, partly an effect, of the dying out in cultivated, and, indeed, in most other circles, of the old theistic habits of reverence and awe. The relation in which He stood to God, the message He had to deliver from God, the homage He was to claim for God, were always put by Christ himself in the first place. A self-annihilating rapture of devotion to God was by him always placed before the self-co-ordinating passion of love for man. Serve God *with* thyself, thy neighbor *as* thyself. This, I say, is the most important part of Christ's teaching, that upon

which He most earnestly insisted. This kernel he took from the Jewish dispensation, while casting its husk forever away. That man is not an end to himself, but that the object of his existence is God's glory; that the moral government of God is the supreme fact of world-history, of human life; that God governs the world on principles of eternal rectitude, of inviolable law, principles apprehensible by the human mind, principles which, if God's government is to be a reality to man, must be infinitely honored and inflexibly maintained; that the consummation of human history is to be the establishment on earth of the kingdom of God, the kingdom of justice and peace, a kingdom limited only by the limits of the globe:—these are a few of the cardinal truths embodied in Christ's theological teaching. That the forces to be employed in the establishment of God's kingdom on earth were spiritual, not material,—that all nations, not the Jews only, were to be brought into it,—this was what Christ added to Judaism, or rather what, by the Divine depth of his apprehension of the meaning of the Jewish economy, He found in it. At the time of Christ the conception of the power of spiritual forces had hardly dawned upon the foremost minds; and after nineteen centuries Jesus of Nazareth continues to stand in solitary God-like elevation above the rest of humanity in his power to conceive and trust in their might. No theory of development will account for this fact. It is of the essence of the development theory that the development be gradual, and from the Jew of the reign of Tiberius to Jesus Christ was a leap—if we are to conceive it all—of thousands of years. If He was what He declared Himself to be, if He was what the Catholic Church, Greek, Latin, and Protestant, has pronounced him to be, this and all else in his history become credible and natural, and Christian doctrine, as unfolded by John and Paul, the Plato and the Aristotle of the Christian Church, is the appropriate sequel to the Gospel history. I know that it is the fashion to sneer at all this as mere "popular theology;" but I am justified in believing that a cant which is not a hundred years old in Germany, and hardly a score in England, has less dignity and authority than the unanimous judgment of the Christian Church, and that the *vox populi* is, in this instance, the voice of God.

VI.—DR. BUSHNELL'S "VICARIOUS SACRIFICE."*

It gives us positive pain to discover a fundamental antagonism of thought between ourselves and one whose writings have contributed so largely to our spiritual rest and religious life: yet it must be honestly admitted that Dr. Bushnell, in this interesting and startling book, has put forth the whole strength of his nature to resist one of those characteristics of the work of our Lord, which appears to us as essential to a right comprehension of it, as do these elements—correlative as we think, antagonistic as he deems—on which he has discoursed so eloquently. We are disposed to agree with him that it is utterly impossible to express in theological formulæ, or to reduce to a few propositions, what we feel, and what we know to be the power of God unto salvation; but we think that in his reiterated assertions as to *that* which the blood of Christ is *not*, in the vehement effort which he makes to negative the expiatory quality of Christ's sufferings, in his rough and offensive handling of the great doctrine of "satisfaction," in his virtual repudiation of the objective work of Christ, wrought independently of our co-operation, and in the self-sufficient tone in which he reduces the mystery of redemption, at least to the forms of his own mind, he has run into a much graver and more perilous state than those have done, who, without denying the "moral power of the Atonement," have endeavored to take account, not only of *it*, but of the ground and cause of that power. It would be grossly unfair to charge Dr. Bushnell with accepting the Tridentine doctrine of justification, or with expressing a merely Socinian view of the suffering and sacrifice of Christ, yet we can scarcely refrain from changing the title of his book into another, and calling it, not "Salvation made easy, and every man his own Saviour," but "Salvation shown to be impossible, or every man his own sacrifice." The controversy has re-appeared in many forms. At one period, it is the antithesis between faith and works as a means of salvation; at another, the identity or difference between justification and sanctification; we have even seen it under the form of the alternative precedence of regeneration and justification, and it would not be difficult to show, that we have the same old antithesis emerging in the relative importance of the objective and subjective element in salva-

* From the *British Quarterly Review*, April, 1866.

tion. Verily if theologians were to succeed, as Dr. Bushnell thinks they will, in expelling from Christian doctrine the idea of the penal sufferings of Christ, the objective satisfaction rendered to eternal law in His infinite grief and intense agony of love, and were to limit the whole atoning work of Christ to that which He as a spirit and a power accomplished in the region of our moral nature, we have a firm conviction that the controversy would appear again in new forms, as long as there remains to man a consciousness of guilt, a yearning after reconciliation with his highest ideal, or the fear of death. It is impossible for us, in the space at our disposal, to expound Dr. Bushnell's theory. He has offered yet another to the multitude of schemes by which this many-sided mystery may be apprehended by the human intelligence. Though we give him credit for great earnestness and sincerity, for much tenderness of feeling and practical power, for a diction which glitters and corruscates, and sometimes sputters like an electric light, though we feel that his treatise reads like a musical composition intended for many instruments, and abounding with startling contrasts, apparent novelties, charming *andantes*, and here and there a rattling *extravaganza*, though we admit that his estimate of the human life-work and mighty spirit of our Lord cannot be read without profound emotion, yet we feel bound to say that his theory utterly fails to satisfy our conscience, our intellect, or our heart.

Dr. Bushnell first endeavors to set forth that there is nothing superlative in vicarious sacrifice, or above the universal principles of right and duty, and he starts with the boldest Patripassianism, and attempts to show that a *cross* is in God's perfections from all eternity; that love must suffer, and then points out that the Holy Spirit, that good angels, and all redeemed souls are in vicarious sacrifice. Many exquisite and true things are said under all these headings, and we feel even disposed to allow that he is laying a broad foundation for far deeper views than those which he ultimately sustains. But in proceeding to establish the vicarious sacrifice of Christ, he finds the consummation of it in Christ's "healing ministry" and "regenerating powers," and he appears to us entirely to confound regeneration and redemption. Though these two theological terms describe one and the same condition of our moral nature, viewed from the stand-point of our consciences, yet inextricable confusion is introduced into theologic

thought, by treating their correlation with each other as a sign of their identity. The chapters which show how Christ becomes the moral power of God by awakening the sense of guilt and drawing confidence to Himself, and being the expression of God's affliction for sin, are largely deprived of their great excellence by his pertinacious assault on what he seems to regard as the *bêtes noir* of theology, the penal character of Christ's suffering. In his third part, Dr. Bushnell recognizes the necessity that exists for "sanctifying the law precept," "maintaining the legal enforcements and rectoral honor of God;" but he does not, as it appears to us, prove either of these points: and on his system, a sinner conscious of guilt is left without any valid ground of hope. Nevertheless, strange to say, yet not strange with such a mind and heart as his, he comes back in his "practical uses and ways of preaching," to what he calls "the altar forms," and though he has got rid of an objective sacrifice, oblation, atonement, or propitiation, he admits that the disciple needs these concepts to produce an attitude of objectivity; once more convincing us that if we would comprehend "the height and depth, and length and breadth of the love of Christ," we must do so "with all saints;" but also that an objectivity which points to no object, that a resting-place which is only a mental condition, a symbolism which has no reality underlying it, will prove to the burdened, broken heart of man in the nineteenth century as well as the first, a mockery and a snare; yet we can join with Dr. Bushnell in the sublime prayer with which he concludes his book, satisfied that we are more widely separated from him in the logical conception of our faith than in the object or spirit of our trust.

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NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1.—*Ecce Homo: a Survey of the Life and Work of Jesus Christ.* Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1866. 12mo. New Haven: Judd & White.

It is not difficult to see why this book has been so warmly and almost indiscriminately commended in England. It presents, in a glowing and captivating style, many views of Christ's person and work which have the charm of novelty and seem to be a tribute to the Christian faith. Its fundamental position, however, is radically erroneous. The author regards our Lord as proposing to establish a spiritual monarchy, dependent upon the *enthusiasm of humanity*, proceeding by contagion from the spirit and example of Christ. Accordingly, the book is intensely humanitarian. Love to God as the first duty of rational beings is made to give place to love to man. Sin is merely injury to our fellowmen. Holiness is essentially enthusiasm. From first to last, the divine mode of salvation is not even hinted at There are multitudes who will welcome this mode of regarding the Gospel, and be glad to substitute a pleasurable enthusiasm for Christian faith, and an idealized morality for a devout and spiritual life. It will be wise for unthinking admirers of this book to consider the dreary conclusion to which the author comes in saying "it is a common mistake of Christians to represent their faith as alone valuable, and as by itself containing all that man can want or can desire. But it is only one of many revelations, and is very insufficient by itself for man's happiness,"—a result entirely in keeping with the professed purpose of the writer "to accept those conclusions, not which church doctors, or *even apostles*, have sealed with their authority, but which the facts themselves, critically weighed, appear to warrant."

2.—*Life of Benjamin Silliman, M.D., LL.D., late Professor of Chemistry, Mineralogy, and Geology in Yale College. Chiefly from his Manuscript Reminiscences, Diaries, and Correspondence.* By George P. Fisher, Professor in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1866. 2 vols., 12mo.

If the successful execution of a biographical memoir is to be estimated by the fullness and distinctness with which character is exhibited, the many friends and pupils of the late distinguished professor of chemistry in Yale College have every reason to be satisfied with this highly-interesting memorial of his life and labors. His uniform urbanity and dignity, unfaltering regard for the right, enthusiasm for science, and delight in communicating its principles and results, together with his reverend and Christian spirit, growing more mellow and mature with advancing years, are here beautifully exhibited. His own Reminiscences and Diary constitute the basis of the work; but a large number of interesting letters written by himself and his correspondents, many of whom were among the most distinguished men of their time, add largely to its value and interest. The author has executed his task with excellent judgment and taste, and has earned the right to predict that "the reader will rise from the perusal of this work with no diminished appreciation of Professor Silliman's excellence."

3.—*The Idle Word: Short Religious Essays upon the Gift of Speech and its Employment in Conversation.* By Edward M. Goulburn, D.D., Prebendary of St. Paul's, etc. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1866. 12mo. $1.25.

The principle on which the author insists is that words, to redeem themselves from the charge of being idle, *must fulfill some one of the ends which words were designed to fulfill.* These ends are indicated as being the carrying on the necessary business of life, the entertainment and refreshment of the mind, religious edification and praise. The subject is discussed in a serious and earnest spirit, and with many valuable suggestions, but with some lack of vivacity.

4.—*The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost: or Reason and Revelation.* By Henry Edward Manning, Archbishop of Westminster. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1866. 12mo., pp. 274.

By the temporal mission of the Holy Ghost is meant, in the Roman Catholic Church, his office and work in time, in distinction from his procession from the Father and the Son conceived of as existing in eternity. Under this general title the author labors to show that "the Holy Spirit has united Himself indissolubly to the Church, that the interpretations or doctrines of the Church are true, because divine, and that the voice of the Church in all ages is the sole rule of faith and infallible, because it is the voice of a divine person." In other words, faith in the infallibility of the Church of Rome is the only solution of the question between reason and revelation. In vindication of this oft-refuted assumption, the author in successive chapters presents the Romish view of the relation of the Holy Ghost to the Church, to human reason, to the written Scriptures, to their interpretation, and to tradition. Although a Roman Catholic theologian can offer nothing really new on these subjects, yet in the struggle with Romanism such a book may be of service as indicating the points of defence or assault which the champions of Romanism at the present day are inclined to select.

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE.

Hebrew learning has suffered a loss in the death of Dr. Hermann Hupfeld, the successor of Gesenius at Halle. He was born at Marburg in 1796, and died April 24, 1866, aged 70. His latest and principal work was a commentary on the Psalms in four volumes, which is valuable for its philology, but less satisfactory in its doctrinal statements.

Dr. Rowland Williams, one of the writers of "Essays and Reviews," has published a volume entitled "Prophets of Israel and Judah during the Assyrian Empire, containing a new version of Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah, (first part,) and Nahum, with critical notes and a commentary." The *Athenæum* characterizes it as wanting in critical accuracy, and neither com-

prehensive nor generous. Alexander and Henderson on Isaiah are never mentioned. His view is that prophecy in the sense of prediction, such as that on which the argument from prophecy is generally founded, is not to be looked for in the prophetical books.

The *British Quarterly Review* warmly commends Professor Fisher's Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity, and expresses the hope that they will be re-published in Great Britain. It also regards Westcott's work on the Gospel of the Resurrection, and Mozley's Bampton Lectures on Miracles, as exceedingly valuable and timely.

Among the latest and most important works published in GREAT BRITAIN may be mentioned: MOORHOUSE, Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Subject of Growth in Wisdom, (Hulsean Lecture for 1865,) 5*s.*—LUCAS, The Biblical Antiquity of Man; or Man not older than the Adamic Creation, 4*s.*—Life and Times of Rev. SAMUEL WESLEY, by L. Tyerman, 7*s.* 6*d.*—CHRYSOSTOM on the Priesthood, translated by B. Harris Cowper, 6*s.*—EASTWOOD & WRIGHT, The Bible Word-Book: a Glossary of Old English Bible Words, 5*s.* 6*d.*—DE PRESSENSE, Jesus Christ, his times, life and work, translated from the French, 8vo., 14*s.*—GARRATT, Commentary on the Gospel of John, 8vo., 7*s.* 6*d.*—HARDY, Legends and Theories of the Buddhists, 8vo., 7*s.* 6*d.*—DELITZSCH, Commentary on Job, translated from the German, Vol. I., 8vo., 10*s.* 6*d.*—WESTCOTT, The Gospel of the Resurrection; Thoughts on its Relations to Reason and History.—DONALDSON, Critical History of Christian Literature and Doctrine, from the death of the Apostles to the Nicene Council; Vol. I., The Apostolic Fathers; Vols. II. and III., The Apologists.—MOZLEY, Bampton Lectures on Miracles, (showing their relation to human reason.)

UNITED STATES.—LANGE, Commentary on the Scriptures, Vol. II., containing Mark and Luke, 8vo., pp. 550, $5.—NOYES, New Translation of the Hebrew Prophets, 3d ed., 2 vols., 12mo., $3 50.—THOMPSON, The Holy Comforter: His presence and His work, 16mo., $1 50.—The works of PHILIP LINDSLEY, D.D., of the College of New Jersey and the University of Nashville, edited by L. J. Hussey, D.D., 3 vols. 8vo., $10.—MOORE, Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts, 8vo., $3.—MATTISON, The Resurrection of the Dead, considered in the light of history, philosophy, and divine revelation, with an Introduction by Bishop Simpson, 12mo., $1 50.—PORTER, The Giant Cities of Bashan, and Syria's Holy Places, 12mo., $3.

GERMANY AND FRANCE.—ROSEN, das Haram von Jerusalem und der Tempelplatz des Moria, 8vo., pp. 65.—FEUERBACH, Gottheit, Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit, 8vo., pp. 293.—NEUBAUER, Geschichte des Karäerthums, 12mo.—Frauenstädt, das sittliche Leben nach seinem Wesen, Elementen und Bedingungen, 8vo., pp. 503.—DUMMBER, Auxilius und Vulgarius: zur Geschichte des Papstthums im Anfange des 10ten Jahrhunderts, 8vo., pp. 141.—WALLON, de la Croyance due à l'Évangile, 2d ed., 6 *fr.* 50*c.*—ROSENKRANTZ, die Wissenschaft des Wissens, 1te Band, 8vo., pp. 479.—STEINMEYER, die Wunderthaten des Herrn in Bezug auf die neueste Kritik.

VII.—DEAN STANLEY ON THE HEBREW KINGS AND PROPHETS.*

BY REV. J. S. HOWSON.

Through the winter months this volume has been in the hands of many various and diligent readers. The graver theological students have been submitting it to close criticism, the results of which we shall probably soon see in some of our weighty contemporaries. But the charm of the volume is so great, and its interest so diversified, that it has equally attracted those to whom theology is merely a branch of general literature. It has been read aloud in families of almost every temperament, sedulously used by schoolmasters to make Bible lessons alluring, and the clergy have laid it under large contribution for the purpose of giving liveliness to discourses from the pulpit. It is our evident duty, without further delay, to give our own account of its contents, and some part of the impression which a very careful perusal of it has left on our minds. The author's position, too, is so eminent, the respect inspired by his character is so great, and his contributions to historical theology have been so considerable—and, we must add, there is so much disquietude and anxiety in many serious minds regarding the influence exerted by his writings, that longer procrastination would neither be respectful to him nor fair to the readers of this journal.

A great difficulty, however, presents itself at the very outset of our task. These Lectures cover a very large space of Sacred History; their contents are manifold and diverse; and very grave questions are raised even in the incidental portions of the work. Thus it is impossible within moderate limits to give both a sketch of the narratives and the biographies, and also an analysis of the religious results which are either expressed or suggested. Are we to dwell chiefly on doctrine, taking little

* A Review of Stanley's *Lectures on the Jewish Church*, (Part II, fromSamuel to the Captivity.) From the *Contemporary Review*, May, 1866.

notice of our author's marvellous power of grouping and describing? or are we to give only the pictures, throwing all the more serious topics into the shade? If we adopt the latter course rather than the former, it must not be supposed that we accept all the explicit conclusions which we do not attack, or that we are blind to the consequences that logically follow from many sentences, which, though lightly passed over by the fascinated general reader, will infallibly catch the notice of the theological eye. It seems to us, indeed, that in regard to the substantial statement of positive religious truth, this volume is a satisfactory advance upon the former. It may be that the Dean of Westminster feels more than previously the importance of disarming unjust suspicion, by bringing doctrinal truths more definitely forward. Or it may be, that we ourselves feel less than previously the want of such definiteness of doctrine, because here we find ourselves on more secular ground than before. The history of the Hebrew Monarchy must necessarily have much in common with the history of other monarchies. The details of the Scripture narrative in this period are profuse and minute, and even on its Prophetic side it has points of closer contact with our own times than ever could be realized in regard to the careers of Abraham and Moses, or of Joshua and Eli. For these reasons, considering the peculiar bent of Dr. Stanley's mind, and his customary method of dealing with the Bible, we should expect, *à priori*, this volume to be his best; and we think most readers will agree that the expectation is fulfilled.

However this may be, the volume undoubtedly possesses all the merits of its predecessor. There is the same high moral tone, the same diligent use of materials gathered from every quarter, the same series of pleasant surprises in sudden contrasts and comparisons, which are almost always appropriate, and almost always unexpected. Above all, there is the same power of vivid and distinct representation. Dean Stanley's faculty of putting before us living characters, and (if we may use the expression) living facts, and of concentrating an immense amount of light for a moment on a given point, is truly wonderful. The reader is enabled to go through these Lectures with a light and easy step, as if he were walking in the freshest air over elastic turf scattered over with flowers. And this we regard as no trivial advantage. It is a great merit to have written a book on the

Bible which is really attractive, and which the most impatient can read. No doubt such a power involves correlative dangers. There is the double risk of too readily using precarious materials for the elaboration of the picture, and of subordinating and neglecting graver and more important subjects for the sake of the picture. Nor has the Dean, with all his powers, been altogether preserved from either of these risks. But these Lectures have conferred no slight benefit on the Biblical student, if viewed merely on their descriptive side. After studying such an account as that which is given of all the details of David's retreat from Jerusalem, on the first sad day of Absalom's rebellion, we feel that we have obtained a firmer hold on the history than before. No one, after making himself master of all the incidents and circumstances of that cold winter's day, when the book written by Baruch at Jeremiah's dictation was destroyed by the Jewish king, will listen with quite so vacant a mind as before to the first lesson in the afternoon of the 15th Sunday after Trinity.* And we hope it will not be quite useless if we endeavor in the following pages to give such impressions as the Dean has enabled us to form of the Hebrew Kings and Hebrew Prophets, interspersing here and there some additions and remarks of our own.

The first portrait in this gallery of Jewish Monarchs is of course that of SAUL; and the portrait is given with most lifelike reality, and with a sympathizing kindly treatment of that mixed and perplexing character. The time to which the son of Kish belonged was "transitional,"—between "the patriarchal and nomadic state" which was now passing away, and "the fixed and settled state" which afterwards became continuous. His career is "the eddy in which both streams converge." And his characteristics were in harmony with the requirements of the time. He was to conduct the war against the Philistines, who held the greater part of the country in their terrible grasp, and he was chosen in great measure for the royalty of his outward appearance. Conspicuous among the people for his "stately and towering form," he was like one of the heroes in Homer. Dr. Stanley compares him with Agamemnon. It would be a natural thought also to compare him with Ajax, both from his stature, his madness, and his suicide, and for the sake of an obvious contrast:

* Jer. xxxvi.

and there are passages in these Lectures which suggest (whether justly or not) that there was something of Ulysses in David:—

> "Tibi dextera bello
> Utilis; ingenium est, quod eget moderamine nostri.
> Tu vires sine mente geris; mihi cura futuri est.
> . . . . Tu tantum corpore prodes:
> Nos animo."

The circumstances in the midst of which Saul was summoned to the throne may appear very trivial, but they were not really so. In that strayed drove of asses we have "still the cherished animal of the Israelite chiefs." And even if it were so, we must remember that the moral import of Biblical events does not depend upon their magnificence according to the human standard. "The asses of Saul's father are strayed away. What is that to the news of a kingdom? God lays these small accidents for the ground of greater designs. Little can we, by the beginning of any action, guess at God's intention in the conclusion."* Our author does apply the word "trivial" to the religious part of the first transaction between Saul and Samuel; but we think without sufficient reason. He uses the term *bakshish* for the gift which the young chief placed in the hands of the seer. This surely brings down the Prophet to a level far too low. Rather we should view the gift as an expression of subjection—as the δῶρον, or gift of homage, which was to come back in δωρεαί gifts of favor and bounty, from the superior.† The relations throughout of the King with the Prophet ought very carefully to be noticed. It is in comparison with the uniform and consistent goodness of Samuel, that we see most clearly the irregular zeal, the wild impulses, the superstition, the fitful changing temper of Saul. Something of this is, perhaps, to be explained by the tribe to which he belonged. "I will send thee a man out of the land of Benjamin," was the word spoken to Samuel.‡ And Saul was "a true Benjamite from first to last," not merely in such loyalty and family feeling as showed itself in the case of the men of

* Bishop Hall's "Contemplations on the Old Testament," xii: 4.

† The contrasted use of these two words is very consistent in the New Testament. Compare, for instance, Matt. ii: 11; xv: 5; with John iv: 10; Ephes. iv: 7. See "Eirenica," by the Rev. W. B. Marriott (Pt. ii, p. 187), who illustrates this Eastern custom of placing a gift of homage in the hands of a superior, that it may be returned in a far richer gift of royal bounty, by the great Durbar held by Sir John Lawrence in the Punjaub.

‡ 1 Sam. ix: 16.

Jabesh-gilead, but in "the strange union of fierceness and of gentleness, of sudden resolves for good and evil, which run, as hereditary qualities often do run, through the whole history of that frontier clan." But there is also a deep and most painful individual interest in this first of the Jewish Monarchs: and in this Lecture we are carried rapidly and vigorously through all the varied scenes which bring all this interest to view—the victory of Michmash—the confused flight of the Philistines down the defile of Beth-horon—the reckless vow—the heroism and generosity of Jonathan, faithful alike to his father and to his friend—the anguish of the final separation from Samuel—the alternate love and hatred for David—the gradual gathering of the gloom over the king and his fated house—the weird midnight expedition to Endor—the battle, and the coming up of the "wild Amalekite," when Saul was sinking in "the dizziness and darkness of death." For a few pages we are carried on to the close of the tragic history of his house and dynasty; and then, with dramatic propriety, we are brought back, and the Lecture closes with David's elegy over Saul and Jonathan, "the mighty Archer of the Archer tribe,"—"the song of the bow"—"the bow which never turned back from the slain."

Next in the series is a whole-length picture of David. We had already been familiar with the first sketch of this monarch in the "Dictionary of the Bible:" but here the figure and face are before us, framed in the history, and carefully finished with minute individual touches. One Lecture was given to Saul. David, as is reasonable and fitting, has three, divided according to three obvious topics,—his youth, his reign, and his fall. Our plan precludes us from giving special attention to the Lecture on the Psalter, which, though linked on here to David, in fact was parallel with the whole course of subsequent Jewish history. It is not now the tallest, the most robust, that is chosen, the most heroic according to the barbarous standard,—but the youngest, the gentlest, the most despised at home, though universally loved and admired by those who gathered round him from all quarters during the course of his life. It would be quite impossible, without profuse quotations, to do any justice to the whole of these three Lectures. We can only indicate a few of the more salient points, for the purpose just of showing how David appears on the canvas, and by what scenery and companions he is surrounded.

We are reminded of the full materials which we have for the most intimate knowledge of David. He comes before us throughout in the most vivid personality. We have even the means of fixing his actual appearance in our minds—his auburn hair, his bright eyes, his short stature, his grace and comeliness. We commonly think of him as a light stripling; but in his fleetness of foot and the vigor of his movements there was more than a mere supple activity of limb: he was doubtless possessed of great muscular and nervous strength; and probably we ought to take this into account more than it is our custom to do in thinking of that moment when he rushed against the Philistine with all the enthusiasm of a Divine impulse. Among the circumstances, too, which belong to the biographical aspect of the man, we may mention the beauty of his children. The house of Jesse seems to have been famous in this respect; the ill-fated Absalom being "the flower and pride" of the whole family, and indeed of "the nation:" "in all Israel, there was none to be praised for his beauty" like him; "from the crown of his head to the sole of his foot there was no blemish;" while in the next generation but one, the same characteristic appears in Maachah, the favorite queen of Rehoboam. David's affection for his children and his kindred was passionate and intense. This everywhere appears through the history. Even at the last, when he is dying, after having worn the crown for forty years, he is still "David, the son of Jesse." Nor among the circumstances which tend to bring out these individual features, must we forget his close connection with, and strong attachment to, Bethlehem. Here was his early home. In this neighborhood he "kept watch over his flocks by night." Here was the ancestral burying-place. To this spot his nephew Asahel was borne, after he fell so sadly by the spear of Abner. From the fields near Bethlehem he gave that property to Barzillai's son, which we trace long afterwards in the writings of the prophets.* "He never forgot the flavor of the water of the well of Bethlehem." That adventure in his unsettled wandering life does more than a world of description to bring out to view some of the marked characteristics of the man. Above all, we have a large number of Psalms, which reveal to us his deeper

* 2 Sam. xix: 37–8; Jer. xli: 17.

experience, his feelings and his motives, his joys and his sorrows. Leaving on one side the general subject of the Book of Psalms, we may just point to the 23d, "the first direct expression of the religious idea of a shepherd, afterwards to take so deep a root in the heart of Christendom,"—those which may belong to the period of the wanderings, such as the 31st, the "Fortress-Hymn," where the metrical version of Tate and Brady has inserted "Keilah's well-fenced town,"—or those which seem to recall the familiar scenery and providences of those days of danger, as the 11th and 18th—the high royal resolves of the 101st—the solemn thankfulness of the 3d and 4th, which have been assigned to the evening and morning that succeeded the first eventful day of his flight in the revolt of Absalom—and of course the 51st, the Psalm of Psalms for the penitent souls of all ages. The great variety, again, of incidents and characters with which David came in contact through those successive changes of life, are all subservient and helpful towards our realization of that remarkable combination of differing qualities—that union of sagacity, discretion, enthusiasm, tenderness, courage, generosity and sympathy,—which have rarely, if ever, been united in any man as in David, and which gave him that extraordinary power which he exercised, and still does exercise, over the hearts of men.

Turning now to follow the general progress of the nation through David's life and reign, it is interesting to notice the gradual accession of the tribes to his obedience. Even in his youth and during his unsettled period of wild adventure, we find members of various tribes forgetting their clan feeling and attaching themselves to his fortunes. In the stronghold near Engedi there were already men of Benjamin as well as Judah; and at the Court of Achish, in Gath, Benjamite archers and slingers are conspicuous. Gadites swam the Jordan that they might rally round him. "On his march to Gilboa, and on his retreat, he was joined by some chiefs of the Manassites, through whose territory he was passing;" and his warm message afterwards to those members of that tribe, who had taken Saul's body from Bethshan, was both politic and generous.* While reigning still at Hebron, he had deputations from "all the tribes," specially from Levi and the sons of Issachar, "who had understanding

* 2 Sam. ii: 5–7.

of the times, to know what Israel ought to do;"* and in the consecration hymns at the reception of the Ark, "the two warlike tribes of the North, Zebulon and Naphthali, are conspicuous. It is evident that personal influence had much to do with the consolidation of the whole nation, when he founded his capital on the frontier line between Saul's tribe and his own. We must not dwell on the military organization of the kingdom, on the officials of the Court, and the foreign wars of this reign, which are described so completely by Dean Stanley. The one point on which chief stress is to be laid at this moment of the history, is Jerusalem. From the time when "the City of David" was made the center of the religious and political life of the nation, a new period was begun, rich in ever-growing prophecies of the Messiah. Jerusalem and David are inseparably connected, and lie in the heart of all our sacred associations. Even in the Gospels, Jerusalem is "the Holy City," "the City of the Great King.†" Even in the first great outburst of Pentecostal life we are reminded by an Apostle that David's sepulchre is there "unto this day."‡

The best Lectures in the book are, in our opinion, those which relate to Solomon. This was, perhaps, to be expected; for here we have the Jewish History and the Jewish Monarchy on their most strictly secular side. Nothing can surpass the admirable way in which the characteristics of his reign are gradually opened and spread out before us. It is pointed out truly (perhaps a little too strongly) in contrast with David, how few personal incidents are recorded of Solomon. But on the other hand, we have a large and rapid development of the relations of the Hebrew kingdom with foreign countries. The contemporary Egyptian monarch, whose name is made known to us in the Jewish annals themselves, may still be seen depicted on the walls of Karnac. "This reign contains the first historical record of the contact between Western Europe and Eastern India. In Solomon's fearless encouragement of ecclesiastical architecture is the first§ sanction of the employment of art in the service of a true religion. In his writings, and in the literature which springs from them, is the only Hebrew counterpart to the philosophy of Greece;" while in this thousandth year before the Christian era we are

* 1 Chron. xii: 32. † Matt. v: 35; xxvii: 53. ‡ Acts ii: 29.

§ But does not the Dean forget here Aholiab and Bezaleel, and what he said himself in his first volume, pp. 167–8?

"on a level" with the familiar beginning of the great Classical times. No contact of sacred history with general history—we may say, no contact of it with modern times—can possibly be more interesting. We must add, too, that here we have the beginning of that world-wide connection of Judaism with trade, which has subsisted ever since.

The "wisdom" with which Solomon was so highly favored is to be regarded chiefly as denoting practical sagacity, tact, discretion, a penetrating and comprehensive view of human character, with the power of managing public concerns on a large scale: and it is particularly to be remembered here how great a part of the duties of the Oriental monarch consisted in the administration of justice. In no respect were his practical wisdom and administrative ability more clearly shown than in his establishment and organization of Hebrew commerce. The public works of Solomon, and his internal arrangements for the safety, strength, and prosperity of his kingdom, are well described by Ewald in a few vigorous pages.* As to those external relations of which we are more particularly speaking, we see no reason to doubt that, north-eastward, in the direction of Syria and Mesopotamia, Tadmor is identical with Palmyra, and that, with Baalbec, it was established at this time as a mercantile depôt with a garrison. As regards Egypt, the King's unhappy marriage must alone have tended to keep and increase an active trade with that country; and it is interesting, too, to notice the nature of the imports and exports—a subject into which Dr. Stanley does not largely enter—horses and linen yarn in one direction, probably oil and wine in the other. But it is the mercantile intercourse with Phœnicia which more especially demands our attention. It is evident that the most elementary lessons of political economy suggest the advantage of a mutual interchange of products between that country and Palestine. There were indications of this feeling even in David's reign;† and at a much later period of Scripture History we are reminded‡ how naturally the country of Tyre and

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* "Geschichte des Volkes Israel" (2d Edit., 1853), iii, pp. 329–49. Dr. Stanley, though his treatment and grouping of his subjects is his own, shows an evident wish throughout the volume to express his obligations to the eminent German Historian of the Jews.

† 2 Sam. v: 11; 1 Chron. xiv: 1.

‡ Acts xii: 20.

Sidon might become dependent for its food on "the King's country," whether it were King Herod's or King Solomon's.

We see clearly that Solomon turned his active mind and powers of organization very vigorously in this direction. Hiram's fleets commanded all the commerce of the West. The Israelites themselves had had no experience in ship-building, and it was evidently not bad policy to place Tyrian rather than Edomite sailors in the ships which traded in the Eastern seas; while Phœnicia herself would obviously derive benefit from this large development of her mercantile relations.* Thus there resulted the two great navies which are connected with the names of Tarshish and Ophir. We see no valid reason against identifying these two regions with the South of Spain and the South of India; and all the difficulties of the Scriptural expressions seem to be sufficiently removed (as is suggested here in a note) by accepting that circumnavigation of Africa which Herodotus shows to have been probable at a very early period. Solomon went himself to Ezion-geber, on the Red Sea, to see the preparations for some of these voyages;† and most interesting it is, in connection with this subject, to notice in the Book of Proverbs the frequent allusions to trade and to commercial products, while even sea-sickness is employed there to point a warning for the shameful drunkard.‡ And far down in the Hebrew annals we see the effects of this mercantile greatness of the reign of Solomon. The head of the Gulf of Akabah is again, though unsuccessfully, made the scene of mercantile enterprise under Jehoshaphat, in conjunction with a foreign alliance; and still later, we see efforts of the same kind in the reign of Uzziah; while in the time of Ahaz, the loss of the seaport of Elath is one of the indications of the waning powers of Judah.

The articles, too, of this Solomonian trade form a very attractive subject of research. Thus, one precious import, which might come by either the eastern or western fleet, reappears frequently in the history, in the "throne of ivory" of the kings of Judah, in the "ivory palaces" of the forty-fifth Psalm,—whatever the

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* Some of the best chapters in the late Dr. Kitto's "Daily Bible Illustrations," are those which relate to Solomon. See especially "The Wisdom of Solomon," "The Royal Merchant," and "Trade with Egypt," in the volume on the Kings; and "The Garden and the Pool," in the volume on the Poetical Books.

† 2 Chron. viii: 17.

‡ Prov. xxiii: 34.

occasion or scene of that Psalm may be,—in the "ivory house" which Ahab made, in the "beds of ivory" for which Amos blames the luxurious nobles of the North. But above all a strange interest is connected, not simply with the spices and precious metals and fragrant algum wood,* but still more with the monkeys and peacocks, the very names of which associate them with Southern India, and with the Southern India of that particular period.† With the mention of these animals we come upon another side of Solomon's activity. We see here partly, perhaps, the love of display, but we appear to see also something of the exercise of his wisdom in the direction of science. And if this curiosity was manifested by him in reference to the animal world, we can hardly imagine him indifferent to the world of plants. "I made me gardens and orchards," he says in the Book of Ecclesiastes, "and I planted trees in them of all kinds of fruits: I made me pools of water, to water therewith the wood that bringeth forth trees."‡ And if, as some travellers assert, there are near the traditional pools of Solomon, "a number of plants, self-sown from age to age, which do not exist in any other part of the Holy Land,§ we have a confirmation of a very natural conjecture, and there still remains a trace not only of the Royal Merchant, but of the Royal Naturalist, "who spake of trees, from the cedar tree that is in Lebanon even unto the hyssop that springeth out of the wall: he spake also"—and here the classification is really scientific—"of beasts, and of fowl, and of creeping things, and of fishes."‖

This train of thought leads us to the consideration of those books of Holy Scripture which we are always in the habit of associating with King Solomon; and it is very satisfactory to find that Dr. Stanley does most distinctly associate with this monarch both the Proverbs and Ecclesiastes.¶ He might indeed, even if the evidence had been less strong, have been under some

* See the article on "Algum wood," by Dr. Forbes Royle, in Kitto's "Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature."

† See Max Müller, "Lect. on the Science of Language," pp. 204–6.

‡ Eccles. ii: 5, 6. § "Daily Bible Illustrations:" "Solomon and the Kings," p. 101.

‖ 1 Kings iv: 33.

¶ The Proverbs are explicitly assigned (p. 243) to Solomon as their chief author; and of Ecclesiastes it is said (p. 255), that "there can be no doubt that it embodies the sentiments which were believed to have proceeded from him at the close of his life."

temptation to accept this conclusion for the sake of its attractive symmetry, and the great help which it gives for completing the picture of Solomon. And we think he has in some degree yielded to this temptation, in assigning, with M. Renan, so confidently to this age the derivation of the Book of Job. It is true there is force in the arguments, that the allusions to such animals as the peacock and the hippopotamus lead us naturally to think of Solomon's collections, and again, that the Gentile relations of the book are in keeping with the wide and general scope of his life and reign. But the conclusion is far more precarious in this case, than with regard to those other two books which the Church has always connected with his name. And certainly those books help us to fill up, in a very instructive and pathetic manner, the full proportions of his biography.* The Book of Proverbs is truly in harmony with all our impressions of Solomon, while it holds, as Dr. Stanley shows, a most important place in the sacred Canon. "It is the philosophy of practical life. It is the sign to us that the Bible does not despise common sense and discretion. It impresses upon us, in the most forcible manner, the value of intelligence and prudence, and of a good education; while its method of teaching, "the illustrations from natural objects, the selection of the homelier instead of the grander of them," carry our thoughts onward to the Parables, and to Him who taught in "Solomon's Porch," and who referred with emphasis to "the wisdom of Solomon." Still closer, though more melancholy, does the connection seem between the Book of Ecclesiastes and this prosperous unhappy monarch. "It is the bitter, the agonized, and in this sense the most true and characteristic, utterance of one who has known all things, enjoyed all things, been admired by all men, has seen through all the littleness and worthlessness of all these things in themselves, and yet not been able to grasp that which alone could give them an enduring value, or compensate for their absence." No part of the Bible is more sad, none more seriously instructive, than the account of the later years of Solomon. Worldly splendor and voluptuous habits had brought on satiety. Selfish despotism had sown the seed of future revolu-

* It should be added, that Dr. Stanley assigns the Canticles also to "the age, if not to the pen of" Solomon, and associates that book with a supposed favorite resort of the King near Lebanon, overlooking the plain of Damascus. See pp. 198, 240.

tion. The enemies of that superb kingdom were gathering on the frontier. This part of the Scriptural narrative "contains the most striking witness to the instability of all power that is divorced from moral and religious principle. It is clear that Dr. Stanley—great as is the evident pleasure with which he has elaborated his account of this reign—is far from extending to Solomon that sympathy which he gives so ungrudgingly to the impulsive and inconsistent Saul. No worse character could be assigned to any man than the description given of the career of David's successor, namely, that it was "the union of genius and crime."

After the death of Solomon we enter very rapidly on the diverging histories of the two separated kingdoms. The causes, so well drawn out by Professor Blunt, which even in the reigns of David and Solomon were silently preparing the way for division, are clearly indicated.* The great house of Joseph, which had received the patriarch's special blessing, could not easily forget the glory of Joshua, Gideon, Jephthah and Samuel, or see with patience the political and religious preëminence of Shechem and Shiloh merged in Jerusalem. It needed only the foolish oppression of Rehoboam, and the appearance of the popular JEROBOAM on the scene, to excite disaffection and complete the revolution. The connection of Jeroboam with Egypt is one most interesting and significant part of this narrative. Thither he had been banished by Solomon; and there—"like his ancestor Joseph"—he acquired so much influence, that the reigning monarch, Shishak, parted from him reluctantly, and gave him an Egyptian princess in marriage. The subsequent progress of Jewish history was most seriously affected by this connection. We find Rehoboam, when strenghening himself in his restricted kingdom, giving prompt and great attention not only to the fortification of the metropolis, but to garrisons along his southern frontier. "The reason for this soon became apparent. The great Egyptian monarchy was not now allied with the House of Solomon, but with the House of Jeroboam; and now, for the first time since the Exodus, Judah was once more threatened with an Egyptian bondage." Jerusalem was actually captured, and the Temple lost its golden shields. But again it was in Egypt that Jeroboam had become familiar with those outward

* See Blunt's "Undesigned Coincidences," Pt. ii, 15.

forms under which the Divine Power was represented and worshiped; and hence came the suggestion, not only of the golden calves that were set up in Bethel and Dan, but also of the formula which attended this profane consecration,—"Behold thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt."* The mark which Jeroboam set at this moment on Hebrew history, and the mark which God set on Jeroboam, are impressive for all time.

From this point the Dean of Westminster gives the annals of the two kingdoms in several lucid, learned and instructive lectures. In his general arrangement he does not exactly pursue the plan of Ewald. But first he follows the kingdom of Israel to its close in the Assyrian exile, and the introduction of the new settlers; and thence he goes back to resume the history of the kingdom of Judah, which then he conducts continuously to the fall of Jerusalem and the Babylonian Captivity. If there is some disadvantage in following separately and in succession, from their source, two streams which are not only parallel, but very close together, there is gained on the other hand great clearness of representation. This plan, too, is peculiarly suitable to a volume of Lectures; nor is it difficult to combine the two histories at any point.

As to the spirit and tone in which this work is done, we must say that Dr. Stanley seems to us to have made too little of the evil of separation and of the idolatry with which it was connected: and we think that the impression derived from these pages is not quite in harmony with the feeling left by Holy Scripture in the mind. But leaving this topic for the present, we must here call attention to the instructive way in which the author sets before us some of the contrasts of the Northern and Southern kingdoms.

Even in the outward aspect of the two territories there is a signal discrepancy. "The fertility, the freshness, the beauty of Ephraim and Manasseh, the wild forest scenery of Zebulon and Naphthali," are even now remarked by all travellers as opposed to the barrenness and bareness of Judah and Benjamin. Nor was this contrast without its effect on the course of the history. Scenes like these in the North may possibly have had some share

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* 1 Kings xii: 28.

in producing the "force and freedom," the "life and energy," of some of its characters, which appear, as the author remarks, "nowhere equally in the South." And it must necessarily have had some influence in reference to another characteristic of the Israelitish kingdom. Here "the Court was not, as in Judah, confined to a single capital. Shechem, in spite of its unrivalled attractions, never became to the North what Jerusalem was to the South. The sovereigns of Israel followed the tendency by which Princes of all times have been led to select pleasant residences apart from the great cities of state. This difference arose partly from the absence of fixed religious associations at Shechem, partly from the succession of dynasties. It was also fostered by the greater opportunities furnished in the North for such an increase of royal residences. In the territory of Ephraim—in this respect the exact reverse of Judah—the fertile plains and wooded hills, which are its characteristic ornaments, at once gave an opening for the formation of parks and pleasure-grounds like the 'Paradises' of the Assyrian and Persian monarchies. The first of these was Tirzah, in the hills north of Shechem, of proverbial beauty, selected by Jeroboam, and during three reigns the residence and burial-place of the royal house. Another was Jezreel. The chief of all was Samaria, which ultimately superseded all the rest." And what was true of the monarch was true in its degree, and for the same reason, of the nobles of the North. Our attention is rightly called to "the stately independence of Naboth in his vineyard at Jezreel," to "the lofty hill of Shemer, which he would sell to the King only at a vast price," to "the great lady of Shunem in her well-known home on the slopes of Esdraelon."

Other elements of contrast enter more deeply into religious realities. Dr. Stanley presents to us the history of the Northern kingdom as the history of the "nation," while the history of the Southern is rather that of a "dynasty" and a "city." To this distinction we must somewhat demur. The concession is immense which allows to the South the unbroken dynasty of David and the Holy City of Jerusalem. It is true that ten tribes were rent from the twelve to form the new political community; that "all Israel"* is described as following Jeroboam; that the "God of Israel"† sanctioned not only this original division, but likewise

* 1 Kings xii: 20.

† 1 Kings xi: 31; 2 Kings ix: 6.

at least one subsequent step of its progress, in the appointment of Jehu. But our author so speaks of this community by the word "national," as almost to imply some preference of it over the other community. And this view appears to color some of his minor references and illustrations. Thus the "twelve stones" of Elijah's altar on Carmel, which we are always disposed to view as a symbol of the union which ought to be, Dr. Stanley presents to us as a symbolic sanction of the disunion that is. The aspect under which he exhibits the subject in another place is far more religiously and instructively true, namely, that God's grace comes to help when discouragements seem darkest, and overflows what we might conceive to be its appointed channels. For whatever we may say of the "National" character of the Northern kingdom, its "Prophetical" character is undoubted. During the period which is immediately before us, the activity of the Prophets, the schools of the Prophets, are associated with the North, while Prophecy was comparatively a blank in the South. There the main interest is centralized in Jerusalem, in the Temple and in the Priesthood. The contrast indeed, so far as this particular period is concerned, may be approximately summed up in the antithesis between the Priest and the Prophet,—while it is never for a moment doubtful to which side the preference of Dr. Stanley inclines.

Unwritten prophecy rises to its highest point in ELIJAH, at the very time when the apostasy (for so we must still call it) of the ten tribes sinks to its lowest point in AHAB and JEZEBEL. The biographical interest of these three characters is immense. The crisis was tremendous. "For the first time, the chief wife of an Israelite king was one of the old accursed Canaanite race." The marriage with Jezebel seems to have resulted in an organized effort not only to establish the false and foul divinities of Tyre and Sidon, but to root out even the modified remembrance of Jehovah, which was kept up by Jeroboam's institutions. She stands forth in the history as a Queen utterly reckless and licentious in character, and yet with a strange "magical fascination," —fierce—stern—regardless of consequences, and with a spirit quite unbroken even in the terrible retribution of her end. That name, which was a proverb among the Israelite people, might well become the warning of Christendom in the Apoca-

lypse.* The weakness of the husband, contrasted with the strength of the wife, comes before us as one of the most instructive and impressive portraitures of Scripture. And yet there is almost a certain pathos in Ahab's character; at least there is a particular aspect of his weakness, which gives definiteness to the individuality of the picture. We are rightly reminded of that "peculiar mood of sadness" which is described on two occasions in him, and "in no one else."† In the character also of Elijah there is a pathetic side. He is indeed the "public champion" of God and of the cause of God; but first we see him "as an individual sufferer." There is much tenderness in the recollections of Cherith and Zarephath, and almost more in the last scene of all, when the separation from Elisha was impending with the young prophets looking on from the ledges of Jordan. Elijah, too, has his weakness,—in the dejection and impatience at Beersheba, and the unbelief which led him to suppose himself alone in his loyalty to Jehovah. But all this only enhances and brings out into relief the magnificence of his rugged nature, and the fearlessness with which his mission was discharged. "He stood alone against Jezebel; vindicated the true religion from the nearest danger of overthrow; and set at defiance by invisible power the whole forces of the Israelite kingdom." Elijah's position is forcibly set forth by Dr. Stanley, both as a Prophet and as a precursor of Prophets, and especially the latter. He says that, like Luther, he was "a Reformer, not a Theologian." This perhaps is hardly fair either to Luther or Elijah; for each of these men is surely in some degree to be valued "for what he said," as well as for "what he did." Still it is true in the case of the Tishbite, that attention is called to him rather for what he "destroyed" than for what he "created." And certainly "for this, his special mission, his life and appearance especially qualified him." All his wildness—his isolation—his roughness—the suddenness of his appearances—his swiftness of foot and unexhausted endurance—his rough garb—the long shaggy hair flowing over his back—and his large rough mantle of sheepskin—are here most vividly depicted. Some of the most animated and impressive descriptions are found, as might be expected, in this part of the volume, such as the account of the storm and stillness on

* 2 Kings ix: 22; Rev. ii: 20.

† See 1 Kings xx: 43; xxi: 4.

Horeb, and of the uproar and wild fanaticism of the idolatrous priests on Carmel. The concluding scene of that critical occasion is set before us with remarkable life and beauty; and the quotation may be given with advantage before we pass on to Elisha. The Prophet was on a declivity lower than the top of the mountain, "in the Oriental attitude of entire abstraction;" the attendant boy was on "the highest ridge of all," whence there is a wide view westward over the blue Mediterranean. "The sun must have been now gone down. But the cloudless sky would be lit up by the long bright glow which succeeds an Eastern sunset. Seven times the youthful watcher ascended and looked; and seven times 'there was nothing.' The sky was still clear; the sea was still calm. At last, out of the far horizon there rose a little cloud, the first that for days and months had passed across the heavens, and it grew in the deepening shades of evening, and quickly the whole sky was overcast, and the forests of Carmel shook in the welcome sounds of those mighty winds which in Eastern regions precede a coming tempest. Each from his separate height the King and the Prophet descended. The cry of the boy from his mountain watch had hardly been uttered when the storm broke upon the plain, and the torrent of Kishon began to swell. The King had not a moment to lose, lest he should be unable to reach Jezreel. He mounted his chariot at the foot of the hill. And Elijah was touched as by a supporting hand: and he snatched up his streaming mantle and twisted it round his loins, and amidst the rushing storm with which the night closed in, he outstripped even the speed of the royal horses, and ran before the chariot—as the Bedouins of his native Gilead would still run—with inexhaustible strength, to the entrance of Jezreel, distant though visible from the scene of his triumph."

Two short and very beautiful Lectures follow, of which Elisha and Jehu are the contrasted heroes: and here again the biographical interest is very great. One sentence in the lecture on Elijah gives the connection well between the former period and this. The Tishbite thought in Horeb "that his work was over:" but it was "only begun." He was still "to anoint Gentile and Hebrew, King and Prophet." "In the three next names, Hazael, Jehu, Elisha, is contained the history of the next generation of Israel." The name of Hazael belongs to the subject of Syria, to which we shall come immediately. As to the other two names,

—the abrupt call of Nimshi's son—his deep reserve and tenacity of purpose—the terrible rapidity of his movements—his mad driving up to Jezreel—the death of the two kings—the brief grim allusion, in the words addressed to Bidkar, to the time when they two sat together behind Ahab's chariot—the curious episode of Jehonadab—the unsparing slaughter of the members of the last royal family—the utter destruction of Baal's images and Baal's priests—the establishment of his own dynasty on the throne—are all given in the most lively narrative. The name of Elisha demands a longer pause; and we cannot do better than give, in Dean Stanley's own words, the general impression of Elijah's successor. "The succession was close and immediate, but it was a succession of contrast. . . . Elisha was not secluded in mountain fastnesses, but dwelt in his own house in the royal city; or lingered amidst the sons of the Prophets, within the precincts of ancient colleges; . . . or was sought out by admiring disciples in some town on Carmel, or by the pass of Dothan; or was received in some quiet balcony, overlooking the plain of Esdraelon, where bed and table and seat had been prepared for him by pious hands. His life was not spent, like his predecessor's, in unavailing struggle, but in widespread successes. . . . His deeds were not of wild terror, but of gracious, soothing, homely beneficence, bound up with the ordinary tenor of human life. When he smites with blindness, it is that he may remove it again; when he predicts, it is the prediction of plenty, not of famine. . . . At his house by Jericho the bitter spring is sweetened; for the widow of one of the prophets the oil is increased; even the workmen at the prophets' huts are not to lose the axehead which has fallen through the thickets of Jordan into the eddying stream; the young prophets, at their common meal, are saved from the deadly herbs which had been poured from the blanket of one of them into the caldron, and enjoy the multiplied provision of corn." And the lesson is strikingly drawn from this contrast of the two great Israelitish Prophets,—a lesson all the more valuable, because it is applicable to all men in common times. "Elisha was greater yet less, less yet greater, than Elijah. He is less. . . . We cannot dispense with the mighty past even when we have shot far beyond it. . . . Those who follow cannot be as those who went before. A prophet like Elijah comes once and does not return. Elisha, both to his countrymen

and to us, is but the successor, the faint reflection of his predecessor. . . . Less, yet greater. For the work of the great ones of this earth is carried on by far inferior instruments but on a far wider scale, and it may be in a far higher spirit. The life of an Elijah is never spent in vain. Even his death has not taken him from us. He struggles, single-handed as it would seem, and without effect; and in the very crisis of the nation's history is suddenly and mysteriously removed. But his work continues; his mantle falls; his teaching spreads; his enemies perish. The Prophet preaches and teaches, the martyr dies and passes away; but other men enter into his labors. . . . What was begun in fire and storm, in solitude and awful visions, must be carried on through winning arts, and healing acts, and gentle words of peaceful and social intercourse; not in the desert of Horeb, or on the top of Carmel, but in the crowded thoroughfares of Samaria, in the gardens of Damascus, by the rushing waters of Jordan."

But there is another side to the character and career of Elisha. During his whole life, as well as during that of Elijah, Syria and the Syrian wars form the dark though varied background of the history. Much earlier, indeed, premonitions had occurred of the struggle which the Chosen People would be required to maintain with that kingdom of which Damascus was the capital. During David's reign two of the sons of Zeruiah had conducted campaigns in this direction; the metropolis had been taken; the Israelite empire extended to the Euphrates and the Orontes; and those golden shields were brought to Jerusalem, which were the destined ornaments of Solomon's temple, and the loss of which has been mentioned above. In Solomon's own reign the power of the Jewish crown was easily reasserted; and how strong its hold was over this north-eastern territory is sufficiently shown by what has been said before of Baalbec and Palmyra. But when the Northern and Southern kingdoms were separated, the Syrians grew stronger as the Israelites became weaker through division. These wars belong more to the Northern kingdom than to the Southern: but they touch them both very seriously; and they bring them both before our view together. The alliance of Ahab and Jehosophat in the earlier part of this period is reproduced in the alliance of Joram and Ahaziah in the later. Ramoth-gilead is, so to speak, the local link between the two histories, as Athaliah, daughter of Ahab, daughter-in-law of Jehosophat, is the personal link. Both

these points of connection are set before us by Dr. Stanley with much force and distinctness. For the significant history of that Princess who carried into the veins of Judah the poison introduced by Jezebel into those of Israel, appropriate use is made of Racine's finely conceived "Athalie." To see the significance of "the great frontier fortress,"—"the rallying-point of the Trans-Jordanic tribes,"—it is enough to adduce the questions asked when consultation was held regarding the undertaking of the war —"Know ye that Ramoth-gilead is ours, and we be still, and take it not out of the hand of the King of Syria?" "Shall I go against Ramoth-gilead, or shall I forbear?" or the question raised "when a cloud of dust was seen approaching Jezreel from the East,"—"Is it peace in Ramoth-gilead?"* To follow all the alternations of the war—the possession of "streets" in Samaria by the Syrians—the possession of "streets" in Damascus by the Israelites—the giving up of the sacred treasures of Jerusalem by Joash—the league of Asa with the Syrians against Israel, revenged long afterwards by the league of Israel with the Syrians against Hezekiah,—to relate all this is impossible. The highest interest of these Syrian wars is concentrated in the biography of Elisha. In the terrible siege of Samaria he becomes the support of his countrymen, "the life and soul of the patriotic party in the invaded kingdom," and the means of baffling the Syrian King. But besides this, we are reminded that he is the Prophet of Syria as well as of Israel, and that in this respect he marks an epoch. "It is from his time that the Prophets of Israel appear as the oracles, as the monitors, not only of Israel, but of the surrounding nations." This "larger comprehensiveness" is eagerly seized upon by Dean Stanley, who notes with evident satisfaction that it is this feature of his character which is caught in the only reference to him which the New Testament contains.† But this passage concerning Naaman tempts us to a word of adverse criticism. Two things in this part of Elisha's life are noted as instances of victory over exclusiveness, and as indications of "a gentle and catholic spirit," namely the injunction to the King not to kill those whom he has not taken as prisoners of war, and the permission which is understood as accorded to the Syrian to perform the customary act of devotion to the false god Rimmon.

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* 1 Kings xxii: 3, 6, 15; 2 Kings ix: 18.

† Luke iv: 27.

Now certainly both these acts may be included under such general terms as "liberality" and "comprehensiveness:" but to be merciful to an enemy and to take part in idolatry are "comprehensive" and "liberal" in two very different senses: and it appears to us very doubtful whether the simple "Go in peace" implies any such definite sanction at all. To conclude, however, with the two scenes which close the career of Elisha in connection with Syria. He is once in Damascus itself; and his interview with Hazael, perplexing as it is, displays human emotion to a degree not usual with the Hebrew Prophets. He speaks indeed "as one constrained by some overruling power:" but "the foreboding of national calamity" causes tears to rush into his eyes. And the last scene of all is very affecting, when "Elisha was fallen sick of the sickness whereof he died," and the old Prophet laid his hand on the King's hand, and the arrow was shot through the eastward window,—"the arrow of the Lord's deliverance, the arrow of deliverance from Syria."* Speedily and very effectually —and with great results for the appointed time—was this vivid prophecy fulfilled by Jeroboam II.

But at the period at which we are now arrived another power appeared on the Eastern horizon, more formidable than that of Syria. Nineveh now becomes the dread name at which the hearts both of Israel and of Judah are made to tremble. It was probably the growing might of Assyria which had made the successes against the Syrians possible. In another respect, too, this moment is a marked epoch in the Jewish annals. Now appear the Prophets, whose utterances were committed to writing, and whose writings have come down to us. The earlier cycle of the Minor Prophets, from Jonah and Joel to Nahum and Habbakuk, including likewise Amos, Hosea, Micah and Zephaniah, covers all the ground of the history from the conquests of Jeroboam II, in Israel to the reforms of Josiah in Judah. The later cycle, including Obadiah, with Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, does not fall within the chronological range of this volume. There is no more instructive method of grouping into one view the incidents of these 250 years, than to consider them in connection with the warnings and encouragements of this older cycle of prophecy, defined as above. For the elucidation of the five earliest of all these

* 2 Kings xiii: 14–19.

Prophets we have now the great advantage of Dr. Pusey's devout and elaborate commentary; while for the connection of all these Minor Prophets with the History, we have the extraordinary penetration and ingenuity of Ewald. There is, indeed, a shrewd and very true remark made by Dean Milman in the Preface to the last edition of his "History of the Jews," to this effect, that it would be satisfactory to see Ewald criticised by an Ewald; but it seems agreed by all Biblical scholars that this acute and able, but far too self-confident writer, has, by putting together scattered notices in the Prophets, which might easily be overlooked, thrown marvellous light on the history of the Jewish monarchy. The period before us is of course divided into two portions, by the destruction of the Northern kingdom, the Assyrian Captivity, and the first establishment of the Samaritans in Palestine. In the earlier of these portions, for about a hundred years, taking our commencement from Uzziah in the Southern kingdom, and the second Jeroboam in the Northern, we have Jonah, Joel, Amos, and Hosea as the great moral teachers of the time. Jonah stands indeed apart, calling our attention to the heathen Nineveh, not to anything which is taking place in Israel or in Judah. We conceive that Dr. Stanley is quite correct in making him the earliest of the Minor Prophets; and whatever be the difficulties connected with Jonah's voyage and mission, the Dean has pointed out convincingly the high and permanent moral lessons of this part of the Scriptural Record. Meanwhile, two Prophets describe, in poetry and parables, the moral corruption of the Northern kingdom, and the need there was of some consolation for the few righteous who remained. Amos—rich in all the pastoral imagery drawn from the neighborhood of his native Tekoa,—Hosea—with lessons colored and strengthened by his own bitter experience—give us a terrible picture of the prevalence of drunkenness, extending even to the ladies of Samaria,* and with this shameful vice, its attendant evils of dishonesty, oppression, profanity, and impurity. The vigorous invectives of these religious teachers are true for all times of luxury and self-indulgence. We are reminded that when Savonarola "wished to denounce the sins of Florence, he used the Prophets of this period as his text-book. His sermons on Amos are almost like

* Hosea iv: 1.

Amos himself come to life again." So too are the encouragements of these Prophets of perpetual force, even in the worst of times. Nowhere in any part of the Old Testament do we see more clearly than in Hosea, "the power of the forgiving love of God." Meanwhile the moral condition of the Southern kingdom was not greatly better, notwithstanding the continuance of the line of David, and the possession of the Temple and the legitimate Priesthood. The religious reaction under Joash and Jehoiada had led to very imperfect results. The observances of worship indeed were strictly kept up, but (as has been too often the case since) side by side with luxury and vice. The "nobles" of Judah appear now as a conspicuous class, accumulating wealth, oppressing the poor, and leading lives of profligate display. Meanwhile calamities of various kinds were closing round the country. The plague of locusts, which fills the dirge-like poem of JOEL, was doubtless a literal reality; but it was also an image of a worse and more relentless foe, which threatened the throne and the people. Now, too, the Northern tribes having been dispersed and replaced by an alien population, Judah was more than ever at the mercy of Assyria. With MICAH—still sterner than Joel in his denunciations, still more distinct in his prophecy of blessing in the far off distance—we come to the contemporaries of the great Isaiah. "The reign of HEZEKIAH is the culminating point of interest in the history of the Kings of Judah." Still his diligent reformation of Religion, and his deliverance from Sennacherib, did not save the country, but only delayed its destruction. The corrupt and disgraceful reign of Manasseh followed. At this period, Palestine was the debatable ground between the two mighty monarchies of Egypt on one side, and Assyria on the other. The convulsions of the time, too, were made more terrible by that inroad of the Scythians which left its trace not only in the name, Scythopolis, which the old city of Beth-shan received, but also in the writings of the contemporary Prophets. At this time ZEPHANIAH (from whom the opening words of the "*Dies Iræ*" have been borrowed) is "the herald of the great catastrophe which, step by step, he sees advancing," and "looks out, according to the full meaning of his name,—the Watchman of Jehovah,—over the wide and awful prospect, in which nation after nation passes in review before him;" and Nahum sings in what have been well called "unrivalled lyrics," the dirge of

Nineveh, which soon finally "vanishes from view, to be no more seen till in our day the discovery of her buried remains has given new life to the whole of this portion of sacred history;" while HABAKKUK, in the prospect of all this general overthrow, proclaims the principle of all true religious recovery, in the words—twice quoted in the New Testament—"The just shall live by his faith." The monarchy of Judah has one more gleam in the reign of JOSIAH, but it is only momentary. Great as was the permanent example of that King for all future reformers, the amendment in his own age did not reach below the surface. His own fate was sudden and disastrous. Venturing to oppose the Egyptians in their northward march, he fell in the plain of Esdraelon, and was brought to Jerusalem to die. His elegy was composed by Jeremiah, who now appears on the scene; and the mourning of that day was never effaced from the memory of the Jews.*

The long Lecture on JEREMIAH, blending as it does the biography of that Prophet with the story of the final catastrophe of Judah and Jerusalem, is one of the most interesting, most original and instructive. If, in this short sketch and criticism of the book, we have hitherto mentioned only the minor Prophets, and now conclude simply with Jeremiah, it must not be supposed that Isaiah and Ezekiel find no place in our author's pages. The former has his due preëminence assigned to him, both historically and theologically; and the latter comes forward to play his great and solemn part in the very last scene of the great Hebrew drama.† But our space is limited, and is now rapidly narrowing to its end; and Jeremiah deserves our especial attention, from the touching traits of personal character with which he stands out amid amid the crash of his country's hopes.‡ The pathos of the man corresponds with the pathos of the history; and the Decline and Fall of the Monarchy, and the personal sorrows and bitter experiences of the Prophet, are together told with much feeling in the Lecture before us.

After the dispersion of the ten tribes, Assyria waned before

* 2 Chron. xxxv: 25; Zech. xii: 11–14.

† Daniel is just beyond the range of this volume. Thus the important questions connected with that book are only mentioned in general terms.

‡ Ewald's "Propheten" (1840–2) has been published many years; but the introductory matter concerning Jeremiah is very copious. Neumann, in his recent Commentary ("Jeremias," 1856–8, p. 16), points out the close personal links which this prophet has with the history of his times.

Chaldæa, or rather the empire of Nineveh was merged in that of Babylon. This transition of the history has been well given in Professor Rawlinson's latest volume, with a description of the Babylonians, or (as the Scripture calls them) "the Chaldæans, that bitter and hasty nation,"—their high civilization, their learning and trade; with a description also of the character and policy, and terrible cruelty, of Nebuchadnezzar.* And especially we may call attention to his geographical account of that long avenue between the parallel ridges of Lebanon, that "Hollow Syria" (stretching southwards from "the entrance of Hamath") which was the magnificent high-road of the Babylonian armies on their march to Palestine.† Nebuchadnezzar defeated Pharaoh-necho at Carchemish on the Euphrates, and rapidly became master of the whole country to the Egyptian frontier. Then follow the brief reigns and dwindling power of Jehoiakim and Jeconiah, the Babylonian occupation of Jerusalem, the desecration of the Temple, and the beginnings of the Captivity. "The nation reeled under the blow. It seemed to them as if the signet ring of His promises were torn off from the hand of God Himself. It could hardly be believed that the young Prince, the last of his race, should be cast away like a broken idol, a despised vessel, and that the voice of the young lion should be no more heard on the mountains of Israel, that the topmost and tenderest shoot of the royal cedar-tree should have been plucked off by the Eagle of the East, and planted far away in the merchant city of the Euphrates. From the top of Lebanon, from the hights of Bashan, from the ridges of Abarim, the widowed country shrieked aloud, as she saw the train of her captive King and nobles disappearing in the distant East. From the hights of Hermon, from the top of Mizar, it is no improbable conjecture that the departing King poured forth that exquisitely plaintive song, in which, from the deep disquietude of his heart, he longs after the presence of God in the Temple, and pleads his cause against the impious nation, the treacherous and unjust man who, in spite of plighted faith, had torn him away from his beloved home. With straining eyes the Jewish people and Prophets still hung on the hope that their lost Prince would be speed-

* "The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World," vol. iii, pp. 328, 489, 496, 501.

† Rawlinson, p. 251.

ily restored to them. The gate through which he left the city was walled up, like that by which the last Moorish king left Granada, and was long known as the gate of Jeconiah. From his captivity, as from a decisive era, the subsequent years of the history were reckoned." The foolish resistance of Zedekiah led only to the terrible siege and destruction of Jerusalem, and he himself was carried off an exile, and brought before Nebuchadnezzar at "Riblah in the land of Hamath,"—the above-mentioned meeting-point of all Eastern roads,—where the conqueror "was encamped, awaiting the double result of the sieges of Jerusalem and of Tyre." It is hardly necessary to mention that last shred of the history which is furnished by the tragedy of Gedaliah. "The Lamentations of Jeremiah" are its natural close.

But besides this cloud of sorrow from without, under which the Prophet lived, he had to suffer from the wretchedness of discord and party spirit within the city itself. The mutual distrust which divided friends from one another; the insolent resistance of the King to Divine warnings; the opposition of false prophets; the party of the nobles who still clung to heathen idolatry; the superstition of the Jewish priests, who thought that the Temple itself would be a charm against danger,—these things must be well considered before we can appreciate the long agony of Jeremiah, his tender sympathy and noble firmness. He is the central figure in all this suffering and disgrace; and a careful study of his prophecies in conjunction with the history, brings him before us in most distinct individual characteristics. We perceive this all the more clearly if we contrast him with Isaiah, whose personality was, as it were, merged in his prophecy, and with Ezekiel, whose residence on the Chebar dissociates him from Jerusalem, while the peculiar structure and subjects of his writings make us think far more of his visions than of the man. Dean Stanley has naturally compared Jeremiah with St. Paul; and this parallelism might with justice have been carried further still. Not only in the "fascination," on the one hand, which he exercised over his friends, and "the tender sympathy which they received from him," and on the other hand, in the solitude of great part of his mission, when he "had no man likeminded with him,"—is there a similarity of character and experience between the Prophet and the Apostle; but there is the same commanding inspiration combined with strongly marked individuality—the

same intrepid courage combined with shrinking sensitiveness—the same deep love for Jerusalem—the same rapid alternations of style, expressive of sudden interchanges of feeling. We might even pursue the comparison into minor details. Jeremiah, like St. Paul, lived a life of celibacy; he was exposed to imminent danger in the very Temple precincts; he was more than once imprisoned, sometimes "with a certain amount of freedom;" and Baruch, like Onesiphorus, was "not ashamed of his chain." Such details enhance very much the interest with which we contemplate the attitude of Jeremiah in this last crisis of his country's ruin. Such human weakness, if we can call it weakness, gives a higher elevation to his holy testimony and example. Naturally "the most retiring, the most plaintive" of all the Prophets—in the midst of terror from without, and of faction, selfishness, prejudice, heathenism within,—still he is "the solitary fortress, the column of iron, the wall of brass, undismayed, unconfounded—the one grand, immovable figure, which alone redeems the miserable downfall of his country from triviality and shame; for forty years, day by day, at early morning, standing to deliver his mournful warnings, his searching rebukes, in the royal chamber or in the Temple court:" and this spirit continued to the end, with the combination also of most practical wisdom and prudence, till the captivity was complete, and he died, himself an exile, probably in Egypt. We cannot wonder that a peculiar feeling of the dignity of Jeremiah and the significance of his career continued afterwards among all generations of the Jews. So great was his traditional fame, that he has been called the Patron Saint of Judæa. We read of his appearing to Judas Maccabæus "with gray hairs, exceeding glorious, of a wonderful and excellent majesty." "As time rolled on, he became the chief representative of the whole prophetic order"—and this feeling in regard to him may illustrate, though it does not explain, that reference to him in one of the Gospels, which has puzzled the theologians of every age.*

Three subjects lie in the background of nearly all this history, and are made the occasion of separate and very important Lectures,—the Psalter, the Temple, and the Priesthood. The first two of these subjects are, for different reasons, in the highest

* Matt. xxvii: 9.

degree, attractive: but the third assumes peculiar importance in this volume, because it was omitted in the former. It was felt to be very strange that, in an account of the first establishment of Jewish institutions, scant notice should be taken of that sacrificial system which, by express Divine appointment, was one of its most prominent characteristics. Nor even now, when all the Hebrew annals have been unrolled before us, from the call of Abraham to the captivity of Jerusalem, do we think that due prominence is given to the Priesthood and the Sacrifices. There seems throughout to be, not indeed an undue enthusiasm for the Prophets, but an undue repugnance to the Priests; and the record in the Book of Chronicles seems always to be set before us as liable to considerable suspicion from its sacerdotal bias. Yet it was the Priests who saved Joash from the fury of Athaliah, and became the guardians of the Monarchy at a critical time: and, setting aside all questions of inspiration, it does not seem fair, in the case of a people divinely provided with the priestly element, that its annals as presented on the priestly side should fail to have our confidence.* But it is as we approach the bearing of Sacrifice on Christian doctrine and Christian experience, that the question assumes its most serious importance. The whole subject is discussed here with far too little reference to the Epistle to the Hebrews: and when that Epistle is quoted, its language is presented to us too much as if it were mere illustration taken from the Old Testament, as it were, accidentally. But we crave something more than this when we look steadily at the whole Epistle, and think closely of the significant connection of the two dispensations, and when we combine with all this the reference in other parts of the New Testament to "the Lamb which taketh away the sin of the world," to "the Paschal Lamb sacrificed for us," to "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." Most true it is that the blood of dumb animals "cannot take away sin:"† and most true that David says, in the hour of his deepest repentance, "Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it Thee;"‡ but his allusion

* Dean Milman's remarks on this subject ("Hist. of the Jews," third edit., i, 362) are in a different tone. See also his note on the Book of Chronicles, p. 329.

† On the Efficacy of the Mosaic Sacrifices, see Macdonnell's "Donnellan Lectures on the Atonement," App. to Lect. I.

‡ Psa. li: 16.

in the same Psalm to the ceremonial "hyssop" cannot in fairness be set aside; nor must we forget his looking forward to the offering of the Levitical sacrifices as a happy result, for which God's favor was making preparation. It seems to us that Bishop Horne's old-fashioned comment on the 51st Psalm is far more helpful than Dr. Stanley's, in enabling us to see the harmonious teaching of various parts of Scripture in regard to this great subject of Reconciliation; while we believe that the awakened and enlightened conscience is always in deep harmony with that teaching. We must confess to have read with a painful feeling some parts of this volume where this subject is touched; as when, in giving Ezekiel's grand announcement of the doctrine of individual responsibility, the author pauses to remark, that "the doctrine of substitution is not known in any form in the teaching" of that prophet. Now certainly we lay no special stress on the word "substitution," which is nowhere found in our English Bibles. But we must not expect that every part of religious truth is to be given in any one book of Scripture; still less that a book of the Old Testament will give what is fully revealed only in the New. We are most anxious to be entirely just in our criticism; and elsewhere, we are thankful to say, Dr. Stanley does speak of "that spiritual nearness to God, which, through the life and death of Christ, has been communicated to all who share in His Spirit;" but it is a duty to be extremely sensitive in regard to a truth which, in the experience of the saints of all ages, has been felt to be the vital essence of Christianity, the strongest motive for self-sacrifice, the encouragement of the best religious efforts, and the stay and support of the soul in great temptations and in the moment of death.

We must be forgiven if we make one other grave remark before we finally close Dr. Stanley's captivating volume. If we regret the absence of more definite lines of doctrine, we feel also that he has gone too far in a mere naturalistic treatment of the Bible. This is carried to such an extent that we almost doubt whether a reader, who had never heard of a Revelation, might not go through very considerable portions of these Lectures without being made conscious of the existence of a Revelation. No doubt Dr. Stanley would say, (and, in a certain sense, most truly,) that by bringing the Bible *au niveau* with ourselves, we are taking the most effectual method for raising the human to

the Divine. But there is also, on the other side, the danger of bringing the Divine down to the human, and with consequences the most disastrous. There is a leveling process carried on in various ways throughout the volume, which seems to us to threaten the destruction of many things too precious to be lost. Prophecy appears to waver in Dr. Stanley's hands very uncertainly between vague presentiment and definite prediction. Josephus and even Mahommedan traditions are presented to us as if they were coördinate authorities of almost equal value with the Holy Scriptures. Though the moral tone, as we have said, is always very high, yet a very undue stress is laid, throughout the volume, on "freeness and breadth," as though these could in themselves be characteristic of truth. We are told that Saul was only "half converted," and yet St. Bernard is blamed for saying he was not saved. If such a question is raised at all, it is surely important to bear in mind the tremendous severity of the New Testament, which draws the line inexorably between the sheep and the goats, the tares and the wheat, and shuts a door between the foolish and the wise. In speaking of the wars between the two Israelite kingdoms, and the pulling down of Ramah, that Geba and Mizpeh might be fortified with the fragments, the great French preacher's saying,—"Bâtissons les forteresses de Juda des débris et des ruines de celles de Samarie,"—is quoted to illustrate the duty, "not of rejecting the materials or the arguments collected by unbelievers or by heretics, but of employing them to build up the truth." But it is to be remembered that Bossuet speaks here of the absolute "ruins" of heresy and unbelief, not of the adoption of their buildings unbroken, or of any obliteration of the frontier line. Again, there seems almost a mischievous humor in the way in which the heretic is brought forward on the conservative side, and the orthodox in defence of what is precarious; as, for instance, when we are told that Dr. Colenso retains too tenaciously the traditional titles of certain Psalms, and that Calvin suggests that some of the Psalms were written under the Maccabees. Throughout the Lectures, and in various ways, there is too great a disposition to treat serious differences as if they were unimportant. Too often the effect is like that of a beautiful snowstorm, which gently hides the old familiar lines, and mixes perplexity with our admiration.

The Dean of Westminster is the last man in the world to blame that free criticism which the very excellence and popularity of his works render quite inevitable. Some indignation indeed must be caused among his friends when, as has occasionally been the case, such a man is made the object of reckless and vulgar vituperation. Such language, so ill-directed, can only recoil on those who use it, and promote the progress of opinions which are felt to be dangerous. But it can hardly be a matter of surprise if, even among those who have the utmost respect and admiration for his character, some misgiving is mingled with their gratitude for his services to Biblical Science. The antidote, however, against any errors, whether of defect or excess, which exist in these Lectures on the Jewish Church, is near at hand, and is to be found simply in a closer and more careful study of the Scriptures themselves. The great danger is—and no one would deprecate it more than the Dean himself—lest these two charming volumes should be read, even by theological students, not with the Bible, but instead of the Bible.

VIII.—THE CHARACTER OF JESUS CHRIST.*

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

It is my purpose to inquire what was the character of the extraordinary man who, a little over eighteen centuries ago, founded in an obscure country, and in the midst of a despised people, an order of things, which has since conquered and changed a large part of the world, and which exerts to this day, as even its detractors will admit, a profound influence on individuals and communities.

I do not deceive myself. The purpose which I have just indicated can be accomplished only partially. The personality of Jesus has thus far transcended all the conceptions, individual or collective, which have been presented of it; and the artist has not yet been found who has attempted a description of Christ without leaving to unknown rivals, much against his will doubtless, many traits of the model which he wished to copy. The reason for this is, first of all, a moral reason. In the moral realm man fully apprehends only that which he has in a measure already realized. Hence, according to the profound thought of the Apostle who best knew Jesus, we shall see him as he is, only when we shall be like him.

Neither do we conceal from ourselves how strange, possibly, and how wanting in reverence, may be to some the idea of placing beside the name of Jesus a word so strictly human as *character*. Indeed we may remark that until these latter times, the Church has laid but little stress on the study of the character of Jesus Christ. This we can easily explain. The early contests of the Church with Judaism and Paganism, leading in the one case to an examination of the history and institutions of the Jews, and in the other to the sphere of philosophy, were alike unfavorable to the elementary study of the life of Christ. In the Middle Ages, the Church was engaged in consolidating herself as an institution, on the one hand reducing all religion for the

* Translated and condensed from the *Revue Chrétienne*, by Rev. L. J. Evans, Professor of Church History in Lane Theological Seminary.

common people to ritualism, on the other giving to her studies a form which, as it became more and more systematic, necessarily excluded the multitude. Imagine a monk of the Middle Ages preaching on the character of Jesus! A more contradictory conception is impossible. The Reformation, in opposition to the universal Pelagianism of the day, asserted the claims of God upon the human soul, thus giving prominence to the anthropological question. Then the need was felt of establishing a dogmatic system, in the construction of which it was the paramount aim to defend that which was attacked, and to establish its harmony with the symbols of the first centuries. But no one then attacked the character of Jesus, and we know the place which that subject occupied in the canons of Nice and of Constantinople. It became necessary once more that we should learn from our adversaries to make an inventory of our riches.

I need not traverse that long episode of our theological history; I wish simply to show that to-day the controversy summons us irresistibly to the domain of facts. That on which the assault is made to-day is that creation of God in history which we call Christianity, and which has its centre in the person of Christ. It is that creation which it behooves us to defend, and which we can defend only by placing ourselves as resolutely as our adversaries on historic grounds. This method has claims upon us for another reason. It was that of the Apostolic Church; and we are under great obligations to those who compel us to recognize it.

This being assumed, our task is twofold. We have to vindicate the high value of the documents on which rests the knowledge that we have of Christ; this is the function of criticism. We have also to form, with the aid of the materials at our disposal, a picture of the Christ of history.

The latter is the task which we would now attempt, being well persuaded otherwise, that the best way of serving the interests of criticism itself, will be to present of the Christ of the Gospels an image of such vivid reality as might impress itself, and once again draw forth the exclamation; "Not thus do men invent."

Whatever in other respects was the inner nature of Christ, it is plain that he lived a thoroughly human life. He had consequently a character; that is to say, a certain trait, or a combination of traits marked his individuality; and when constrained

at last to recognize, as that which distinguished Jesus from every other human individuality, the perfect harmony in him of all the normal faculties of the normal being, we should still be able to speak of the *character* of Jesus Christ.

Jesus, it is to be observed, exhibited much rather than defined what he was. He wished the belief in his divinity to be founded, not essentially on affirmations, but on facts, and on the profound recognition of his humanity. Let us be faithful to that example, knowing that in no way could we more surely fail in reverence toward Jesus Christ, than by admitting the slightest veil between him and ourselves, and by allowing our adversaries to believe that we fear to draw too near to him.

There are two ways of studying a great character. We may study him in himself, in the history of his development, in the immediate impression which he produces. Or we may study him in the entire work which he leaves behind him. Thus in order to estimate the character of Christ, we may either examine the documents which relate his life to us, or we may study the Church, and infer from the work the character of the worker.

Either of these methods would be legitimate, but we shall follow the former as the more discreet, and therefore the more certain. We shall search in the Gospel what the character of Christ was. Assuming here the credibility of the Gospels, we shall confine ourselves to two observations:

1. Whatever value be assigned to the labors of modern criticism, it may be boldly affirmed that that criticism has not taken away from us our Gospels. To whatever conclusions we may be brought in regard to a very few passages in those Gospels by the simple appearance of the ancient manuscripts of the New Testament, whatever our conclusions in regard to the delicate question of the composition of our books, that criticism has not yet produced a single clear, absolute, decisive argument, of a character to impair the confidence of the Church in the thoroughly historical validity of those documents. We want no other proof of this than the radical self-contradiction of that criticism, which is sometimes held up before us as unanimous, and whose theories, in that which concerns the Gospels, so far from helping each other, tend to this reciprocal destruction of one another.

2. We are aware that one of the greatest questions now mooted in critical theology is, whether our Gospels offer to us

one and the same representation of Christ, or whether there is not, especially between the Christ of John and that of the Synoptists, a difference which does not allow us in an undertaking like the present to put those sources on the same level. We shall not for an instant lose sight of that important question during the whole course of our investigation, and we believe that the best answer to it will be that investigation itself, if, as we trust, it conducts us to a simple picture of the Saviour's personality, for to that end we purpose making use of John as well as of the Synoptists. There is besides a fact which, we do not hesitate to say, seems to us decisive of the question that we have just indicated. Christian piety seeks its nourishment in the four canonical Gospels, and recognizes everywhere but one Christ. This is a fact of no small importance. There is in the people, as in the child, an instinct which in fineness challenges the best criticism. We can say of it what Jesus says of his sheep: It knows not the voice of a stranger. If now the opinion of which we have spoken were true, if the Jesus of John were another than the Jesus of the three other Evangelists, we should be forced to admit that for more than fifteen centuries the Christian world has been calling, without any misgivings, a stranger by the name of its master, rendering to both indiscriminately, to master and stranger, the same adoration. Such an error would be not only without a precedent in history, but in direct opposition to history. We know, as a matter of fact, that during the first centuries of our era there were current, besides our Gospels, certain documents on the life of Jesus, now for the most part lost, which offered diverse representations of their hero. Of these the one class presented him as a Jewish prophet, the other as a being who, from the outset of his career, manifested a nature differing absolutely from that of man. But the Christian Church did not suffer herself to be deceived in the matter. She did not confound together documents so diverse, nor treat them with the like regard. The Ebionites resigned to the Docetæ, and conversely, not only their Christ, but also their Gospels.

That which we have just been saying does not prevent us from acknowledging that the point of view from which each one of our four Gospels contemplates and presents to us the character of Jesus, is far from being the same. Already among the Synoptists we have to note some striking points of difference.

With Matthew, Jesus is at once the man of the law, and the man of sorrows; one who with unsparing hand tore away the veils beneath which the false justice of his time hid itself (v; vi; vii; xi: 21–24; xii: 30–45; xxiii); and who, meek and lowly in heart (xi: 28–30; xii: 18–20), himself accomplished all righteousness (iii: 15), and bowed down his head beneath the miseries of his brethren (viii: 17), a sublime representation, in presence of which we know not which to wonder at most, the strength or the weakness impressed on it; the contrast which it offers, or the profound harmony where all these contrasts blend again.

The Gospel of Mark is less varied in its contents. We are not called on here to treat of its composition, nor of its author. It is generally agreed to-day that this Gospel was composed under the influence of the Apostle Peter. The representation which this book furnishes of the person of the Saviour makes us think of Peter. The Christ of Mark has indeed all those traits which would most powerfully attract the impassioned soul of the ardent Apostle. He is independent, he is strong, he shrinks from no obstacle. He is the King of nature and of humanity. There is something impetuous about his first appearance.* From the first he shows himself for what he is. He announces himself with the cry: The time is fulfilled! (i: 15). By his words, by his acts, he evokes from the very beginning astonishment at his course (i: 22–27). All gives way before him. Scarcely has he shown himself but all seek him (i: 37), and he exclaims: "Let us go into the next towns, that I may preach there also; for *therefore came I forth*" (i: 38). If during his work of mercy he encounters any resistance from a heartless formalism, "he looks round about him with anger" (iii: 5), and the scribes who have come from Jerusalem, when they see him, exclaim: "He hath a devil" (iii: 22).

More mild, as well as more complete, is the image of Christ, which the Gospel according to Luke holds out before us. Mark transports us at once into the heart of the sanctuary. Luke leads us on step by step, and so gradually, that when we have penetrated thither, our eyes are scarcely dazzled by so great light. But we should err greatly were we to see in Luke only the Evangelist who wished to write *in order* the things which Christ did

* The style of the book has the same characteristic. In the first chapter, beginning with the ninth verse, which first makes mention of Jesus Christ, we have counted nine instances of the use of the word "immediately."

and taught. He also has his individual point of view. That feature of Christ's life which manifestly inspires him is his *active compassion.* The Christ of Luke is the shepherd who seeks his lost sheep, and who, having found it, layeth it on his shoulders rejoicing (xv: 4–6). It is the Christ who gave to the world the parables of the Prodigal Son, of the pauper Lazarus, of the good Samaritan. It is the man of prayer, passing his nights in intercession for his own (iv: 42; v: 16; vi: 12; ix: 18; xi: 1; xxii: 32), and praying for his murderers (xxiii: 28). It is the Saviour, who, nailed to the cross, could still find in one of the malefactors crucified with him an object of redeeming love.

When now we open the fourth Gospel, we must acknowledge that it furnishes fewer materials than the others for our present work. The Gospel according to John is, as we think, the cornerstone of the Apostolic testimony concerning Christ, and we are fully persuaded that the greatest theologian of our century* was never more truly inspired than when he made to his students at Berlin the great prediction that criticism, so far from shaking our confidence in that Gospel would in the end only compel us to render it from day to day more signal justice. Yes! we have in the fourth Gospel a consecutive work, produced by an eye-witness of the life of Jesus, and that witness was the disciple whom Jesus loved. It has accordingly for the critic a place by itself. But how should this book not bear marks of its late composition? How could the testimony of a disciple who had reached a venerable old age in the service of his Master, a testimony given in the bosom of a Church of tried Christian piety, bear the impress of artless wonderment, of frank impartiality, which characterizes on every page the older narratives of the former Gospels, which are also less personal in their origin? How should the fourth Gospel not abound in traits which, obscure as they were to the contemporaries of Jesus, could be apprehended in all their importance only at a later period?† How should the aged Apostle not present the readers whom he must fortify against persecution and heresy with Christ as he is eternally present in the midst of his own, rather than with the Christ whom he had seen with his bodily eyes.‡ Now the impression which Jesus produced on his contemporaries

* Schleiermacher.

† John ii: 19–22; iii: 1–9; iv. 10, 13, 14, 21–24; xii: 28–30, 32, 33, etc.

‡ See John vi: 45–58; x: 1–16; and especially the last of Christ's discourses.

is one of the most valuable elements for our use, and the Jesus whose character we wish to trace is Jesus of Nazareth, such as he was during his earthly life.

Notwithstanding this, the Gospel of John brings before us one side of the character of Jesus which without it would have remained in obscurity. It shows him to us confronting a world far more hostile than friendly, surrounded by a narrow circle of disciples, and devoting himself to them even to the last hour. More than this: if John's Gospel furnished fewer of those scattered and graphic features of Christ's character which we find in the other three, it derives from the personality of its author a unity of conception to which they are strangers; and of it possibly must we demand the secret of the inner nature of Christ.

We cannot close these preliminary remarks without saying a few words of the manner in which our Gospels present to us the character of Jesus Christ. That manner is a strange one; we should notice it much more if we were less accustomed to it. That which strikes us first of all is its *sobriety*. The Gospels, with the exception of a few passages,* contain no laudation of Christ, and those exceptional passages are free from all parade; they are all simple impressions, thrown into the narrative, mostly in the form of brief allusions to the Old Testament. This sobriety of the Gospels is so much the more remarkable that it cannot be ascribed to indifference, and that their authors were manifestly as fully convinced of the lofty mission which Jesus claimed, as was Zenophon of the innocence of Socrates. And yet let one read, from that point of view, a page of the *Memorabilia* after a page from Matthew. On the one side what straining, what undisguised searching for everything which can throw the brightest light on the character of the great philosopher; on the other side what freedom from constraint, what confidence in the truth! The evangelists seem to be still, in a measure, restrained by the injunction so repeatedly laid by Jesus on his followers, not to proclaim too soon to the world without, his real dignity. They know well that they can gain nothing by proclaiming aloud that Jesus was their master, and by expressing their admiration of him. They understand well that the best way to defend him, is to show him as they have seen him.

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* Matth. xii: 17–21; John i: 14; ii: 11, 25; xiii: 1; etc.

This they have done, and yet with a reserve which makes us wonder. They do not all touch on that period of the life of Jesus which preceded his public ministry, and those who do carry us thither do not leave us there long. But what furthermore do they tell us about that ministry, short as it was? Very little of anything, if we take into account all that was included in it; for on the one hand the Gospels contain allusions to facts which they do not relate,* and on the other they themselves are manifestly conscious of their brevity.† How small, indeed, the volume which these four tracts would make, which yet contain nearly all that we know of the life of the Saviour of the world! Nor yet is this all: these materials, inconsiderable as they are, are presented to us, particularly by the Synoptists, with no attempt at order. Here is a fact which no one can doubt. We need only read the first three Gospels together to be convinced that apart from a few of the leading facts of his life, the order in which they give us both the acts and the words of Jesus is to them almost a matter of indifference. Apparently nothing could be more unfavorable than this to the end that we have in view. In reality nothing could be more favorable. I wish to seize with precision the character of some illustrious man. Shall I go in pursuit of all that has been said of him, however sincerely? Shall I make it my business to read some consecutive analytical history of his activity? I might in that way reach the falsest conclusions in regard to him. No! I should put aside as much as possible everything that intervenes between him and me; I should seek him in his letters, if any existed, in the words which has escaped from him at times when his soul must of necessity have given some revelation of itself, in his simplest and most spontaneous acts. Were he living I should try to see him, or better still, to take him by surprise; and only when I myself had seen him for a season move before me, should I be able in any degree to say that I knew him.

It is for such a purpose that the Gospels are useful to us. In perusing them we witness as it were *incognito*, the life of Jesus. Thanks to their sobriety, their irregularity, even the artless and childlike nature of their authors, they exercise over the reader no sort of despotism. They would influence our judgement only

* Matth. xix: 2; Luke iv: 15, 40, 44; John xii: 37; etc. † John xxi: 25.

by the grandeur of their truth. Admirable wisdom! sublime regard of the free God for his free creature! Glorious triumph, when from amidst so great disorder we see arise an image full of harmony and power!

THE CHARACTER OF JESUS CHRIST CONSIDERED IN ITS DEVELOPMENT.

Here the question presents itself, can we speak of development in considering the character of Jesus Christ? If by this question is meant, whether at a given epoch of his life Jesus passed through some inner crisis out of which he emerged by breaking with the past, we must answer without hesitation, No! We know but little of that period of his life which preceded that of his public activity, but what we do know of it, and the very silence which rests on it, leaves on us the impression of peace and harmony. Nowhere moreover does Jesus look back to the past with anything like regret, much less remorse, while all that we know of his character compels us to believe that had there been the least occasion for either, his moral vision was too clear not to perceive it, and his humility too great not to exhibit it before others. Nowhere do we find that he produced any such impression on those about him; and with what eagerness would not some of these, (especially his brethren who did not believe in him) have seized on the opportunity of putting him in contradiction with himself.

Neither do we find in the Gospels any indication that the character of Jesus underwent, gradually or otherwise, any modification. Fixing our attention at various times on some important trait of his character, such as his humility, or the authority which he claimed over his disciples, we have read over again one of the Gospels with that point before us, but never have we found aught that was not in marvellous harmony with that particular trait.

Shall we conclude then that the character of Jesus had no development? By no means. We believe on the contrary that it did develop itself in the truest, most original sense of the word; that is to say, that according to the law of all earthly life it gradually manifested in all their glory the elements in which it was rich from the beginning (Luke ii: 40, 52). As a child we find him "in the midst of the doctors, both hearing them, and asking

them questions." When later, he entered fully on his redemptive work, we still find him subject to the same law. He asks questions, he investigates, he learns (Matth. xvi: 13; Mark viii: 5; Luke viii: 45).

I.

What Jesus learned in that natural way could not have been without its influence in the development of his character. It was impossible that he should live, as every Jewish child lived, in the austere and religious society of those old prophets of his nation, that he should contemplate the holy anger of an Elijah (see Mark vi: 15); that he should hear the banks of the Chebar resound with the voice of an Ezekiel, announcing to the exiled Jews at once the most terrible judgment and the most marvellous deliverance; that more than once in reading the prophet Isaiah he should see portrayed before him the true servant of God, wounded for the transgressions of his brethren, despised of men, but sustained by God, and bearing light to the ends of the earth; that he should remember Jeremiah, warning his people, and weeping over the ruins of his beloved city, and Judas Maccabeus, whose fiery heroism and glorious defeat still filled the land with his fame,—without feeling his soul most powerfully stirred within him. The history of the people of Israel, a history which owed to religion at once all its interest and all its character, was in fact one of the first elements which we must take into account among those which contributed from without to the development of his character, and which we can most easily trace both in his life and in his words.*

On the other hand we have no reason to believe that he ever had the least contact with heathen culture, nor that he ever had occasion to learn anything about the history of foreign nations, and about their religion, as was the case, on the contrary, with Paul. But we cannot see wherein such knowledge could have enriched his character, or better prepared him for his mission. To be ignorant of the history of the pagan world, was that to be ignorant of that world itself? Did he share in one of the national prejudices of his contemporaries? Was he the less clearly conscious that his redemptive work embraced the whole world?†

* Matth. xi: 10; xiii: 14, 15; xxi: 16; xxvi: 34; xxvii: 46; Luke iv: 17–21; John viii: 56; etc., etc.

† John x: 16; xii: 32.

Did he repel the heathen who came to him? What joy, on the contrary, did the faith of the Roman centurion give him! With what compassion he received the Canaanitish woman!

But in the knowledge of humanity, of that in man which is fundamental, immutable, permanent, Jesus stands alone. He is conscious of being, and he rejoiced in being a citizen of the entire world; without rejecting the title "child of Abraham," the name by which he prefers to call himself is "Son of man;" he feels himself to be in living communion with the human family; he bears on his own head its miseries and sorrows; nor can we see how a more special familiarity with the events and ideas which had agitated humanity until his time could have enabled him to know it better, or to pity it more.

We can more easily see why he must not be a stranger to the history of the Jews. It was among the Jews that he was to found his spiritual kingdom;* to the Jews that he was to present himself as the fulfillment of all the promises. Let us beware however of exaggerating the influence of the study of the past on the development of his character. The bearing of Jesus, his independence of all that was merely artificial or conventional, the freshness of his words, the unforeseen turn which he almost always gave to them, the want of culture on the part of those who followed him, the absolute liberty which he maintained before those who represented the religious enlightenment of the nation, and whom he astonished and vanquished far more by the powerful spontaneity of his religious sense, than by the extent of his acquisitions;—all in him tells of nature much rather than of art, and reveals to us one who frequented the school of life more than that of the doctors

II.

This brings us to notice another element which must have exerted a peculiar influence on the development of Jesus; we mean his relations and his contemporaries. There is no doubt that he mingled largely with them; his discourses abound in illustrations drawn from their habits; in language always elevated, almost always poetic, he speaks to the people as a child of the people, who

* Matth. x: 5, 6.; xv: 24. Mark vii: 27.

lived their life, knew their toils, their joys, their sufferings; and when he addresses the great, he finds words to reach them which prove that he has observed them, also, from a very near point of view. Nothing escapes the extraordinary penetration of his glance. "Jesus did not commit himself unto them," says John, "because he knew all men. And needed not that any should testify of man; for he knew what was in man" (ii: 24, 25).

Among those whose companionship contributed to the formation of the character of Jesus, a place in the first rank must be assigned to the humble and pious woman who was his mother. The account which the Gospel gives of Mary is marked by great sobriety, and we desire here only to point out where the principal traits of her character find their parallel in that of Christ. Thus her humility, the obscurity out of which she first came forth, the unfeigned astonishment which she felt in presence of her mission, (Luke i: 46–48, 52), reminds us of the obscure beginning and lowly appearance of Christ. (Isaiah l; iii: 2; xlii: 2). Another trait which we note in Mary is her submissiveness. "Be it unto me according to thy word," said she to the angel, (Luke i: 30); and it would seem as though that word of the mother's had become the motto of the child throughout his life. "Not as I will, but as thou wilt!" (Matth. xxvi: 30). It was also a bitter cup which Mary must drink. The baptism of reproach and of sacrifice was not wanting in her obedience. What opprobrium in the position which she had accepted! What a sacrifice of her maternal feelings in surrendering her son to the work of his life! From these parallelisms we cannot measure, with any exactness, the influence which Mary exercised on the child Jesus. We believe, nevertheless, that they are not without significance, and that it was not through pure chance that Jesus found himself from infancy surrounded by an atmosphere of humble piety, and of sorrowful obedience.

The Gospel presents Joseph to us as a pious man, full of a delicate charity, who accepts, without a murmur, the lot of obscure self-devotion to which he is appointed, and bears his part of Mary's burden, as of her joy. He probably died before Christ began his ministry.

The childhood of John the Baptist was far removed from that of Jesus. The family of John resided in Judea,—that of Jesus in Galilee, and it is probable that, notwithstanding the tie which

united them, the two families came too rarely together to justify the inquiry what influence the two children had, the one on the other. When we find John and Jesus together for the first time, the former is in the fullness of his public activity; and the attitude of Jesus, notwithstanding his humility, in nowise suggests that of a disciple. The personality of the great preacher of repentance was much more remarkable for its force, than for originality. Before hearing his voice sway the region round about Jordan, Jesus had already heard it more than once, while reading the oracles of the ancient prophets. When John the Baptist appeared to the Jews, they recognized Elijah, (John i: 21), and Jesus did not contradict them. (Matth. xi: 14).

Besides these friendly influences which Christ found in the home of his parents, and in the circle, probably a narrow one, of his habitual relations, there were those of another kind which, while less direct, acted not the less powerfully on the development of his character. We wish to speak, first of all, of the effect that must, of necessity, have been produced on him, through contrast, by the relationship into which he came with men whose religious and moral sense was false and artificial. We must not overlook that influence. The sight of evil produces on a healthy nature the same effect as the sight of the good, by awakening a spirit of energetic resistance. Living in the midst of opposition, a man learns what he is, and reaches, almost at a bound, the fullness of his character. It is when sophistry has full sway that the irony and extraordinary good sense of a Socrates, show themselves. It is when Pelagianism has reached its extreme consequences, when men have come to traffic in eternal life, that that re-action of the religious conscience, which we call the Reformation, takes place. It is when a prisoner in the Castle of If, that Mirabeau writes his Essay on Despotism. Without multiplying examples, which abound on all sides, we shall be understood when we ascribe an influence on the development of Christ to his principal adversaries, the Pharisees.

It would be unjust, doubtless, to form our conception of the sect of the Pharisees solely from the light which the Gospels furnish on the subject. That sect was originally the refuge of many upright and noble spirits, who were impatient of the foreigner's yoke, jealous for the religious character of the Jewish nation, and

who submitted to so many forms in worship, and in the religious life, only in order to make, in the language of the doctors, "a hedge around the law." The position taken by the Pharisees was, however, full of illusions and dangers, and the hedge which they wished to set up around the law, tended much rather to choke than to protect it. The general spirit of the sect in the days of Jesus, was that of an empty formalism and of an overbearing pride. Men like Gamaliel, Nicodemus, or even like Simon, the host of Jesus, were becoming more and more rare, and at last it was in the bosom of Pharisaism that the formidable opposition which the Jews made to Jesus, concentrated itself.

It cannot be doubted that Jesus knew his adversaries perfectly. He knew them not only by virtue of his wonderful insight into the depths of the heart, but also through personal association with them. He spoke to them not only of their tendencies, but of their precepts, their prejudices, their habits;* and it is evident from the sorrowful severity and the holy energy with which he calls them to account for their wrongs toward others, that this sad subject was one with which he had been long familiar. We know not just where to place the first contact of Jesus with the Pharisees. These men, in the time of Jesus, controlled the religious education of the Jews; from early youth, accordingly, had the child of Nazareth heard their doctors teach in the Synagogues, and it is probable that the doctors, whom Jesus questioned in the Temple, at the age of twelve, were Pharisees. From an early period, therefore, did that reaction which we have indicated, take place in Jesus,—first, under the form of a holy astonishment,—then, under that of open protest. Thus it was that the irreligious devotion of those doctors developed in him that feeling of religious humility which he has embodied in the prayer of the publican,—"Lord, be merciful to me, a sinner!" Thus it was that all the subtleties and artifices of a morality which outraged the conscience only strengthened in him the simple and powerful sentiment of obedience to the Father's will (Matth. xv: 5, 6; Mark vii: 11). Thus also, it was, that in beholding those blind guides who laid on the people heavy burdens which they themselves would not touch, he felt growing in his soul, besides the profound compassion with which those shepherdless multitudes inspired him, the

* See particularly Matth. xxiii.

feeling of obligation to bear himself the burden of their cares. (Luke xi: 46).

Of still greater power to develop in him his vocation to be the Saviour of men, must have been the contemplation of those woes themselves. The Buddhist legends describe to us the scenes which determined the young Buddha to lay aside his princely robes, and to put on the garb of a pilgrim, that he might go afar in search of indifference to the ills of life. In the first he encounters an old man, bent, broken, and decrepit from age. In the second he encounters a man stricken with disease, wasting away, and filled with terror at the near approach of death. In the third he meets with a dead body surrounded by mourners, after seeing which he says to the driver of his chariot, "Let us return, I must meditate how to accomplish deliverance." The picture in which these scenes are presented to us, is pervaded by an earnest and poetic feeling, and the miseries which Cakya-Muni witnessed are those in part which must have moved most profoundly the heart of Jesus, and revealed to him most clearly the work for which his Father had sent him. But the illusion is not perfect: those scenes, although they remind us of Nazareth, do not quite carry us there. To that end it behooved the young prince to encounter one scene more. It behooved him to meet with a man in the fullness of health and of youth, to whom something was still wanting,—whose conscience was not at ease. It behooved him, instead of avoiding such miseries,—instead of saying, "Let us return, I must meditate how to accomplish deliverance," —to stop, to approach that old man, that diseased man, those mourners, and mingling his compassion with their sufferings, to grant them at least the solace of all the tears which he could have poured out for them. Last of all, it behooved him, in retiring from the world, instead of desiring for himself and for others the power of remaining insensible amidst the evils of this life, to remember that God calls himself *Love*, and not *Indifference*, and to turn toward heaven with a look expressive of most sorrowful supplication, and of sublimest self-sacrifice.

III.

We have thus far sought to point out the contributions made by others to the development of Christ's character, whether by

the men of the past, or by those of his own day. Powerful, however, as was the attraction which social life exercised over Jesus, he was far from being an exception to that law, as we may call it, in accordance with which it behooved every prophet among the Jews to pass through the rigid school of *solitude.* We are authorized by the silence which the Gospels maintain concerning the youth of Jesus,—by the consideration of the gradual spontaneous character of his development, and by the frequent mention that is made of his withdrawing to some solitary place during the period of his public ministry, to regard solitude as an important element of his development.

What now did Jesus find in retirement! He found there *nature, temptation, and prayer.*

Is it necessary to prove that Jesus knew and loved nature? His discourses abound in poetic illustrations derived from it. That which impressed him in nature was that which is simple, elementary, universal. It was not for itself that he loved it; he loved it because it was for him a wonderful type of human life, an affecting proclamation of the mercy of God. His knowledge of it was in nowise scientific; it was wholly religious. In the rising sun he saw the God who makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, thus giving to men an example of the mercy which they should show toward their enemies (Matth. v: 45). The vine brings before his mind the law that life alone can produce life. A barren fig-tree awakes in his mind the thought of our fruitlessness, of the doom which threatens it, and of his intercession. The lilies of the field and the sparrows speak to him of the tender loving-kindness of God, who will much more care for his children. Still more potent, still more sublime the language in which nature must have communed with him during these long nights which he passed alone in meditation and prayer. In all its varied aspects, the most obscure no less than the most wonderful, it proclaimed to Jesus the glory of God, which shines forth preëminently in his love, and makes known, at the same time, the depths of humanity's woes.

In saying that Jesus found temptation in solitude, we would not be understood as saying that there only did he find it. It is none the less true however that when, having withdrawn from the world, he communed with himself, and set in full array before himself all the sacrifices, present and future, which his

work involved, he obtained more vivid glimpses of certain possibilities, which were to him of the nature of temptations. We wish to speak of these temptations here only in a very general way.

Of those which assailed him during the obscure portion of his life, we know nothing, beyond the fact that they corresponded, doubtless, to his age, and developed in him a moral superiority, which as it became more and more distinctly avowed, rendered more and more difficult for him a position of dependence on his natural protectors, a position, however, which he must still continue to accept.

The long and mysterious conflict through which he passed in the desert, immediately after his baptism, is well known. The question which then lay before him was that of his mission in the world. To what end should he employ the gifts which he had received? To satisfy his own wants (Luke iv: 3), to gratify his ambition (iv: 9), or for the good of his brethren? What path should he follow in the establishment of his kingdom,—the path which the popular expectation seemed to mark out for him, which in appearance was the easiest and by far the quickest (iv: 5, 6); or the path which his Father had appointed for him, the path of renunciation, of sacrifice? Would he be that King of the Jews, whose coming was looked for, or the man of sorrows, who was to be rejected, mocked, and put to a shameful death even by those whom he had come to save? Such were the momentous questions that presented themselves before him during that terrible conflict of forty days;—we say not, which Jesus asked of himself, but which the facts, the circumstances by which he saw himself surrounded, asked of him; for however we may interpret in detail the mysterious narrative of the Gospels, it is clear that Jesus, on the one side, did not participate in the temptations—that the conflict took place, not within the soul of Christ, but altogether between Christ and an enemy outside of himself; and on the other side, that Jesus was victorious.

The sacred narrative itself tells us that this was not the last of Christ's temptations: "The devil departed from him for a season." "Ye are they," said Jesus at the passover, "which have continued with me in my temptations." How many temptations, indeed, still awaited him! Temptation, in the midst of the wandering life which he led, surrounded by all that was re-

pulsive in the physical and moral wretchedness of the world, from the thought of a religious and holy repose (Luke ix: 33),—the opposite temptation, so natural to the benevolent heart, to engage too much in outward activity, and not to retire enough into himself,—temptation springing now from the enthusiasm which he kindled (John vi: 15), and now again from the small success which awaited him in the rugged way which he had chosen (Matth. xiii: 57),—the trial to which the bitter hatred of his adversaries subjected his charity (Matth. xii: 34; Luke ix: 54),—and which the affection and faintheartedness of his disciples inflicted on his courage (Matth. xvi: 22, 23; Mark xiv: 50). and lastly, leading and including all the rest, the temptation to retain in his possession everything which belonged to his Father and to his brethren, everything, that is, in himself; the temptation not to accept either that physical death, which, to him, on account of his peculiar holiness, was fraught with such pangs as are to us inconceivable, or that moral death, by which we mean that absolute humiliation, which reached its culmination on the cross. "No man," he says, "taketh my life from me. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." We know how he laid it down; we know also through what anguish and conflict he pressed onward toward the final sacrifice, even to the moment when, bowing his head crowned with thorns, he could cry out, "It is finished!"

The Gospels are unanimous in recognizing these struggles. This has been questioned, especially in regard to the Gospel of John. "The dominant conception of Christ," says Keim, "has impressed on it a tranquillity of soul, whose divine serenity nothing can disturb. This is to be attributed to John's Gospel, which has passed into the flesh and blood of Christianity." And further on, "John does not give us Gethsemane; scarcely does he speak of a passing trouble in the experience of Jesus in the streets of Jerusalem." We are astonished that any one can charge such a distorted representation of Christ on the Gospel which records the groaning of Jesus at the grave of Lazarus, and which contains that sentence, no less human than sublime, "Jesus wept;" the Gospel in which we read, "Then Jesus was troubled in spirit, and testified and said, Verily, verily, I say unto you, that one of you shall betray me;" and which, just before this, shows us Jesus on his knees, washing the feet of Judas, as though he were a

slave. We are amazed that any one can speak so lightly of the emotion which seized on Jesus in the streets of Jerusalem, when, the thought of his sacrifice suddenly rushing on him, he cried out, "Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour; but for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name." Yes, we are amazed that in this inward dialogue, to which Jesus, with a touching disregard of all outward dignity, admits his disciples, any one can fail to perceive the fugitive expression of a long and sorrowful conflict which did not ordinarily exhibit itself; we are amazed, in fine, that one does not find there the whole of Gethsemane.

We shall dwell no longer on this point; nor do we believe it necessary to demonstrate the reality of these temptations of Jesus Christ. That reality has been written with too many tears and with too much blood to require demonstration. Nor have we attempted the reconciliation of dogmas: with the Gospel in our hand we repeat its story, and if it were true,—which we cannot believe,—that there could be any danger to dogma from insisting on the reality of Jesus Christ's temptations, all would concur with us in exclaiming: Perish dogma, rather than the Gospel!

The conclusion of the whole matter is, that Jesus did not pass through so many struggles, and that victoriously, without receiving benefit therefrom. If the temptations which he encountered were real, the victories which he achieved were no less real; each one of them enriched him. If he left the wilderness as he entered it, if Gethsemane did not strengthen his soul, we should no longer comprehend the wilderness, or Gethsemane; Jesus would stand for us outside of the conditions of the moral life, outside of humanity. On the other hand, this long and gradual abnegation of his own will,—this long and gradual surrender of himself to his brethren, implies no sin in Jesus; for it is not once only, nor under its absolute form, that of death, that God demands of Christ that self-surrender. At the age of twelve he is not required to die for his brethren, nor does he sin in returning to Nazareth. Sufficient for him to fulfill the task of each day. To-day let him enjoy in peace the repose which to-morrow he must renounce; to-morrow let him enjoy the consideration which the next day he must renounce; the next day let him enjoy the life which hereafter he must lay down on the cross. For his Father to appoint the hour: for him, when the hour is come, to say in

the strength acquired through all former renunciations: "Thy will, not mine, be done!" In this sense, it is, that the Epistle to the Hebrews can say of Jesus: "He learned obedience."

We have said, finally, that for Jesus solitude was prayer. How often do we read in the Gospel such words as these: "He departed into a solitary place, and there prayed;" "He went out into a mountain to pray, and continued all night in prayer to God." If, in the midst of his greatest activity, Jesus sought opportunity to adore in silence, we may be allowed to suppose that adoration occupied an important place in the preparatory period of his life. We need only look at the circumstances which called forth his prayers, to understand what place adoration holds in his general development. He prays before choosing his apostles; he prays,—and with what absolute confidence! at the tomb of Lazarus; he prays in Gethsemane. In the prayer which he offered for his own, he sought and found guidance in the way that was before him, power to realize his compassionate desires, strength to renounce himself and to walk the path of suffering to the end. Leaving for a time behind him the disorder of this world, he seeks the centre of harmony, he identifies himself with the plan of God. While below all conspired to distract him, if possible, and to turn him aside from the labor of sorrow which he must accomplish, on these heights, in communion with his Father, he recovers himself without difficulty; every earthly thing falls into its own place,—and while he sees the path which he must follow lie clearly before him, he derives from divine communion new strength to press onward.

We have passed in review the principal elements which concurred in the development of the character of Jesus. Did his character bring these elements into subjection to itself, or was it subject to them? Do they suffice to explain Jesus Christ, or must we, after long resistance, look higher in order to understand him? Is he their product, or their master? The answer to these questions will be found in

THE CHARACTER OF JESUS CHRIST CONSIDERED IN ITSELF.

We touch, not without trembling, upon the heart of our subject. Shall we say what sustains us, in attempting to represent in language so unworthy of him, what Jesus was, and in adding

something to the degradation which he has already undergone among men? It is the thought that in entering into the conditions of our life he condescended to enter at the same time into the conditions of our poor speech; the hope that as with the rags which but serve to make more manifest the majesty of him who wore them for a day, so it will be with our words.

We shall follow in our study the most natural method, that which in the time of Jesus any serious and impartial observer of his life would have followed, who, having accompanied him, heard him, seen him in his work, should have attempted to describe him as he was. That observer would most naturally have been impressed first of all, with that which was of an external character, that which was peculiar in the mission and the attitude of Jesus; then he would have penetrated, little by little, into the inner motive of his life, until at last he had reached the centre. This is what we shall now attempt.

It is impossible to approach Jesus at all without being struck with what we may call the complexion of his personality, a complexion altogether moral and religious. The life of Jesus was first of all,—indeed, we should rather say, exclusively religious and moral; these two terms, be it specially observed, which we use separately here from pure poverty of language, forming, in strict propriety, but one. Jesus will recognize, for himself as for humanity, but one interest, the religious interest, which is, at the same time, the moral interest: "My meat," he says, "is to do the will of him that sent me;" his vocation lies altogether in the reconciliation of men with God, and thereby with each other. Not that he felt any indifference, much less contempt, toward the earthly relations or vocations of men. He was a loving son, (John xix: 26), a faithful friend, (John xi: 5; xiii: 23). It is probable, also, that he labored for a time in the workshop of Joseph. He permits Peter to return to his fisherman's bark, and even recognizes, by a miraculous benefaction, the holiness of his earthly vocation (Luke v: 1–11). But we can see clearly that the holiest of earth's relations, and the purest of its vocations are nothing to him, except in so far as each is not only controlled, but penetrated by a higher relation and vocation. His true friends are those who do what he commands (John xv: 14). His mother and brethren are those who hear the word of God, and do it (Luke viii: 21). His true, his sole vocation, is that of

Saviour (John xii: 27; xviii: 37). A few particular traits will illustrate the general aspect of his character.

We have seen the extent of his familiarity with the heroes of Jewish history, and with his contemporaries. What profound and subtle observations might he not have made about them! What luminous illustrations might he not have derived from his knowledge of them! But never does he allow himself to do this. Whenever he introduces man to us, it is before God that he always places him.

We shall see presently what a powerful and rich imagination we must attribute to him. But never does he exercise that for its own sake, and even yet, as we stand before the most poetic of his parables, we feel that when we have exclaimed "How beautiful it is!" everything still remains to be said.

We know in the midst of what patriotic aspirations he lived; we would not say that he was himself insensible to them (Luke xiii: 34, 35). But most assuredly he did not share them in their popular form; least of all did he do anything to excite them. He, too, dreamed of the independence of Israel; but for him the real enemy of Israel was not Cæsar.

All about him, the popular prejudices which prevailed, the indefinable restlessness which he carried into the consciences that only asked to be delivered from themselves (Luke xiii: 23), all conspired to make him abandon that religious and moral centre from which he judged everything. But nothing could move him thence. And is not this the reason why he belongs to us as well as to the Jews of his time? Is not this "pre-eminently *human* vocation," as it has been called,* precisely that which he had chosen? Could he not say with a thousand-fold more truth than the Latin poet, "Nothing human is alien to me?" It is long since the last soldier of Cæsar disappeared from Judea and Galilee; we are far distant from Jordan and Nazareth; but not one of us can open the Gospel at any page, and say that there is nothing in common between that page and him.

Let us go one step further. What is the moral, religious *aspiration* of Jesus?

That aspiration is boundless. We can say, without fear of contradiction, that nowhere is there anything to compare with it.

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* Ullman, *Sinlessness of Jesus Christ.*

What was the ambition of a Buddha? To give to humanity, oppressed with a thousand ills, the consolation—here of an indifference which effects no change in its misery even—and hereafter of Nirvâna, that is to say, of Nothing, And even then all cannot hope to attain this happiness; Buddha yielded to no illusion on this head; he knew that one-third of the human race is irrevocably doomed to error. What was the ambition of a Socrates? Was it with all his might to overthrow and to deliver the conscience from the gods of Olympus, those lawless divinities, defiled with all human passions, and to substitute for them the only and just God, of whom he seems to have had some conception? In no wise. Socrates never thought of such a revolution. He continued to commune with that mysterious *demon* whose secret counsel guided him; he instructed the young who thronged to hear him in the precepts of morality, or in the science, not previously known, of man, of his duties, and of his infirmities; and when he stood before his judges he was able to allege in self-defence that he had never ceased sacrificing to the gods of the republic.* What, finally, was the ambition of a Seneca? To "withdraw from the corruption of the world, to live with himself, and to make it the rule of his conduct: to associate with those who could make themselves and others better." Paltry hopes! poor ambitions! when we compare them with the hope which from the beginning Christ held up to the world.

That which Christ promises is Heaven; Heaven, we say, not Nirvâna; Heaven, not Elysium, the gloomy abode of shades, whose highest joy is to cherish among themselves the half-forgotten memories of their sojourn on earth; Heaven, not that vague immortality, in view of which Socrates said in parting from his judges: "We are now about to separate, I to die, you to live; which lot is the better one, no one knows;" Heaven, that is to say, a life of which the present is but the pale and tainted shadow, the communion of the whole soul with a God who is holiness and love itself. But Jesus does more than direct our thoughts towards those heights which the eye of man cannot reach. That heavenly kingdom of which he dreams is to him the consummation of a kingdom which he came to found on earth, and which, invisible in its beginnings, will not be such in

* Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, Book I.

fruits. That kingdom, or if you please, that family, is to be composed of all those who, feeling their misery, will receive from him the pardon of their sins, and yield to him their consciences and their lives. The beginnings of that kingdom are to be humble: persecutions will come; but soon the little seed will spring up to be a great tree, which will stretch its branches over the whole earth. The victorious leader, the king of that new nation is to be himself the *only-begotten* Son of God; he is to die, but he will live again, and the works accomplished by him in his earthly life are a small thing compared with those which he will accomplish, unseen, through the instrumentality of his servants, weak and ignorant men, until the day shall come when, the powers of darkness having been vanquished, the barriers which separate men from their Heavenly Father having been overthrown forever, the earthly kingdom of God having been re-united with his heavenly kingdom, there will be, in Christ's own words, "but one fold and one shepherd;" and creation will have reached the goal which God has appointed for it from eternity.

Such is the aspiration of Jesus, such the deliverance that he would bring to the world; and the union which no one among men dared even to conceive of, neither the favorite of the most cultivated people, nor the minister of the most powerful emperor, he will undertake—and with what confidence! to accomplish—he, an obscure inhabitant of the most despised province of a subject nation, a nation that owed its sole distinction to the gloomy isolation which it affected toward the rest of the world.

And now we should naturally expect to find in Jesus an attitude corresponding to this extraordinary grandeur of the end which he sets before himself, and of the dignity which he claims for himself. We should not be surprised to see him signalize his advent by some striking deed; we should expect—should we not?—to find his words, his actions, his whole life, invested throughout with a singular stateliness.

Nothing of the kind. His appearance is *simplicity* itself. When we first see him it is in the midst of the penitents who come to receive from the Forerunner the baptism of repentance: when we first hear him, it is in the midst of the multitudes who are gathered from all parts to hear the new prophet, proclaiming, in language free from all pomp, the blessedness of the humble and the afflicted. Not for one instant does that simplicity for

sake him. Never does he court celebrity. How carefully, on the contrary, he avoids it! Never does he, by word or action, betray the least effort. Never does he leave on those who witness his labors, the impression of a plan which he is bent on realizing at any cost. Always himself, he awaits the suggestion of events, and never do these find him unprepared. With what sublime fitness he answers the questions propounded to him, whether sincerely (Matth. xi: 3–5), or insidiously (Matth. xxii: 17–21)! How wisely he converts even the most ordinary incident into an opportunity for accomplishing his work! One day certain Pharisees murmur because he receives publicans and sinners; to that murmuring we owe the parables of the lost sheep, of the piece of silver, and of the prodigal son. Another day he asks drink of a woman who has come to draw water out of the well at which he rests; the colloquy which that request brought forth is well known. And it is of such incidents that his whole life is composed. What incoherence! we should be disposed to say, were we not constrained by the evidence to exclaim—what harmony!

In that simplicity again, what moderation! The world admires the serenity of Socrates going, against his wont, to the theatre to see himself exhibited as the butt of the pitiless raillery of Aristophanes, standing the meanwhile that he might be the better seen, and declaring to his friends that he imagined himself to be present at a grand banquet, where the guests indulged in pleasant jests about him. It admires in another way those rich stoics of Rome who reserved in their sumptuous mansions a chamber of wretched appearance, which they called the poor chamber, and where they passed certain hours, and often the whole night, on a pallet, in order to acquaint themselves with need. It stands amazed before the gloomy asceticism of Çakya-Muni, who will have no other garment than a shroud, which, with his own hands, he carries off from the grave, and fashions for his own wear. There is not one of these traits which would not be a blot on the Gospel, and which does not make the more manifest its wonderful simplicity. Jesus does not court injustice, he does not brave it; but when it comes to him he endures it,—with what patience is known to all! It cannot be said of him, as of Seneca, that he is an amateur of poverty; he *is* poor; and still he does not disdain to see in the rich man a brother, and to sit down at his table

when he is invited. Who will not say that there is a thousandfold more grandeur and power in this simplicity and moderation than in the efforts and exaggerations of the most rigid and mo rose morality? Who does not admire the union of so much simplicity with such loftiness of aim, and feel himself drawn in the spirit of trust toward such a being?

Without inquiring further into the ground of this sublime simplicity, of this wonderful moderation which marks the conduct of Jesus, we observe that it denotes a singular inner equilibrium, a singular harmony of character, in the more restricted and special sense of the word. If it be asked what character, or, if we may use such an expression, what temperament should be ascribed to Jesus, we know not in truth what answer to give. Shall we say that he was distinguished by perfect self-possession? Undoubtedly; but he is also just as much distinguished by the entire freedom with which he abandons himself to those who are about him. Shall we say that he was grave? Most true; the evangelical narrative does not so much as mention that he ever smiled; nevertheless, in its totality, the impression which the personality of Christ leaves on us is fully as much that of joy as of an austere gravity (Luke x: 21). Shall we speak of the serenity which he maintained alike in presence of the greatest danger, and of the most excited enthusiasm? We shall not have said all; for we shall need still to speak of that profound sensibility which sometimes betrayed itself in tears and groans. Shall we say that he was naturally free from care? We can say it. "Sufficient unto the day," he said, "is the evil thereof;" and in little, as well as in great affairs he applied that maxim throughout his life; but can we doubt that he knew what anxiety is, when we remember the agonies which invaded his soul? Shall we say that he loved danger, and courted it? "After these things," we read, "Jesus walked in Galilee; for he would not walk in Jewry, because the Jews sought to kill him." Shall we say, on the contrary, that he avoided danger? "And it came to pass," we read elsewhere, "when the time was come that he should be received up, he steadfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem." Shall we say that he excelled in impressing his superiority on those who were about him? He washed the feet of his Apostles, without excepting Judas, who had already betrayed him. "Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart, and ye shall find rest unto your souls.

For my yoke is easy, and my burden light." Shall we say, on the other hand, that he strove to make them forget his superiority? "Whosoever he be of you," said he, "that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple." Shall we say that he was indulgent? See how he treats the Pharisees. Shall we say that he was severe? See how he receives the woman that was a sinner.

We stop here, and confess our inability to comprehend the character of Jesus in one definition. It has been said that the character of Christ consists in his having none. True: but what a beggarly way of expressing so great opulence! In Jesus an imagination the most poetic and the most fertile detracts naught from the clearest intelligence, nor a sensibility the most profound and tender, from a moral sense the most serious and powerful. In him we find combined in living harmony, and controlled by a higher unity, those qualities which in others are only to be found scattered and apart, and which ordinarily far from enriching mutually circumscribe each other. Only when our investigations have reached their goal in the center of that wonderful harmony, can we indicate what the character of Christ was, his character, that is, in the highest sense of the word, that which applied to Jesus, expresses at once both that which unite him to us, and that which distinguishes him from us; in a word, the place which belongs to him in the world of humanity.

Let us proceed step by step; and having learned from the life of Jesus the work to which he devotes himself, and having considered, in a general way, his attitude, let us inquire into the means which he employs.

In their general character these means reflect faithfully that simplicity which we have noted in the whole attitude of Jesus Christ. Their greatness is far more internal than apparent. He wrought, it is true, wonderful deeds; he fed with a few loaves the multitudes, he healed the sick, he raised the dead; but it is clear that in these acts that which we must regard as greatest is not the extraordinary power which they reveal, but the compassion from which they spring, the reflection in each of these acts of him who wrought them, the spiritual and permanent reality of which each is but the transient manifestation. A few examples will show what we mean. What answer, think ye, would Jesus have made to a disciple who had demanded of him the meaning of the resur-

rection of Lazarus? Would he have taken pains to call special attention to the fact that, by a simple word, he had restored life to a body which had already begun to give signs of corruption? Such an answer, if by any impossibility the Gospel had contained it, would have astonished us. But no! the eloquence of the grave at which Jesus wept, goes far beyond that. Before all else that grave proclaims that Jesus "*is* the resurrection and the life; and he that believeth in him, though he were dead, yet shall he live." Whether Lazarus rises three days after his death, or in the resurrection at the last day, is for Martha an alternative which pierces her very heart; not so for Jesus, who from the height whereon he stands sees already in the cold remains before him that which is to be raised in incorruption and glory. So of all the miracles of Jesus Christ, the wonderful in them is but the form. Of what does he remind the multitude whom he had fed, when on the day following the miracle he reproaches them with their unbelief? Is it of the miracle wrought in their behalf? In no wise. "Labor not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the Son of man shall give unto you." When a paralytic is brought to him to be healed, Jesus sees in him a malady far more dangerous than that of his body, and moved with compassion, he would heal that greater, that central disease of his being. "When he saw their faith he said unto him, Man, thy sins are forgiven thee." A murmur arising at these words, he asks: "Whether is easier to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee; or to say, Rise up and walk? But *that ye may know that the Son of man hath power upon earth to forgive sins;* Arise, take up thy couch, and go unto thine house." Here is made known unto us the essential meaning of the cures of Jesus. In them he reveals himself as the Healer, as the Saviour. The ills of the body excite his compassion, because he sees in them a symbol and consequence of a misery within far more deadly, and in healing those he manifests himself as having come to heal the whole man.

And now shall we recall how sedulously Jesus shunned all notoriety in the performance of his miracles (Luke viii: 51); how often he charged those in behalf of whom they had been wrought not to make it known (Matth. ix: 30; xii: 16); how resolutely he always refused the request of those who demanded them out of a vain curiosity (Matth. xvi: 1; Mark viii: 11; Luke xi: 16;

John vi: 30); and who would not have seized on their true significance? Rather let us pause before that wonderful greatness which can dispense so easily with the admiration of men, and which imposes on those who seriously contemplate it the obligation before all else to consider themselves.

We find in the *teaching* of Jesus the same character, the same disregard of appearances, the same internal glory. He never announces that he is about to speak; he speaks, and most often, as we have already remarked, as the occasion suggests. The occasion of his discourse is ordinarily the most common occurrence. It is the objection of an adversary, the prayer of one in misery, the view or the simple thought of one of those wonders of nature which, for the most part, pass by unnoticed. But how fruitful is the use which he makes of it! With how royal a flight he soars to the sublimest heights (John iii: 1–16; iv: 7–24)! With what wonderful authority he compels his auditors to look to themselves, when they would willingly look elsewhere (Luke xii: 13–21)! How he makes nature shine forth with a new light, and finds in it, without effort, a symbol, admirable in its simplicity, of the moral world! Well has it been said: "He looks on nature with the freedom of a son in his father's house." We might say that standing on the boundaries of the two worlds, the invisible and the visible, or rather at their common center, he calls things for the first time by their own names, and exhibits to us the necessary relation which subsist between them in the mind of the Creator. He makes the like use of the phenomena of human society. The point of view from which he contemplates everything is that of the ideal. We may be allowed to say: what poetry in Jesus! Yes; he is the poet *par excellence*. With what power he lays hold on the reality, at the same time that he causes the ideal which it contains to flash out in all its fullness, and irradiates it with light from above! He possesses in an absolute degree both that *sense of things*, without which poetry has no body, and that *sense of the ideal*, without which it wants a soul. What pure freshness, and at the same time what religious sublimity in the parable of the lilies of the field! In that of the prodigal son what tragic grandeur,—here sombre, and there marvellously bright! But it is in the presence of death that the language of Jesus is instinct with the grandest poetry. No one can say that the contemplation of death did not stir his heart profoundly;

his emotion at the grave of Lazarus, and his anguish at the approach of his own death, show on the contrary that he was sensible to all its horrors. But see him as he stands beside the lifeless body of the daughter of Jairus, and fixes on the pallid face of the dead maiden a long and sorrowful gaze. There is the reality before him in all its implacability! Jesus sees through it, he seems possessed by it; then he raises his head, and turning on the parents of the maiden a look bright with a strange radiance, he says: "She is not dead, but sleepeth!" Sublime audacity with which Jesus demands of death itself a similitude for life! Have we not here the very triumph of the ideal, of the ideal that is as a higher reality? For to Jesus the sleep, in other words, the life of the maiden, is the most palpable, the most positive of realities.

If now we turn to the person, the physical appearance of Jesus, how can we fail to find thereon the impress of that lofty spirituality which marks his actions and his words? The almost entire absence of positive data on that subject imposes on us great sobriety in treating of it, but not silence. We find in Scripture, as in the Church, and especially in religious art, two distinct conceptions of the outward appearance of Christ. There is the Christ of the forty-fifth Psalm, "fairer than the children of men;" the child-Christ of the Gospel, according to Luke, who increased in stature and in grace; the Christ whose aspect made those who came to arrest him fall to the ground; who is also, with very few exceptions, the Christ of modern art. Then there is the Christ of Isaiah liii, who has no form nor comeliness; whom Mary Magdalen, in the garden of Joseph of Arimathea, took for the gardener: who was not recognized by his disciples on the way to Emmäus, nor by the apostles in his last appearance on the shores of Genesareth. This Christ is he to whom Clement of Alexandria and Origen, inspired manifestly by Isaiah, do not hesitate to attribute physical deformity; and whom mediæval art represents as wounded and suffering. Are these two conceptions contradictory? We believe not; and we shall endeavor to show where the truth seems to us to lie, so far as we can conclude anything in regard to the subject.

The question is not whether Jesus was beautiful; a body which serves as the temple of such a soul is beautiful whatever its form. But with what beauty? Was that plastic beauty his

which has its value in itself, and which Greek art has rendered with a perfection never surpassed? Nothing can persuade us to believe that. Such a beauty would of itself have produced an impression of which we should find some traces, at least in the Gospel; and if Jesus had possessed it, whatever changes the resurrection had occasioned in him, he would have been recognized immediately by Mary Magdalene, by the disciples at Emmäus, and by the apostles at the lake of Genesareth. Must we attribute on the contrary to Jesus an appearance quite the opposite, and look for him rather in those mediæval representations of an asceticism which spiritual indeed at times, is in general so diseased? No more can we think of doing that. Jesus endured fatigues which preclude the idea of such debility, and if there had been any particular sickliness in his physical appearance, would not his adversaries have reproached him with it in the interest of that sensuous conception which they had formed of the Messianic king that was to come? Jesus was beautiful, but in the same sense as his miracles and his parables, that is to say with an internal beauty, which might escape recognition, but which fully revealed itself to him who could seek it with his soul, a beauty which was the effulgence, at once majestic and simple, of the profound serenity of his inner being, as well as of his suffering and sympathising love. We find the nearest approaches to it in the Virgins of Raphael, and in the paintings of Leonardo da Vinci, and especially of Rembrandt, the painter of light. In the collection of the Louvre is a work by the great artist, representing Christ at Emmäus, at the moment when, breaking the bread and giving thanks he is recognized by the disciples. One cannot say whether the form of the face is beautiful, one feels indeed that that is of small importance, but that which strikes the mind with awe is the profound spirituality of each one of those features, and especially of those deep eyes, full of light, the sympathy which pervades the countenance, the expression of sadness as also of calm confidence which marks the whole attitude. One feels profoundly in presence of that picture, that with Jesus there had appeared the type of a new beauty, which proclaims the triumph of the spirit over the flesh, and which, disdaining to appeal to the senses, speaks only to the soul.

We are now led naturally to consider Jesus in his relations to man, the object of his activity.

We have had occasion to remark above how profound was his knowledge of man, and with what unerring certainty—we should have called it implacable, had it not been allied to so great compassion—he unveiled the inclinations of men's hearts. The most striking feature of that extraordinary knowledge is its impartiality. That Jesus should have been able to expose the secret motives of his adversaries, and to make known all their baseness is also astonishing, for we know how keen are our eyes to detect the faults of those who wish us ill; but that which amazes us is that he should exercise to the full the same penetration in regard to his disciples, for we know how far the affection, and especially the enthusiasm with which our friends regard us have power to veil from us their faults. Yes! that which amazes us is that Jesus, at the moment when he is about to be abandoned by all, and, as it might seem, to need his disciples more than ever, far from encouraging, or even receiving the sincere, although exaggerated expression of devotion which the most ardent of his apostles addressed to him, should take occasion to show Peter how little he knows himself (John xiii: 37, 38); that when the multitude whom he has fed, returns to him on the next day, far from being moved by such homage, he turns to them and says: "Ye seek me, not because ye saw the miracles, but because ye did eat of the loaves, and were filled."

Yes! Jesus knows the exact worth of the enthusiasm of a friend, or of a multitude, even when he himself is the object of it. He knows humanity; he knows how fickle, how selfish, how base it is; he is not deceived there;—and yet, strange to say! he does not despise it. Severe words fell from his lips, never one word of contempt. He does not despise the great; his attitude toward them is ever one of dignity. Need we show that he does not despise the little? He despises neither friends nor foes: he despairs of no man; he never fails to see in the most blinded and degraded creature the temple of God, empty and ruined although it be; and to sum up in one trait all that we could say—he washes the feet of Judas. How far are we here from the stoicism and the aristocratic scorn which prides itself in its devotion to *the vulgar!* how far from Socrates, who, when rudely struck in the market-place, said to his friends, who were astonished at his patience, "If my horse had struck me, would you have me call him to account for it?" how far from Napoleon

who boasted of his knowledge of men, and who, in course of a famous discussion, said of them, "It is with toys one manages them." There, what profound contempt! Here, what respect! and strange to say, he who best knows humanity, and we can add, who suffers most from it, he it is who honors it the most.

He it is also who *expects the most of it.* Jesus places men immediately before the absolute. That which he demands of them is not to take a step toward the realization of their true manhood, but to realize it completely. "Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." Nor do we find that want of success led him to abate aught of his requirements; far otherwise. Those of his discourses which set forth most completely and most absolutely that great reconciliation of the whole man with God, and of humanity with itself, which he came to accomplish, are the last which he uttered, first in the upper chamber with his disciples at the last supper which prefigured his death, and then in the night as he walked the streets of Jerusalem, mute witnesses of his own benefactions and of men's ingratitude, on his way to the garden where there awaited him the agony, the kiss of a Judas, and the desertion of his friends.

Penetrating still further into the relations of Jesus with men, we note the perfect *independence* which he ever maintains before them. This independence shows itself at the very first glance in a freedom of manners which would be still more striking if it were not combined with an entire absence of all effort. Jesus avoids any collision with the usages of his people, as well as with their laws, which he observes (Matth. viii: 4); he acknowledges even the authority of the stranger (Matth. xvii: 27; xxii: 21), and is careful never to give the slightest occasion of scandal to the weak. But otherwise his manner of life bears the stamp of the most absolute liberty. He confines himself to no fixed place of abode, he goes wherever he thinks he can carry on his work. He gives himself no concern for subsistence, he knows that his heavenly Father, for whom he works, will leave him in want of nothing, and he is not disappointed (Luke iv: 39; v: 29; vii: 36). He sits indifferently at the table of the Pharisee (Luke vii: 36), and of the publican (Luke v: 29). Like Paul, he "knows both how to abound, and how to suffer need." He teaches in the market-places, and amidst the scenes of nature, as well as in the synagogues. He bestows his benefactions on pagan, as well as Jew (Matth. viii:

5, 6; Mark vii: 25, 29). And that which is most remarkable in this independence in regard to external things is that it is manifestly accompanied by the most inexorable discipline of self which man has ever exercised. The life of Jesus produces on no one the impression of a facile lawlessness: here, as nowhere else, liberty appears as the fruit of obedience.

Postponing for the present the consideration of the question, what was the supreme object of the obedience of Jesus, it is enough to say here that we must not seek low for it. *No man* was his master. By this we mean that Jesus, once arrived at the age of full liberty, neither accepted nor submitted to the least moral dependence. Who indeed, let us ask, could have been the master of Jesus? So completely does his personality overshadow and dominate the whole Gospel that it would be in truth absurd in us to look for one. Jesus profited by men; he certainly learned something from them, as we have seen; but the very investigation which we have made into the human elements which must have contributed to his development demonstrates the futility of attempting to measure Jesus Christ by any one of those elements.

Furthermore, we have testimony on this point which is to us decisive: it is that of Jesus himself, of Jesus who never recognized the authority of man, who, on the contrary, again and again proclaims himself worthy of the obedience of all, and who, were it only because of the deep humility with which he impresses every one who approaches him, deserves that he should be heard whenever he is moved to propound his claims.

Let us consider briefly the independence of Jesus under its various aspects.

He shows himself independent not only of every individual, but of the *multitude*. There reigned among the multitude which followed him in Galilee a well-defined, well-known Messianic type. What concession did he ever make to that type? When did he for a single instant in the least extenuate before the people the character of an abased and suffering Messiah, which he had accepted? He seems, on the contrary, to have taken pains to avow it the more openly; he even resorts to paradoxes in order to dissipate every vestige of misapprehension on the part of the multitude. We read in Luke (xiv: 25, 26), "And there went great multitudes with him; and he turned and

said unto them; If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." Of which of the passions of the populace did he ever avail himself when at any moment he might with a word have roused it to the highest pitch of excitement? What harsh truth did he ever soften or withhold? When he learns that the multitude wishes to take him up to proclaim him king, what does he? Does he content himself with refusing the honor? That would have been a small matter, for that very refusal might have increased his popularity, —he withdraws, alone, to a mountain.

Jesus is no less independent of his disciples. And first, see how he receives those who aspire to join themselves to him. How careful he is to decline the homage of those who comprehend not its import (Matth. xix: 17)! How unsparingly he portrays before those who would follow him all that they must leave behind them, all the sacrifices of which their life will be composed when once they have attached themselves to him (Luke ix: 57–62; xiv: 26, 33). Strange way of attracting them! See also how little he spares his disciples. When the critical moment is at hand in which, all feeble as they were, they are about to see their attachment to the Master and his cause subjected to the severest test which it had ever encountered, he speaks to them such words as these: "They shall put you out of the synagogue; yea, the time cometh that whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service." A strange way of assuring their spirits! We cannot deny to these men, notwithstanding their errors, a certain force of character, a certain natural energy of action. Peter, and the sons of Zebedee, whom Jesus called sons of thunder, were, to say the least, not pusillanimous. But what determinative action did these men ever exert on Jesus? At what point in the life of their Master do we detect the least trace of such an influence? Was he shaken by the agitation of Peter when he first openly announced his death to the disciples (Mark viii: 31–33)? And when they deserted him, did he face his adversaries any the less firmly?

We have just named his adversaries: is it necessary to say that least of all did they in any degree prevail over him? That which strikes us most forcibly in the long and painful interviews which Jesus had to sustain with the Jews of Jerusalem, is not the un-

shaken firmness with which he does not cease for an instant to maintain his title before those who accused him of blasphemy (John viii: 25); it is not even the severity with which he treats those enemies of whose power he was aware (John viii: 44); it is the calm serenity, the unalterable patience which he preserved in the midst of opponents whose smallest concern was for the truth, and of the base emissaries who sought only to prepare for him one snare after another. And who, in truth, will not admit, that patience is an attribute not of weakness and servility, but of strength and of liberty? At a later period, the more fiercely the storm rages around Jesus, the more emphatically he charges on his enemies the design of putting him to death, the more, also, does he seem to escape them. Patiently he awaits his hour; he awaits the pleasure not of his enemies, but of his Heavenly Father: and when the hour is come, how full of dignity, of strength, and of calmness the attitude which he maintains in presence of his judges! He does not brave them, even with the calmness of a Socrates! Caiaphas and Pilate would doubtless have found some relief in that; whereas his simple and calm replies, together with the silence with which he meets a question unworthy of any other answer, cast the most glaring light on their shameful motives. But that which must have surprised them yet more, was that they could obtain no concessions from him. Socrates, condemned to death, and invited by his judges, according to custom, to designate what commutation he desired in his sentence, replied: "I sentence myself to be supported for the remainder of my days, at the Prytaneum, at the expense of the State, for the great services which I have rendered it." Far from being shaken by their triumph, Jesus never relied more on himself than at the moment when all seemed lost. "Tell us whether thou be Christ, the Son of God," demanded Caiaphas, the Jew. "Thou hast said," replied Jesus; "nevertheless, I say unto you, hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven." "Art thou a King?" demands Pilate, the Roman. "Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born."

We cannot pass from this consideration of the absolute independence of Jesus, without remarking how simple and unstudied it is! He exhibits no solicitude to preserve it in the eyes of others; he does not proclaim it; he does not shrink even from

actions which seem inconsistent with it. See him as he stands before John the Baptist: see him washing the feet of his disciples. He is truly free, who, in order to do good, is not afraid to appear a slave.

We have considered hitherto only the negative side of the relations of Jesus with men: it is time that we consider his *positive action* on them. First, we observe that Jesus presents himself to men as one having *absolute authority* over them. Everything about him breathes this authority; his speech: "he taught them as one having authority," says Matthew; and the officers dispatched by the chief priests did not dare to take him; "never man spake like this man," they said; his very person: he drives the sellers from the temple with no other weapon than a whip of small cords,—with no other warrant than that which his holy wrath gave him; the soldiers, under the guidance of Judas, recoil and fall to the earth, when he presents himself to them, and says, "I am he."

Jesus regards men as belonging to him of absolute right; as having been given him by his Father, that he again might give them eternal life, and reign eternally over them. See further how he disposes of them. "Follow me!" he says to Philip;—"Follow me!" to Levi;—"Follow me!" to the sons of Zebedee, and these men leave *all* and follow him. It is thus that Jesus asserts in principle his kingship. In principle, we say, for he does not require all to follow him in that way. He permits Lazarus, for example, to remain with his sisters. But one thing is certain: he requires all to consider not only their souls, but their possessions, their entire life, as devoted to Him who calls himself their Saviour. Jesus allows no rival; his disciple must subordinate, and *if need be*, sacrifice to him even this holiest affection. Such is the meaning of the passage heretofore cited (Luke xiv: 26), which we have already relieved of its paradoxical form. Jesus never requires any one to hate, for his sake, father or mother. To part from one's own, even by a voluntary death, when it is the death of a martyr, is very often to love them with a higher love.

Can we fail to recognize in this kingship which Jesus has always asserted over his followers, and which they have always accepted, that profound spirituality which we have had occasion to describe in him? Jesus will reign only over souls. If he de-

rounds the life, it is because of the soul which is the center of it. Without prejudging in aught the future, he does not dream for an instant of giving to those who follow him, and whom he is about to leave alone, the slightest trace of an external organization. His indifference in regard to this is absolute. Who does not wonder at it? In what moment does he not choose at last wherein to accept from the multitude an homage which, until then, he had always refused? It is when he betakes himself to Jerusalem to die; and even then a singular triumph is his—a singular intermingling of royalty and of humility do we find in his attitude.

No feature of Christ's character, or, if you will, no dogma of the Gospel, is better established than the sovereignty to which Jesus lays claim. We cannot conceive how any one can seriously question it. And it is worthy of remark, that the Synoptical Gospels—those which are held up to us in opposition to the Gospel of St. John, as contradicting the idea of a *real* divinity in Jesus—are precisely those which put in the mouth of Christ the most absolute (Math. x: 39), the most extraordinary (Luke xiv; 26), affirmations of his kingship over men. And this kingship over souls, what else is it, we ask, than divinity? Can he be to me a mere man who demands my soul, and to whom I surrender it—I, who so unhesitatingly proclaim that it belongs only to God? And after this, what difference remains between the first three Gospels and the last Gospel, except that this insists more perhaps on the *title* which belongs to Christ, while they speak rather of his *rights?*

But not to anticipate, let us pass on, to speak of the love of Jesus. We can scarcely say that benevolence is a *trait* of the character of Jesus, so entirely does it penetrate it, so near is it to being the centre of it. Here we need have no fear whatever of emphasizing too strongly the trait which we are describing, or of leaving in the shade any opposite trait which must be taken into the account. What trait, indeed, in Jesus can we regard as the counterpoise of his benevolence? He was all benevolence. There was no act of his life which was not determined by his love. We need not stop to prove this; it rests with those who deny this harmony, to show us in the history of Jesus any trait which contradicts it. It is vain to say that we have not the materials for the decision of such a question; that we do not know all the de-

tails of the life of Jesus. What we do know of his life is sufficient: for, on the one hand, as we have already shown, the documents which we do possess are, by the absence of systematic regularity, eminently suited to assist us in finding Jesus unawares, in all possible circumstances; and, on the other hand they make us witnesses of the most critical moments of his life—those at which there is every evidence that his benevolence would have failed him, had it been possible. Let us note some of the characteristics of this benevolence.

And first, let us look at it in its more *negative* aspects. We know what Jesus had to suffer from men, from their frivolity, their ingratitude, their hatred. We can say, I believe, that Jesus was, of all men, the most unappreciated, the most bitterly hated, as well as the most beloved. Yet never does a fretful word fall from his lips; never does he invoke on his adversaries the least malediction (Luke ix: 54, 55); never does he, as another in his place might have done a hundred times without our dreaming of being astonished at it—never does he turn away with disgust from those men who so basely and obstinately shunned him, whom he, for his part, still desired to save. Against the Scribes and Pharisees, it is true, he uttered threatening words; but what is the feeling which those words disclose? Is it that of an injured personality? Never. "Woe unto you," he cries out, "Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men; for ye neither go in yourselves, nor suffer ye them that are entering to go in." Have we not here the holy anger of benevolence itself? What, moreover, is it that he hates in the Pharisee? Is it the man? No, it is the Pharisee; and nothing is less subtile than that distinction. Did he ever pursue one of these men with animosity? Did he ever withhold from one of them his compassion? Never; while on the other hand we can point out a man whom Jesus received, treated as a cherished disciple, bore with long, who in return for all this kindness sold his master, and whom that master, although cognizant of his treason, did not cease to treat as a brother, combatting the hateful purpose not yet consummated by the power of a compassion as deep as it was delicate, nor ever repelling the wretch when he came to give him a traitor's kiss, (Luke xxii: 21, 22; John xiii: 3–5, 21, 26). We have there the measure of the endurance of Jesus. Is it necessary, after that example, to recall another, hardly more sublime

—we mean the prayer which Jesus offered from the cross to his Father in behalf of those who had nailed him there? "Father," he says, "forgive them, for they know not what they do."

But the benevolence of Jesus is not passive only: it is active. It is in the presence of suffering that the active side of his benevolence especially shows itself. One thing which strikes us from the first is that Jesus, far from denying that there is suffering, does not even seek to make it seem less to the sufferer. On the contrary, his presence seems to cause it to be more sensibly felt. He does not seek to persuade the leper that his leprosy is a small matter. He does not counsel him as a Seneca, an Epictetus, or a Marcus Aurelius would have done in his place, to raise himself above his disease, and to imbibe ineffable consolations from the internal liberty of his soul. He knows what the liberty of a leper is worth—of a leper, we say, a man condemned to isolation and disgust with himself. He looks on him, and on his life; he is "moved with compassion," that is, in the literal sense of the word, he suffers with him because of the leprosy; then he "touches" him, whom no one dared to touch; in his compassion for the man, he identifies himself with him so far as to risk that hideous contact, and he heals him, (Mark i: 40–42). We have selected this example because it seems to us to exhibit completely that which characterizes the active benevolence of Jesus, to wit: his compassion. It is so, moreover, that the Gospel intends it. "When the even was come," says Matthew (viii: 16, 17), he healed diseases; and the Evangelist adds, "that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Isaias the prophet, saying, Himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses." Yes! Jesus looks human suffering in the face, he calls it by its true name, he trembles before it, he embraces it, he lets himself be embraced by it, he heals the miserable one who mourns because of it, and in the same way that he healed the leper, so, even by delivering himself to the lowest humiliation, will he heal humanity of its most unrelenting enemy, Death.

In speaking of humanity, we have named the real object of the benevolence of Jesus. He would embrace in his compassion humanity in its entireness (John iii: 16; Cf. x: 16); and still, while cherishing such a purpose, we find him moved by the obscurest of sufferings. Yes, the misery of the most friendless speaks to his heart as loudly as that of a multitude; the Gospel

applies the same to that which Jesus feels in presence of the one and the other of these miseries, "he was moved with compassion," (Matth. ix: 36; Mark i: 40); and he who came to save the world, the same it is who portrays himself as a shepherd, who having lost one sheep, goes after it until he finds, and brings it back rejoicing (Luke xv: 5).

If Jesus, as we have seen, regards with deep horror the miseries of this world, there is one among them which is for him misery itself, lying at the bottom of all the others, and exciting his most sorrowful compassion. That misery is moral evil. He proclaims distinctly that it is with sin he has to do (Matth. ix: 2; John v: 14), with sin, and the profound uneasiness which accompanies it (Matth. xi: 28, 29), with sin, and the fatal fruit which it bears in its bosom, death (John viii: 21, 24). To this death he opposes life, and life is for him communion with God, without which nothing remains for humanity but to die.

Who can deny that he binds to himself the life of humanity by an absolute and necessary bond? He is the life of man; no one comes to the Father but by him. "This," he says, "is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son and believeth on him, may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day." But that he might become the source of life to man, he must die, he must lay down his life (John x: 17, 18), he must experience the extreme bitterness, deprivation, humiliation of death. Unto this hour is he come (John xii: 27), this hour most fully reveals his mercy (John x: 15, 17, 18; xv: 13); for now it is that he sustains, triumphantly, the most terrible of his trials.

"The death of Socrates," says Rousseau, "philosophizing tranquilly among his friends, is the most gentle that one could desire; that of Jesus, expiring in the midst of torments, reviled, mocked, cursed by an entire people, is the most horrible that one could dread. Socrates, taking the poisoned cup, blesses him who presents it weeping; Jesus, in the midst of horrible pain, prays for his infuriated executioners. Yes: if the life and death of Socrates are those of a philosopher, the life and death of Jesus are those of a God." Inimitable as the passage is, it comes far short of explaining the anguish and the death of Jesus. In another place, indeed, Rousseau ignores that anguish. "Where is the man," he asks, "where is the philosopher who can do, suffer and

die without weakness, and without ostentation?" Voltaire, it is said, wrote on the margin of *Emile*, opposite these words: "Without weakness! And he sweated blood?" Ah, well! for once, at least, the philosopher of Ferney failed in his blasphemy. In spite of himself doubtless he spoke truly. No! the death of Jesus was not free from what, in a similar case, one is accustomed to call weakness. We shall look to it in vain for the amiable serenity of a Socrates, the gloomy pride of a Brutus, or the calm strength of an Utican Cato. For him, it is clear, death is full of horror; it is at least no triumph, no deliverance, but a dark pass which he would avoid,—and when it comes he accepts it, but he does not brave it. And still we feel that there is at the bottom of all this weakness, a heroism which we have found nowhere else. We see that Jesus, such as we have known him, trembling before death, would be the most inconceivable, the most monstrous of contradictions, if death were for him nothing else than it was for Socrates, Brutus, or Cato, and that before he could have endured the agony of Gethsemane, he must have tasted in death a bitterness which those heroes of pagan antiquity did not even suspect.

It is to this conclusion, then, that we come. Jesus no more seeks to raise himself above death when it overtakes him than he sought to make the leper forget his leprosy. He sees in it the baleful condensation of all the woes of humanity, the foul and bitter penalty of sin, the utter degradation of him who has rebelled, and in the fullness of his liberty, and of his consciousness of righteousness, he makes that degradation his own. Hence those sorrowful tremblings, hence that sad visage, hence that "bloody sweat," over which Voltaire exults, and in which, for eighteen hundred years, all those wretched ones have exulted who have been able to discern therein the last conflict, and victory too, of redeeming love.

We have said that the benevolence of Jesus penetrated his whole life. But after all it is not the last word; we are not yet at the very center. There is, if we may once more use an expression so limited for anything so great, there is a characteristic which rules even the love of Jesus,—we mean his union with God.

One thing strikes us from the first when we consider Jesus in his relations to God. It is that he never exhibits himself as needing his Father's forgiveness. Never does he speak of sins

which he has committed, never does he show the least concern about the salvation of his soul, never in his soul disturbed except by the misery of others. On the contrary, he declares that he always does those things which please his Father (John viii : 29); he challenges those who oppose him to convince him of sin (John viii : 46): he presents himself at all times as in possession of eternal life. "Strange illusion!" we should say, did we not know how clear was his vision in regard to the sins of others: "Unheard of pride!" did we not know how humble he was.

How humble, we say; and indeed the form under which his union with God appears to us is that of the most absolute *dependence*. It is in the Gospel of John that we find the most humble declarations of Jesus on the subject of his relations to the Father; it is in the three other Gospels that we find that dependence manifesting itself in actions. Jesus declares that he came not of himself,—it is the Father who sent him (John viii : 42), the Father who is with him, for he does always those things that please him (John viii : 29), the Father who hath given him all that he has (John iii : 25), all that he says (John viii : 26), all that he does (John viii, 28), the Father whose glory he seeks at all times, on all occasions (John vii : 18). We shall not stop now to show how this profound humility of Jesus, a humility which prompts him to turn aside from himself all the honor of his proffers and deeds of mercy, is supremely adapted to inspire confidence in him. He himself invokes its testimony. "He that seeketh his glory that sent him," he says, "the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him" (John vii : 18). The humility of Jesus does not limit itself to words; it passes into acts and becomes *submission*. We shall not again contemplate the struggles which he underwent; we shall not recall Gethsemane. We have considered those struggles in the light of his love,—we might review them in the light of his submission. His triumph is no less that of absolute piety than of absolute compassion; we are wrong,—it was much more that of absolute piety. "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son," said Jesus, in putting his hand to the plow; and at the close of his day's work he still cries out, "Father, Thy will be done, not mine!" It is not the benevolence of Jesus which determines his obedience,—it is his obedience which determines his benevolence. It is not because he loves his brethren that he is one with God,—it is because he is one with

God, that he loves those whom God has given him. "As the Father hath loved me," he says, "so have I loved you." Why make any further distinctions? Here we are at the center, or, if you will, at the common summit where all the lines meet. To obey God, and to give himself to me, is one and the same thing: absolute piety is at the same time absolute benevolence. To say that Jesus is the *true* Son of God, living among man, and to say that he is, by his absolute love, the Saviour of humanity, is to set forth in a sublime pleonasm the entire character of Jesus.

But it is not on the side of dependence alone that Jesus presents to us his union with God. That Union is real; Jesus is not the servant, he is the *Son* of God. He can say to his Father, without hesitation, "All thine is mine." As such the power of forgiveness belongs to him (Luke v: 21), and Life (John v: 26), and Judgment (Matth. xxv: 30), and sovereignty over nature (Mark iv: 41,) and that eternal kingship of souls, still more glorious, which is perhaps the most authentic manifestation of his real divinity. And behold with what composure he moves in the midst of so many riches,—with what simple majesty he appropriates it to himself! Let me figure for a moment an impostor, or a fanatic, assuming to pardon sins: he would soon perish, not on a cross, but on the inexorable pillory of ridicule. No! the attitude of Jesus has in it nothing of the stranger, nor even of the servant; the more we contemplate him, the better do we recognize in him *the only-begotten Son.*

IX.—A PORTRAIT OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY.

JOHN TAULER.*

The first half of the XIVth century was an epoch of tears, of blood, and of unmeasured calamity. In France, the war of a hundred years with England had commenced. In Germany, the long struggle of the Emperor against the Popes continued, with its accompaniment of sorrow,—princes excommunicated, and cities and provinces placed under interdict. To civil and religious dissensions were added, with appalling rapidity, frightful catastrophes,—earthquakes, devastating hurricanes, and famine, feeding on human flesh. And to crown the whole, the black death, the plague,—" of which," says a chronicler of those times, " a third of the human race perished,"—ran over Europe, and struck terror into every heart.

Then a dreadful darkness overspread the earth. Some, half dead with terror, waited, in gloomy stupor, for the final blow. Others, turning their frightened gaze from the desolations which surrounded them, fled for refuge and isolation to a life of ecstacy and contemplation. With others, grief fevered into a paroxysm of rage, broke forth in acts of violence against the Jews, and thousands of that wretched race perished in the flames, under the absurd but greedily-accepted pretext that they had produced the plague by poisoning the water and the air. Others still, in immense numbers, joined themselves to the flagellants, who, organizing on the borders of the Rhine in 1348, and swelling into an avalanche, poured themselves over Germany, the Low Countries, Switzerland and England. These last, their faces covered with a hood, with bodies naked to the waist, with a red cross upon the heart, perambulated Europe, shedding torrents of tears, chaunting penitential psalms, and perpetually lacerating their bodies with blows from cords armed with spikes of iron. And still others, such as " the brothers and sisters of the free spirit," touched, in their ecstatic folly, the last limits of human extrava-

* Translated from *Le Temoinage, Journal de l' Eglise de la Confession d' Augsburgh*, by Rev. C. M. Butler, D. D., Professor in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church, Philadelphia.

gance and cynicism. For them there was no longer any difference between the Creator and the creature—every Christian is a being in whom God is incarnate—the Christian, freed from the law, can no more sin—the Church, with its sacraments and institutions, is a sham—purgatory, heaven and hell are silly fancies—marriage is an outrage upon nature—and property is another name for theft.

Such was the year 1348. It is a dark picture, whose color I have mitigated rather than overcharged; and upon which is discerned, in beautiful relief, a gentle and admirable figure—that of a Dominican monk, named John Tauler. Born at Strasburg in 1290, of a rich and reputable family of that city, John Tauler had early renounced the world and entered a convent of Dominicans; and after having studied theology at Paris, had returned to Strasburg. There his mild and meditative nature had been influenced, both by the mysticism which counted numerous representatives in Alsace, and by the religious association of "the friends of God," which extended in this century from the borders of the Rhine to Italy. Like the Mystics, "the friends of God" relied upon a present inspiration, an interior revelation, and sought happiness in an ineffable union with God, which was capable, as they believed, of being realized upon earth. But that which was most characteristic of these mystics was their practical devotion, and their ardent and indefatigable love of souls. It is unquestionable that the "friends of God" exercised a salutary influence in many respects upon Tauler, whose practical, popular, fervent preaching, full of vivacity and of Christian earnestness, soon attracted remark at Strasburg. His reputation was already widely extended when, in 1340, a decisive crisis in his Christian life occurred. A strange and powerful person, enveloped in mystery, then swayed the association of "the friends of God." His name was Nicholas de Bâle; but this name itself was a mystery to most of those with whom he was in relation. They called him "the great friend of God," or "the inspired layman." He was a man profoundly impressed with a sentiment of the vanity of earth; he was a mighty wrestler with sin, and carried in his heart anguish for his own transgressions and for those of his contemporaries; he was possessed with such living and vivid convictions, that he spake and acted with the authority of a prophet, and sought too often truth and light in direct reve-

lations from God, by ecstacy and vision. He came to Strasburg in 1340, and as the result of long interviews with Tauler, the latter was convicted of having been proud and Pharisaical in heart, and submitted himself blindly to the spiritual exercises which his mysterious friend imposed upon him, to lead him, as he said, to a perfect humility, and a complete renewal of heart. In order to stifle in him the last germ of self-love, Nicholas de Bâle interdicted him from preaching, and during two years Tauler remained immured in the cell of his convent, mortifying his body and purifying his soul by assiduous meditations upon the sufferings of Christ. These were two years of profound anguish, of spiritual and corporeal suffering, and of salutary struggles, which ended in a signal victory. From the period when he again appeared in the pulpit, we contemplate in him one of the most noble and touching types of Christian character. Henceforward he was distinguished for three eminent virtues.

He was remarkable *for a true and profound humility.* A single proof of this grace, selected from many others, will be given. He was about to preach, and the church was crowded to excess. Tauler ascended the pulpit, and prayed thus: "Almighty and most merciful God! if it be thy will, give me grace so to speak that thy name may be glorified, and that these poor souls may be converted unto thee!" At the same time he was suffused with tears, and unable to proceed. The audience sat waiting for the word, and some becoming impatient cried out, "How long shall we be kept here? It is already late; if you do not wish to preach, permit us to withdraw." But the tears of Tauler flowed more profusely, his consciousness of unworthiness entirely overcame him, and he was compelled to dismiss the assembly with the words,—"Dear Brethren, I sincerely regret to have retained you so long, but it is impossible for me to speak; pray God for me, that I may be able to do so on another occasion."

I have perused with profound edification the sermons of Tauler which remain, and I can confidently say that the object of every sermon is to show the misery of man, and the inconceivable majesty of God. "Not unto us, O Lord! not unto us, but unto thy name be the praise!"—this is the prayer which rises from all these pages, which cannot be read without warm emotion. Among the earnest appeals which he constantly addresses to the soul, this is reiterated most frequently and fer-

vently: "Be humble, examine and know yourself, and empty your soul of self, and cease to seek to desire or know anything but God."

Besides this real and sincere humility, there was in Tauler *an inner life of singular intensity.* Few men have ever become so sincerely and completely dead to self, so spiritually poor in order to become spiritually rich, as Tauler. Hence, no doubt, the astonishing power, and the surprising effects, of his preaching. He preached one day on the parable of the ten virgins; and when he described the joy which a saved soul experienced at the coming of the bridegroom, a voice from the crowd exclaimed, "It is true," and a person in the assembly dropped down as dead —so profound was the rapture awakened by the inspired words of the preacher. "Enough! enough!" cried others to the speaker, "since this person is dying in her arms." Then Tauler continued: "Ah! my dear children: if the bridegroom calls this dear soul away, we must not detain it; nevertheless I will cease," —and the sermon was ended with these words.

But that which more than all else distinguished Tauler was charity—*simple, practical and thoroughly Christian charity.* It partook of that immense compassion which moved the heart of Jesus when, weeping over the sins of Jerusalem, he went about doing good. This apostolic charity burned with all the purity, and with a brilliance truly divine, in 1348, that dreadful year of the plague, when terror and death hovered over every roof in Strasburg; when fifteen thousand persons were smitten in that city as by a thunderbolt; when Strasburg, which had recognized as Emperor of Germany a prince excommunicated by the Pope, was under interdict; when the churches were closed, and convents in great part abandoned, and when only a few priests remained in the city, detained there by terror greater even than their fear of the Pope. Then it was that Tauler, single-handed and superior to fear, under the supreme impulse of Christian charity, braved the interdict. Night and day his heart, overflowing with compassion, poured forth its consolations and appeals. He preached in the churches, and hurried from them to the couches of the dying, and hastened again to the churches to preach and to console the stricken and to encourage the timid. A thousand fell by his side and ten thousand at his right hand; and still every day with an heroic devotion which recalls the no-

blest periods of the history of the Christian church, he offered himself to almost certain death.

I have said that Tauler was alone; but I do not wish to be unjust. Two men joined him in 1348, and although little information has come down to us in regard to them, their names deserve to be remembered to the eternal honor of the gospel. The one was an Augustinian monk, Thomas of Strasburg, the other, a monk of the order of the Chartreaux, Rudolph of Saxony. These three men, united in the same sentiment of practical charity, addressed two circular letters to the clergy. The first was an urgent appeal to the clergy and the monks no longer to refuse Christian consolation to the sick and the dying—"because' said Tauler, "Christ died for all the world, and the Pope cannot close heaven to the poor people who die under the weight of an interdict which they do not deserve." In the second letter Tauler and his two friends contend among other things, "that he who confesses the true Christian faith, and has done no other evil than that of resisting the Pope, is still far from being a heretic."

It was these declarations, new and strange to the Bishop of Strasburg, which led him at first to prohibit the publication of these circulars. An assembly of Bishops condemned them as heretical, and the three courageous confessors of the truth were forbidden to remain in Strasburg. Tauler, in anguish of heart, left the city where his ministry had been so necessary, and so abundantly blessed, and repaired to Cologne. In 1391 we again find him at Strasburg dying. Perceiving himself near his end, he besought his mysterious friend, Nicholas de Bâle, to come and see him for the last time, and received him, when he came, with these words: "I believe that the time approaches when God will call me from the world; and hence, my dear son, it is an unspeakable consolation to have thee near me." Then he placed in his hands a manuscript in which he had described his interview with the great "friend of God," and he prayed him to publish them, without however affixing to them his name; "for," added the dying man, "you well know that what God has done for me, poor and wretched sinner, belongs wholly to him and in no sense to me; and take care not to allow this little book to be seen by any one in this city lest it should be suspected that I am its author; and carry it into your own country, and do not let it

appear in case I should live." Here we have the last touch which finishes the picture of his profound and beautiful humility.

A few days after, on the 16th of June, 1361, he consigned his soul to God. He was buried in his convent, amidst the most sincere demonstrations of universal grief. The stone which covered his mortal remains was removed in 1824 to the church where he had so often preached in Strasburg; and in the fire which, in 1860 destroyed the Protestant Gymnasium of that city, the remains of the ancient convent which inclosed the cell of the pious Dominican, became the prey of the flames.

Such was John Tauler of Strasburg. His opposition to the Romish Church of the middle age was essentially moral and almost involuntary. He had not, for a moment, thought of separating himself from the church. But he had been a reformer without having been conscious of it, when in advance of the crowd which subsequently raised these issues, he set himself with astonishing energy, against the prevailing materialism of the day,—proclaiming the insufficiency in themselves of masses, of macerations, of indulgences, of alms, of pilgrimages, and of many prayers;—when he proclaimed before all that even the works of the law, which are expressly commanded of God, can never merit salvation—when he urged the people to abide by the pure and simple word of God, instead of running after the dogmas of science, and the decisions of the learned doctors;—when he contended for the true liberty of the children of God over which Popes had no rightful power—when, without intending to place himself in conflict with the authority of the Pope, he knew how, in certain emergencies, to place infinitely above the Pope, the duty clearly indicated to him by the master in the words, "I have given you an example that you should do as I have done to you."

Tauler had also been a reformer without wishing to be so, when, reproving all sin, he had yet censured with peculiar energy the scandalous lives of the clergy of his time, and gibbetted the iniquity and hypocrisy of the men who believed that they were delivered to do all their abominations because they were ecclesiastics, or monks of celebrated orders. Tauler was accustomed to reply—"I know it well,—but multiply your hoods and cassocks as you will, one thing is certain, and that is, if you do not con-

form your life to your profession you are forever and irrevocably lost."

Tauler, the Dominican, of that order whose principal mission appeared to be to exterminate heretics, became unconsciously a reformer, by showing in words and actions, and his entire life, that the only thing which he had ever opposed to error, was the holy sorrow of a Christian who wishes to save the souls of sinners, and not to harm their bodies.

But his true opposition to the Romish church was to be found in his example of powerful faith, manifested by a charity no less powerful,—a charity that was practical and simple. The dualism which was manifested in all the church of the middle ages, the fatal divorce between faith and works, doctrine and morality, was not found in Tauler, and we discover for a moment in him the glorious and fruitful unity of apostolic faith and of apostolic morality. In an age when the most pure had no other refuge than the convent, and conceived that their highest duty was fulfilled when they labored for their own salvation in the cloister, without disquieting themselves concerning the salvation of others, Tauler renounced indeed the world, and became a Dominican monk, but he renounced the world without separating himself from the world, and by acting powerfully upon the world with a Christian influence; and his whole life was but an admirable practical exemplification of what he was accustomed to repeat: "When you are plunged in interior meditation, and God calls you to go forth and preach, or to discharge to a poor sick person a duty of Christian charity, do it promptly and with joy; and the presence of God will be more sensible to you there than if you remain concentrated upon self." This, in my judgment, constitutes the powerful originality of Tauler in the middle age, and explains the truly blessed influence which he diffused around him.

But shall I go so far as to say that he seized evangelical truth in all its fullness? This has been affirmed, but I believe it to be far from the truth. It is true that he expressly rejected salvation by works, and declared as expressly that man can be justified only by the merits of Christ. But in examining the point more closely, we see that the sufferings and death of Christ were regarded by him as a necessary and indispensable *means* of salvation, rather than as itself the salvation. In virtue of his expiatory death, the Saviour, according to Tauler, communicates to those who

believe, that grace of God, which alone renders possible the return of sinful man to God; and it is this return to God which appears to Tauler to constitute salvation,—as also it is not justification by faith, but absolute self-renunciation, which, according to him, procures peace. In a word, Jesus Christ is not, according to Tauler, a complete Saviour. Thus this soul, notwithstanding it was so humble, did not know how to rejoice here below in a salvation already in possession; and this preacher, so faithful, and in many respects so powerful, was not in a condition to make others taste the supreme joy which he did not himself possess.

On the other hand, is it not true that Tauler rested firmly upon the rock of the Holy Scriptures? It is beyond doubt that he appealed often to the word of God, and earnestly aided souls toward its living spirit; yet we cannot fail to admit that he attached too much importance to what he called an interior revelation,—a religion of intuition and of sentiment.

But, however this may be, John Tauler suffices to show us that the Church of the middle age, so profoundly debased in many respects, has yet produced some admirable characters, which may at once humble us and be our models.

[Luther only required to know such a man as Tauler in order to love him, not so much on account of his opposition to the Papal power, which we have just mentioned, but of which perhaps the Reformer never heard, but far more on account of the solid Christian piety which thought in a German way, and spoke the German tongue, for which he felt a deep reverence, and by which he formed his mind, before he himself dreamed of any kind of opposition. He called Tauler "a man of God." He exhorted his friend John Lange, "to keep to Tauler," and writes to Spalatin, "If it will gratify you to become acquainted with a solid theology in the German tongue, perfectly resembling that of the ancients; procure for yourself John Tauler's sermons, for neither in Latin, nor in our own language, have I seen a theology more sound, or more in accordance with the Gospel. Taste and see how gracious is the Lord, if you have previously tasted and seen how better is all that we are in ourselves." Melancthon, also, assents to this opinion. He says: "Among the moderns Tauler is the most eminent. I hear, however, that there are some sophists who presume to despise the thoroughly Christian doctrine of this celebrated man."]—Ullmann's Reformers before the Reformation, vol. 2, p. 212.

X.—THE OLD CHURCH OF IRELAND.

BY JAMES GODKIN.

An immense number of learned works have been written on the life of St. Patrick, and the nature of the Irish Church, which he is said to have founded. Some ecclesiastical historians have denied his existence altogether; others have contended that there were several saints who bore the name of Patrick, and that in dark and barbarous times it was natural that popular legends should magnify one of those primitive missionaries into a great national apostle. The orthodox Roman Catholic idea is that St. Patrick received his commission from Pope Celestine in the fifth century, and was sent to Ireland to organize into properly regulated churches the Christians whom previous missionaries had converted, to preach the Gospel to the heathen, and to establish a national Church in strict connection with the See of Rome and complete subjection to Papal jurisdiction. To prove that he did all this, and to vindicate the character of the Irish Church from the aspersions cast upon it in the twelfth century by English writers, who deceived the Pope, and persuaded him to authorize the invasion by Henry II, was the great object which the Rev. Dr. Lanigan had in view in writing his "Ecclesiastical History of Ireland, from the first introduction of Christianity among the Irish to the beginning of the Thirteenth Century." Dr. Lanigan was a Roman Catholic divine of some eminence, formerly professor of ecclesiastical history in the University of Pavia, and afterwards librarian of the Royal Dublin Society. His work has been always held in high estimation for its learning. The Irish Roman Catholic clergy think so well of it that one of their number, the Rev. P. J. Carew, Professor of Divinity in the College of Maynooth, has published an Epitome of it as a text-book for the students in that institution.

The orthodox Protestant idea, on the other hand, is that St. Patrick, the apostle of Ireland, went to that country, converted the natives, and established a National Church quite independent of the Pope and his jurisdiction—a Church which always repu-

* From the *Fortnightly Review*.—[J. McC.]

diated Papal authority and resisted the influx of Papal errors till subjugated by Henry II, who caused the Irish Church for the first time to pass under the Papal yoke. This Church of St. Patrick, many Protestant writers contend, was truly and essentially an Episcopal Church of the Anglican type, with which the present Established Church of Ireland is really identical. The identity is assumed to be a fact clearly demonstrated; and on the strength of this assumption, the Roman Catholic hierarchy is regarded as an alien institution imposed upon the country, and possessing no right, human or divine, for persisting in its very offensive intrusion. Now, there can be no manner of doubt that the old Church which existed in Ireland from the fifth to the twelfth century was an institution essentially different from the Papal hierarchy which had grown up in the course of ages, and been finally established throughout the provinces of the Roman empire, within which the Island of Saints was never included. There can, I think, be as little doubt that the same old Irish Church was totally different from the Church of England as established by law at the time of the Reformation. Many able works have been written upon this subject, but I know of none, whether ancient or modern, that can be for one moment compared, for learning, research, accuracy, candor, and sound judgment, with the recently published Life of St. Patrick, by the Rev. Dr. Todd.* Fully one-half this most valuable work is devoted to "an introductory dissertation on some early usages of the Church in Ireland, and its historical position from the establishment of the English colony to the present day."

Enlightened and candid as Dr. Todd is, he assumes upon his very title page that the old Celtic Church and the Protestant Establishment are one and the same body, although he himself has proved by irresistible historical testimony, and in express words asserted, that the old Church in question had become "practically extinct" before the Reformation. "The Church of the native Irish," he writes, "was discountenanced and ignored by Rome as well as by England. It consisted of the old Irish clergy and inmates of the monasteries beyond the limits of the English pale, who had not adopted the English manners or language, and who

* "St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland. A Memoir of his Life and Mission," &c. By James Henthorn Todd, D.D., Senior Fellow of Trinity College, Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University, and Treasurer of St. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin.

were, therefore, dealt with as rebels, and compelled to seek for support from the charity or devotion of the people. Many of these took refuge in foreign countries, or connected themselves with foreign emissaries hostile to England at home; but at a subsequent period, when the Anglo-Irish Church had accepted the Reformation, *the mere Irish* clergy were found to have become practically extinct."*

When foreign writers in the interest of the Pope came to deal with the native Irish Church, they were shocked with what they regarded as its gross irregularities. St. Bernard, in his "Life of Malachy," for example, complains that up to his own times there had been "a dissolution of ecclesiastical discipline, a relaxation of censure, a making void of religion, and that a cruel barbarism, nay, a sort of Paganism, were substituted under the Christian name." In proof of this he adds that "bishops were changed and multiplied at the pleasure of the Metropolitan, a thing unheard of since the beginning of Christianity; without order, without reason, so that one bishoprick was not content with a single bishop, but almost every congregation had its separate bishop." It is quite evident that St. Bernard was ignorant of the constitution of the Irish churches, and equally ignorant of the ecclesiastical polity which prevailed throughout the Continental nations in the earliest and purest ages of Christianity.

An Oxford champion of Apostolic Succession speaks of "the minuteness of the dioceses into which many parts of Christendom were divided in the first ages. Some churches in Italy were more like our rural deaneries than what we now consider dioceses, being not above ten or twelve miles in extent, and their sees not above five or six miles from each other."† When Christians were but a fraction of the population, and their bishops lived within five or six miles of each other, it is manifest that those bishops could have been nothing more than congregational ministers. In Bingham's time the kingdom of Naples contained one hundred and forty seven sees, of which twenty were archbishoprics. Asia Minor, a country about twice the size of Ireland, had nearly four hundred dioceses. This refers to the state of things in the latter end of the fourth century; a period at which many of the village and rural bishopries had been abolished in the process of cen-

* Life of St. Patrick, p. 241.

† Tracts for the Times, No. 33.

tralization, in order to aggrandize and enrich the prelatic order. Yet at that time there still remained four hundred bishops in a territory not much larger than Great Britain, and which only a fifth part of the population had been evangelized. "Some that appear to be our pastors," wrote Eusebius, "deserting the law of piety, were inflamed against each other with mutual strifes, accumulating quarrels and threats, rivalship, hostility, and hatred to each other, only anxious to assert the government as a kind of sovereignty for themselves." The city bishops had from their position gradually acquired an undue influence over the rural bishops, and when Christianity was established by Constantine the wealth and power of the metropolitan prelates were vastly increased. Neander, speaking of the earliest Apostolic churches, says:—"It is certain that every Church was governed by a number of the elders or overseers, chosen from among themselves, and we find among them no individual distinguished above the rest, who presided as a *primus inter pares;* though probably in the age immediately succeeding the Apostolic, of which we have unfortunately so few authentic memorials, the practice was introduced of applying to such a one the name *episcopos*, by way of distinction."* Mosheim and Milner, in their Church histories, Dr. Hinds, in his "Early Progress of Christianity," and a host of the most learned Episcopalian historians, allow that there were no diocesan bishops in the churches founded by the Apostles and their immediate followers. And Hooker, admitting the fact, observes:—"The necessity of polity and regimen may be believed without holding any certain form to be necessary in them all. And the general principles are such as do not particularly apply to any one; but sundry forms of discipline may be equally consistent with the general maxims of Scripture." Churchmen, who would base the truth of Christianity, the rights of the Christian people, and even the salvation of souls upon an Apostolic succession, which cannot be proved, and a form of Church government which the Apostles never established, but which was borrowed from Paganism, should learn a lesson of toleration from "the judicious Hooker." Du Pin tells us that in the fourth century the form of Church polity was settled; and that it was for the most part according to the form of the civil government. The civil pro-

* "History of the Planting, &c., of the Church," vol. i, p. 167.

vince formed the body of the ecclesiastical province. The bishop of the civil metropolis was looked upon as the chief bishop of the province. Some rights and prerogatives were assigned to him, and to him was committed the care of overseeing the whole province. Those "metropolitans," thus enriched and exalted, and imitating the grandeur of the civil rulers in the same city, naturally looked down with contempt on their poor and unpolished country brethren, whose presence wounded their official pride when they met them in the assemblies of the Church, and found them sitting as their equals in synods and councils. Thus, in the course of time, as the empire declined and the church rose in power and influence, the civil arrangements of the states with regard to the boundaries of official jurisdiction, were adopted by the Church, until a territorial hierarchy became fully developed, and was crowned by the Papal tiara. Ireland, which lay beyond the bounds of the empire in the far West, remained for centuries exempt from those changes, and the Church there clung with strong tenacity to the system that had been planted by the first missionaries.

If, then, every congregation in that country had its own bishop, instead of proving that the Irish Christians were corrupt, disorderly, and heathenish, it would prove only that they had adhered with fidelity to the primitive system of Church polity, modified by the peculiar circumstances of the country, and by the genius of the Celtic race. The word "bishop," in the sense in which it is used by Churchmen, and generally understood, means a prelate who rules over a number of parochial clergy, be the same more or less. There was nothing of the kind in Ireland till it was imported by the Norsemen, and imposed by the Pope. During six or seven centuries after the introduction of Christianity, or about half the period that has elapsed since the mission of St. Patrick, the word "parish," or its equivalent, does not once occur in the history of the Irish Church. But the parish we know is the basis of the ecclesiastical system now established in England and Ireland. The old Irish Church was built without this foundation stone of Episcopacy; and the first thing that the Rev. Dr. Todd can find which at all resembles a "diocese" is indicated in the following words:—"The district which owed allegiance to the *chieftain*, and was inhabited by his followers, became the proper field of labor to *his* bishops and clergy, and this was the first

approach made to a diocese or territorial jurisdiction in the Church of Ireland."* But let not Presbyterians or Independents take comfort from the non-episcopal character of that Church. Its ecclesiastical polity, if the word be applicable to such a state of things, was neither Presbyterian nor Congregational. We look in vain for either model in the old Church of Ireland; and nothing can be more futile than the attempt of controversialists to torture its ancient ecclesiastical records into proofs in favor of their respective systems of Church government.

When St. Bernard and other assailants charged the Irish Churches with having a bishop for every congregation, they did not state the whole truth, nor half the truth. The "Four Masters" make the number of churches established by St. Patrick 700, with 700 bishops and 3,000 priests.† Dr. Petrie has published a later record, A. D. 664, in which St. Patrick is said to have consecrated 350 bishops, 300 priests, and 700 churches. But no reliance can be placed on those numbers. The early MS. records were manipulated, modified, and mixed with legends in the course of the middle ages. What is certain is, that almost every religious community worshiping in one place had not only one bishop, but several bishops, the prevailing number being *seven*, to which the Irish Christians evidently attached a mystic import. Thus the Martyrology of Donegal mentions no less than six groups of seven bishops each, living together. In three of those cases the seven bishops are said to have been brothers—sons of one father. "But this list," says Dr. Todd, "is completely eclipsed by the one hundred and forty-one groups of seven bishops of various churches and places in Ireland, who are invoked in the Irish Litany, attributed to Aengus Cele De, or the culdee, and probably composed in the ninth century."‡ It is doubtful whether the number seven was deemed necessary, or was general in the churches. Dr. Todd thinks that the institution of seven bishops was only temporary. But there is no doubt whatever that there was generally a plurality of bishops in each church or religious community, or that the bishop was ordained "*per saltum*," that is, without passing through any intervening orders, and that this was done by a single bishop with the simple formality of prayer and the imposition of hands, often with little attention

* St. Patrick, p. 38. † O'Donovan's Translation, A.D. 493. ‡ St. Patrick, p. 32.

to personal qualifications. Nothing more, therefore, was implied by the title of "bishop" than that the bearer was, as we should now say, in "holy orders," that he was a "clergyman" or "minister;" it gave him a certain clerical *status*, being, in fact, equivalent to our term "*Reverend.*" The title conferred no jurisdiction whatever. Dr. Todd has made this quite plain and perfectly undeniable, by proofs drawn from the original records, admitted by such writers as Lanigan and Colgan. The learned dignitary gives the results of his inquiries in the following words:—"From the foregoing facts and anecdotes, no doubt can remain in the mind of any unprejudiced reader that the normal state of Episcopacy in Ireland was, as we have described, *non-diocesan*, each bishop acting independently, without any archiepiscopal jurisdiction, and either entirely independent, or subject only to the *abbat* of his monastery, or in the spirit of clanship to his *chieftain.* The consequence of this was necessarily a great multiplication of bishops. There was no restraint upon their being consecrated. Every man of eminence for piety or learning was advanced to the order of a bishop as a sort of *degree* or mark of distinction. Many of these lived as solitaries or in monasteries. Many of them established schools for the practice of religious life and the cultivation of sacred learning, having no diocese or fixed episcopal duties; and many of them, influenced by missionary zeal, went forth to the Continent, to Great Britain, or to other heathen lands, to preach the gospel of Christ to the Gentiles." Again, "On the continent of Europe, the Christian empire, both in the East and in the West, was divided into episcopal provinces and dioceses, based upon the ancient civil divisions, and the canonical regulations in question were closely connected with the institution of metropolitan and diocesan jurisdiction. In Ireland, where there were no metropolitans, no dioceses, and no fixed or legally recognized civil divisions of the country, these canonical rules were inapplicable, and therefore were disregarded."*

The word "archbishop," it is true, occurs in Irish Church history, but Dr. Todd has shown that it was used in a sense totally different from its present meaning. The Irish word *ard-episcop* is not equivalent to archbishop; it denotes simply an eminent or celebrated bishop, and there might be several of such archbishops in the same town or district.†

* St. Patrick, pp. 27–79. † Ibid. p. 16.

Dr. Todd has justly remarked that the *clan* is the true key to Irish history, political and ecclesiastical. Upon the clan Christianity was grafted in the monastic form, and this vital connection was maintained indissolubly till—after a struggle which endured for nearly four centuries—the clan system itself was destroyed by the power of England. When the Christian missionaries first went to Ireland, they found the clans existing as the primitive form of government, with numerous chieftains virtually independent, and one, two, or three nominal kings. St. Patrick and his followers always applied themselves in the first instance to the chieftain, and with his conversion followed that of the clan or sept. At or near his headquarters in the town, village, or station, they obtained permission to erect a church, and school, and a dwelling house, in which they and their leading converts lived in community, cultivating the land they had obtained, teaching those who came to them for instruction, and thus forming centers of civilization. They selected almost invariably the sacred sites of Paganism, and built their wooden churches under the shadow of the Round Towers—then as mysterious and inscrutable as they are to-day. Thomas Moore, in his "History of Ireland," follows the Abbé M'Geoghegan and other Irish writers in describing, with poetic coloring, the triumphs of the Cross. "In Ireland," he says, "by the influence of one humble but zealous missionary, and with little previous preparation of the soil by other hands, Christianity burst forth at the first ray of apostolic light, and with the sudden ripeness of a northern summer, covered the whole land. Kings and princes, when not themselves among the ranks of the converted, saw their sons and daughters joining in the train without a murmur. Chiefs, at variance in all else, agreed in meeting under the Christian banner: and the proud Druid and Bard laid their superstitions meekly at the foot of the Cross; nor, by a singular disposition of Providence, unexampled indeed in the whole history of the Church, was there a single drop of blood shed on account of religion, through the entire course of this mild Christian revolution, by which, in the space of a few years, all Ireland was brought tranquilly under the influence of "the Gospel."* And so M'Geoghegan says: "On peut dire avec vérité que nulle autre nation dans toute la Chrètienneté ne recut

* "History of Ireland," vol. i, p. 203.

les nouvelles du royaume de Dieu, et la foi de Jésus Christ, avec tant de joie." The only defect of this beautiful picture is, that it is not true; and, indeed, to any one acquainted with the country or with human nature, nothing can seem more unlike the truth. St. Patrick's life was often in danger from the intolerance of the Druids. His ecclesiastical establishments were surrounded by fortifications for the protection of the inmates; and many of the most celebrated of them, as Armagh, Cashel, Downpatrick, Clogher, were built in situations possessing natural advantages for defence, or near the already fortified habitations of the converted chieftains. Whole tribes persisted in rejecting Christianity for ages. Even where the greatest success was obtained, it was secured by a prudent tolerance of the national superstitions, or by even turning them to account, in order to graft upon them Christian ceremonies. It was only in "some rare instances" that the missionary ventured upon the destruction of an idol, or the removal of a pillar-stone; sometimes he contented himself with inscribing upon such stones the sacred names or symbol of Christianity, and ultimately they were changed into crosses. The very festivals of the heathen were respected, and converted into Christian solemnities or holidays. The *Beltine* and the *Samhain* of our Pagan forefathers are still observed in the popular sports of May Day and All Hallow's Eve; while the bonfires on St. John's Eve, through the flames of which children are accustomed to jump, and from which till lately coals were taken to the corn-fields to secure them from blight, are a remnant of the worship of Baal. "Nothing is clearer," says Dr. O'Donovan, "than that Patrick engrafted Christianity on the Pagan superstitions with so much skill, that he won the people over to the Christian religion before they understood the exact difference between the two systems of belief; and much of this half-Pagan, half-Christian religion will be found not only in the Irish stories of the Middle Ages, but in the superstitions of the peasantry to the present day."* Dr. O'Donovan has translated an ancient poem, in which the Christian bard contrasts his faith with Druidism thus:—

> "Our fate depends not on sneezing;
> Nor on a bird perched on a twig:
> Nor on the root of a knotted tree.
> I adore not the voice of birds,

* "Four Masters," p. 131.

Nor sneezing, nor lots in this world;
Nor a boy, nor chance, nor woman:
My Druid is Christ, the Son of God—
Christ, Son of Mary! the great Abbat,
The Father, the Son, and Holy Ghost," &c.

It is a curious fact that from childhood to old age, even at the present day, an Irish peasant never sneezes without exclaiming, "God bless us!"

Not only was the old Irish Church from the earliest times surrounded on all sides by gross forms of superstition and idolatry, deeply rooted in the soil, but in later times it was exposed to corruption from the Pagan rites of the Danes or Norsemen, who had established themselves in the country. In order, therefore, that it might be able to withstand "a lawless and savage Paganism," in the midst of which neither life nor property was secure, *monastic* institutions became a necessity. The head of each of these cœnobitic associations, was the abbat, who was often a layman, and sometimes the head of the institution, was a woman, as in the case of St. Bridget of Kildare.* Within the abbey or monastery the bishops lived and labored, subject to the abbat so long as they chose to remain, but free to go where they pleased if they became discontented with their position, and aspired to be founders of similar institutions in other lands, which many of them did, winning great fame on the continent of Europe, and becoming saints in the Roman calendar. At home the bishops assisted in cultivating the soil, plowing, digging, reaping, &c., unless the wealth of the institution rendered them independent of such toil, and enabled them to devote their energies exclusively to the cultivation of learning and art, and the instruction of the people around them. These communities were in some cases so numerous and prosperous that they became the *nuclei* of considerable towns.

In a document first published by Archbishop Usher, and supposed to have been written about the middle of the eighth century, the Irish "saints" are classed in three orders. The first were all famous and holy bishops, who rejected not the services and society of women, "because, founded on the rock of Christ, they did not fear the blast of temptation." They had

* Dr. Todd spells the word "abbat," not "abbot," following the primitive and more correct practice.

but one head, Christ,—but one chief, Patrick,—but one mass, and one tonsure, from ear to ear. The second order had also one head and lord, but different masses or liturgies; they refused the services of women, separating them from the monasteries. The third order dwelt in desert places, lived on herbs and water, and on the alms of the faithful, despising property of all sorts. They were, in fact, hermits. Dr. Lanigan accounts for the exclusion of women from the monasteries, by the fact that it became necessary when they were crowded with young students; and he asks how would Dr. Ledwich like to see boarding-schools composed indiscriminately of grown-up boys and girls. On this document Dr. Todd makes the remark, that throughout the whole of the patalogue there is not the smallest allusion to diocesan or archiepiscopal jurisdiction. Not a word is said of a primacy in Armagh, or any peculiar authority vested in the successors of St. Patrick, except this, that the first order, having their one head Christ, followed Patrick as their leader or guide, retained in the celebration of their mass the liturgy introduced by him, adopted the same tonsure and the same Easter, which he had taught, and were so far united in discipline "that what one of their churches excommunicated, all excommunicated." The second order of saints does not appear to have had any connection with Armagh or the institutions of St. Patrick. They had received a mass or liturgy from David, the celebrated Bishop of Menevia, now St. David's, in Wales. This order was also connected with the Columban churches of North Britain, Cumberland and Durham. It was from this order proceeded "that great stream of Irish missionaries who went forth to evangelize Europe at the end of the sixth and during some following centuries." Dr. Todd adds the following remarkable passage:—"From them the venerable Bede must have derived his information respecting the Scotic or Irish churches. From them must have been obtained all the information respecting Ireland which is to be found in the writings of continental authors. And it is remarkable that in the writings of Bede we find no mention of St. Patrick or of Armagh. He speaks only of Columba and the presbyters or bishops of the second order of saints. Adamnan also, the biographer, although he once incidentally mentions St. Patrick, is silent as to Armagh. The continental missionaries of the sixth and following centuries seem to have carried with them to Europe, no traditions of Ar-

magh or of Patrick. This remarkable silence has appeared to some unaccountable, and even inconsistent with the existence of St. Patrick. But the explanation of it is obvious; the Irish saints of the second order were connected with the British Church, and not with the Church of St. Patrick. They were disposed to emigration, and their religious zeal carried them to the Picts of North Britain and to the barbarous nations of the continent of Europe to win souls to Christ. There was no reason why they should say anything to their converts about Armagh or the successors of St. Patrick. They were in all probability more anxious to connect the churches and monasteries which they had founded on the Continent with Rome and the successors of St. Peter, from whom more effectual support might be obtained. But that they did not altogether ignore St. Patrick is evident from the great collection of canons, from which D'Achery has published extracts, in which Patrick and the synods said to have been held by him are frequently referred to. This collection has been preserved in continental libraries only, and was evidently compiled in one of the continental monasteries connected with Ireland."*

Referring to Wales, Dr. Lanigan states that in those times a great intercourse was kept up between the religious persons of Ireland and those both of Great Britain and Brittany; so that while Irishmen repaired to either of the latter countries, many pious Britons used to spend a great part of their time in Ireland. Among many instances, he mentions St. Renan, an Irish bishop, who retired to Brittany about the latter end of the fifth century, and led a solitary life in the Forest of Nivet.† Could this be an ancestor of the author of "La Vie de Jésus?"

The original taint of paganism was never fully worked out of the Celtic Church. With the old customs, the old religion survived. An English Governor once complained bitterly that the very soil of Connaught was "Popish." The Christian reformers of the middle ages might have said of all Ireland that the very soil was Pagan. The festive gatherings, in honor of the saints called "patrons," held around the "holy wells," differed little forty years ago from what St. Patrick found them fourteen hundred years ago. The saints succeeded to the gods. There was the same belief in miraculous powers, magic, and charms, the

* St. Patrick, pp. 95, 96.

† "Ecclesiastical History," vol. i. p. 492.

same mortifying self-inflictions, the same riotous self-indulgence, the same grotesque mixture of devotion and revelry, of piety and immorality.

The Magi, or Bards, contributed powerfully to keep alive the old superstitions. They were a sort of scribes, a literary priesthood, antiquaries, chroniclers, conveyancers, historians, and poets, who kept the national records and celebrated the fame of kings, chiefs, and heroes, whose delight was to glorify the past, and thrill their hearers with the recitals of the warlike achievements of their pagan ancestors. This class became extremely numerous. There was a round of festivities from the 1st of November, a great pagan festival, which became "All Saints' Day," to Easter, which had been rescued from the worship of Ashtoreth—and May Day, the festival of Baal, or the sun god, whose name is still borne by innumerable places in Ireland. During the whole half year the Bards were quartered upon the people,—"coshering,"—and became such a burden at last, that a proposal was seriously entertained by the abbats and chiefs to banish the whole tribe. They were the more inclined to this from the fact that the Bards were to a great extent sceptics and scoffers—a sort of mixture of the Scribe and the Sadducee, with a strong leaning to the old idolatry. But the proposal was overruled. The bards were indispensable as record-keepers, transcribers, and interpreters of the Brehon laws, &c., and instead of being abolished, the order was reformed and curtailed. The complaint, however, was often made that the bardic class had contributed materially to the corruption in faith and morals of the Irish Churches, and that they formed a party hostile to the clergy. At all events there was "a general disorganization of discipline, a dissolution of morals, a partial apostacy from the faith, a return to the superstitions of paganism." But a body of reformers sprang up, the chief of whom was St. Gildas, who went over from Wales to assist in the good work of evangelization. Another great reformer was St. Dissibod, whose biographer, the Abbess Hildegardis, describes the state of morals then prevailing in Ireland "as making men resemble beasts, more than rational moral beings." But in those charges there seems to have been much exaggeration; and we find, in the collection of old Irish canons, a sort of apology for "holy abbats, whose only fault is that they possess castles and ride in chariots, either from the custom of the country or because

of infirmity. For these things are less injurious if they are possessed in humility and patience than laboring at the plow, and driving stakes into the earth with presumption and pride. When the ship is wrecked let him swim who can swim."*

The great peculiarity of the old Irish Church was its clanship, and the facts that many of its abbats, or chief rulers, were not in holy orders; and when they were in holy orders, the rights of chieftancy were transferred to the ecclesiastical landlords, who enjoyed them in hereditary succession. Thus the land granted in fee to St. Patrick, or any other ecclesiastic, conveyed to the clerical society of which it became the endowment, all the rights of a chieftain or head of a clan. The com-arb, or co-arb—that is to say, the heir or successor of the original saint—who was the founder of the religious society, whether bishop or abbat, became the inheritor of his spiritual and official influence in religious matters. The descendants in blood, or "founder's kin," were inheritors of the temporal rights of property, although bound to exercise those rights in subjection, or subordination to the ecclesiastical co-arb. There was sometimes a double succession, or *progenies*, ecclesiastical and lay, both connected by blood with the original founder or donor of the lands. The tendency of this system was to throw the ecclesiastical succession into the hands of the lay succession, and so to defeat the object of the founder, by transferring the endowment to the laity. This is what actually took place in Armagh, and continued for two hundred years, the head of the ecclesiastical community, or monastery, whose successor afterwards claimed to be Primate of all Ireland, being actually a layman, and employing others to do the clerical duty. The rank of the feudal lord, or chieftain, absorbed the co-existing episcopal or sacerdotal character in the co-arb, or spiritual chieftain. The "*family*" of a monastery comprehended not only the bishops, friars, or monks, and other religious inmates, but included also in many cases the vassals, serfs, or clansmen who lived on the lands around the abbey, and other dependencies. Sometimes an abbat was a pluralist, and had under his rule several monasteries. For example, the Abbat of Hy was the common head of the monasteries of Durrow, Kells, Swords, Drumcliff, and other houses in Ireland, founded by Columba,

* Todd, p. 144.

whose successor he was. Hence the "family" of Columbkill was composed of the congregations, or inmates, and dependants of all those monasteries, together with the mother-monastery of the island of Hy. The feudal abbat, therefore, was often able to turn out a large body of fighting men to defend his establishments and his estates, in which they had a joint property. In general, however, the family of the monastery consisted only of the monk-bishops and their assistants. This mixture of the temporal and spiritual has been a source of the utmost confusion to ecclesiastical historians, who looked at the old Irish Church through the modern hierarchical system, and labored to trace the line of apostolical succession from St. Patrick down to their own time. "Even Ussher, Ware, and Lanigan," says Dr. Todd, "led away by their preconceived opinions, as to the existence of diocesan succession from the age of St. Patrick, were unable to realize to themselves the strange state of society indicated by our ancient records, and the still more strange state of the Church, when bishops were without dioceses or territorial jurisdiction. Hence it is that these eminent writers took the modern state of the Church, since the establishment of dioceses, as the model of what they conceived was, or ought to have been, the state of the Church in the days of Patrick and Columbkill, and thus they have confounded the ancient corbes with chorepiscopi, and erenachs with archdeacons. Even Colgan, influenced by the same prejudices, fell into the same mistakes."*

The latter office mentioned had reference to the Church lands, and was also hereditary in the same families. There are ancient lists of the co-arbs of St. Patrick; but Dr. Todd, the most learned man in the Irish Established Church, and probably the most competent of living judges in such matters, affirms that they all bear internal evidence of having been drawn up at the close of the eleventh or the beginning of the twelfth century, "when," he adds, "archiepiscopal and diocesan jurisdiction were introduced —and it is probable that their authors were influenced by a wish to establish a claim to a regular episcopal succession—at least at Armagh, and thus to escape so far the reproach of irregularity, which the Roman party amongst the Norsemen and English of that period had brought against the Irish Church."

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* St. Patrick, p. 162.

We know how eager some noisy champions of the Irish Establishment at the present day are to prop up apostolical succession, and to claim it for the Irish branch of the Anglican hierarchy, but one of the greatest ornaments of that hierarchy, one of the most distinguished Fellows and Professors of Trinity College, and one of the most learned antiquaries of his time, himself a zealous Churchman, has demonstrated, as we have seen, that the claim has not a shadow of foundation in history. In reference to a regular succession in Armagh, or elsewhere, Dr. Todd says, emphatically, "THE TRUTH IS, THERE WAS NO SUCH THING."*

The monastic institutions or clan-churches were mutually independent and perfectly free from external authority, although they made repeated attempts to establish common rules of discipline, and to be so far united that what one church excommunicated, all should excommunicate. But the Church followed the fortunes of the sept to which it belonged, and its establishments were plundered and burned without scruple, in the course of the almost internecine war which the chiefs and tribes waged against each other. The Celtic abbeys had been demolished by the Danes for centuries before the Conquest; they were devastated by Anglo-Norman settlers for centuries after the Conquest; and they often became the prey of those native chiefs who should have united to a man in their defense. Thus Glendalough and its "Seven Churches," situated in the Wicklow mountains, on the border of that gloomy lake celebrated by Moore, had in the twelfth century become a stronghold of robbers. Nothing seems to have survived the violence of the times but the Round Tower, which sphinx-like looks down upon the ruins of the rudely constructed ecclesiastic buildings; and when we examine both, we cannot but wonder how any man could believe that they were erected by the same race of people, and for the same religious purposes.

This leads me to make a few remarks on the manner in which the old Church of Ireland was "housed." Lest it should be supposed that I disparage the Irish Church unfairly on this point, I will give the description of the ecclesiastical architecture of the time in the words of Catholic historians. Father Malone writes, "In nothing was the Irish Church so indebted to the stranger as in architecture. The buildings in the service of religion, before

* St. Patrick, p. 172.

the invasion of the English, were of a very unpretending character in Ireland. The door was generally to the west; the windows were narrow, splayed inwardly, and always unglazed, because glass for glazing purposes was almost unknown. . . . The churches were small in dimensions, seldom did they reach sixty feet in length, and never more. Poverty of spirit was displayed even in the service of God."*

The writer speaks of stone buildings. But these were comparatively modern. The Irish churches were nearly all wooden structures. Dr. Lanigan makes very light of this matter, and says, "In building these churches of wood, the Irish had no peculiar motive imaginable except that they were very little in the habit of erecting any sort of edifices of stone or other materials. Accordingly nothing can be more ludicrous than the assertion of a silly presuming author that the doctrine and discipline of the Irish Church were averse to stone fabrics. Even before the twelfth century some stone churches had been erected in Ireland, although it was not until that period that this fashion was introduced into some of the northern parts."† The learned Doctor makes the very natural remark, that it cannot be expected there should be any remains of such wooden structures at present. Some idea may be formed of them by those who have seen the wooden churches thrown up by the Free Church of Scotland at the time of the disruption. In the Irish churches, no doubt, the workmanship was much more rough; but some of them were so ornamented as to present a splendid appearance. The finest, perhaps, of these was at Kildare, founded and richly endowed by St. Bridget, who employed as many bishops as she thought necessary to do the clerical part of the work, and held them in far stricter submission to her authority than Queen Elizabeth could by any possibility enforce in her bishops. The church of Kildare, as described by Cogitosus, in the early part of the ninth century, was large and lofty, and adorned with paintings. It was composed entirely of wood,—cruciform like the modern Roman Catholic chapels. At the head of the cross was placed the altar; and this part was entered by a door at each end. The right door was for the bishop and those who were to

* "A Church History of Ireland," &c. By the Rev. Sylvester Malone.
† Vol. iv, p. 393.

assist in the service; the left was for the abbess and the nuns. The body of the church was divided into two equal parts by a wooden partition, in order to separate the sexes, who were not allowed to mix in any of the Irish Churches. For the men there was a large door, not in the front, but in the side; and for the women, a corresponding door at the opposite side. As this was one of the grandest of the churches, a sort of cathedral, which vied with Armagh, we may easily infer the style of those which existed in inferior places.

There does not seem to have been much reverence for places of worship among the ancient Irish, nor was the sacerdotal spirit much cultivated. This was manifested particularly by the clerical costume, or more properly speaking the absence of clerical costume. If there was primitive simplicity in their church architecture, there was still greater simplicity in the episcopal dress. This has been graphically described by Dr. Lanigan. All the clergy were distinguished from the laity by the tonsure; and this seems to have been almost the sole distinction. "They wore a long tunic made of wool, over which they sometime wore the cuculla, or mantle of the same material. Notwithstanding the variety of monastic rules that existed in Ireland, there was no difference as to the color of their garments; for they left the wool in the natural color it had received from the sheep. Accordingly, some of them were clad in white, some in black; for besides white sheep there were also black ones in Ireland, but there was no obligation as to using any particular color."*

Dr. Ledwich had irreverently suggested that the clergy wore black dresses, because the bogs, their constant retreat, were black; but Giraldus Cambrensis assigned the more natural reason, namely, the blackness of the sheep.

Dr. Lanigan indignantly denounces "a beastly assertion of Ledwich, that not only the Irish laity, but even their ecclesiastics of old times, were in the habit of wearing no other dress than a short sort of mantle, that covered the shoulders and reached only to the elbows, leaving the rest of the body absolutely naked." This, he says, was a vile misrepresentation of a canon forbidding that any ecclesiastic should appear without having all his person properly covered. Dr. Lanigan proceeds to give the reasons why

* Lanigan, vol. iv, p. 357.

the canon was enacted. Its object, he says, was that the clergy should not appear dressed in a fashion which was very general with young and military men, particularly of the lower orders, who, below their upper dress, reaching to the elbows or the waist, wore a sort of pantaloons covering in one piece the thighs, legs, and feet, but so tight, and fitted so close to the limbs, as to *discover* every muscle and motion of the parts which it *covered.* Pantaloons of this kind were justly considered an indecent article of dress, and particularly unbecoming ecclesiastics; on which account the impropriety of it was marked in the strong terms which occur in the canon, representing it as tantamount to real nakedness."* In a note he slily adds: "The practice of Protestant bishops, who, when appearing in public in the short dress used in our times, wear a kind of apron, might have taught him to explain the words of the canon in a manner quite different from what he has done."

But I must bring to a close a paper already too long. I cannot do so without quoting a few sentences from Dr. Todd, on the monastic or collegiate churches founded by St. Patrick, for the double object of providing education and perpetuating divine worship. He says, "Hence it was that in Ireland Christianity became at once a national institution. It was not looked upon as coming from foreigners, or as representing the manners and civilization of a foreign nation. Its priests and bishops, the successors of St. Patrick in their missionary labors, were many of them descendants of the ancient kings and chieftains, so venerated by a clanish people. . . . By his judicious management, the Christianity which he founded became self-supporting. It was endowed by the chieftains without any foreign aid. It was supplied with priests and prelates by the people themselves, and its fruits were soon seen in that wonderful stream of zealous missionaries, the glory of the Irish Church, who went forth in the sixth and seventh centuries to evangelize the barbarians of central Europe."†

Such was the old Church of Ireland, which perished three centuries ago, after enduring for a thousand years! How it perished, and how its place has since been occupied, I hope to be permitted to show in a future number.

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* Lanigan, vol. iv, p. 360. † St. Patrick, p. 514.

XI.—SAMARITAN MANUSCRIPTS.

The *Athenæum* of June 30, 1866, contains the substance of the Report of Mr. Deutsch, of the British Museum, on the photographs recently made in Palestine under the direction of the Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund.

The first set of photographs consists of three representations of the most important scroll of the Samaritan Pentateuch used at Nabulus—the only one existing in the form of a roll. Although purporting to be written by the great-grand-son of Aaron himself, it has, by modern investigators, together with the Samaritan Recension itself, been placed some centuries after Christ. There can, however, be no doubt as to its being, if not the very oldest, yet one of the oldest MSS. of that Recension. The silver case which incloses this scroll is particularly interesting, as representing in raised work the whole ground-plan of the Tabernacle, with all its sacred vessels and implements, together with the much-contested measures, etc., with corresponding inscriptions attached to each minute particle.

Two photographs are taken from different pages of another Samaritan Pentateuch, in quarto, also in sacred use among the Samaritans, and hardly less revered than the scroll. One of the pages taken contains the interesting interpolation which follows the Ten Commandments in the Samaritan Recension, and which refers to the holy mountain of Gerizim.

The most vital discovery, however, which Mr. Deutsch has been able to make has led to his full and complete restoration of probably the oldest Samaritan epigraph in existence. Conjectures and guesses, more or less correct, have been rife about it ever since 1844, when it was first published, by Rödiger, from a drawing made by Schultz. The monument in question consists of a stone immured (upside down) in the southern wall of a minaret belonging to a Mahommedan sanctuary, near Nabulus. The last copy taken by Dr. Rosen in 1859 leaves three of its ten lines incomplete. Mr. Deutsch has been able to finish the reading of the whole stone, and thereby corroborates, in some instances, the happy conjectures made by Rödiger against Rosen and Blau. The contents of the stone are, an abbreviated form of the Ten Commandments as found in the Samaritan Recension, and other sentences.

XII.—THE NICENE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY.

BY PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., NEW YORK.

Whether we look at the importance of the subject involved, or the power of intellect and character engaged, or the extent and degree of authority attached to the result, the trinitarian controversy of the Nicene age will ever occupy a preëminent, if not the very first place among the many doctrinal conflicts which have agitated the Christian Church during the eighteen centuries of its earthly course of development and ever deepening apprehension and exhibition of divine truth in conflict with the various forms of error. The dogma of the triune God, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, as professed and believed to this day by all the three great branches of the Christian world, Greek, Latin, and Evangelical Protestant, is the most fundamental and most comprehensive doctrine of Christianity, and its characteristic mark as distinct from all false religions, whether they be abstractly monotheistic (as Judaism and Mahometanism), or polytheistic (as heathenism and idolatry).

The doctrine of the Trinity came up first as a subject of theological controversy not by itself in abstract form, but in inseparable connection with the doctrine of Christ and the Holy Ghost. If this latter doctrine is true, the Trinity follows by logical necessity, the biblical monotheism being presumed; in other words, if God is one, and if Christ and the Holy Ghost are distinct from the Father and yet participate in the divine substance, God must be triune. Though there are in the Holy Scriptures themselves few texts which directly prove the Trinity, and the name Trinity is wholly wanting in them, this doctrine is taught with all the greater force by the main facts of the revelation of God as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, besides being indirectly involved in the deity of Christ and the Holy Ghost.

The Church always believed in this Trinity of revelation, and confessed its faith by baptism into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. This carried with it from

Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1866, by Moore, Wilstach & Baldwin, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio.

the first the conviction, that this revelation of God must be grounded in a distinction immanent in the divine essence. But to bring this faith into clear and fixed knowledge, and to form the baptismal confession into doctrine, was the hard and earnest intellectual work of three centuries. In the Nicene age minds crashed against each other, and fought the decisive battles for and against the doctrines of the true deity of Christ, with which the divinity of Christianity stands or falls.

The controversies on this fundamental question agitated the Roman empire and the church of East and West for more than half a century, and gave occasion to the first two ecumenical councils of Nice and Constantinople. At last the orthodox doctrine triumphed, and in 381 was brought into the form in which it is to this day substantially held in all orthodox churches.

The external history of the Arian controversy falls into three stages:

1. From the outbreak of the controversy to the temporary victory of orthodoxy at the council of Nice, A. D. 318–325.
2. The Arian and the semi-Arian reaction, and its prevalence to the death of Constantius, A. D. 325–361.
3. The final victory, and the completion of the Nicene creed, to the council of Constantinople, A. D. 381.

Arianism proceeded from the bosom of the Catholic Church, was condemned as heresy at the council of Nice, but afterwards, under various forms, attained even ascendency for a time in the church, until at the second ecumenical council it was cast out forever. From that time it lost its importance as a politico-theological power, but continued as an uncatholic sect more than two hundred years among the Germanic nations, which were converted to Christianity under the Arian domination. It has since revived, from time to time, under ever-varying forms, in Socinianism, Unitarianism and Rationalism, and as private speculation, and raised its old objections to the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, but has always been defeated by the superior theology of the church which holds fast the precious fruits of the labors and conflicts of past ages.

We do not propose to enter into the external history of the trinitarian conflict, but confine ourselves to a historical representation or reproduction of the orthodox dogma itself as it resulted from the long conflict and was adopted by Christendom.

DOCTRINAL IMPORT OF THE CONTROVERSY.

To the superficial and rationalistic observer, the great Nicene struggle seems a metaphysical subtilty and a fruitless logomachy, revolving about the little Greek iota—homo-ousios, homoi-ousios, hetero-ousios. But it enters into the head and heart of Christianity as a religion of salvation, and must necessarily affect in a greater or lesser degree all other articles of faith. The different views of the contesting parties concerning the relation of Christ to the Father involved the general question, whether Christianity is truly divine, the highest revelation, or merely a relative or finite truth which may be superseded in time to come by a more perfect revelation.

Arianism was a religious political war against the spirit of the Christian revelation by the spirit of the world, which, after having persecuted the church three hundred years from without, sought under the Christian name to reduce her by degrading Christ to the category of the temporal and the created, and Christianity to the level of natural religion. It substituted for a truly divine Redeemer a created demigod, an elevated Hercules. Arianism proceeded from human reason, Athanasianism from divine revelation; and each used the other source of knowledge as a subordinate and tributary factor. The former was deistic and rationalistic, the latter theistic and supernaturalistic, in spirit and effect. The one made reasonableness, the other agreement with Scripture, the criterion of truth. In the one the intellectual interest, in the other the moral and religious, was the motive principle. Yet Athanasius was at the same time a much deeper and abler thinker than Arius, who dealt in barren deductions of reason and dialectic formulas.

In close connection with this stood another distinction. Arianism associated itself with the secular political power and the court party; it represented the imperio-papal principle, and the time of its prevalence under Constantius was an uninterrupted season of the most arbitrary and violent encroachments of the state upon the rights of the church. Athanasius, on the contrary, who was so often deposed by the emperor, and who uttered himself so boldly respecting Constantius, is the personal representative not only of orthodoxy, but also of the independence of the

church with reference to the secular power, and in this respect a precursor of Gregory VIII in his contest with the German imperialism.

While Arianism bent to the changing politics of the court party, and fell into diverse schools and sects the moment it lost the imperial support, the Nicene faith, like its great champion Athanasius, remained under all outward changes of fortune true to itself, and made its mighty advance only by legitimate growth outward from within. Athanasius makes no distinction at all between the various shades of Arians and semi-Arians, but throws them all into the same category of enemies of the catholic faith.

It may be proper to add here the testimony of two eminent scholars, a German divine and an American historian, to the profound significance of the Trinitarian conflict of the Nicene age.

The late Dr. Baur, the founder of the famous Tübingen School, who, however, is characterized by a much deeper discernment of the philosophical and historical import of the conflicts in the history of Christian doctrine, than all other rationalistic historians, thus speaks of this contest:

"The main question was, whether Christianity is the highest and absolute revelation of God, and such that by it in the Son of God the self-existent absolute being of God joins itself to man, and so communicates itself that man through the Son becomes truly one with God, and comes into such community of essence with God, as makes him absolutely certain of pardon and salvation. From this point of view Athanasius apprehended the gist of the controversy, always finally summing up all his objections to the Arian doctrine with the chief argument, that the whole substance of Christianity, all reality of redemption, everything which makes Christianity the perfect salvation, would be utterly null and meaningless, if he who is supposed to unite man with God in real unity of being, were not himself absolute God, or of one substance with the absolute God, but only a creature among creatures. The infinite chasm which separates creature from Creator, remains unfilled; there is nothing really mediatory between God and man, if between the two there be nothing more than some created and finite thing, or such a mediator and redeemer as the Arians conceive the Son of God, in his essential distinction from God: not begotten from the essence of God and

coëternal, but created out of nothing and arising in time. Just as the distinctive character of the Athanasian doctrine lies in its effort to conceive the relation of the Father and Son, and in it the relation of God and man, as unity and community of essence, the Arian doctrine, on the contrary, has the opposite aim of a separation by which, first Father and Son, and then God and man, are placed in the abstract opposition of infinite and finite. While, therefore, according to Athanasius, Christianity is the religion of the unity of God and man, according to Arius the essence of the Christian revelation can consist only in man's becoming conscious of the difference which separates him, with all the finite, from the absolute being of God. What value, however, one must ask, has such a Christianity, when, instead of bringing man nearer to God, it only fixes the chasm between God and man?"

George Bancroft, himself once a Unitarian preacher, but viewing the controversy between Arius and Athanasius from the general standpoint of civilization, in his eloquent address on the *Progress of the Human Race*, delivered before the New York Historical Society, in 1854, thus portrays their respective influence upon posterity:

"In vain did restless pride, as that of Arius, seek to paganize Christianity and make it the ally of imperial despotism; to prefer a belief resting on authority and unsupported by an inward witness, over the clear revelation of which the millions might see and feel and know the divine glory; to substitute the conception, framed after the pattern of heathenism, of an agent, superhuman yet finite, for faith in the ever-continuing presence of God with man; to wrong the greatness and sanctity of the Spirit of God by representing it as a birth of time. Against these attempts to subordinate the enfranchising virtue of truth to false worship and to arbitrary power, reason asserted its supremacy, and the party of superstition was driven from the field. Then mooned Ashtaroth was eclipsed, and Osiris was seen no more in Memphian grove; then might have been heard the crash of the falling temples of Polytheism; and instead of them, came that harmony which holds heaven and earth in happiest union. Amid the deep sorrows of humanity during the sad conflict which was protracted through centuries for the overthrow of the past and the reconstruction of society, the consciousness of an incar

nate God carried peace into the bosom of mankind. That faith emancipated the slave, broke the bondage of woman, redeemed the captive, elevated the low, lifted up the oppressed, consoled the wretched, inspired alike the heroes of thought and the countless masses. The down-trodden nations clung to it as to the certainty of their future emancipation; and it so filled the heart of the greatest poet of the middle ages—perhaps the greatest poet of all time—that he had no prayer so earnest as to behold in the profound and clear substance of the eternal light, that circling of reflected glory which showed the image of man."

We shall now proceed to examine the contending systems separately.

ARIANISM.

The doctrine of the Arians or Eusebians, Aëtians, Eunomians, as they were called after their later leaders, or Exukontians, Heteroousiasts, and Anomoeans, as they were named from their characteristic terms, is in substance as follows:

The Father alone is God; therefore he alone is unbegotten, eternal, wise, good, and unchangeable, and he is separated by an infinite chasm from the world. He cannot create the world directly, but only through an agent, the Logos. The Son of God is preëxistent, before all creatures, and above all creatures, a middle being between God and the world, the creator of the world, the perfect image of the Father, and the executor of his thoughts, and thus capable of being called in a metaphysical sense God, Logos, and Wisdom. But on the other hand, he himself is a creature, that is to say the first creation of God, through whom the Father called other creatures into existence; he was created out of nothing (not out of the essence of God), by the will of the Father before all conceivable time; he is therefore not eternal, but had a beginning, and there was a time when he was not.

Arianism thus rises far above Ebionism, Socinianism, deism and rationalism, in maintaining the personal preëxistence of the Son before all worlds, which were his creation; but it agrees with those systems in lowering the Son to the sphere of the created, which of course includes the idea of temporalness and finiteness. It at first ascribed to him the predicate also of unchangeableness, but afterwards subjected him to the vicissitudes of created being. This contradiction, however, is solved, if need be, by the dis-

tinction between moral and physical unchangeableness; the Son is in his nature (φύσει) changeable, but remains good (καλός) by a free act of his will. Arius, after having once robbed the Son of divine essence, could not consistently allow him any divine attribute, in the strict sense of the word; he limited his duration, his power, and his knowledge, and expressly asserted that the Son does not perfectly know the Father, and therefore cannot perfectly reveal him. The Son is essentially distinct from the Father, and—as Aëtius and Eunomius afterwards more strongly expressed it—unlike the Father; and this dissimilarity was by some extended to all moral and metaphysical attributes and conditions. The dogma of the essential deity of Christ seemed to Arius to lead of necessity to Sabellianism or to the Gnostic dreams of emanation.

The later development of Arianism brought out nothing really new, but rather revealed many inconsistencies and contradictions. Thus, for example, Eunomius, to whom clearness was the measure of truth, maintained that revelation has made everything clear, and man can perfectly know God; while Arius denied even to the Son the perfect knowledge of God or of himself. The negative and rationalistic element came forth in even greater prominence, and the controversy became a metaphysical war, destitute of all deep religious spirit. The eighteen formulas of faith which Arianism and semi-Arianism produced between the councils of Nice and Constantinople, are leaves without blossoms, and branches without fruit. The natural course of the Arian heresy is downward, through the stage of Socinianism, into the rationalism which sees in Christ a mere man, the chief of his kind.

To pass now to the arguments used for and against this error:

1. The Arians drew their *exegetical* proofs from the passages of Scripture which seem to place Christ in any way in the category of that which is created, or ascribe to the incarnate (not the pre-temporal, divine) Logos growth, lack of knowledge, weariness, sorrow, and other changing human affections and states of mind, or teach a subordination of the Son to the Father.

Athanasius disposes of these arguments somewhat too easily, by referring the passages exclusively to the *human* side of the person of Jesus. When, for example, the Lord says he knows not the day nor the hour of the judgment, this is due only to his human nature. For how should the Lord of heaven and earth,

who made days and hours, not know them! He accuses the Arians of the Jewish conceit, that divine and human are incompatible. The Jews say: How could Christ, if he was God, become man, and die on the cross? The Arians say: How can Christ, who was man, be at the same time God? We, says Athanasius, are Christians; we do not stone Christ when he asserts his eternal Godhead, nor are we offended in him when he speaks to us in the language of human poverty. But it is the peculiar doctrine of Holy Scripture, to declare everywhere a double thing of Christ: that he, as Logos and image of the Father, was ever truly divine, and that he afterwards became man for our salvation. When Athanasius cannot refer such terms as "made," "created," "became," to the human nature, he takes them figuratively for "testified," "constituted," "demonstrated."

As positive exegetical proofs against Arianism, Athanasius cites almost all the familiar proof-texts which ascribe to Christ divine names, divine attributes, divine works, and divine dignity, and which it is unnecessary to mention in detail.

Of course, his exegesis, as well as that of the fathers in general, when viewed from the level of modern grammatical, historical and critical method, contains a great deal of allegorizing caprice and fancy and sophistical subtilty. But it is in general far more profound and true than the heretical.

2. The *theological* arguments for Arianism were predominantly negative and rationalizing. The amount of them is, that the opposite view is unreasonable, is irreconcilable with strict monotheism and the dignity of God, and leads to Sabellian or Gnostic errors. It is true that Marcellus of Ancyra, one of the most zealous advocates of the Nicene homoousianism, fell into the Sabellian denial of the tri-personality, but most of the Nicene fathers steered with unerring tact between the Scylla of Sabellianism and the Charybdis of Tritheism.

Athanasius met the theological objections of the Arians with overwhelming dialectical skill, and exposed the internal contradictions and philosophical absurdities of their positions. Arianism holds Christ to be a mere creature, and yet the creator of the world; as if a creature could be the source of life, the origin and the end of all creatures! It ascribes to Christ a pre-mundane existence, but denies him eternity, while yet time belongs to the idea of the world, and is created only therewith, so that before

the world there was nothing but eternity. It asserts the unchangeableness of God, but denies, with the eternal generation of the Son, also the eternal Fatherhood; thus assuming after all a very essential change in God. If Christ be not strictly divine, much less can we become partakers of the divine nature and children of God.

SEMI-ARIANISM.

The Semi-Arians or the Homoiousiasts, wavered in theory and conduct between the Nicene orthodoxy and the Arian heresy. Their doctrine was not an internal reconciliation of opposites, which in fact were irreconcilable, but of diplomatic evasion, temporizing compromise, flat, half and half *juste milieu*.

The signal term of Semi-Arianism is *homoiousion* in distinction from homo-ousion and heteroousion. The system teaches that Christ is not a creature, but co-eternal with the Father, though not of the same, but only of like essence, and subordinate to him. It agrees with the Nicene creed in asserting the eternal generation of the Son, and in denying that he was a created being; while with Arianism it denies the identity of essence.

Hence it satisfied neither of the opposite parties, and was charged by both with logical incoherence. Athanasius and his friends held against the Semi-Arians, that like attributes and relations might be spoken of, but not like essences or substances; these are either identical or different. It may be said of one man that he is like another, not in respect of substance, but in respect to his exterior and form. If the Son, as the Semi-Arians admit, is of the essence of the Father, he must be also of the same essence. The Arians argued: There is no middle being between created and uncreated being; if God the Father alone is uncreated, everything out of him, including the Son, is created, and consequently of different essence, and unlike him.

Thus pressed from both sides, Semi-Arianism could not long withstand, and even before the council of Constantinople it passed over, in the main, to the camp of orthodoxy.

THE NICENE DOCTRINE OF THE HOMOOUSIA.

The Nicene, Homo-ousian, or Athanasian doctrine was most clearly and powerfully represented in the East by Athanasius, in

whom it became flesh and blood; and next to him, by Alexander of Alexandria, Marcellus of Ancyra, (who, however, strayed into Sabellianism), Basil, and the two Gregories of Cappadocia; and in the West by Ambrose and Hilary.

The central point of the Nicene doctrine in the contest with Arianism, is the identity of essence, or the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, and is expressed in this article of the (original) Nicene creed—"[We believe] in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God; who is begotten the only-begotten of the Father; that is, of the essence of the Father, God of God, and Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father."

The term ὁμοούσιος, *consubstantial*, is of course no more a biblical term than *trinity*, but it had already been used, though in a different sense, both by heathen writers and by heretics, as well as by orthodox fathers. It formed a bulwark against Arians and Semi-Arians, and an anchor which moored the church during the stormy time between the first and the second ecumenical councils. At first it had a negative meaning against heresy; denying, as Athanasius repeatedly says, that the Son is in any sense created or produced and changeable. But afterwards the homoousion became a positive test-word of orthodoxy, designating, in the sense of the Nicene Council, clearly and unequivocally, the veritable and essential deity of Christ, in opposition to all sorts of apparent or half divinity, or mere similarity to God. The same divine, eternal, unchangeable essence, which is in an original way in the Father, is, from eternity, in a derived way, through generation, in the Son; just as the water of the fountain is in the stream, or the light of the sun is in the ray, and cannot be separated from it. Hence the Lord says: "I am in the Father, and the Father in me;" "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father;" "I and my Father are one." This is the sense of the expression: "God of God," "very God of very God." Christ, in his divine nature, is as fully consubstantial with the Father, as, in his human nature, he is with man; flesh of our flesh, and bone of our bone; and yet, with all this, he is an independent person with respect to the Father, as he is with respect to other men. In this view Basil turns the term ὁμοούσιος against the Sabellian denial of the personal distinctions in the Trinity, since it is not the same thing that is consubstantial with itself, but one thing that is consub-

stantial with another. Consubstantiality among men, indeed, is predicated of different individuals who partake of the same nature, and the term in this view might denote also unity of species in a tritheistic sense.

But in the case before us, the personal distinction of the Son from the Father must not be pressed to a duality of substances of the same kind; the homo-ousion, on the contrary, must be understood as identity or *numerical* unity of substance, in distinction from mere generic unity. Otherwise it leads manifestly into dualism or tritheism. The Nicene doctrine refuses to swerve from the monotheistic basis, and stands between Sabellianism and tritheism; though it must be admitted that the usage of *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* still wavered for a time, and the relation of the consubstantiality to the numerical unity of the divine essence did not come clearly out till a later day. Athanasius insists that the unity of the divine essence is indivisible, and that there is only one principle of Godhead. He frequently illustrates the relation, as Tertullian had done before him, by the relation between fire and brightness, or between fountain and stream; though in these illustrations the proverbial insufficiency of all similitudes must never be forgotten. "We must not," says he, "take the words in John xiv: 10, "I am in the Father, and the Father in me," as if the Father and the Son were two different interpenetrating and mutually complemental substances, like two bodies which fill one vessel. The Father is full and perfect, and the Son is the fullness of the Godhead. "We must not imagine," says he in another place, "three divided substances in God, as among men, lest we, like the heathen, invent a multiplicity of Gods; but as the stream which is born of the fountain, and not separated from it, though there are two forms and names. Neither is the Father the Son, nor the Son the Father; for the Father is the Father of the Son, and the Son is the Son of the Father. As the fountain is not the stream, nor the stream the fountain, but the two are one and the same water which flows from the fountain into the stream; so the Godhead pours itself, without division, from the Father into the Son. Hence the Lord says: I went forth from the Father, and come from the Father. Yet he is ever with the Father, he is in the bosom of the Father, and the bosom of the Father is never emptied of the Godhead of the Son. The Son is the essence of the Father, not by division or diminution, but by

simple and perfect self-communication. His divine self-communication of eternal love is represented by the figure of *generation*, suggested by the biblical terms *Father* and *Son*, the *only-begotten* Son, the *first-born*. The eternal generation is an internal process in the essence of God, and the Son is an immanent offspring of this essence; whereas creation is an act of the will of God, and the creature is exterior to the creator, and of different substance. The Son, as man, is produced; as God, he is unproduced or uncreated; he is begotten from eternity of the unbegotten Father. To this Athanasius refers the passage concerning the only-begotten who is in the bosom of the Father.

Generation and creation are therefore entirely different ideas. Generation is an immanent, necessary and perpetual process in the essence of God himself, the Father's eternal communication of essence or self to the Son; creation, on the contrary, is an outwardly directed, free, single act of the will of God, bringing forth a different and temporal substance out of nothing. The eternal fatherhood and sonship in God is the perfect prototype of all similar revelations on earth. But the divine generation differs from all human generation, not only in its absolute spirituality, but also in the fact that it does not produce a new essence of the same kind, but that the begotten is identical in essence with the begetter; for the divine essence is, by reason of its simplicity, incapable of division, and by reason of its infinity, incapable of increase. The generation, properly speaking, has no reference at all to the essence, but only to the hypostatical distinction. The Son is begotten not as God, but as Son, not as to his *natura*, but as to his ἰδιότης his peculiar property and his relation to the Father. The divine essence neither begets nor is begotten. The same is true of the *processio* of the Holy Ghost, which has reference not to the essence, but only to the person of the Spirit. In human generation, moreover, the Father is older than the Son; but in the divine generation, which takes place not in time, but is eternal, there can be no such thing as priority or posteriority of one or the other hypostasis. To the question whether the Son existed *before* his generation, Cyril of Alexandria answered: "The generation of the Son did not precede his existence, but he existed eternally, and eternally existed by generation." The Son is as necessary to the being of the Father, as the Father to the being of the Son.

The necessity thus asserted of the eternal generation does not, however, impair its freedom, but is intended only to deny its being arbitrary and accidental, and to secure its foundation in the essence of God himself. God, to be Father, must from eternity beget the Son, and so reproduce himself; yet he does this in obedience not to a foreign law, but to his own law and the impulse of his will. Athanasius, it is true, asserts on the one hand that God begets the Son not of his will, but by his nature; yet, on the other hand, he does not admit that God begets the Son *without* will, or of force or unconscious necessity. The generation, therefore, rightly understood, is an act at once of essence and of will. Augustine calls the Son "will of will." In God freedom and necessity coincide.

The mode of the divine generation is and must be a mystery. Of course all human representations of it must be avoided, and the matter must be conceived in a purely moral and spiritual way. The eternal generation conceived as an intellectual process is the eternal self-knowledge of God; reduced to ethical terms, it is his eternal and absolute love in its motion and working within himself. In his argument for the consubstantiality of the Son, Athanasius, in his four orations against the Arians, besides adducing the proof from Scripture, which presides over and permeates all other arguments, sets out now in a practical method from the idea of redemption, now in a speculative, from the idea of God.

Christ has delivered us from the curse and power of sin, reconciled us with God, and made us partakers of eternal, divine life; therefore he must himself be God. Or, negatively: If Christ were a creature, he could not redeem other creatures from sin and death. It is assumed that redemption is as much and as strictly a divine work, as creation.

Starting from the idea of God, Athanasius argues: The relation of Father is not accidental, arising in time; else God would be changeable; it belongs as necessarily to the essence and character of God as the attributes of eternity, wisdom, goodness and holiness; consequently he must have been Father from eternity, and this gives the eternal generation of the Son. The divine fatherhood and sonship is the prototype of all analogous relations on earth. As there is no Son without Father, no more is there Father without Son. An unfruitful Father were like a dark light, or a dry fountain, a self-contradiction. The non-existence of

creatures, on the contrary, detracts nothing from the perfection of the Creator, since he always has the power to create, when he will. The Son is of the Father's own interior essence, while the creature is exterior to God and dependent on the act of his will. God, furthermore, cannot be conceived without reason, (ἄλογος), wisdom, power, and according to the Scriptures (as the Arians themselves concede), the Son is the Logos, the wisdom, the power, the Word of God, by which all things were made. As light rises from fire, and is inseparable from it, so the Word from God, the Wisdom from the Wise, and the Son from the Father. The Son, therefore, was in the beginning, that is, in the beginning of the eternal divine being, in the original beginning, or from eternity. He himself calls himself one with the Father, and Paul praises him as God blessed forever.

Finally, Christ cannot be a proper object of worship, as he is represented in Scripture, and has always been regarded in the Church, without being strictly divine. To worship a creature is idolatry.

When we attentively peruse the warm, vigorous, eloquent, and discriminating controversial writings of Athanasius and his co-laborers, and compare with them the vague, barren, almost entirely negative assertions and superficial arguments of their opponents, we cannot escape the impression that, with all their exegetical and dialectical defects in particulars, they have on their side an overwhelming preponderance of positive truth, the authority of holy Scripture, the profounder speculations of reason, and the traditional faith of the church. The spirit and tendency of the Nicene doctrine is edifying; it magnifies Christ and Christianity. The Arian error is cold and heartless, degrades Christ to the sphere of the creature, and endeavors to substitute a heathen deification of the creature for the true worship of God. For this reason, also, the faith in the true and essential deity of Christ has to this day an inexhaustible vitality, while the irrational Arian fiction of a half-deity, creating the world and yet himself created, long ago entirely outlived itself.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN ITS COMPLETENESS.

We now present the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity as a whole as finally settled by the second ecumenical council, held at Constantinople in 381, including the results of the Pneumatomachian,

and other controversies which intervened between the council of Nicea and that of Constantinople.

This fundamental and comprehensive dogma secured both the unity and the full life of the Christian conception of God; and in this respect it represents, as no other dogma does, the whole of Christianity. It forms a bulwark against heathen polytheism on the one hand, and Jewish deism and abstract monotheism on the other. It avoids the errors and combines the truth of these two opposite conceptions. Against the Pagans, says Gregory of Nyssa, we hold the unity of essence: against the Jews, the distinction of hypostases. We do not reject all multiplicity, but only such as destroys the unity of the being, like the pagan polytheism; no more do we reject all unity, but only such unity as denies diversity and full vital action. The orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, furthermore, formed the true mean between Sabellianism and tritheism, both of which taught a divine triad, but at the expense, in the one case, of the personal distinctions, in the other, of the essential unity. It exerted a wholesome regulative influence on the other dogmas. It overcame all theories of emanation, established the Christian conception of creation by a strict distinction of that which proceeds from the essence of God, and is one with him, like the Son and the Spirit, from that which arises out of nothing by the free will of God, and is of different substance. It provided for an activity and motion of knowledge and love in the divine essence, without the Origenistic hypothesis of an eternal creation. And, by the assertion of the true deity of the Redeemer and the Sanctifier, it secured the divine character of the work of redemption and sanctification.

The Nicene fathers did not pretend to have exhausted the mystery of the Trinity, and very well understood that all human knowledge, especially in this deepest, central dogma, proves itself but fragmentary. All speculation on divine things ends in a mystery, and reaches an inexplicable residue, before which the thinking mind must bow in humble devotion. Man, says Athanasius, can perceive only the hem of the garment of the triune God; the cherubim cover the rest with their wings. In his letter to the Monks, written about 358, he confesses that the further he examines, the more the mystery eludes his understanding, and he exclaims with the Psalmist: "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it." Augustine says, in

one place: If we be asked to define the Trinity, we can only say it is not this or that. But though we cannot explain the how and why of our faith, still the Christian may know, and should know what he believes and what he does not believe, and should be persuaded of the facts and truths which form the matter of his faith.

The essential points of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity are these:

1. There is only *one* divine *essence* or *substance.*

Father, Son and Spirit are one in essence, or consubstantial. They are in one another, inseparable, and cannot be conceived without each other. In this point the Nicene doctrine is thoroughly monotheistic or monarchian, in distinction from tritheism, which is but a new form of the polytheism of the Pagans.

The terms *essence* (*οὐσία*) and *nature* (*φύσις*), in the philosophical sense, denote not an individual, a personality, but the *genus* or *species;* not *unum in numero*, but *ens unum in multis.* All men are of the same substance, partake of the same human nature, though as persons and individuals they are very different. But in the divine trinity consubstantiality denotes not only sameness of kind, but at the same time *numerical* unity; not merely the *unum in specie*, but also the *unum numero.* The three persons are related to the divine substance not as three individuals to their species, as Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, or Peter, John and Paul to human nature; they are only one God. The divine substance is absolutely indivisible by reason of its simplicity, and absolutely inextensible and untransferable by reason of its infinity; whereas a corporeal substance can be divided, and the human nature can be multiplied by generation. The whole fullness of the one undivided essence of God, with all its attributes, is in all the persons of the trinity, though in each in his own way: in the Father as original principle, in the Son by eternal generation, in the Spirit by eternal procession. The church teaches not *one* divine essence *and* three persons, but *one* essence *in* three persons. Father, Son and Spirit cannot be conceived as three separate individuals, but are in one another, and form a solidaric unity. Many passages of the Nicene fathers have unquestionably a tritheistic sound, but are neutralized by others which by themselves may bear a Sabellian construction; so that their position must be regarded as midway between these two

extremes. Subsequently John Philoponus, an Aristotelian and Monophysite in Alexandria about the middle of the sixth century, was charged with tritheism, because he made no distinction between φύσις and ὑπόστασις, and reckoned in the Trinity three natures, substances and deities, according to the number of persons.

2. In this one divine essence there are three *persons*, or, to use a better term, *hypostases*, that is, three different modes of existence of the one same undivided and indivisible whole, which in the Scriptures are called the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. These distinctions are not merely different attributes, powers, or activities of the Godhead, still less merely subjective aspects under which it presents itself to the human mind; but each person expresses the whole fullness of the Divine being with all its attributes, and the three persons stand in a relation of mutual knowledge and love. The Father communicates his very life to the Son, and the Spirit is the bond of union and communion between the two. The Son speaks, and as the God-Man even prays to the Father, thus standing over against him as a first person towards a second; and calls the Holy Ghost "another Comforter," whom he will send from the Father, thus speaking of him as of a third person.

Here the orthodox doctrine forsook Sabellianism or Modalism, which, it is true, made Father, Son and Spirit strictly coördinate, but only as different denominations and forms of manifestation of the one God.

But, on the other hand, as we have already intimated, the term *person* must not be taken here in the sense current among men, as if the three persons were three different individuals, or three self-conscious and separately acting beings. The trinitarian idea of personality lies midway between that of a mere form of manifestation, or a personation, which would lead to Sabellianism, and the idea of an independent, limited human personality, which would result in tritheism. In each person there is the same inseparable divine substance, united with the individual property which distinguishes that person from the others. The word *person* is in reality only a make-shift, in the absence of a more adequate term. Our idea of God is more true and deep than our terminology, and the essence and character of God transcends our highest ideas.

The Nicene fathers and Augustine endeavored, as Tertullian and Dionysius of Alexandria had already done, to illustrate the Trinity by analogies from created existence. Their figures were sun, ray and light; fountain, streams and flow; root, stem and fruit; the colors of the rainbow; soul, thought and spirit; memory, intelligence and will; and the idea of love, which affords the best illustration,—for God is love. Such figures are indeed confessedly insufficient as proofs, and if pressed, might easily lead to utterly erroneous conceptions. For example: sun, ray and light are not coördinate, but the two latter are merely qualities or emanations of the first. *Omne simile claudicat.* Analogies, however, do the negative service of repelling the charge of unreasonableness from this doctrine, which is in fact the highest reason, and which has been acknowledged in various forms by the greatest philosophers, from Plato to Hegel and Schelling, though often in an entirely unscriptural sense. A certain trinity undeniably runs through all created life, and is especially reflected in manifold ways in man, who is created after the image of God: in the relation of body, soul and spirit: in the faculties of thought, feeling, and will; in the nature of self-consciousness; and in the nature of love.

3. Each divine person has his *property*, as it were a characteristic individualty, expressed by the Greek word ἰδιότης and the Latin *proprietas*. This is not to be confounded with attribute; for the divine attributes, eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, wisdom, holiness, love, etc., are inherent in the divine *essence*, and are the common possession of all the divine hypostases. The *idiotes*, on the contrary, is a peculiarity of the *hypostasis*, and therefore cannot be communicated or transferred from one to another.

To the first person fatherhood, or the being unbegotten, is ascribed as his property; to the second, sonship, or the being begotten; to the Holy Ghost, procession. In other words: the Father is unbegotten, but begetting; the Son is uncreated, but begotten; the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, (and according to the Latin doctrine, also from the Son.) But these distinctions relate, as we have said, only to the hypostases, and have no force with respect to the divine essence, which is the same in all, and neither begets nor is begotten, nor proceeds, nor is sent.

4. The divine persons are in one another, mutually interpene-

trate, and form a perpetual *intercommunication* and *motion* within the divine essence; as the Lord says: "I am in the Father and the Father in me;" and "the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works." This perfect indwelling and vital communion was afterwards designated (by John of Damascus, and the scholastics) by various terms, as *περιχώρησις*, *inexistentia*, *immanentia*, *inhabitatio*, *circulatio*, *intercommunio*, *circumincessio*.

5. The Nicene doctrine already contains, in substance, a distinction between two trinities: an *immanent* trinity of constitution, which existed from eternity, and an *economic* trinity of manifestation; though this distinction did not receive formal expression till a much later period. For the generation of the Son, and the procession of the Spirit are, according to the doctrine, an eternal process. The perceptions and practical wants of the Christian mind start, strictly speaking, with the trinity of revelation in the three-fold progressive work of the creation, the redemption, and the preservation of the world, but reason back thence to a trinity of being; for God has revealed himself as he is, and there can be no contradiction between his nature and his works. The eternal preëxistence of the Son and the Spirit is the background of the historical revelation by which they work our salvation. The Nicene divines, however, move somewhat too exclusively in the field of speculation, and in the dark regions of the intrinsic and ante-mundane relations of the Godhead, and too little upon the practical ground of the facts of salvation.

6. The Nicene fathers still teach, like their predecessors, a certain *subordinationism*, which seems to conflict with the doctrine of consubstantiality. But we must distinguish between a subordinationism of essence, *οὐσία*, and a subordinationism of hypostasis, of order and dignity. The former was denied, the latter affirmed. Father, Son and Spirit all have the same divine essence, yet not in a coördinate way, but in an order of subordination. The Father has the essence originally and of himself, from no other; he is the primal divine subject, to whom alone absoluteness belongs, and he is therefore called preëminently God, or the principle, the fountain, and the root of Godhead. The Son, on the contrary, has his essence by communication from the Father, therefore in a secondary, derivative way. "The Father is greater than the Son." The one is unbegotten, the other begotten; the Son is from the Father, but the Father is not from the Son;

Fatherhood is in the nature of the case primary, Sonship secondary. The same subordination is still more applicable to the Holy Ghost. The Nicene fathers thought the idea of the divine unity best preserved by making the Father, notwithstanding the triad of persons, the monad from which Son and Spirit spring, and to which they return.

This subordination is most plainly expressed by Hilary of Poictiers, the champion of the Nicene doctrine in the West. The familiar comparisons of fountain and stream, sun and light, which Athanasius, like Tertullian, so often uses, likewise lead to a dependence of the Son upon the Father. Even the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan creed favors it, in calling the Son God *of* God, Light *of* Light, Very God *of* Very God. For if a person has anything, or is anything, of another, he has not that, or is not that of himself. Yet this expression may be understood, and is in fact sometimes used by the later Nicene fathers, as giving the Son and Spirit only their hypostases from the Father, while the essence of Deity is common to all three persons, and co-eternal in all. The scriptural argument for this theory of subordination was found abundant in such passages as these: "As the Father hath life in himself, (ἔχει ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ), so hath he *given* (ἔδωκε) to the Son to have life in himself; and hath *given* him authority to execute judgment also;" "All things are *delivered* unto me (πάντα μοι παρεδόθη) of my Father;" "My Father is greater than I." But these and similar passages refer to the historical relation of the Father to the incarnate Logos in his estate of humiliation, or to the elevation of human nature to participation in the glory and power of the divine, not to the eternal metaphysical relation of the Father to the Son.

In this point, as in the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, the Nicene system yet needed further development. The logical consistency of the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Son, upon which the Nicene fathers laid chief stress, must in time overcome this decaying remnant of the ante-Nicene subordinationism.

While the Greek church stopped with the Nicene statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, the Latin Church carried the development onward under the guidance of the profound and devout speculative spirit of Augustine in the beginning of the fifth century, to the formation of the Athanasian creed. Of all the fathers, next to Athanasius, Augustine performed the greatest

service for this dogma, and by his discriminating speculation, he exerted more influence upon the scholastic theology and that of the Reformation, than all the Nicene divines. The points in which he advanced upon the Nicene creed, are the following:

1. He eliminated the remnant of subordinationism, and brought out more clearly and sharply the consubstantiality of the three persons, and the numerical unity of their essence. Yet, he too admitted that the Father stood above the Son and the Spirit in this: that he alone is of no other, but is absolutely original and independent; while the Son is begotten of him, and the Spirit proceeds from him, and proceeds from him in a higher sense than from the Son. We may speak of three men who have the same nature; but the persons in the Trinity are not three separately subsisting individuals. The divine substance is not an abstract generic nature common to all, but a concrete, living reality. One and the same God is Father, Son and Spirit. All the works of the Trinity are joint works. Therefore one can speak as well of an incarnation of God as of an incarnation of the Son, and the theophanies of the Old Testament, which are usually ascribed to the Logos, may also be ascribed to the Father and the Holy Ghost.

If the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity lies midway between Sabellianism and tritheism, Augustine bears rather to the Sabellian side. He shows this further in the analogies from the human spirit, in which he sees the mystery of the Trinity reflected, and by which he illustrates it with special delight and with fine psychological discernment, though with the humble impression that the analogies do not lift the veil, but only make it here and there a little more penetrable. He distinguishes in man being, which answers to the Father, knowledge or consciousness, which answers to the Son, and will, which answers to the Holy Ghost. A similar trinity he finds in the relation of mind, word, and love; again in the relation of memory, intelligence, and will or love, which differ, and yet are only one human nature (but of course also only one human person).

2. Augustine taught the procession of the Holy Ghost *from the Son* as well as from the Father, though from the Father mainly. This followed from the perfect essential unity of the hypostases, and was supported by some passages of Scripture which speak of the Son sending the Spirit. He also represented the Holy Ghost

as the love and the fellowship between Father and Son, as the bond which unites the two, and which unites believers with God. The Nicæno-Constantinopolitan creed affirms only the *processio Spiritus a Patre*, though not with an exclusive intent, but rather to oppose the Pneumatomachi by giving the Spirit a relation to the Father as immediate as that of the Son. The Spirit is not created by the Son, but eternally proceeds directly from the Father, as the Son is from eternity begotten of the Father. Everything proceeds from the Father, is mediated by the Son, and completed by the Holy Ghost. Athanasius, Basil, and the Gregories give this view, without denying procession from the Son. Some Greek fathers,—Epiphanius, Marcellus of Ancyra, and Cyril of Alexandria, derived the Spirit from the Father and the Son; while Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Theodoret, would admit no dependence of the Spirit on the Son.

Augustine's view gradually met universal acceptance in the West. It was adopted by Boëthius, Leo the Great, and others. It was even inserted in the Nicene Creed by the Council of Toledo in 589, by the addition of *filioque*, together with an anathema against its opponents, by whom are meant, however, not the Greeks, but the Arians. Here to this day lies the main difference in doctrine between the Greek and Latin Churches, though the controversy over it did not break out till the eighth century. In this controversy the Protestant churches side with the Latin against the Greek, as regards the double procession itself, but the propriety of changing an ancient creed may justly be called in question.

XIII.—CHURCH MUSIC AND SONG.*

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The means by which the congregation gives united expression to its spirit of pure devotion, are Song and Prayer. The passage in James v: 13, would, however, signify that the two differed in their method of application; that Song signified the expression of the joyful, and Prayer of the sorrowful spirit. And this is deeply founded in psychological truth. Joy is the mother of song, and need is the feeling which teaches one to pray. But still there are songs of affliction, (lamentations), songs of penitence and mourning; and there are, on the other hand, joyful prayers, (praise and thanksgiving). This proves that the distinction is not an absolute one.

We cannot really disjoin song and prayer, since song commonly assumes the form of petition, and in the ancient Church the two were more commingled than now. It is hard to determine how the two stood related to each other in the apostolic times. 1 Cor. ii: 4, exhibits prayer in connection with prophecy. On the other hand, Col. iii: 16, mentions song with exhortation, without specific mention of prayer. It is also to be remembered that "the Lord's prayer," which was given to the disciples as a model, does not make its appearance in the worshiping assemblies of the first Christians. It belonged to the *disciplina arcani*. Whether the "*carmen dicere*" of Pliny's letter to Trajan is to be regarded as the singing of a hymn, or as the recitation of a formula of prayer, is an open question. The ancient song was, for the most part, in the form of a recitation.

It is a commonly established liturgical principle, that the s ng is to be sung either by the whole congregation, or by the choir, but not by single individuals. The chanting of the priest at the altar, which is found in the Romish, and also partly in the Lutheran Church, can only be considered theoretically as a form of recitation, and would not be practically permissible in the Reformed

* Translated from HAGENBACH, *Grundlinien der Liturgik und Homiletik*, by Prof. J. M. HOPPIN, Yale Theological Seminary.

Church. Solo parts, performed by single male or female singers, trench upon the rightful boundaries of religious culture. They belong to the sacred concert, to the oratorio, where they certainly can subserve some devotional purpose; yet in these the devotional element is but the secondary consideration, and the artistic the primary; in religious worship this is reversed.

The fundamental basis of Protestant ecclesiastical song, is the CHORAL.* The choral (*cantus plenus, plein chant*) was introduced as is well known, at the time of Gregory I., in the place of the alternating Ambrosian chant. While the Roman Catholic and Greek Churches are deprived of this mighty instrument of devotion, the Protestant Church rightly considers the choral as its liturgical palladium. Zelter, in a letter to Goethe, regards the German choral singing re-introduced by the Reformation, as an original form of worship, making the great distinction between Protestant and Catholic worship, by giving, as it did, opportunity to the whole congregation, in the true spirit of the Gospel, to offer praise to God in song.

Besides this uniform element of the Choral, special choirs, with their more artistic harmonies, compose that variable element which, particularly upon festival days, conduces to the elevation of religious worship. But even in ordinary public worship, to assist in the singing of the choral by the whole congregation, a stated choir, alternating with congregational singing, will be found to aid materially in the ennobling and animating of Church song. It would be well, in a perfected system of cultus, for the choir, at the opening of every religious service, to receive the congregation with a greeting of song. If this is not always practicable, it should at least be done on occasions of formal public worship. The selection of pieces to be sung by the choir, of tunes, etc., should not be left exclusively to the choir leader, but should be in harmony with the superintending will that presides over the whole cultus,—that is, of the minister himself. A judicious pruning, and keeping down of all "brilliancies," is needful throughout, when by such displays, the devotional spirit would be more injured than aided. Care should be taken to prevent the performance of fugue-pieces, when often much that is disjointed (unfug) is perpetrated; of those artistic counter-point musical

* A simple sacred tune, sung in unison by the congregation; in a word, congregational singing. Tr.

combinations, in which the congregation perceive only a senseless confusion of tones with which they become wearied; of those "song-serpents" which twist themselves out into endless convolutions. The worst is, when the personal character of such a choir stands in no organic relation to the congregation, and the singing is only a part performed from time to time by strangers, (especially unsuitable is that element which is drawn from the opera). Therefore the effort of a Church to gather to itself its own Church choir, is to be greatly commended. The real position of the Church choir is to be the leader of congregational singing. It should stimulate the congregation, by setting before it a good pattern. At the same time it serves to lend animation and variety to the singing, where choir and congregation sing alternately, (*alternis choris*). This compensates, in some measure, for the aversion of the Reformed Churches to antiphonal or responsive singing.

In Church-song, the text of the song that is sung, is to be considered as well as the melody. The two are mutually conditioned upon one another. It is not meant by this that every song should have its own melody or tune. It were far better if a number of hymns could be sung to one and the same tune. It is only by having a limited number of tunes, which are, however, the most suitable tunes, that some certainty in the singing can be secured. But it ought to be laid down as a principle, that only songs of *one and the same character* can be used with the same tune, and that the mere accidental similarity of metre should not be the only deciding test. One should not sing a hymn relating to the resurrection and ascension of the Lord, to a mournful, penitential melody,—nor a penitential hymn to a joyful tune commemorating the birth of Christ. It is too frequently the case that the text of some of our most beautiful hymns is set to secular melodies. In order, however, to secure that permanency in the cultus of which we have before spoken, the text, as well as the tune, should be familiar to the congregation; it should be an actual possession. The Church has this song-treasure in its hymn book, which for this reason should not be too full, neither too meagre. The hymn book, besides its liturgical use, should often truly serve as a school book, and as a book of family devotion, and it is from this circumstance, and in particular reference to this, that many comprehensive hymns, more fitted for committing to mem-

ory at school, or for devotional reading, than for singing, have been placed in our hymn books, thus increasing their bulk. For a long time it was thought necessary that a special hymn should be chosen for every conceivable topic in the province of doctrine and duty. In this way hymns upon the attributes of God, and upon particular duties, (such as industry and frugality), have originated. Whenever a want has occurred in the rubrics, a hymn must be made expressly to meet this want, which naturally turns out to be prosaic enough. Thus in a Basle hymn book of 1809, we find the hymn,—

> "To tend this body, and to nurse it,
> This is, O Maker, my behoof;"

And so in a Zurich hymn book:

> "Not gloomy and severe is he,
> A Christian who delights to be,
> Without servility is kind,
> Both earnest and of friendly mind;" etc.

But setting aside such misconceptions, one would feel tempted by the exceeding richness of our Church collections, (there are said to be about 11,000 hymns), to place in the hands of the congregation a large store of truly good hymns. But when one looks more closely at this hymnological wealth, he would be able to select but a small number proportionally of such hymns, that could be recommended for all circumstances as Church and congregational hymns, as spiritual songs for the people. Those that truly are such, however, need no recommendation; they have made their own way, and though there has not been up to the present time, a successful agreement made upon a common hymn book, neither for Germany, nor even for reformed Switzerland, yet the individual Churches have silently united upon a number of truly classic hymns, which will be found in all good hymn books, however diverse these compilations may be. Here is indeed an absolute uniformity not arbitrarily created, or at least one not controlled by outward influences. This unpremeditated agreement of good minds in a good thing, is all the more delightful, —a quasi inspiration in the true evangelical sense.

Among the hymns in the hymn book, some will present themselves as forming a class of permanent, and others as forming a

class of variable hymns. Among the first class we reckon the hymns used for public worship on Sundays, for festivals and communion seasons, which, after longer or shorter periods, always come round as the old familiar hymns, and those which were committed to memory in youth; among the variable, or changing hymns, are those more thoughtful ones adapted to sermons, among which some may be more firmly established in the use of a congregation than others, but after all their recurrence is not a regular thing, but is determined more by the theme of the sermon. While such a Sunday hymn as "Dearest Jesus, we are here," could be repeated twenty or thirty times a year without difficulty, indeed, as often as the season for celebrating the Lord's resurrection comes round, it *must* be sung in order to maintain the spirit of the day, it might happen that a hymn specially adapted to a sermon might come in use only once in two years. But those hymns which, year in and year out, are not sung, should be omitted from a new collection. The hymns of a permanent character should so live in the heart and mouth of the congregation, that no book is needed for them. Singing from a book has something disturbing in it, and to a looker on, something really offensive. This cannot be avoided in the case of the variable hymns, because it can hardly be expected that the whole hymn book will be committed to memory; yet, in the singing of standard hymns which live in the memory, and which are reduced to but few in number, the book, as is customary among "the United Brethren," should remain shut. Among this class we count the hymn before communion, "O, thou Lamb of God," and the closing hymn, "The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ." To sing other hymns than those contained in the hymn book, can only be allowed upon extraordinary occasions, as upon a jubilee, or a national festival. But the hymn, whatever it be, if it be sung by the congregation, should be set to a familiar Church tune. The custom of the free Churches who from time to time introduce new productions of living composers, is indeed otherwise. But this agrees with their out-spoken spirit of individualism. Extraordinary hymns of this character may also be sung in periods of transition, and perhaps be made entirely new to meet occasions or sentiments, for which the customary hymn book is no longer competent to supply fitting expression. Thus Schleiermacher, before the new Berlin hymn-book was ready, distributed single leaves at the Church door.

The text of the Church hymn can either be one proclaiming the Gospel salvation (objective),or may be the expression of an inward desire for it, the feeling which appropriates that salvation (subjective). The history of Church music shows us that the songs of the first class have yielded to those of the second. Most of the hymns of the Reformation period, have the character of proclaiming, or publishing the Gospel —("It is salvation come to us."—"Our God is a firm foundation"); while with Paul Gerhard, Schmolck, and others, hymns of a yearning character, of a character receptive of the Gospel, are introduced,—("How shall I receive thee?" "O wounded, bleeding head.") The hymns of Cramer, Lavater, Gellert, are full of the reflective character, or of individuality, as those of Novalis. Schleiermacher did the good Gellert injustice, when he conveyed the impression that he was too "sickly" to be a good poet. We may appeal here to experience. Compare my treatise upon "Gellert as a religious poet," and the beautiful essay upon Gellert, by Nitzsch. In both of these styles the hymn must flow from its inner agreement with the Word of God, without being bound to follow literally the words of the Bible. Hymns which stand in no inner relation to the Bible, which do not spring from it, which are not pervaded, or at least touched by its breath, do not belong to a Christian hymn book. But by this, it is not said, as I have hinted, that Bible words only should be sung. It was a misconception when Luther himself thought that the ten commandments and the apostles' creed should be made into song, although he had his precedents for this in the ancient Church, which placed the epic before the lyric. We have always declared ourselves opposed to putting the Psalms into rhyme. On the contrary, the Psalms themselves, which for a long period have reigned alone in the worship of the Reformed Church, form in truth, the type and standard of Church song. Sundry other poetical portions of the Bible, besides the Psalms, have also assumed a typical character, as the Song of Moses, (Exod. xv); Hannah's Song of Praise, (1 Sam., 2, 1 sqq.); the "Trisagion" of Isaiah, (chap. vi); the "Song of Praise of the Three in the fiery furnace;" from the new Testament, the Thanksgiving Song of Mary; (the so-called "Magnificat," Luke i, 46 seq.); and the Apocalyptic Doxologies, (Rev. iv, 1; v, 12, 13; vii, 10-12; xix, 1 sqq.).

But every poem of a Christian character is not, for that reason, a Church hymn. The apostolic Church recognized psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs, (Eph. v, 19; Col. iii, 16). How these were related to one another, it is hard to determine, yet by Psalms, we are obliged to understand either the Old Testament Psalms, or Christian Psalms modeled after them; by Hymns, songs of praise; by Spiritual Songs, hymns of a more general character. Olshausen sees no distinction in these, but considers them as being only different terms for one and the same thing. But how these should be sung,—how they are related to the cultus,—and how they harmonize with the other elements, we know but little. Still we have many hymns belonging to Christian antiquity; but these could not be easily sung by the general congregation. If we critically regard the newer religious poetry, it cannot be denied that it affords us in manifold forms, with much dull rhyming, much that is good and excellent; still, not all that is excellent poetry is suitable to be sung. The pathetic, as in Klopstock,—(though we here refer to his odes, for his communion hymn, "Lord, thou would'st make us truly ready," and the well-known "To rise again, yea rise again," should certainly have place in our hymn books); the prosaic and sentimental-reflective, as in Gellert and Spitta, (of the last, we would commend the beautiful "Abide with him who for your sake," and also others, though the charming poem "There goes a silent angel," perhaps the pearl of the collection, could hardly belong to a congregational hymn-book),—poetry of this character, and also much that might be sung by a select and limited circle to the piano, would not therefore be suitable for the Church.

Many songs, for example, of the United Brethren, have a too intimate and familiar tone to be sung by the whole Church together. This is the case with that much-loved song, "We find ourselves all here together." The hymns of Novalis also express too much individuality of mind in contra-distinction from the mass. "When all shall be untrue, I will be true to thee;" or, "Let others still pursue the broad and lighted way." A great assembly of worshipers could hardly sing such a hymn. Let it be understood that the "I" does not shut a hymn out. The "I" has a collective character, as the "Thou" ("order thou the paths.") But when the "I" of the individual contrasts itself with the mass, then it is a special "I," separate from others, and thus does not unite itself with the song of the congregation.

In order to be adapted to the use of the Church, a hymn must not only be fitted for general singing, but for congregational singing in public worship. It must unite the truly poetical lyric flow with the easily comprehended popular expression that presents itself as a free production of the devotional feeling, and as such finds its own way to the mouth and heart of the congregation. The composing of good church hymns is a special "charisma." They cannot be made to order, as perhaps a sermon can. The best church hymns have not been written for the purpose of being used as church hymns, but they have come into use (as the volk-songs have,) without willing it. Many have thought that the best tunes have had the same origin. It has been often affirmed that a hymn is not fit for a church hymn, because it is subjective in its character. We would rather affirm the contrary. There is indeed a subjectivity which is in harmony with the spirit of a fallen Church, or one that has not yet become right in its own subjectivity; but this will produce no true church hymns, (*Goethe, Sallet*). The same is true, also, of a Christian subjectivity which, in its manifestations and modes of expression, does not take root in the people, but leans towards some particular school *e. g.* the romantic. But when, on the other hand, the personal peculiarities of the poet have their natural roots in the life of the Church, and that the Church of the people, and are not first studiously wrought into a popular tone, then the hymn which has gone through one's own heart, which bears the stamp of a subjective experience, really attains of itself the highest degree of objectivity. This is the case with Job and the Psalms, and thus the most genuine Church hymns have their own history, and their myths as well. Least vital of all are the purely objective hymns, that is, such as could only have been made to order for some external occasion, or those which fit some dogmatic or moral need,—in a word, doctrinal hymns.

From what has been said, it is manifest that the periods of the Church in which the pure consciousness of the members shows itself in an energetic, and therefore spiritually productive principle, are also the most fruitful for church song. It is therefore entirely right that the Protestant Church should prefer to build itself upon those old original hymns in which that consciousness was vigorously expressed. This preference for the old, however, should not degenerate into a liturgical narrowness which closes the ear in advance to any hymn of the more recent time. This is

the affectation of antiquity. To forbid modern hymns altogether, would signify that the Church of the present shows signs of poverty. This point, thank God, is not yet reached. So long as our ear is accustomed to the ancient tone, there is little fear that it will despise the new. Many suppose that that only which has an antique sound should be adopted by the Church. With this aversion to what is new in song, a dissatisfaction in regard to the modern tendency of theology may entirely coincide. Which of these tendencies, to the old or the new, is the most just, we do not pretend here to decide. But at all events, it would be asking too much, if we should be called upon to hold the old dogmatic terminology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as the only indisputably authoritative one, because it is contained in the old hymns of the Church. On the other hand, the different tendencies of these days, which are not to be forcibly set aside, should be appreciated and harmonized, if we would not wish to draw the limits of Church orthodoxy too narrowly in the hymn book; only there should be no motley mixture through which an inner contradiction runs, which serves but to bewilder a congregation. It would contribute much more to the upbuilding of the Church, if the Church would, where it is possible, strive to listen through all the centuries of Christianity, to the voices that unite for the glory of *one* Lord over all. We do not say too much when we say, "where it is possible." Many of our Church hymns, such as the Ambrosian chant, (*Te Deum Laudamus*), the "Come Holy Spirit," (*Veni Creator Spiritus*), the "O Sacred Head, so wounded," (*Salve caput cruentatum*), the "In the midst of life we are" &c., (*Media in vita*), spring from the Middle ages, or reach yet further back into the first centuries. That they have been changed in form, and thus brought nearer to us, is no disparagement to them. The old tones are heard through them still.

The true harmony between the historic past and present finds its application in the ancient church hymns, as far as they may be employed in the cultus of the present. Undoubtedly the blessing which we anticipate from the use of these hymns would be lost, if we rob them of their antique character, and wish to make them in all respects the fit expressions of our own time. But we have also to guard ourselves, lest a pious deference for the old degenerate into a contemptuous disregard of the humanity of

to-day, from which we may hardly demand the preservation of an absolutely unchanged text, such as the antiquarian may rightly claim. This is illustrated in part by those dogmatical roughnesses which either transcend the word of Scripture, or, which is the same thing, bring in Scripture improperly, coarsely painting representations of the wrath of God, which must be quenched by Christ's blood; of the devil, who goes about as a "spectre of the night;" of the torments of those who "with the damned throng must fire and brimstone feed upon;" and other crudities of the same kind, which at all times would be a welcome prize to the enemies of religion. Apollinarian extravagances also, such as "O mighty want, God's self is dead," are to be avoided from the stand-point of a sound orthodoxy. In this category, likewise, come false ethical representations of this world being "a vale of tears," out of which one could not be soon enough taken,—while very few who sing the hymn, would be willing to be taken at their word. One might reply that the Church is not to accommodate itself to the frivolity of the world, and the effeminacy of the age, but on the contrary, to contend with them, —to address sin-reproving hymns to the conscience of the children of this world, and if he who sings, feels smitten through the opposition of his worldly heart to the contents of these Scriptural hymns, the blame of this painful feeling lies upon himself, and not upon the hymn; and this should be a warning and awakening voice to him that the flesh should no longer strive against the spirit. We fully agree to this, but only in so far as the spirit, which is thus condemned, is a frivolous and blamable one, which cannot stand before the earnestness of Christianity. To many a one, the hymn which he has sung with others, may, in this view, be a spur to his conscience. But how do the two things agree, where perchance it should be said in the sermon, that the world is no vale of tears, that is, only by reason of sin; that worldly enjoyments are not condemned in themselves,—it is only through the sinful disposition with which they are enjoyed,—and yet the hymn still stands in direct opposition to this? It is only these *exaggerated* statements which we wish to do away, for these always work evil; they lead either to stupid indifference, or fanaticism. These antique roughnesses are seen also in crudities of language, which can be better borne than dogmatical crudities. They must happen sometimes when the hymns cannot be changed without

injury. This occurs especially in the quantity of the syllables and the rhyme. In the hymn, "Wie schön leuchtet der Morgenstern," we must let even "leuchtet" go as an iambus. In like manner we leave untouched the rhyme "waffen" and "betroffen," (in the hymn "Ein feste Burg"), or "Stimme" and "Zinne," (in "Wachet auf"), or "Sieh hier bin ich Ehrenkönig," or "Kost" and "Lust," if we would not make too deep and vitally perilous invasion upon the structure of the hymn. But the congregation easily get wonted to such anomalies, and are glad to have them occur, to have consciously before them an *old* hymn which in this way proclaims its honorable antiquity. In this matter the school must prepare the way. There are pedantic school masters enough who, from their narow stand-point, set youth in opposition to these incorrect expressions of the hymn book. On the other hand, the hymns "*Valet* will ich der geben," "*Gloria* wird dir gesungen," would lose nothing by changing the Latin scraps into German words, although the alteration of the initial word is generally injurious, and causes confusion to one searching for the hymn. Finally, the *naive* also comes under the same category, inasmuch as some hymns may bear very well to be spoken privately, but would not do for public singing. A congregation of the present day could not in truth sing without some sense of the ludicrous:

> "Ein Kindlein so löbelich
> Ist uns geboren heute,
> Von eine Jungfrau säuberlich
> Zum Trost uns armen Leuten."

and, in like manner,—

> "Das Oechslein und das Eselein,
> Die loben Gott den Herren sein."

nor,—

> "Dess klopf' ich in die Hände."

To offer this to a congregation to sing, is the same as if one should set up an old German painting, with all its simplicities, as an altar-piece. As far as concerns the teaching of the history of art,—and even for the connoisseur himself, it may be exceedingly profitable and delightful, but it is not so for the middle stratum of our citizen-classes, who are too well educated to receive uncon-

cernedly anything that is offered, and too little educated to reconcile the historical and psychological features of the case. Finally, we confess that taste changes, and that which is endured in one age, is insupportable in another, and vice versa.

There are also hymns which were made in direct reference to the weakness of some believers, and which should be treated with the greatest possible tenderness and indulgence. One may say indeed that the Church should draw the people to the inner and outer understanding of its cultus treasures, and not let itself down to these weak ones; but this can be done only to a certain extent. If Paul could choose rather to eat no meat than that the weakest brother should be offended, (1 Cor. viii, 13), so we also might rest satisfied with a meagre diet in liturgical matters, rather than tickle our palates with aesthetical words, which to another man destroy all enjoyment in the worship. We should not offer condiments but bread to the people. Alterations of hymns should be made in the spirit and sense of the evangelical church which is to be edified through these hymns. If one looks carefully through the history of hymn-books, he strikes upon many most unwarranted alterations. The present period is not the first that has sinned in this matter. Luther complained that his hymns were mutilated, and the old orthodox in their flattening style of interpretation, have here set the example to the rationalists and neologists. A chief hand at altering was the churchly orthodox Klopstock. In the various changes which have already taken place, it is exceedingly difficult to discover the original reading. But before one proceeds to change a hymn, it is at least necessary to assure oneself of the true original reading, not to hold to it inexorably, but to make it a basis to proceed upon. Schleiermacher has well shown in his letter to Ritschl, that the question has not regard to the rights of an author, but to the Church and its edification. When a felicitous change has already made its way into the living hymn-books in the hands of the people, this should be adhered to and not again altered. But when a change is absolutely needed, great care should be taken not to make use of a modern phrase, which forms too great a contrast to the ancient complexion of the hymn, like a new patch on an old cloak, or a flaming red tile upon an age-blackened roof! A fine knowledge of language, and even a special perception of the particular author and of his use of language is

required, in order to make judicious alterations. Sometimes a whole verse, or many verses must be given up as incurable. This can be done without hesitation inasmuch as at all events, most hymns are too long, and in the best of them there are some dull portions which could be removed without injuring the general impression. Where such a gap occurs, the junctions where the separated parts are brought together should be skillfully made. Therefore it is that the restoration of old hymns for the Church's use is as difficult, and even more difficult, than the restoration of old pictures. But any modern alteration of an old hymn in accordance with a dogmatical system that is at variance with the evangelical Church, and its fundamental intuitions, must be evidently unsuccessful. The rationalism of the previous century made it in this regard an unfortunate restorer. But it does not thereby follow that true orthodoxy is capable of making a happy restoration of the old, or correction of the new. Even the hymns of Gellert must be left as they are, lest they should be made worse by attempting to mend them in the spirit of a dogmatical restoration: e. g. "Virtue's path is hard at first" into "Faith's path," and so on. Here it should be enjoined that what is right for one is right for another. If you will have Gellert in the hymn-book, then leave him his "virtue" and whatever is connected with it. But if there is fear of Pelagian leaven let the hymn itself be given up.

In regard to the *musical* element in Church song, the question arises whether the choral should be sung in one or in four parts? We would rather treat this question as an open question, since theorists themselves are not agreed upon it. Thus one says "the unison (unisono) of voices is as unnatural as it is offensive;" another pronounces "the congregational singing in different parts as a false way, as an illusion." He calls to mind the fact that volk-song is eminently unisonal. He says, "In this unison, as the expression of perfect communion, lies the truly elevating and impelling power of congregational singing." The hymn of one part (with organ accompaniment) finds its devoted defenders, especially in Germany, while in Switzerland, particularly in the country, where there are no organs, they hold to the singing of four parts, as the opposite is considered to be an evidence of want of cultivation. Luther in opposition to Carlstadt, defended the practice of singing in four parts, and called the unisonal singing

"a donkey bray." The argument against congregational singing in four voices, is first the great difficulty of overcoming the imperfection in their musical training of the great masses who attend our churches. In relation to this Schöberlein has remarked with truth "that every one chimes in with those neighbors nearest to him who sing only in his own key, and that the impression of the various parts is entirely lost to him, and can be only truly appreciated by hearers standing aloof and not participating." But it is still further urged that they who cannot even maintain an accompanying part are condemned to silence, or to join in the melody. The first is of doubtful expediency, since it is a part of religious edification for every one to join in the singing as well as he can; the last disturbs the harmony, if the four parts are sung at the same time; the uncultivated singer finds that he is not right, and goes unsteadily between the one voice and the four voices, while he might be able to join heartily and gladly in one voice. And it is indeed true, and it is a fact somewhat encouraging to such a one, that the song of all combined is less artistically rich. And then it is a matter worthy of consideration that the voices which belong together do not come together in the order of place, as musical conformity would demand. Men and women sit apart, in like manner soprano and alto, and tenor and bass are pell-mell; boy's voices also (where the young people no longer sit together) are heard separate in the midst of men's voices, here a soprano, there an alto. This disturbs indisputably the effect of the four-voiced song. We come back then to the expedient before mentioned, that the choir previously sing a four-voiced and artistic strophe, without the organ, then the following strophe to be sung unisonal, *with* the organ, by the whole congregation, in the way of alternate song.

Another question that arises is whether the song sung by the congregation should be accompanied by the organ or by any other instrument. Although in the Reformed Church, the organ was broken to pieces as a "papistical music-mill" and condemned to silence, yet by degress it gained the ascendancy. In the Greek Church the organ (notwithstanding its Grecian origin) never came into use; in the Latin Church the papal chapel has never admitted it to this day, and in the 16th century it had so many opposers, that even at the council of Trent its removal was proposed. Its preservation in the Roman Catholic Church is especially due to the intervention of the Emperor Ferdinand.

That the organ can work disturbance in Church music there can be no doubt. There is much and bitter complaining over the organist's misdemeanors. But there is improvement in this respect. Where the organ is played by a skillful and consecrated hand, it does its part undoubtedly in devotional edification; not only in that it sustains the song and furnishes the harmony where there is harmonious song, but also in the prelude, which we have reckoned among the elements of religious worship. The concluding voluntary may likewise form a fitting close to the service. It surely does so, if the organist, animated by the impression of the sermon, strikes upon the keys of his instrument and lets an accordant strain pour forth, as if it were out of the upper sanctuary, answering that to which the whole congregation had just given utterance in song. We cannot agree with Schleiermacher when he says that "the playing of the organ at the close of the service is properly no part of the worship but is a free-will offering; therefore organists often play marches." Bad enough when that happens! The concluding voluntary upon the organ is to be sure not properly a part of the cultus, as during its performance the worshiping assembly takes its departure; but as at the beginning of the service the organ awakens the devotional sentiment, so it accompanies the congregation when they leave the house of God, as with the divine benediction. In this respect it stands in even closer connection with the worship, than the ringing of church bells; and yet even this is not without liturgical significance. The people should not be *played* out of church, but be *led* out, as those who have resting upon them the blessing of the Lord. On the other hand those fatal interludes which Harms has fitly characterized, are rightly judged in the more modern view, to be out of place.

The organ among all instruments is the only purely ecclesiastical instrument. It dwells and is enthroned in the sanctuary, a Church within a Church! He who would hear must come to it; it does not go out into the crowded world. As to the use of other instruments in Church music, sometimes these, like the harmonium, may be employed in default of an organ. Formerly wind-instruments were employed in the place of the organ and even with it. Trumpets have still a high liturgical significance. They represent the *Ecclesia militans* and call up the terror of the judgment day (*tuba mirum spargens sonum*). But for all ordinary

public worship, they are too ceremonial and should be reserved for the high triumphal feasts of the Church. They have in the absence of the organ their suitable place in military public worship. But how far at the present day the former host of string-and-wind instruments should be employed, is a difficult question to answer. It certainly stands written (Ps. cl, 3 sqq.): "Praise him with the sound of the trumpet, praise him with the lute and harp, praise him with the timbrel and dance, praise him with stringed instruments and shawms, praise him with the clear cymbals, praise him with the resounding cymbals." This is according to De Wette's translation; in Luther's translation, *violins* are likewise included. Compare also 1 Sam. xviii, 6.

But however uniformly these instruments may be recognized and named, the Old Testament cannot here be immediately transferred to the Christian dispensation, otherwise the timbrel and dance would also be re-introduced (Exodus xv, 20). Our string and wind instruments serve, ordinarily, other purposes, which are far from those of an ecclesiastical character, and thus their appearance in the Church has something foreign to the genuine churchly feeling. Wycliffe in his day declared himself against a church music which tended more to dancing than devotion. In like manner the Reformers strongly pronounced their judgment. Zuingle was a great lover of music, and a skillful performer upon the instruments then in vogue, but he never employed them for church music. Among the "United Brethren," stringed instruments are admitted without hesitation into public worship. They can do it because they know no place where violins and bass-viols are seen in any other relations than those connected with the Church. From the mass of the people however, we cannot hope for much discriminating thought in this matter.

The Romish Church both tolerates and aims to produce a ravishing musical harmony at its religious solemnities; our devotional sentiment would be more disturbed than elevated by this. A mixed festival solemnity in which the civil and ecclesiastical elements meet (as jubilees and such occasions) might perhaps form an exception. Still less edification would we find in a solo than even in a musical performance with a full orchestra, say a solo upon the violin or flute, though executed in the severest style. We are pretty much confined to this, that as a general rule, so far as instrumental music is concerned, we have to be content with the

organ. And it may be added that true liturgical impression is destroyed by whatever is introduced into the sanctuary of a purely technical or artistic character, whether appealing to the eye or ear.

As regards the conduct or regulation of church music, it does not stand in the power of any individual leader, whether preacher or pastor, to introduce hymn-books, or to change and determine the order of church song. Yet though all are called upon to take part in this, the pastor can do very much for the elevation and improvement of church music; therefore the musical cultivation of our ministers is to be greatly recommended as well upon the theoretical as the practical side. Since it is a prevalent fashion for the preacher to make choice of the hymn and of the verses to be sung, this is a privilege which he should make use of with the greatest conscientiousness, as much often depends upon the choice of a good hymn as upon the choice of a good text. One should not put this off to the last moment when the sexton announces himself to take the hymn, but he should be prepared betimes, and some attention should also be paid to the selection of the tune. For this reason the minister should be himself perfectly at home in the hymn-book.

XIV.—THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION AS INTRODUCTORY TO CHRISTIANITY.*

What amount of religious knowledge was it within the power of the pious and sincere among the Jews under the ancient dispensation to attain? In what way were the great questions that lie at the basis of all real religion, the questions relating to the deliverance from guilt and moral impurity, capable of being answered so as to bring salvation to their souls as a blessing which they might personally enjoy? And what kind and degree of spiritual privilege was it possible for them to receive?

These are questions of profound interest in many respects, but they are also questions not very easily answered. If we would arrive at a satisfactory decision on the subject to which they relate, we must carefully avoid everything of the nature of a hasty and sweeping conclusion. A rash skepticism, and an indiscriminating dogmatism, must be equally shunned in our treatment of the subject. It is only by a comprehensive survey of all the evidence attainable, and a cautious induction from what is seen to be probable, that any well-grounded result can be reached by us in such a field of inquiry. It is necessary, also, that we should abstract as much as may be from the ideas we have gathered from the Christian Scriptures, lest we insensibly carry back thence to the Old Testament what does not belong to it, and by reading it in the light of later revelation, ascribe to those by whom that revelation was altogether unknown, a degree of illumination which they did not possess, and which it was not possible for them to possess. It is not easy, indeed, to make this abstraction, and perhaps it is vain to expect that it can be made perfectly. As Foster has justly remarked: "The mind has no power of imagination to place itself as in the predicament of suffering, or having suffered, an annihilation of its knowledge; it cannot feign itself in a process of putting out one bright, fixed truth within it, and

* Abridged from a review of Litton's Bampton Lecture in the *British Quarterly Review.*

another in order to conceive the state it would be in if they were extinguished; . . . a man cannot create to himself a fictitious temporary consciousness of *not* knowing what he really *does* know."* This, all must admit to be physically impossible, for on the opposite hypothesis we should be conscious, and yet not conscious of one and the same thing, at one and the same moment, which would be a contradiction in terms. Hence the difficulty of withdrawing the mind from the influence of knowledge already possessed, and the tendency so continually exhibited to reflect on others the light of our own minds, and to interpret their meaning by what we ourselves are thinking of. Still, though difficult, it is not absolutely impossible so to abstract the mind from what it knows as that, without ceasing to be conscious of such knowledge, it shall not allow it to influence materially its judgments in cases where such knowledge cannot be pre-supposed. The attempt, at any rate, must be made in every such case, if a sound and true judgment is to be formed; otherwise we shall be like the trader who, in summing up the columns of his ledger, insensibly adds to the credit side something which should stand only on the debit side, and so falls into a mistake which must vitiate his whole reckoning.

But while we pursue our inquiries into Old Testament theology and religion with a continual watchfulness lest we interpolate the ancient records with ideas learned by us only from the New Testament, it is possible to carry the principle of such caution too far. Mr. Litton has, we think, done so in the following statement: "The only way to arrive at just views respecting the degree of spiritual illumination enjoyed by the ancient believer at any given period, is to suppose that all the books of Scripture subsequent to that period had perished, and then to examine how much of Christianity we can fairly extract from the portion that is left." According to this canon, if we would ascertain the degree of spiritual illumination possessed by the Patriarchs, we must confine ourselves to the book of Genesis, with the addition, perhaps, of that of Job; if we would ascertain with what degree of illumination the Israelites entered Canaan, we must add to these the remaining books of the Pentateuch; and so on for subsequent stages of Israelitish history; always carefully avoiding the ascription to the men of any given age, of religious thoughts

* Essay on Popular Ignorance, p. 8.

or feelings not formally enunciated in those books of Scripture which were written before or during their day. Now to such a canon of interpretation, however specious it may at first appear, we can by no means subscribe. It appears to us to involve two assumptions, both of which we hold to be unfounded. In the first place, it assumes that the men of any given age knew nothing of religious truth but what we find recorded in the sacred books composed either before their age or during its lapse; in other words, that these books make known to us *all* that the men of the age in question knew of religious truth. If this be not assumed, it follows that there might be a large body of religious truth influencing the minds and inspiring the hearts of the godly, of which no complete statement is given in the writings anterior to their age, or those of their cotemporaries. But can such an assumption be conceded with safety? Is it safe in any case to determine the religious knowledge of the people of any age by what we may find written in their books? On this assumption we must suppose that the authors of these books *meant* to tell us all that their cotemporaries knew of religion; and we must also ignore the whole effect of traditionary teaching in sustaining the religious belief of the community. Now, surely, to do this in the case of such records as that of the Old Testament, and in case of such a people as the Jews, is peculiarly unsafe. It would not be safe to do it in almost any case. Take the case of the ancient Greeks and Romans; should we arrive at a correct view of their actual, every day religious and ethical condition, by restricting their religious and moral knowledge to what we find formally stated in the writings of the classics? or, would it be wise to maintain that, because some important religious truth is announced for the first time in the writings of a later writer, it was in his day for the first time brought before the minds of his countrymen? On the contrary, do we not know that in all times the higher and better truths of religion were taught by the traditionary lore of the Mysteries? and that those who sought to promulgate doctrines opposed to Polytheism and the mythological vanities of the poets appealed to antiquity and tradition for the sanction of what they taught? Cicero, in arguing for the immortality of the soul, appeals to both the Mysteries and the "*consensio omnium gentium*,"* and Augustine admits that when the Christians pointed

* Vide Tusc. Qu, i. 23.

the heathen to the evil effects which must flow from the scandalous conduct attributed to their gods, they were met by the reply —"*At enim non traduntur ista sacris Deorum sed fabulis poetarum;*" * a reply which he does not attempt to invalidate by any denial of the fact affirmed, at least as respects the belief of antiquity. Or, to come nearer home: Would a correct and adequate estimate of the actual religious life of good people in this country, at any time during the last three centuries, be formed by the man who should ignore the whole effect of that hereditary traditional teaching which has been, during that period, continually diffusing its influence through the families of our land, and should confine himself to what he found recorded in books? And if, in such cases, it would not be safe to confine ourselves to documentary evidence, how much less so is it the case of the Jews? They were inheritors of a body of religious teaching which had descended to them from the primitive ages when men conversed with God. They received constantly and universally, as Josephus not unbecomingly boasts,† that instruction from their priests in the higher truths of religion which, among the heathen, was confined to the initiated, and that but for a few days. And the records which we have concerning them are not in the shape of formal treatises on religious belief, nor do they contain anything like scientific histories of religious opinion, nor do they give us in any case a detailed confession of any individual or party. In respect of these points, they are wholly unsystematic and informal, and, with hardly an exception, proceed upon the assumption that religious knowledge is rather a thing already possessed by those for whom they were composed, than a thing which they were to be made the vehicle of communicating. Under such circumstances it is, we think, wholly incompetent to assume that we can form a just estimate of the religious knowledge of the Jews, at any given period, by confining our attention to such of the Old Testament writings as were extant in their day. When, in a series of writings, truths are enunciated, no where as *new* truths, but invariably as parts of a catholic faith which has at all times and by every one been held, there is no other way in which we can accurately ascertain what truths were believed at any given time, but by ascertaining, by an inductive process, *from the entire series*, what truths were at all times believed.

* De Civ. Dei, ii. 7, 8. † Cont. Ap., ii. 22.

The second assumption which the canon laid down by Mr. Litton requires for its support is, that the revelation of God's truth to mankind was *progressive;* in other words, that, in the earlier stages of His communications to men, He made known only elemental truths in the form adapted to ignorant and feeble minds, and that, as His communications advanced, He gradually made known the deeper and more spiritual truths of His religion. Unless something of this sort be assumed, such a rule as Mr. Litton has laid down, is useless; for if there was not progressive revelation, there can be no advantage in attempting a chronological development of theological truth. Now that religion was thus progressively made known to man, was a favorite notion with many, and of late it has been the fashion in certain quarters, to assert this as an undoubted and established fact. Some have even proposed to apply it to the writings of the Apostles; and one writer has gone so far as to pretend that we may discover an advance towards greater maturity and depth in the later Epistles of Paul, as compared with his earlier. A recent writer on Hermeneutics has instructed his readers to follow out this principle as the only one which will guide to a just interpretation of the theology of the Old Testament; and on all sides we find it asserted more or less confidently, that a chronological study of the Sacred Books is demanded in order to discover and estimate aright the truths they unfold. It would be well if, instead of incessantly enunciating the necessity of this, some one would set himself to do it. We should then be better able to judge of the value of the prescription. Let a fair and full development be given of this alleged progressive revelation in its successive stages, and we shall then be prepared to admit the fact of its existence. Only let those who shall attempt it, not indulge in the fallacy of a *petitio principii;* let them not first seek to determine the chronology of the Sacred Books by the supposed progressiveness of their revelations, and then prove that revelation has been progressive from the chronology of the books.* Meanwhile, we take

* "It were much to be wished," says Mr. Jowett, (vol. ii, p. 232), "that we could agree upon a chronological arrangement of the Old Testament which would approach more nearly to the true order in which the books were written, than that in which they have been handed down to us." Yes, this *is* much to be wished; but until it is accomplished, we submit that all attempts to unfold a progressive revelation in these books, are premature and hopeless.

leave to hint that the entire hypothesis is fallacious. It is with this, we suspect, as with the development hypothesis in nature. A competent authority has assured us that zoölogists of the school of Lamarck have "confounded gradation with progress."* Because there is a morphological analogy between the more perfectly developed animals and those existing in a more rudimentary state, it has been hastily concluded by those speculators that existence was first manifested in its lowest forms, and that these gradually progressed as they were developed into a higher. A pleasing enough theory, but one to which nature most obstinately refuses to conform, placing barriers which are never passed between genus and genus, and beginning her productions with the more perfect organisms of a class. A similar fallacy has, as it appears to us, misled the theological theorists to whom we now refer. They have mistaken the different degrees of clearness and fullness in the unfolding of Divine truth for a progressive discovery of that truth to men. Because Paul sometimes enunciates moral and spiritual principles more fully, or in sublimer language, or with greater distinctness than at other times, they hasten to the conclusion that one is the mature and enlarged revelation, the other the initiatory and imperfect revelation of these principles of the Apostle's mind. Because David reaches a higher strain of religious and moral utterance than we find from Moses, it is concluded that David had a fuller and clearer intelligence of Divine truth than Moses had. To us all this seems most baseless and precarious speculation. May not a writer have a whole system of truth in his mind, and yet not feel himself called upon, on every occasion of using his pen, to utter it wholly, or to utter it with equal energy and eloquence? Would it be fair to charge a preacher with only a rudimentary acquaintance with Christianity, because in a sermon he confined himself to the simplest elements of the Gospel? Sometimes an author's most elementary expositions are his maturest works; and it not unfrequently happens that it is his very mastery of his subject in its details that best fits him for teaching it in the simplest forms. Why then, must we suppose that, when the Sacred writers express themselves in a simple, or even rude form, the cause of this is to be sought in their own partial acquaintance with Divine truth? May the

* Miller, *Old Red Sandstone*, p. 74.

cause not rather be that, like the greatest of all teachers of religious truth, they accommodated both the matter and form of their teaching to the circumstances of their hearers, and taught them as they were able to bear it?

On these grounds, we think our researches into the theology of the Bible ought to be fettered by no such restriction as that which Mr. Litton has proposed to lay on our examination of that of the Old Testament. Assuming, as we must needs do in such an inquiry, the equal authority of all the books of Holy Scripture as given by inspiration of God, we would insist upon the *whole* being examined and compared, and the statements of one part supplemented or expounded by those of another, as the only just and hopeful method of arriving at a conclusion on the subject. Our inquiry in such a case is analogous to that of persons engaged in the geological survey of a country; every stone has some story to tell, every cropping supplies its link of evidence, and rocks, separated by many miles of chasm, may furnish unmistakable proof of the existence of one great and continuous whole, of which they originally formed parts.

Taking the Old Testament, then, in its entireness, let us inquire into the evidence it affords as to the religious knowledge attainable by those who lived under the former dispensation, and as to the spiritual privileges they enjoyed. And here we shall not dwell on the representation given in the Hebrew Scriptures of the Divine Being and attributes, or of the moral and spiritual condition of man in relation to God. On these subjects there are few who will not admit that the views presented in the Old Testament are accordant with, and almost as clear as, those presented in the New. A few writers, indeed, like Mr. Parker, still hang on the anthropomorphism of the Old Testament, and would fain persuade us that persons by whom such modes of representation are used could have no just or spiritual views of the Deity; but even De Wette refuses to give in to this cavil,* and we may safely leave it to be disposed of by the common sense of mankind. We may also assume that most candid inquirers will agree with the very free-thinking, but most learned and acute writer just mentioned, that while on the one hand "Hebraism places man very high," it on the other represents the moral nature of man as cor-

* *Biblische Dogmatik A. und N. Testaments*, p. 73, 96.

rupt, and that "sin is inherited from the first man by the rest."* Assuming these points, we pass on at once to place ourselves in front of the great problem of all religion, arising out of the relation of man as a sinner to God, as the Holy, All-perfect, and Omnipotent Governor—the problem, "How shall man be just with God?" What answer might a pious and intelligent Jew under the ancient dispensation be able to give to such a question?

The Jew found himself from his birth a member of a very peculiar institution. In this institution the Church and the State were one, and every Jew was by birthright a member of the former no less than of the latter. Jehovah, the God of the whole earth, was the political head of the Jewish State, enacted laws for its government, and enforced the observance of them by temporal sanctions. While thus brought into peculiarly close and privileged intimacy with the Most High, the Jew was never permitted to forget the immense distance which separated him from God, nor the fact of his continual unworthiness and uncleanness in the sight of Him who is Holy. Though Israel was a priestly nation, no individual could approach unto God save through the medium of an official priesthood, appointed by God, and solemnly consecrated to his service. Continual purifications were required even in cases where no moral impurity was necessarily contracted, and, when offences of an open kind were committed, it was only by offering sacrifice that they could be remitted. Sacrifice had also to be presented to clear away the guilt of offences not detected or inadvertantly committed; and to cover all and to protect the nation from the Divine displeasure, a great annual act of expiation had to be performed, so as to free the community from its sins. There was thus a continual remembrance of sins made, so as to keep before the minds of the people an abiding consciousness, at once of their own proneness to transgression, and of God's hatred of sin and jealousy of his own glory. Only by sins being continually purged away could Israel retain God's presence in their sanctuary, and avert his wrath from them and their land.

It has been made a question whether the illustrations and sacrifices of the Jews had any *immediate* effect on their interests as members of the theocracy, or were only designed to bear on their welfare as subjects of God's moral government. There can, we

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* *Biblische Dogmatik A. und N. Testaments*, p. 91, 92.

think, be little reason to doubt that the former is the true hypothesis of this subject. The theocracy, as it presented itself to the eye of the observer, was wholly an outward temporal institute. God, it is true, was the Head and Sovereign of the system; but He ruled by means of temporal instrumentality, and by the force of temporal sanctions. As King of Israel his relation to the people was purely outward. An offence might involve deep moral guilt, but it was not on account of this that it was taken notice of by the authorities under the theocracy; they had to do with it only as a political offence, an offence against the State, and which had to be expatiated by sacrifice, and washed away by purifications, before it could be forgiven. Here, then, was the immediate effect of sacrifice under the law; it was the legal method of purging a criminal from his guilt, so that he might be restored to his place as a member of the community. And what was thus the effect of particular sacrifices on individuals was the effect of general sacrifices on the nation; they purged it from national guilt, and averted God's judgment from the land.

There are some that have contended that, under the law, only offences of a ceremonial kind were expiated by sacrifice. This statement may be correct or it may be erroneous, according to the sense in which we take the word *ceremonial*. If by it is intended to express the idea that it was only as violations of *theocratic* law that offences were directly expiated by sacrifice among the Jews, we would regard the statement as true. But if by "ceremonial" it is meant to exclude offences that in their nature were moral, and include only such as were breaches of positive institutes, we must reject it as wholly erroneous. Nothing can be more explicit than the words of the law itself on this head. Not only do we read that "if a soul shall sin through ignorance against *any* of the commandments of the Lord, concerning things that ought not to be done, and shall do against them," . . . "the priest shall make an atonement for his sin that he hath committed, and it shall be forgiven him;"* but in the ordinances for trespass-offerings special mention is made of such moral offences as inconsiderate swearing, falsehood and dishonesty, along with political offences, such as refusing to give witness against a criminal,† and such purely ceremonial offences as touching an unclean

* Lev. iv. 2, 35.

† Lev. v. 4: vi. 2–7.

thing,*—all these being placed on the same level as respects the efficiency of sacrifice in clearing from guilt the party chargeable with them. Indeed, the general law relating to the trespass offering is laid down in words of the most comprehensive import—"if a soul sin and commit any of these things which are forbidden to be done by the commandments of the Lord, . . . he shall bring a ram without blemish out of the flock, with thy estimation for a trespass-offering unto the priest, and the priest shall make atonement for him.'† And with respect to the annual expiations for the whole nation on the great day of atonement the law runs thus:—"On that day shall the priest make an atonement for you to cleanse you, that you may be clean from *all* your sins before the Lord."‡ These passages seem to preclude the supposition that only breaches of ritual and positive laws were expiated by sacrifice; they evidently teach that for all offences, moral as well as ritual, atonement was thus made. Of course, acts involving rebellion against God, acts incompatible with the very existence of the theocracy, or indeed any form of government, could not be so easily cancelled, and for some such there was no forgiveness. In the case of sins, also, against their fellows, by which injury or loss was caused to them, restitution had to be made, or a civil penalty endured, before the guilt of the act as a theocratic offence could be forgiven. But with these qualifications, the position holds good, that all offences committed by a Jew against any of the Lord's commandments might be expiated by sacrifice, so as to exempt the party who had offended from theocratic penalties, and reinstate him in his theocratic privileges.

The whole truth on this part of the subject is expressed, we take it, in the following statement: sacrifice, as an institute of the theocracy, was an expedient for cancelling theocratic guilt. This was the whole extent of its immediate effect. It left the political, the social, and the moral bearings of the offence untouched. If the offence was one which could not be passed over with safety to the State, it was not passed over, but was punished with civil penalties: if it was one involving injury to a neighbor, compensation had to be made, either by restitution or by the penalty of the *lex talionis;* and if it was a breach of the moral law, the guilt remained, unless taken away by moral means. The act of sacrifice directly touched none of these things; it simply

* Lev. v. 1, 2. † Lev. v. 17, 18. ‡ Lev. xvi. 30. Comp. 34.

removed theocratic disabilities, and restored to theocratic privileges.

Had Mr. Litton sufficiently adverted to this view of the immediate effect of sacrifice under the law, it might have saved him from the remarks he has made at the close of his third Lecture, which we think the feeblest part of his book. In order as he thinks to reconcile the conflicting views above adverted to, he recurs to the etymology of the Hebrew word for atonement, (formed from כפר to cover), and suggests that moral offences under the law were only *covered* or *hid* from the sight of God, not really expiated; so that "God forbore the immediate execution of the penalty, tolerated the existence of the sin, when, in obedience to his command, the prescribed sacrifices of atonement were offered." This suggestion seems to us exceedingly unhappy and objectionable. In the *first* place, we are at a loss to see how such an hypothesis does help to reconcile the theories of sacrifice it is adduced to reconcile. One party says these sacrifices cancelled all ceremonial guilt; the other party says they expiated all guilt. How does it make these contrary opinions one, to say that the sin was not cancelled at all, but merely for a season covered? *Secondly:* Mr. Litton has not made it very clear whether he means his hypothesis to apply to *all* offences moral and ceremonial, or only to the former; but in either case his hypothesis is fallacious. If he means it to apply to all offences, then was there really *no* offence of any kind forgiven under the law through means of sacrifice; a statement directly opposed to the often repeated assurance appended to the laws concerning the offering of sacrifice; "and his sin shall be forgiven him." If he means it to apply to moral offences only, then he introduces an unauthorized distinction into the Divine Law, which places moral offences on a level with ceremonial, in relation to the atoning effect of sacrifice; arbitrarily makes the word כפר which is alike used of both, to mean a different thing in the one case from what it does in the other; and requires such statements as the following, "to make atonement for the children of Israel, for all their sins, once a year,"* to receive a *double* interpretation, one referring to their ceremonial sins, which were perfectly atoned for, and another to their moral offences, which were only imperfectly atoned for. *Thirdly:* We must protest against such a confusion of

* Lev. xvi. 34.

thought and language as is exhibited in identifying atonement with respite, the covering of sins from the punitive justice of God, with the forbearance and long-suffering of God which forbid Him to execute judgment speedily on the workers of iniquity. These two are totally distinct,—so distinct that it is only in the absence of the former, that there is any place for the latter. God is never represented as *forbearing* to punish sins which had been atoned for; the atonement once offered and accepted on behalf of the sinner, his sin is remitted and blotted out, and come no more into mind. *Fourthly:* Though the word used to express the act of atoning signifies etymological *to cover*, yet this can afford no shadow of support for Mr. Litton's hypothesis, because the covering implied by that is such an one as virtually destroys or obliterates the thing covered. It may suffice to cite on this head the authority of one to whom Mr. Litton pays, and justly, much deference, Professor Baehr. "According to the ground-signification," says he, speaking of the word כִּפֶּר in the Piel form, to which usage has fixed the meaning of *atone*, "nothing else can be intended by the conception of atonement than the covering of that which God cannot suffer to appear and be ever before Him; what is covered is no more to be seen—and consequently is as good as vanished, as no longer there. Hence according to the Hebrew usage, to cover is equivalent to abolish, to take away, to annihilate. . . . By atonement, consequently, that which was against God, opposite to Him, and hindered union and fellowship with Him, was obliterated, abolished, and annihilated."* If such be the idea of the word to which Mr. Litton has appealed, its whole force is clearly *against* the hypothesis he has suggested. *In fine;* this hypothesis receives no support from Romans iii. 25, 26, to which Mr. Litton appeals as confirming his view. He lays stress on the use by the apostle of the expression *πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτήματων*, which he translates "the passing over of bygone sins," and on this being ascribed to "the forbearance of God." But does he mean to insinuate that the sins to which Paul refers were passed over merely in the sense of not being punished at the time they were committed, though followed ultimately with their full deserts? This is the only exegesis of the apostle's words which will make them yield any shadow of support to Mr. Litton's view, but it is one which cannot for a moment be admitted.

* *Simbolik des Mos. Cult.* ii. 202.

On this interpretation what need was there for a vindication of God's *righteousness* in reference to these sins? He had not forgiven them; He had only delayed to punish them for a season; why, then, should his righteousness be supposed to be impeached thereby? or in what way could the propitiatory work of Christ afford the vindication of it supposed to be required? It seems plain from Paul's entire train of thought that πάρεσις here is substantially equivalent to ἄφεσις, that the passing over to which he refers is that of remission. The apostle probably had in his eye such passages as Job vii. 21, Micah vii. 18, where the passing by of sin is equivalent to the pardoning of it.*

We see no occasion for any such expedient as to that which Mr. Litton has resorted. The case is plain and intelligible as it stands. Sacrifice in its relation to the theocracy, was the mode of obtaining absolution from those penalties by which the institutions of theocracy were sanctioned. Its immediate effect was limited to this. It atoned directly for no moral guilt whatever; it sanctified only to the purifying of the flesh. In the nature of things it could not be otherwise; "for it is not possible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin." Such fleshly ordinances have effect only to meet the requirements of a fleshly dispensation. For this, however, they were sufficient; while they were utterly impotent directly to purify the conscience or relieve the sinner from moral guilt, they were certainly effectual in averting from him all theocratic penalties.

So far, we think, no Jew living under the theocracy could misunderstand his relation to God as King of Israel. But he could not understand this much without knowing along with it a great deal more. Even to the least reflective it would naturally occur to ask, "What connection is there between sacrifice and absolution? Whence arises the virtue of this act to remove the guilt and avert the penalty of offences committed against the theocratic king? Is it in the *offering* or in the *suffering* that that virtue lies? in other words, Is the sinner forgiven because he has brought and yielded up to God the victim, or because the victim's blood has been shed upon the altar?" Now to these questions, which would naturally in some shape or other occur to every man who had any desire to apprehend the meaning of what he was con-

* Comp. the notes of Rosenmüller, Hirzel, and Heiligstedt on Job vii. 21, with Ewald's Translation.

tinually required to do, the law under which he lived provided an answer. It taught him that while these sacrifices were to be gifts from his own proper good, the service itself was an expedient furnished to him by God for escaping the penalty he had incurred; and it at the same time proclaimed to him that the *principle* on which the act of sacrifice proceeded, and from which it derived its efficacy, was that of blood instead of blood, life instead of life, in short, the principle of vicarious substitution.* The law thus precluded the Jew from taking the heathen view of sacrifice as a gift intended to propitiate an angry God; it represented Jehovah as merciful, as propense to forgiveness, and as himself providing a method by which the claims of his own law might be harmonized with it. It also forbade any such idea of the import of the sacrifice as some modern theories on the subject propose, such as that it was a gift whereby man endeavored to render his imperfect consecration of himself to God complete, or that it was a symbol of the surrender of the soul to God to be made partaker of his holiness—theories which have found advocates among some of the most enlightened of the German theologians, and which have not wanted able and eloquent expounders in our own country. All such theories, to say nothing of those grosser notions advocated by Spencer and Sykes, as applied to Mosaic sacrifices are, as Mr. Litton has justly observed, "essentially defective; they throw into the background the ideas which in these sacrifices are most prominent, those of a broken law of consequent guilt, of liability to punishment, and of forgiveness through vicarious suffering." At the same time, though defective, we think that in the better class of these theories there lies the recognition of a great truth. Sacrifice was not merely the offering of life instead of life; to be accepted the victim required to be the *property* of the offerer; so that the idea involved in the act was partly that of consecration, partly that of satisfaction. The sinner yielded up to God a victim that had the peculiarity of being his own, and he presented its life instead of his own to God. We are inclined, therefore, to say that both the offering and the suffering entered into the whole conception of sacrifice, and that the value of the rite was derived from this combination. The sacrifice was a symbol of personal surrender to God; so far we agree with Bähr, Tholuck, and Maurice. But we cannot stop

* Compare especially Lev. xvii. 11; xvi. 21.

here. These writers have overlooked the condition in which man is when he makes this surrender; they have thought of him simply as a wandering child who would return to his father, not as a rebellious subject who has contracted guilt before his Sovereign. In this light however, no Jew was suffered to regard himself when he came with sacrifice. The fact most forcibly obtruded on him was that he was guilty and deserved to die. To what, then, did a surrender of himself to God amount? It amounted to nothing less than a yielding of himself up to all that the law demanded of him, and consequently to the full penalty of his sin. But in this case how was he to escape? Here comes in the effect of the vicarious substitute of the victim. God graciously accepted it for him, its life for his; so that the man having made a surrender of himself unto God, returned justified through sacrifice. According to this view the virtue of sacrifice lay both in the offering of the victim as property, and in the suffering of the victim as a substitute for the sinner.

That this was the light in which the Jews actually regarded sacrifice, is rendered more than probable by the statement of some of the Rabbinical writers. Thus from one of these we have the following explanation of the import of the rite. "It was just that his blood [that of the sinner] should be shed, and his body burnt. But the Creator, of his great clemency, accepts this victim from him as a vicarious thing and a ransom, that its blood should be shed in place of his blood, life for life."* Of this much, then, we may rest assured that in the mind of every Jew, living under the ancient dispensation, the great truths of man's guilt and of God's righteousness and clemency must have been established, along with the perception of the fact that it was by means of sacrifice, as an act of surrender on the part of the sinner, and as a vicarious satisfaction to the Divine law, that the guilt of the sinner was removed, and the Divine clemency and righteousness brought into harmonious action. Beyond this point, however, it is easy to conceive that two separate tendencies might develop themselves in the minds of the Jewish people, and two separate paths of religious belief and activity might be pursued by them. Men of a worldly carnal spirit would be content with the outward and carnal significancy of their ritual system:

* See this, and many passages of similar import, in Outram, *De Sacrificiis*, l. i. c. 22, § 10, ff.

if they, by attending to its requirements, might escape temporal penalties, and enjoy temporal privileges, they would be satisfied to inquire no farther, and, destitute of moral and spiritual life, they would not trouble themselves to ascertain whether the system under which they lived had any relation to spiritual things or any bearing on moral responsibilities. But men of a serious, earnest and religious spirit—men whose consciences were awake, and who felt that above and beyond the sphere of temporal interests there was a great world of moral and spiritual distinctions—could not be so satisfied. They must have felt that in whatever relation God was pleased to stand to them as a nation, He was still the God of the whole earth, the Universal Governor, whose law was written on the hearts of men, and who would reckon with men at last for their conduct as measured by that law. They were inheritors of a traditional faith in which the relations of man, as a moral agent, to God, as a moral governor, were dealt with apart from any special relations of an outward or dispensational kind, into which he might be pleased to enter with any section of the race. They knew that sin was something more, something worse than mere breach of theocratic law, and that it exposed to penalties far more dreadful than those temporal calamities by which the interests of the theocracy were protected. They felt that there were claims upon them which no ceremonial righteousness could suffice to meet; and their consciences were burdened with a sense of guilt which no ceremonial observance could remove. They knew that though sacrifice was of Divine appointment, as part of their national institute, it was a thing of no value in the sight of God as a means of canceling moral guilt; that He desired not sacrifice, nor delighted in burnt-offering, where moral guilt had to be expiated—nay, that when presented with this view the costliest oblations were vain, and the most fragrant incense an abomination to him.* When they returned therefore from their sacrificial observances, purged of theocratic guilt, they felt that the moral guilt still remained, and the question had still to be asked, How were they to be freed from it?

Had Judaism any answer for this question—a question which, just in proportion as a man had religious feeling quickened in his soul, would press with absorbing interest upon him? Surely it

* Psalm li. 17; Is. i. 11–14.

had; surely during all those centuries men of earnest and pious minds, with the oracles of God in their possession, were not left to grope in darkness or tremble in despair for want of an answer to such a question. Nay, does not their very piety, in its force, its joyousness, its elevation, assure us that they must have had an answer to it, such as calmed their consciences, cheered their hearts, and led them with the loving confidence of those who had their sins forgiven them, to rejoice in the Lord as the God of their salvation? The soul that is under the burden of unforgiven guilt cannot run as they ran in the paths of God's commandments. The heart that is shrouded over with the darkness of despair cannot shine as their's shone with the light of God's countenance.

It could hardly miss the observation of any thoughtful Jew who was inclined to pursue the inquiry, that the whole theocratic system under which he lived was symbolical of something else, viz., of God's moral government over men. Moses, it is true, nowhere formally states this; but to a people familiar with symbolical representations it would hardly fail to occur. Indeed, on no other hypothesis could the Jew reconcile the views given in his own Scriptures of Jehovah, as the God of the whole earth, with the specialty of His relation to Israel; if the latter representation was not a minature symbol of the former, it was a gross contradiction of it.* But if the Jew had the general conception of the theocracy as a symbol of God's moral government of men, it would be easy for him to pass to the conclusion that the theocratic guilt must represent moral guilt, and that the method by which a Jew was cleared from theocratic guilt represented the way in which he was to be cleared from moral guilt.

That this was actually the case we know from the New Testament, and we think it hardly credible that such a plain inference could have escaped the observation of thoughtful earnest men under the ancient dispensation, even supposing that they had no teaching to guide them to it. But they were not left destitute of teaching on this head. Even by Moses himself in the law, they were taught to interpret some of his institutions as morally symbolic: thus circumcision was represented as symbolical of moral purification,† the eating of the sin offering by the priest as symbolical of the reconciliation of the offerer with God,‡ and, what is most of all noticeable, the inscription upon the plate which the

* See De Wette, *Bibl. Dogmatik*, s. 94. † Deut. x. 16, xxx. 6. ‡ Lev. x. 16, ff.

high priest was always to wear on his forehead, "Holiness to the Lord," was expressly described as designed to teach every offerer that it was only by deliverance from moral guilt and impurity that he could be acceptable to God.* In such passages we have, to say the least, the *principle* of symbolical interpretation suggested to the Israelites, the key put into their hands, by which the whole of this mystic cabinet may be unlocked. We learn, moreover, that a part of the priests' duties was to teach the people the judgments and law of the Lord; and that this cannot be restricted to a mere inculcation of the ritual they had to observe, but must also be considered as including an explanation of the *meaning* of that, seems evident from the rebukes addressed by the prophets to the priests for their negligence in conveying to the people the needful spiritual instruction, so that they were left to perish for lack of knowledge,† as well as from the fact that on occasions of spiritual revival after degeneracy, care was taken to restore to the people those means of priestly instruction, the neglect of which had led to their sinking into sin.‡ We find also that the prophets, who were the familiar and constant teachers of the people in spiritual things, were not slow to press upon them, in the most emphatic manner, the necessity of an inner and spiritual cleansing, and the utter worthlessness of sacrifice and offering apart from this, as a medium of acceptance with God.

Taking all these things into account, we think it would be indulging a very undue and needless skepticism were we to doubt that the more earnest and pious of the ancient Jews perceived in the ritual of their public worship a symbolical representation of spiritual truths and spiritual relations. In point of fact, we know that some of them, at least, did perceive the spiritual significancy of these external observances; as they have recorded their experience in compositions intended for liturgical purposes, the conviction they have expressed could not be confined to them. We may adduce in illustration such passages as Ps. xl. 6; li. 7, 16–19.

But here a further question arises. These ceremonies were not only symbols of spiritual truths; they were also, as we know from the New Testament, prophetic adumbrations of the work of

* Exod. xxviii. 36, ff. See note on this passage in Kalisch's *Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament.* London, 1855.

† Compare Hos. iv. 6: Micah iii. 11; Mal. ii. 6, 7; 2 Chron. xv. 3.

‡ Compare 2 Chron. xvii. 7–9.

Christ as the great sacrifice for the sins of the world. Have we any reason to believe that the Jews understood their significancy in this respect? Mr. Litton somewhat peremptorily answers this question in the negative. "Of the prophetic meaning of the types," says he, "no hint is given in the law, and it is not for us to intrude our tapers where the light from heaven fails us." Very true, provided the light from heaven does really fail; but this does not follow from the fact that the law itself does not afford the necessary illumination. The nature of the case, or other parts of Scripture, may furnish the guidance we require, without any feeble flickerings from a taper of our own. Now, if it be admitted, as it is by Mr. Litton, that the Mosaic symbols were not only symbols of spiritual ideas, but also *designed* pre-figurations of Christian facts, it strikes us as very strange that it should be supposed that this part of their significancy was wholly hid from the ancient believers. Of necessity they could only have dim and imperfect conceptions of what was thus prefigured, for no symbols whatever can give men a just idea of a new fact before it has happened; but that they gathered no lessons at all from these designed prefigurations of Christ and his work, seems to us a most extravagant assertion. In that case, we ask,—for whose benefit was this adaptation of the type to the antitype designed? According to what we infer to be Mr. Litton's opinion on this subject, we presume he would answer,—for ours, who can read the record both of the type and the antitype, and see their correspondence. But to this we would reply, with one of the Congregational lecturers, who had treated this whole subject sixteen years before it was felt needful to introduce it into the Bampton Lectures, that it is doubly wrong; 1st, by confounding a type with a mere record of it; and 2d, by maintaining that a transaction was performed many centuries before, for the instruction for persons who must possess the knowledge it embodies before they can find out that it was intended to convey it.* A type, as the same writer observes, is "an acted lesson," to the utility of which intelligent "spectators are as indispensable as actors;" and he argues that, if under the ancient dispensation, there were merely actors, and not intelligent spectators, the Divine appointment and pre-adaptation of the type to the anti-type would have been

* *Connection and Harmony of the Old and New Testaments*, by W. L. Alexander, D. D. Second edition, p. 330.

in vain. That benefit of a certain kind may accrue to us as Christians from viewing Christian facts in connection with the typical adumbration of them under the law, we are far from denying; but we must maintain that, if to convey such benefit was the primary and chief intention of the ancient types, it will be difficult to defend the latter from the charge of being splendid superfluities. To quote again the words of the writer last cited: "A was done to teach B; but it is only after we have thoroughly mastered B, that we can find out that such was the design of A; in such a case, of what use is A?

The presumption then is, that the Jews did possess the means of understanding the typical import of their own ritual. As already observed, their perception of Christian facts thus obtained, would necessarily be imperfect; but it did not require to be more so than what they could obtain by means of prophecy. Between the types and prophecy the affinity is close. A type is an acted prophecy; a prophecy is a verbal type. The one seeks to convey by symbolical representations, what the other teaches by words. And as the two went hand in hand under the ancient dispensation, so that the people continually heard from the lips of the Prophet the same great predictions which were shadowed forth by the performances of the Priest, we cannot conclude that the whole ritual was to the earnest, pious and inquisitive Jew, destitute of any prophetic significancy, without presuming that the Jew was at a lower grade of intelligence than all we know of him otherwise will suffer us to suppose.

Mr. Litton, in discussing the part of his subject which relates to prophecy, has shown that "all the leading doctrines which center in the Saviour's person and work," find clear and impressive enunciation in the prophetical writings. A Jew, then, listening to these communications, and receiving them with devout thoughtfulness as Divine truths of the profoundest interest, would be familiar with the fact that the Messiah promised to his nation, was to come not only as a King to reign over the spiritual Israel, —not only as a Prophet to teach his people and be the Light of the world,—but also as a Priest to make atonement and intercession for mankind. He might also know that the Messiah was not only to be a Priest, but that he was to be the victim in His own sacrifice,—that he was to bear the sins and pains of his people,— to be bruised for their iniquities, and to be cut off in order to

make an end of sins, and to effect reconciliation for iniquity. Now, conceive a man familiar with these beliefs and expectations, witnessing every day atonement made by the Priest for sin, by means of animal sacrifice; witnessing every day the very thing done in symbol which he knew from the Prophets the Messiah was to do in reality; and can it be maintained that he would be so stupid and obtuse, though wishing and praying to be taught of God all the wondrous significancy of His law, as not to see the connection between these two, how the one adumbrated the other, and how they both pointed to the same great facts in which both were to find their fulfillment?

In reasoning thus, we of course presume that pious Jews, under the ancient dispensation, enjoyed the aids of that spiritual illumination without which, even under the Christian dispensation, men are not able to discover aright the things of God. To this subject Mr. Litton has devoted a considerable portion of one of his lectures. In many of his observations we cordially agree. We concur with him in believing that the converting and sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit were enjoyed by the saints under the former dispensation; and we concur with him in thinking that the difference between the two dispensations in respect to the gift of the Spirit, is not to be resolved into a mere superiority on the part of the latter in the amount of Holy Scripture possessed by those living under it, or into the larger effusion of miraculous power conferred during the apostolic age, or into the greater measure of sanctification now attainable, or into the greater formality with which the conveyance of the blessing has been made to the New Testament Church. On all these points we think his strictures just and conclusive; but when he proceeds to state his own theory on the subject, he diverges into a field whither we cannot follow him. According to his view, the influences of the Spirit under the ancient dispensation, acted chiefly from without upon the believers,—whereas, now they act from within; and are now abiding,—whereas, formerly they were only occasional. "Hitherto," he says, "it was a temple of human structure, a building in which the Deity had manifested his presence, and in this only by symbol, the bright cloud which filled the tabernacle. If man had been the subject of such a spiritual inhabitation, it was only, as in the case of the Prophets, for special purposes, and therefore temporarily and irregularly, while ordinarily the

impulses of the Spirit came from without, and operated upon the soul sufficiently for the purposes of sanctification, but without permanent indwelling."* On this theory we have to remark,—(1). That we are at a loss to understand what spiritual blessing can be superior to sanctification. Hitherto we have been accustomed to regard that as the crown and consummation of Christian privilege; and that the Apostle, when he besought God on behalf of the Thessalonians, that He would "sanctify them wholly," supplicated for them the highest blessing that they could receive. But according to Mr. Litton, there is something higher still, viz: the permanent indwelling of the Spirit. We wish he had told us distinctly what this implies as distinct from sanctification; and further, we wish he would tell us how, if this be a superior blessing to sanctification, the Thessalonians, who, as living under the Christian economy, by the supposition, possessed this superior blessing, still needed to be sanctified. (2). There is, undoubtedly a distinction,—one which all divines have recognized, between the operations of the Spirit on man *ab extra*, and his operations *ab intra;* but it has been usual to regard the former as having reference to restraining and preparatory grace,—the latter, as embracing all that has to do with the spiritual regeneration and sanctification of the man. Does Mr. Litton, then, think that the saints under the Old Testament had only the former of these blessings? He does not; for he emphatically asserts that, by the people of God under the ancient dispensation, the gracious influences of the Spirit were enjoyed, and to an extent which renders it doubtful whether their sanctification was not as complete as ours. What, then, does he mean, by saying that "ordinarily the influences of the Spirit come on them *from without?* (3). It has been usual with divines to identify the inhabitation of the Spirit in man with His sanctifying and elevating operation on man's heart.† According to Mr. Litton, these two are distinct, so that the one may exist without the other. Will he tell us explicitly

* We find a view somewhat similar to this advanced in Bishop Martensen's *Christliche Dogmatik* (S. 376. 3 Aufl)., a work rich in thought and spiritual feeling.

† Thus Quensted:—"(Gratia) inhabitans (ipse Sp. Sanctus) quæ ipsum hominis cor ingreditur, illudque spiritualiter immutando inhabitat. Buddæus:—"Cum homo jam conversus et justificatus est, templum rite præparatum inhabitat (Sp. S). . . . ex quo simul intelligitur renovationem, seu sanctificationem cum istâ Sp. Sancti inhabitatione arctissimo vinculo esse conjunctam." Compare Owen's *Pneumatologia*, B. iv. c. 8, § 18, ff.

wherein the distinction consists, or how a man can be sanctified without the indwelling operation of the Spirit? 4. Mr. Litton says that when the Spirit filled any of the Old Testament saints, it was only temporarily and irregularly. How does he reconcile this with his previous statement, that when he speaks of the old dispensation having its appropriate spiritual influences, he refers not to "the recording communications of God to the Patriarch, nor of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in the Prophets, for these were exceptional and intermittent illapses, but of a *permanent* and *ordinary* operation of Divine grace?" Can an operation which was "permanent and ordinary," be an operation that took effect "only temporarily and irregularly?"

These reasons are, we think, sufficient to prove that Mr. Litton has not shown his usual soundness in the theory he has thus advanced regarding the superiority of the Christian to the Jewish dispensation in the matter of spiritual influence. We cannot enter at large into this question, but must state in a few sentences, what a comparison of the passages of the Old Testament, bearing on this subject, with those in the New, having the same relation, seems to us to suggest, as the proper answer to the question,—at least *approximatively*, for in this question we have before us one of the difficulties of Scripture, which will never, perhaps, be wholly removed. Premising, then, that we think both the ordinary and extraordinary gifts of the Spirit are to be considered as included in the question, we would state the superiority of the Christian over the Mosaic dispensation in respect to these gifts, as consisting in the following particulars: 1st. In the greater *extent* to which the blessing was conferred. Under the former dispensation miraculous gifts were enjoyed but by a few; while under the latter they were conferred so extensively that, as has been justly remarked, "there were, probably, more inspired men during the last half of the first century than during the whole of the old economy;"* and as respects the ordinary gifts of the Spirit, there can be no doubt that from the day of Pentecost onward, a more liberal effusion of them has been poured forth from year to year, than was ever at any time enjoyed during the best days of the Jewish commonwealth. 2d. In the *more general*, *i. e.* the *less restricted* and *exclusive communication* of these gifts. Under the ancient dispensation, only persons of a special

* Brown's *Discourses and Sayings of our Lord*, &c., vol. ii, p. 41.

class received communications from God, and only men of one nation enjoyed spiritual blessings; under the new dispensation, all this is done away. The Spirit is "shed forth abundantly," is "poured forth on all flesh," so that even servants and handmaidens prophesy; every believer is a priest and a king unto God; and men of all countries and all tribes, may come freely and drink of the living waters. And 3d. In the *richer* and *brighter* and *more blessed results* of the Spirit's operation, both as respects the truths made known to the Church, and as respects our apprehension of their import, and realization of their preciousness. What were under the Old Testament economy only figures and promises, are now historical facts; what was then only seen dimly amid the shadows of the future, is now seen clearly amid the realities of the past; life and immortality have been brought to light by the gospel; reconciliation with God has been effected on behalf of the sinner; the way into the holiest of all has been thrown open; heaven has been taken possession of for the Church by her exalted Head; and "the things of Christ" being thus revealed to us by the Spirit, we receive in larger measure, and in more vivid consciousness, the light, and life, and joy of our religion. In these particulars we submit, consists the superiority of the Christian over the Mosaic dispensation, in respect of spiritual influences. The advantage which the former has over the latter is thus shown to be greater, but yet to be one only of degree, and not of kind.

We have dwelt so long on this part of our subject, that we must dismiss very briefly the other topics on which we shall touch. One topic, indeed, of great interest, on which we had designed to say something, viz., the ethical condition and sentiments of the ancient Jews, we must wholly omit, as it is not one which admits of being compressed into narrow limits. We hope ere long to take it up and discuss it in a separate article. Meantime, we turn for a little to ask,—Seeing such was the religious condition of the ancient Israel, in what relation does Christianity, as a religious system, stand to the system under which they lived? To this question, the Author of Christianity Himself has given a brief but categorical answer in the words "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets,: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill."* By the law and the prophets here, our Lord

* Matthew v: 19

must be understood as intending not the written word of the Old Testament, but the religious system therein contained, so that if we can but justly interpret his words, we shall at once reach the best answer that can be given to the question above proposed.

Now here everything depends on the meaning we attach to the words "destroy," and "fulfill." By these our Lord's meaning is determined, so that in ascertaining the sense to be attached to them, we ascertain the force of the whole declaration. The meanings in which commentators have proposed to take these words, are various. By some, destroy is assumed to be synonymous with "abrogate," by others, with "violate," and by others, by "invalidate." None of these, however, seems the correct exegesis here. We must dismiss "abrogate," and "invalidate," as fixing a sense on our Lord's words incompatible with truth; for undoubtedly He did come to abrogate and invalidate the ancient dispensation as such, inasmuch as by the system which he established, the former became weak and vanished away. It is absurd to say that a system which He is expressly said to have taken out of the way, and to have caused to decay and wax old, He did not abrogate or invalidate. As to "violate," the objection is, that it brings out a sense which is not relevant to the occasion: the question was not whether our Lord would observe and obey the Mosaic institutes, but what was the bearing of His doctrine on the system of which these formed a part; and had our Lord not spoken to this latter question, He would have spoken aside of the real point in hand. We would suggest that the sense in which the original word is used in Acts v; 38, 39, is that which should be retained here. Gamaliel, prudently counselling the Sanhedrim not to proceed to violent measures against the Christians, says: "If this counsel, or this work, be of men, it will come to nought, (*καταλυζήσεται*), but if it be of God, ye cannot bring it to nought, (*καταλῦσαι*). The subject of which Gamaliel here speaks, is analagous to that of which our Lord had to speak in the passage we are considering, viz., a system claiming to be of divine appointment, and the word he uses in reference to it is the same as that used by our Lord. Now this word, as used by Gamaliel, can only mean, as our translators have given it in the thirty-eighth verse, "to bring to nought," *i. e.*, to render vain, nugatory, or contemptible. This no man can effect with reference to any scheme of God's appointment. What God has instituted

as a mere temporary scheme, may be laid aside when its end is answered, and God may commission any one of his servants to do this. But no scheme of God can ever be brought to nought. It must serve its purpose; it must prosper in the thing whereto He sends it. And when it ceases to operate, it is not brought to nought, or rendered nugatory, for it ever ceases *in the realization of its end*, which is triumph, not defeat,—a higher perpetuity, not a mortifying or dishonorable annihilation. This, we take it, is what our Lord intends here. It is as if He had said, "I am not come to bring the ancient economy to nought,—to annihilate it as a nuisance, or to sweep it away as an incumbrance; I am come to put on it its crowning honor, by giving fulfillment." What our Lord intends by this fulfillment, we must now inquire. Were we to interpret our Lord's words here only by what follows in His discourses, we should probably restrict the fulfillment of which He speaks to that exposition of the true meaning of the preceptive parts of the ancient Scriptures which he goes on to lay before his hearers. But we cannot so restrict our Lord's statement here. It is to be kept in mind that he is speaking of the prophets, as well as the law, as included in what he had come to fulfill, so that we must of necessity regard Him as referring to something more than merely the explanation and vindication of the preceptive parts of the Old Testament; we must include under the "fulfilling" here at the least the accomplishment of ancient predictions, as well as the performance and assertion of ancient law. If, however, we take the phrase, "the Law and the Prophets," in the sense above proposed, as equivalent to the whole religious system of the ancient dispensation, and keep in mind, also, that "fulfill" here as the antithesis of destroy, must be commensurate in signification with it, we shall see occasion to enlarge the meaning of "fulfill" in this passage, so as to make it equivalent to the carrying out to full and complete realization of all that the ancient dispensation commanded or promised. Our Lord's words, then, may be explained thus: "I am not come to bring to nought, or to nullify the ancient dispensation: I am come to carry it out to perfection,—to complete in a glorious reality all that it intimated, enjoined, or foreshadowed." Christianity, in other words, was to take the visible place of Judaism; Christ had come to abrogate the ancient dispensation as such; but He had not come to sweep it away as if it had been a godless thing. He had come to abro-

gate it as the dawn is abrogated in the day,—as the seed is abrogated in the plant,—as the child is abrogated in the man,—by making what was merely introductory, pass into what was permanent, and developing into fullness that which before existed only in the germ.

Here, then, we have an answer to the question, in what relation did Judaism stand to Christianity? That relation is not one of hostility or rivalry; the later religion has not come to combat with or cast out the earlier; it has come simply to carry it forward to its full development. The change to be effected is one of progress and enlargement, not one of annihilation or degradation. Judaism is Christianity in nonage; Christianity is Judaism in full maturity; the latter man, the former, his earlier and less perfect self. We are not to seek, then for any antagonism between the two: we are rather to explore the fulness of their essential harmony.

And if such be the relation of Christianity to Judaism, in what light ought those who enjoy the teaching of Christ and his apostles to regard the documents that unfold the principles of the ancient faith, and record the history and experiences of the men who lived under its influence? Does it become us to cast these documents aside as unworthy our reverential study, or to treat them as if of more doubtful authority, or possessing less of Divinity than the documents of the Christian faith? or to regard them with a kind of cold courtesy, that refrains from questioning their pretensions, but carefully avoids cultivating acquaintance with their contents? It was not so that Christ and his Apostles regarded the Old Testament. By them it was evidently loved and revered. They studied it deeply; they referred to it confidently; they had its language ever on their lips; and they rested the claims of their own doctrine principally on the fact that it had its roots deep in the Old Testament revelation, and drew sap and strength from that generous soil. So completely have they thrown the protection of their authority over the ancient Scriptures, that they impose on us the necessity of either admitting the Divine authorship of these writings, or questioning the Divine authorship of their own. It is impossible for any mind, imbued even slightly with logical perception, to admit Christ and His apostles as infallible teachers, and yet repudiate the Old Testament as of doubtful authority, or of inferior authority to the New. If any were

to do this, he would pronounce his infallible teachers to have erred, and that in one of their most clearly enunciated and most earnestly advocated doctrines. What, then, shall we say of those who profess that it is their respect for the teachings of Christ and His apostles, that leads them to turn slightingly from the Old Testament, and to confine their studies to the New?

We are strongly persuaded that it is neither for the interest of theological science, nor for the advantage of real, vital, experimental godliness, that the writings of the Old Testament should be lightly esteemed, or carelessly scanned by Christian teachers and their flock. For one thing, we can never expect to see a just apprehension even of the New Testament writings, where this is the case. One consequence of the familiarity of the apostles with their own Scriptures is, that Christian ideas are continually presented in forms so directly borrowed from the Old Testament, that it is impossible to attach to them their just significance, without a correct and extensive acquaintance with the sources from which they are drawn. Even the very phraseology of the apostles is tinged deep with hues derived from the ancient Scriptures, and is sure to be misunderstood by any one who does not interpret it in the light of those Scriptures. Of this Mr. Litton gives some apt and convincing instances in the volume before us, and even Mr. Jowett speaks with no dubious voice to the same effect. Indeed, the remarks of the latter on the connection of the New Testament with the Old, are so just and so well expressed, that we feel constrained to quote them, happy that we can find something in his volume of which we may approve:

"The New Testament," says he, "is ever Old, and the Old is ever entwined with the New. Not only are the types of the Old Testament shadows of good things to come; not only are the narratives of events and lives of persons in Jewish history "written for our instruction;" not only is there a deep rooted identity of the Old and New Testament in the revelation of one God of perfect justice and truth; not only is the law fulfilled in Christ to all them that believe; not only are the spiritual Israel the true people of God; a still nearer, though more superficial connection is formed by the volume of the Old Testament itself, which, like some closely fitting vesture, enfolds the New as well as the Old dispensation in its language and imagery, the words themselves,

as well as the thoughts contained in them, becoming instinct with a new life, and seeming to interpenetrate with the Gospel."*

These are just sentiments forcibly expressed, and we cordially adopt Mr. Jowett's words, as indicating the absolute necessity of a careful study of the Old Testament by all who would understand either the peculiar phraseology, or forms of thought of the New. There can be no doubt that from the moment theologians begin to discard the Jewish Scriptures, and build up a system of theology solely from the New Testament, they enter upon a course which can result only in a sadly defective digest of the truth taught by Christ and His apostles, if not a positive misconception and misrepresentation of it.

And for those who are not theologians, how precious is the Old Testament as a book of devotion and experimental piety! Where shall we find such noble examples of faith which no difficulties could overcome, of a hope which no disaster could quench, no delays enfeeble, of a delight in God and God's service, which cast all other joys into the shade, and of a serene, abiding religiousness, which looked at all things on their God-ward side, and kept the mind that was stayed on God in perfect peace amid all the tumults and griefs and shadows of time? Not even in the New Testament itself are such depths of religious experience laid open, such illustrations of the laws and phenomena of the spiritual life afforded, as in those records of the struggles and the deliverances, the vicissitudes and the victories of the saints of the former age. It makes one's heart strong to study them. It breaks up the Sybarite effeminacy, the small virtuosity, which in seasons of tranquility are apt to invest our religious being, and stirs us up to quit us like men in the never-ceasing spiritual warfare, to read how these men of the old time, amid the twilight of their dispensation, strengthened each other and themselves in the Lord, and fought their way through to "the city which hath foundations," where they now rest and reign. Most certain is it that in all times of peculiar danger or darkness, it is to these ancient Scriptures that the Church instinctively turns for consolation and for vigor. Most certain is it that all men of strong and deep minds, find a peculiar pleasure in the perusal of these writings, and acknowledge in them something to which their own souls

* *Epistles of St. Paul*, &c., vol. i, p. 353.

cling with a vivid sympathy. Most certain it is, that of those who have borne or achieved great things for the cause of God, the greater part were wont to feed their spiritual energies at the banquet which these provided. Paul and Augustine, Luther and Knox, Cromwell and Milton, the Puritans and the Covenanters, all of them were men whose deepest inspirations were drawn from those old Hebrew oracles. It is not safe to neglect such experiences. If we do, we may soon find ourselves delivered over to the pestering tyranny of little men,—men narrow in their views, loose in their logic, captious in their criticism, shallow in their experience, and heterodox in their theology,—whilst nothing shall be left to us but to mourn over the days that are gone, and say, "Our silver has become dross; our wine is mixed with water."

XV.—THE ULTRAMONTANE REACTION IN FRANCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.*

Ultramontanism,—a barbarous word which we use for brevity, but which is, alas, too often heard among us,—is not an illusion, or an invention; it is a real, organized and tremendous power, which reaches all Europe, and is the indefatigable champion of the past, and the most active enemy of advancing civilization. Weakened, sometimes, through the agency of revolutions, it is never wounded or enfeebled in its vital principle. How is it that it rises again and again with new vigor, in the midst of a state of things to which it is apparently most opposite? And strangest of all, it is a marvellous and alarming spectacle!—that this should occur in France! for the French are a nation vain and haughty, impetuous and indolent, enthusiastic and skeptical. A miniature of Europe, bordering on Italy and Spain in the south, on Germany, Switzerland and England on the north, and partaking of the nature of them all, it has gathered from three centuries of mental warfare, of which it has been the arena, the opposite political, religious and moral doctrines which have struggled together for supremacy. Hence the history of France has progressed by *leaps;* and the world has agreed to call the French inconsistent. But in truth they are not so. On the contrary, there prevails among them a logical, geometrical, positive spirit, which inserts in their minds principles without qualifications; which ignores those modifications which are supplied by experience; which deals with moral matters as vigorously as with mathematical; and through excess of logic, passes beyond the real, and falls into the impossible. Every period of the history of France shows the victory of some doctrine gained by this impulse,—a victory which has been as brief as it was splendid.

But, confining myself to the religious history of France, I

* Translated from L'Esaminatore, *periodico mensile inteso a promovere la concordia fra la religione e la Stato,* Firenze, July, 1864, by Rev. C. M. Butler, D. D., Professor in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church, Philadelphia.

remark that, although it has never been distinguished for mysticism, or fervent piety, it yet, for a long period, was inclined to rigid orthodoxy. During the Middle Ages it put its sword at the service of the Church. The French nobility were the right arm of the Crusaders. Not so fanatical as the Spaniards, the French were equally warlike and devout. In the sixteenth century, France was the battle-field upon which Catholicism and the Reformation fought with the most inflamed animosity. The seventeenth century witnessed at the same time the triumph of the Catholic monarchy, and the preaching of Jansenism. But upon the opening of the following century the wind changed. Excessive subjection had given rise to the general craving for emancipation; and no sooner had the death of the great king opened the door to a little liberty, than France hastened to abandon herself to philosophy and unbelief. A materialistic rationalism gained complete ascendency over the national mind, and the most enlightened of the French nobility adored Voltaire, and applauded his assaults upon religion and the monarchy. Faith in the old regime being lost, the revolution proved irresistible. In a few months the Constituent Assembly overthrew all the civil and religious institutions of old France; and the Convention, advancing on the same radical career, inaugurated the worship of the Supreme Being and of reason. The nobility and the clergy seemed to be destroyed, their principles stifled and extinguished in blood, and France driven forward henceforth hopelessly upon the path of revolution.

But it was not so. Scarcely had Napoleon introduced somewhat of order into society, when there arose a religious and civil reaction which, from that period, has been constantly increasing and extending. This reaction was, in a certain sense, legitimate. The gross materialism of the eighteenth century had undertaken to strike out of the human soul its noblest principles. Terror had substituted only saturnalia for the venerable pomps of the ancient worship; and although proscription and confiscations had overthrown the material edifice of the Church, they had not been able to eradicate the ancient faith from many sensitive consciences profoundly afflicted with these iniquitous proceedings. In these circumstances the magnificent imagination of Chateaubriand easily succeeded in investing the rights of Catholicism with a poetic glow, and in re-animating the older, chivalric and monar-

chical memories of France. That which the great poet accomplished through literature, the clergy undertook to effect through the pulpit and the confessional. Purified by misfortune, they were improved in morals and in manners.

During the empire, the progress made by Catholic reaction was unobtrusive, but substantial. The Imperial government tolerated the Church as a necessary institution, rather than favored it. In reality, it despised the Church; and the Church, in turn, secretly hated the government, and prayed for the return of the ancient dynasty. Preserved from the temptation of political ambition, the clergy were able to devote themselves wholly to religious instruction, and thus became more respectable in the eyes of the people. The activity of the religious order seconded the labors of the secular clergy. Under the name of "the Fathers of the Faith," the Jesuits re-appeared, and insinuated themselves into every city of the provinces, and founded houses of education. The spirit of association made great progress among the clergy and the classes that suffered most from the revolution. French women, impassioned enemies of liberty, made a great display of religious zeal, and offered themselves in crowds to serve the clerical cause. To profit by these good dispositions, the Jesuits founded "the congregation of the Sacred Heart," in order to direct, according to their usual policy, the education of children of the higher ranks. This institution, a marvel of ingenuity, was the origin of all the victories of Catholic reaction in France.

France is that country of Europe in which women have always exercised the greatest influence upon the character and progress of society. The French woman is without an equal in activity, in courtesy, in a spirit of insinuation, in the knowledge of affairs, and in the art of ruling. Her spirit is as positive as that of men, her will more firm, and her personality more defined. Her keen love of worldly things does not destroy her strong religious cravings. Her piety, like her heart, has little of mere sentiment; and she knows how to find in devotion itself, an instrument of sway. The men, notwithstanding that the revolution had rendered them indifferent to religious questions, and grossly impious, yet loved to see the other sex devout; but they did not occupy themselves with a consideration of the nature of the social tendencies of this devotion; their eyes, unaccustomed to discrimination, confounded Jesuit fanaticism with enlightened piety.

At the Restoration, Catholic reaction, which had silently increased under the Empire, came forth as with a sudden and violent explosion. The support of the Court led the clergy into a mistake; they thought that the fine days of the seventeenth century had returned; and they employed religion as an instrument of compression. Under this regime, religion became mixed with politics, and the unbeliever was forced to assume the mask of piety. This mixture produced two results; it hastened the fall of the Bourbons, and it stimulated the revival of revolutionary ideas.

If there ever was a moderate revolution, and one which seemed fitted to found liberty in France, it was surely the revolution of July. No crime stained its inauguration; the men who directed it thought only of finding a just compromise with which to satisfy the nation, and to found a regime of regulated liberty, and of reciprocal toleration between philosophy and religion, between the Church and State. Eclecticism reigned in the Government, but in other quarters extreme passions were not disavowed.

The Republican party declared that it had been deceived, and resorted to propagandism and conspiracy. An immoral and audacious literature discussed, with guilty levity, the most difficult problems, and shook the principles upon which society, ever since its origin, has reposed. On the other hand, the Catholic party, excluded from all participation in power, concentrated its energies; having renounced public agitation, it labored secretly to excavate mines and covert precipices.

The "Society of the Sacred Heart" was greatly extended. It educated in its schools the first young girls of France, and imposed its rules upon all religious and secular establishments for female education. Under the influence of the Jesuits and the Bishops, a didactic literature was issued, which, unobserved and despised by learned men, was yet extremely fruitful, and marked by the narrowest fanaticism. Through the influence of schools, of lay associations, and of confessors, it penetrated all homes, and perverted the minds of women of every class. Modern history, literature, morality, the most splendid results of science, were travestied and disfigured with incredible disingenuousness. The fanaticism of this literature was directed especially against reform, and from that point extended to all modern questions. According to the Canon Gaume, the leading author in this department,

who is copied in all the catechisms, Luther and Calvin were men of revolting immorality, the refuse of society, and the opprobrium of their age. Calvin, in his youth, had been wounded by the sword of a roysterer, and driven from his diocese, and died at last of an obscene disease. As for Luther, he was but a great bag of wind, a man of poor and dirty straw. "Like master, like pupil," was the motto of the clergy of the nineteenth century. "How," they asked, "could a reform, inaugurated by such men, be accomplished, except through the overthrow of Divine and human laws,—by a brutal materialism and communism? If the Church, and if enlightened governments, had not felt it to be their duty to persecute such wicked absurdities, they would have been grossly derelict in duty. The rigors of the inquisition, the massacres of St. Bartholomew, and *les dragonnades* of Louis XIV, were not misfortunes. The only misfortune is, that their labor of purification remained incomplete. If the inquisition had been able to eradicate the poisonous plant from the soil of France, she would have remained docile and tranquil under the sceptre of the sons of St. Louis; the revolution would not have taken place, and modern society would have been preserved from the frightful laceration of a thousand conflicting sects. In short, all evil comes from liberty of conscience."

When these fanatical lucubrations came to be known by cultivated men, they smiled upon them with disdain, and turned elsewhere their regards. They said that it was not for them to be occupied with these absurdities; public opinion would do them justice. The French Academy, the philosophers, the eclectic writers, had an undoubting conviction that their supremacy was assured. Moreover, they believed that France was preëminently the country of liberty, the center of civilization, and that if its institutions were in any peril, it was from the excesses of the revolutionary school, and that the party of reaction would always remain impotent. Without doubt, the free press published many useful and ingenious ideas, and the intelligent circle which embraced them, obtained a splendid culture; but the catechisms, the obscure manuals, the legendary stories, the Jesuit romances, diffused by the million in the libraries of families, read by all the children, under the eyes of their mothers, and commented upon by their spiritual directors, exerted a much more profound and extensive influence. Underneath France, liberal and revolu-

tionary, there was insensibly formed a France reactionary and bigoted, and this by means of a silent and secret labor, continued by women, and by religious associations, throughout the entire kingdom. There was not a house in the provinces to which the little Jesuit books did not penetrate, whose devout narratives were strangely mixed in the minds of the young, with the warm and licentious picture of George Sand and Eugene Sue.

Thus was formed that strange compound of fanaticism and frivolity, of moral levity and religious dogmatism, of devotion to worldly things and of clerical zeal, which constitutes the character of almost all the French of our day. Hatred of liberty and of modern society, profound reverence for the superstitions of another era, the abandonment of the traditions of the seventeenth century for the narrow fanaticism and the odious bigotry of Veuilot, the worship of the sacred heart substituted for that of the Creator of the universe, pilgrimages and genuflections to an image of the Virgin, instead of prayer from the heart:—such were the characteristics of that piety of our days which the Jesuits have succeeded in reconciling to the tastes of a community which had been revolted by the material devotion, the downright fetichism of Spain and Naples. *Not only all liberal ideas, but also all that which France has hitherto regarded as most estimable, has disappeared before this swelling flood of superstition. In the eyes of the devotees of our day, Pascal and Arnauld are no better than heretics, the doctrines of the Port Royalists are horrible, and Bossuet himself lies under suspicion.*

During the reign of Louis Phillipe no one suspected this rapid progress of ultramontanism. Michelet, in a notable book,—"The priest, the woman and the family,"—dared to announce it, and deplored that moral divorcement which destroyed the intellectual communion of the married, and left to the husband only the body of his wife, while her soul was in possession of the man of the dark ages, the enemy of modern society; but Michelet was bitterly criticised for a revelation which disturbed the complacent quietism of liberal France. It was not long that Jesuitism exercised its power only at the hearth of the family; it possessed one institution which was well calculated to excite apprehension. The company of Jesus had not ceased to propagate, and to plant everywhere its affiliated order of Lazzarists, Maryists, &c.; it ruled over a large class of well instructed subalterns,

and directed the immense legions of the *Ignorantilli;* it pressed upon the secular clergy and carried its creatures into Episcopal chairs. Under its influence religion resumed its servile adoration of the Roman Pontiff, and abandoned all the Gallican traditions. The results obtained by the Jesuit fathers among the women were marvellous. The sisters of charity and of St. Joseph, and a great number of new organizations, germinated and flourished in France, and drew into relations with them the whole of the female population. The great families of France were at the head of this propagandism, and their daughters, descendants of the brilliant duchesses and marquises of easy and elegant morals and manners of the court of Louis XV, transformed into sisters of St. Vincent de Paul, and into ladies of the sacred heart, directed the army of superstition and extended their intrigues to all classes of French society. Nor was the material prosperity of the church less. The religious orders accumulated by clandestine means great riches, and pious institutions were multiplied on every hand. At the ports of Lyons and Marseilles there are more convents than there were in the eighteenth century.

Towards the year 1840 their propagandism directed itself with more earnestness to women, and at the same time it began special efforts among men; and the establishment of the society of St. Vincent de Paul, and the conversion of some notable men attested its increased activity. It was under these auspices that the revolution of February broke out.

A deplorable event was this revolution. A single blow struck by a bold minority, suddenly, through the influence of fear and the peculiar circumstances of the population of Paris, precipitated France into a form of government repugnant equally to its traditions, its genius, and its manners. France accepted it with reluctance, and scarcely four months had passed when, provoked by the folly of the Socialists, a powerful reaction was manifested in the provinces, and acted in turn upon the central power. Napoleon was carried into the Presidency, and republican institutions were employed as instruments of repression, until the moment in which the President saw himself sufficiently strong to give to the government a form almost absolute.

At the fall of the house of Orleans the clergy exhibited delirious joy. They blessed the trees of liberty and applauded the proclamation of the Republic. Their joy—did it arise from a

blind and most unjust hatred against the house of Orleans, or from the hopes of approaching triumph? It is not easy to decide this question; but it is certain that the clergy do not yield to sudden gusts of passion. The revolution of February was turned to their advantage. M. de Falloux became heir to the influence of Ledru Rollin and of Lamartine. The labor secretly carried on from the first empire was about to yield its fruits; the conspiracy was ripe; every family contained some instrument of the Jesuits; the fright occasioned by the spectre of socialism came to their aid; French society, skeptical to the core, renounced all its liberal traditions and threw itself into the arms of the Jesuits. Without, the reaction coöperated with Austria to establish the temporal power of the Pope, and to stifle the Italian revolution. Within, it undertook a similar work, and accomplished it all the more readily because the men of property everywhere surpassed its hopes, and supported it with ardor.

Taking advantage of the liberty granted them for secondary instruction, the Jesuits were soon seen to have opened a great number of colleges; the company was not numerous enough to meet all the demands for them in the cities of France; and at the same time the ministry of public instruction, taking its departure from a theory of repression, systematically lowered the level of the university studies, and mutilated the philosophical course. Clerical journalism which received a new impulse, the restrictions imposed upon the press and upon liberal literature, the dispersion and discouragement of the opposition, left the field free to Jesuitism and the counter revolution.

During the first year of the Empire this reaction was possessed particularly with the fear of communism; it favored the clergy in order to consolidate the family and property; it abandoned the literary cliques and voted for its candidates under the pressure of a high conservative conviction. Faith was at that time rare, and but few *men* of the middle class frequented the churches, except to celebrate, and to make confession, upon the festival of Easter. But from that period, through the agency of home missions, through the work of women, through the influence of example, and, in short, through interest, the number of those who communicated increased every year, and a part of the young *bourgeoisie*, and all of the young nobility, were seen to profess great zeal for the clergy, and for the most fanatical maxims of the *Univers*. Vanity and interest came to the aid of propagandism. The

ridicule which Voltaire had visited upon devotees was resented and retorted by the women; and whoever wishes now to succeed with the fair, to marry an heiress, and to pass for an elegant man, must show himself, externally at least, devout. Outside of Paris and of every great center, the pressure of the Jesuit party has been sufficiently strong to threaten the position and the fortune of liberal thinkers. The doctor, the advocate, the shopkeeper, if he wishes to secure patronage, must put his children in the Jesuit schools, and inscribe himself for the conferences of the society of Vincent de Paul. In the smaller cities, French society has returned to the customs of the seventeenth century. One must frequent the churches, and walk in procession in the streets, in order to succeed in life. There is no bankrupt so shameless but that he can reëstablish his credit, by surrendering himself to the Jesuits. At Marseilles and Lyons and the principal cities of the south, the good fathers dispose of the richest heiresses and heirs, and thus give good rewards to those who are zealous for the priesthood.

It is probable that the "Company of Jesus" has never enjoyed so great prosperity as at the present time. More than a third part (2200) of a society which embraces the world in its operations, is occupied with the efforts to revive religion in France. Owing to their activity for the last ten years, their maxims prevail more and more in all seminaries of learning, the number of the secular priests is almost redoubled, there is not a rural parish which has not one or more of its acolytes, everywhere churches and oratories are constructed, and everywhere the education of infants and the distribution of Christian alms is intrusted to the monastic orders. Never were there reports of so many miracles; never were there so many demands for new canonizations, so many relics and pilgrimages! *Formerly the cross was the chosen emblem of the Church of France, but now the Madonna is everywhere substituted in her place, and the cities hasten to place themselves with eager rivalry, under her protection.* The clergy, a short time ago, upon *Puy de Dome*, the central point of France, erected a colossal statue of the virgin, as protectress of the whole empire.

If the Jesuits and the clergy form the staff of the army of faith, the society of St. Vincent de Paul, and the associations of women, constitute the *valets* and the soldiers. By what means a beneficent society, founded for the purpose of distributing bread

and clothing to the poor, has been able to become the first power in the State,—that which distributes magistracies and orders,—is a thing which can be explained only by the Jesuits. Formerly the company reigned by means of the intrigues of courts; to-day, its genius, fertile in expedients, has known how to find immense power in pious associations. By the side of the subtle and tenacious nets in which it knows how to involve whole provinces, and the means of corruption and intimidation which it possesses, the revolutionary affiliations of which we have heard so much, are but childish devices. In some departments, from the Prefect to the *Maire* of the most distant commune, all the political functionaries belong to the society, and the municipal counsellors,—those of the council and of the prefecture—are affiliated; and thus local employments and favors are granted to the creatures of the society; and unless Paris and some of the great cities, and a part of the central administration, had resisted this current, the entire government would soon have been in the hands of this celebrated society.

Then would have been realized that ideal of which the *Civilta Cattolica* and the *Monde* dream. The new regime would modify the civil code, would abolish the concordat and the University, would stifle the press, and suppress the liberty of worship, would institute the Catholic religion as the religion of the state, and make its law the law of the state. Without, France would enter into a league with Austria, would destroy the kingdom of Italy, would undertake to crush England; and everywhere the immortal bravery of the descendants of Marengo and of Austerlitz, would be perpetually employed in combating liberal institutions, and of imposing upon Europe a reign of death!

But is France inevitably given over to ultramontanism? Will these swelling waves, whose advance we witness, submerge the entire territory? Will the sons of Loyola rule in the land of Montesquieu and Voltaire? These monastic institutions, whose ramifications we see extending so far, and whose subterranean intrigues are so multiplied—these clandestine affiliations which penetrate into all families—these youthful generations educated by the Jesuits in the hatred of modern society—will they have power to stifle liberty? Will France return to the Inquisition? At this question the heart of every man of liberal sentiments throbs with indignation, and every one repeats to himself the assurance that the day of recompense is near in which the revolu-

tion shall resume its omnipotent career, and rend like cobwebs these dark and subtle machinations.

In fact while the wealthy classes abandon themselves blindly to ultramontanism, we see unhappily from year to year, the great mass of the people divest themselves more and more of all religion. The pretended sanctity of all these egotists and court libertines offends the good sense of the people; they become disgusted with a piety of genuflections and of politic calculations, and their distaste extends not only to hypocrisy, but to religion itself. The common people of France who are thoughtful, no longer see in Catholicism anything more than an engine of domination for the use of the rich, the safeguard of a privileged and unjust society, a moral despotism which debases the laboring classes, and abandons them to the rapacity of capitalists. The spirit of democracy and of irreligion is compacted into a frightful unity, and prepares for France a new and terrible revolutionary explosion. The democracy, deceived in 1848 by the feigned demonstration of the clergy, burns to revenge itself, sees in dogmas only the dreams of superstitious dotage, and in the priest an enemy upon whom he will, upon the first favorable opportunity make terrible reprisals. But along with these passions and this violence, there are also considerations which excite their apprehension. A hard experience has taught them that force is impotent against moral facts, and that old superstitions are in vain cast aside, unless there is substituted for them a more elevated doctrine which purifies and elevates man—which strengthens him and makes him a more virtuous father of a family and a more loyal citizen.

May this spectacle be useful to Italy and excite her vigilance! At this moment there reigns a calm in which the voice of truth can make itself heard, a moment favorable to religious reformation. Italy, endowed with free institutions, has her moral destinies in her own hands, and it becomes her not to fail in the noble mission which she has assumed. May the spectacle of the deplorable reactions which revolutionary violence and materialistic doctrines excited in France, be to us a solemn warning to seek only in legal measures, and in a just and energetic employment of moral means, the religious progress which is necessary in order to the completion and consolidation of our national regeneration.

XVI.—THE SENSATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.—MR. J. S. MILL AND DR. McCOSH.*

The friends of philosophy have reason to rejoice over the assault which Mr. Mill has made on the teaching of Sir William Hamilton. Even though the renowned Scottish philosopher no longer lives to wield his mighty weapon, there cannot fail to be some gain to philosophical thinking in this country, when the leader of the opposite school of mental science comes forth to assail the doctrines which are so closely connected with the name of the Scotch thinker. Had Hamilton lived to repel the assault, the interest excited in the public mind would have been keener than it is, and the results might have been more full in measure, and more clearly visible to all observers. But that there must, even in present circumstances, be decided gain to mental science, few will doubt.

The nation is once more passing through a struggle between the sensational and intuitional philosophy. The effects must be felt in all departments of mental sciences, whether psychological or metaphysical, whether intellectual or ethical. Since the conflict was last waged, all the appliances needed in such struggles have been greatly improved in efficiency. Philosophical language is more exact; the resources, on both sides, may be said to be more available; and, in general, we have the advantage of all the experience gathered from the previous discussions. On whichever side students of philosophy range themselves, all will be disposed to say that this conflict must land us considerably in advance of the issue attained when Locke and Hume were on the one side, and Reid and Stewart on the other. Beginning on a lower level than Locke's "Experience and Reflection"—laying aside, as questionable, his starting point, that "every man is conscious to himself that he thinks,"—it is affirmed, by Mr. Mill and others, that a complete intellectual and ethical philosophy can be

* From the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, April, 1866.

regarded on the foundation afforded by sensations alone. On the other hand, it is maintained that the conscious mind, in gathering experience, is guided by necessary truths revealed within itself, and that, without regard to these truths, it is impossible to attain a sound philosophy, either intellectual or ethical. On these opposite positions, two schools of philosophy have taken up their place; and, the question is: Which philosophy will prove itself most competent to meet the demands of human thought and life? Has the experimental philosophy, as sustained by Mr. John Stuart Mill, gained anything by taking sensations as the sole starting point in philosophical inquiry? Will the philosophy of necessary and fundamental truth triumph anew over the experimental philosophy as presented in this barely sensational form?

Looking on, at the present stage, men will think differently as to the probable result. Opinions will, no doubt, be influenced in some measure according to the side which is taken by those who venture to express their anticipations. It must be admitted, we think, that there is great disadvantage to the intuitional side, in the fact that their leading champion has fallen. Sir Wm. Hamilton, when assailed, cannot come forth to his own defence, and the defence of the cause he so ably served. Besides this, we fear it must be acknowledged, that before his death he had taken some questionable positions, the occupation of which has in some measure exposed the entire situation. Still further, there are signs which seem to favor the probability of a temporary ascendency of the sensational philosophy. Chief among these are the influences upon thought, which have sprung up from the rapid advance of the physical sciences. Within the area of these sciences, the experimental method reigns, and has already conducted to magnificent results, over which the world is rejoicing. Greater things still are warrantably expected, and it is admitted that the experiments of a few years may overturn the theories which have reigned for centuries. Mental science cannot hope to escape from the influence which is certain to spread into all regions of thought, because of the splendid advance of the physical sciences. Nor should she desire an escape, if such were possible; for the influence must be in the main a healthy one, and can prove injurious only if the essential difference between the mental and physical sciences be overlooked. In mental science there is a wide region for the application of the inductive method, and great results are

yet to be accomplished by it, both in the intellectual and the ethical departments. Valuable it will be in the history of mental philosophy, if those who have devoted themselves to her service have the conviction borne in upon them with commanding force, that a correct and complete psychology is the first requisite for a sound intellectual and moral philosophy. From such psychology all speculation must take its start; and to that psychology speculation must return for the test of its own legitimacy. But the region of speculation, with all its darkness and uncertainty, with its lofty problems concerning human life and destiny, and its vast range of possibilities, is the grandest open to the approach of man. It is the crowning excellence of mental philosophy that this region belongs to its domain. Of first importance it is that this region of speculation have its own company of explorers, unless men, by growing acquaintance with the temporary relations of their life, are to become oblivious of those which are more enduring.

Mental science, we believe, may gain a fresh impulse from the progress of the physical sciences; and these in their turn be made more abundantly a blessing by the progress and widening influence of mental science. But if, because new discoveries are continually overthrowing or modifying old theories in physical science, there appear any tendency in mental philosophy to admit that truth may change, and that moral distinctions may be variable, philosophy itself will speedily be in danger. Such a philosophy may have the promise of considerable popularity,—it may seem to harmonize with experience,—but the harmony is only in appearance, the deception is sure of discovery, and the false philosophy must give place to what is better fitted to meet the wants of men. That important results may yet be expected in mental philosophy, from a persevering analysis of consciousness, may be freely admitted. But, in order to secure progress, and effectually guard ourselves against mere oscillation between opposite extremes, we must anxiously inquire of every philosophy which offers itself to our notice, how it deals with admitted facts. By this test we would wish to see the intuitional and the sensational philosophy alike tried. For a little while it may seem that the latter most harmonizes with the spirit of the age; but, when fully tested, it must appear the least satisfactory philosophy which can be offered to men.

If some popular currents of opinion seem at present to favor a sensational philosophy, it must also be admitted that this philosophy ranks among its supporters men of very high ability. We have only to name Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. Herbert Spencer, in order to indicate the respect and admiration which must be cherished for those who are the avowed defenders of sensationalism. And while we say thus much of the writers, we must also add that they have been at work with no little success in seeking the acknowledgment of their principles among thoughtful men. Had things gone quietly on, as they have done for some years past, it might have been calculated that their influence would be in the ascendant ere long, especially throughout England. We doubt whether the success of a sensational philosophy could ever be so great in Scotland. The intuitional philosophy is too deeply rooted in the North,—it has become too manifestly a national faith to be very easily supplanted by another. The names of Reid, and Stuart, and Hamilton are yet revered to a degree which gives little hope of equal eminence for the names of Mill and Spencer. Still more distant is the possibility of these two last mentioned names rising to a place of acknowledged superiority to the three which have been now long enrolled among the masters in mental science. It is not that deference to authority is greater in the North than elsewhere; it is not that there is any disposition to favor a doctrine of finality in mental science; but that the intuitional philosophy has stood the test of long continued investigation and speculation, and offers a solid foundation for the structure which is yet to be reared.

There can be no doubt, however, that the preponderance of philosophical writing in our country, for a considerable time past, has been on the sensational side. And, but for a few counterchecks of a rather serious order, it seemed not unreasonable to expect that the sensational philosophy might be allowed slowly and quietly to gain possession of the field for a time, and treat the intuitional philosophy as if it were a thing of the past. It was not favorable to this result, however, when Mr. John S. Mill came forth to assault the teaching of Sir Wm. Hamilton, and thus challenge to the defence all who were admirers of the Edinburgh philosopher, or believers in an intuitional philosophy. Opposed as we are to the philosophy of Mr. Mill, we hail his exam-

ination of Hamilton's philosophy as certain to gather the forces to the conflict. And now, we gladly welcome Dr. M'Cosh's examination of Mr. Mill's philosophy, as one part of the valuable fruits which Mr. Mill's efforts are certain to yield.

It is not always the good fortune of a man to help his own side when he means to do it. And we hardly care to disguise our conviction, that if any one thing more than another promises to turn the tide of battle against the sensational philosophy it is this work of Mr. Mill. He who has criticised Hamilton's teaching must have his own examined in turn. This work of counter-examination has begun, and is proceeding in a way which, to say the least, does not augur an easy victory for sensationalism. Dr. M'Cosh's new volume is a very able and thorough examination, not only of Mr. Mill's book on the Hamiltonian philosophy, but of his teaching as a whole.

Conflict is one of the appointed methods of progress in philosophy. We are not long left in peaceful unconsciousness of the fact. And it is not without some feeling of regret that we come upon fresh illustrations of it. Sympathizing as we do with all the praises of "philosophic calmness," we could wish that philosophical inquiries could always be prosecuted in such calmness; and, if felicity so great were possible, that the results of all inquiries were the same. Is there some weakness in the wish? However this may be, the wish cannot be gratified; and what we have mainly to seek is *fairness* in the scrutiny of all experiments and reasonings, hoping that all inquiries may be helpful in leading toward results ultimately to be accepted with some degree of confidence, if not with unanimity.

Not unfrequently has the remark been made, that it has been to the disadvantage of Sir William Hamilton's renown as a philosopher, that his system, as a whole, has been given to the world in the shape of the lectures delivered to his class. The exceeding clearness, power, and fascination of these lectures few will be disposed to deny. But, they are the author's earliest productions, (a fact which is too often overlooked by critics); they were prepared with a regard to the wants of the students listening to them year by year; they do not embrace a complete system; and they were published, though with all the care and skill possible in the circumstances, yet without his own revision. Those who are familiar with his "Discussions" and "Dissertations" may judge

from their compactness and profundity what would have been the character of the production had he submitted to the public a matured statement of his philosophy. We must, however, take the results of his thinking as they are presented to us. Professing, as we do, great admiration of his power, we are far from giving a uniform assent to the doctrines he has propounded. We admit that there are unfortunate gaps in his system of philosophy; and, besides, there are opinions holding a prominent place in his writings which we have strongly opposed. We have, long ago, in separate form, urged arguments in opposition to his doctrine of the unconditioned, in many respects identical with those which Mr. Mill has now advanced. In not a few things we agree with Mr. Mill in his criticism, but we are very far from believing that his examination is successful as a whole. We believe that the way lies open for a much more effectual vindication of Sir William Hamilton than appears to have been thought possible by the admirers of his critic when they arose fresh from their first hurried perusal of the "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy." A lively tale remains to be told of the misunderstandings of the critic, and pages of argumentation wide of the mark.

Our purpose in the present article is to look at the portions of Mr. Mills "Examination," in which he presents his own theory, which he is pleased to call the "psychological theory;" and afterwards to indicate to our readers, though it must be briefly, the character of Dr. M'Cosh's work which is at once an assault on Mr. Mill's position, and a defence of fundamental truth.

We have said that Mr. Mill takes the name of "The Psychological Theory," to designate his own doctrine. We cannot admit that the theory has any warrant for carrying such an honorable appellation. To our thinking, the theory is anything but a psychological one. What psychology there is in it, we reckon very defective. The argumentative process, which starts from the small stock of psychology, is the main part of it, and not very likely, in our view, to endure the test of a careful, fair scrutiny. So far from being a psychological theory, the method by which the theory is developed is quite the reverse of psychological. It really seems to us impossible to institute an examination of the book before us, without agreeing with Dr. M'Cosh when he says, that Mr. Mill's favorite method of procedure "is by deduction

from an hypothesis, which he endeavors to show explains all the phenomena." Such a method may be allowable in certain cases. But a conjectural start in any philosophical inquiry, is the least satisfactory which can be made. When a better is available, the spirit of philosophy requires that this be rejected altogether. What we ask for is thorough analysis, and careful synthesis, but not hypothesis. The true psychological method meets this just demand. It deals exclusively with the facts of consciousness,—seeks to interpret them,—and so far as it goes, leads to sure results. But Mr. Mill's method, being only in a very partial degree psychological, and in the main hypothetical, is constantly laying up results which are most uncertain. The only course by which we may hope to test these results, is to insist upon an exclusive application of the psychological method. What effect this would have in enabling the reader to estimate the fruits of Mr. Mill's thinking, we can hope only briefly to indicate.

One thing strikes us as strange when we come to that part of his work in which Mr. Mill unfolds his own theory, and that is, that he proceeds *first* to give us "the psychological theory of the relief in *an external world*," and *after that* proceeds to tell us "how far the psychological theory of the belief in matter *is applicable to mind*." If Mr. Mill's method of philosophising is questionable, this order of topics is not only curious, but troublesome. Why not give us first a theory of mind, and then, in due course, come to the debatable ground concerning the existence of an external world? Why not inquire first whether man is conscious of his own existence,—whether he is "conscious to himself that he thinks,"—and whether there are "natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men," as Locke has said;—afterwards advancing to the question concerning the existence of matter? Mr. Mill has preferred to take the opposite order. The result is a most unnecessary perplexity to the reader, who is anxious to give its true value to every statement as it comes. While the real question on hand is the existence of matter, and our belief in it, the reader cannot peruse the disquisition on the subject without finding himself committed at almost every step to certain positions concerning *mind*, which should have been first examined and settled. Still, every author is entitled to take the course which pleases himself, and we do not deny the right to Mr. Mill. Only, what he sees to have most advantages for himself, has cer-

tainly most disadvantages for his critics. To secure this result may be of some consequence in warfare, but should be of no account in philosophy, where all ought to search for truth by the clearest and most direct road. So strongly did we feel the disadvantage to sure progress of thought in the order laid down by Mr. Mill, that we had resolved to reverse it in prosecuting our criticism. This Dr. M'Cosh has done, and that obviously on good grounds. In reviewing Mr. Mill's philosophy, he treats first of "mind, personality, personal identity," etc., and afterwards of matter. This is, beyond doubt, the proper order. Waiving our preference, however, we shall follow Mr. Mill as he leads us over the ground, and only ask that nothing essential to the discussion be assumed, or left over till a subsequent stage of the investigation, without being marked as still needing proof.

Turning then, to the chapter which unfolds to us "the psychological theory of the belief in an external world," we find that the various elements of the theory may be grouped under the following heads. The theory postulates certain "psychological truths," which are numbers one and two in the following enumeration: (1) "That the human mind is capable of *expectation;*" (2) That there are the following "laws of the association of ideas;" (*a*) "Similar phenomena tend to be thought of together. (*b*) Phenomena which have either been experienced or conceived in close contiguity to one another, tend to be thought of together. (*c*) Associations produced by contiguity become more certain and rapid by repetition. (*d*) When an association has acquired this character of inseparability, things which we are unable to conceive apart, appear incapable of existing apart, and the belief we have in their co-existence, though really a product of experience, *seems intuitive.*" (3) "There are associations naturally, and even necessarily, generated by the order of our sensations, and of our reminicences of sensation." (4) "What we mean when we say that the *object* we *perceive* is external to us," is, "that there is *involved in our perceptions something* (*a*) which *exists* when we are not thinking of it; (*b*) which *existed* before we had ever thought of it, and (*c*) *would exist* if we were annihilated; and *further* (*d*) that *there exist things* which we never saw, touched, or otherwise perceived, and (*e*) things which never have been perceived by man." (5) "This *idea* of something, which is distinguished from our fleeting impressions by what

in Kantian language, is called perdurability, constitutes altogether our *idea* of external substance." (6) "Whoever can assign an *origin* to this *complex conception*, has *accounted for* what we mean by the belief in matter." (7) "Now this, according to the Psychological theory, is but the *form* impressed by the known laws of association upon the *conception or notion*, obtained by experience, of contingent sensations; by which are meant, *sensations* that are not in our present consciousness, and *perhaps never were in our consciousness at all*, but which, in virtue of the laws to which we have learned by experience that our sensations are subject, we *know* that we should have felt under given supposable circumstances, and, under these same circumstances, might still feel." (pp. 190–2.)

These seven positions, presented almost entirely in the words of the author, may be taken as a fair statement of his views concerning the existence of matter. We have numbered the different assertions, and have marked the various sub-divisions of the more complex sentences, that the work of reference may be simplified.

Will our readers go back on the foregoing statement, and say how much there is of the psychological method in it. Passing numbers one and two, which are offered only as postulates, or premises which are here assumed, and which, it is said, "are not contested by Sir William Hamilton and the other thinkers of the introspective school," we come upon the method by which Mr. Mill means to explain our belief in an external object. Here there is no offer of successive psychological experiments,—there is not anything which can be called analysis of consciousness,—there is only a very wonderful statement of "*what we mean*" when we say that the object we perceive is external to us. No good can come out of such a twisted, round-about method of prosecuting psychology; or if, fortunately, some good do come of it, the result must be better than we have a right to expect.

Before approaching closer to the statement of "what we mean" by an object of perception being external to us, we must mark *how many things are assumed*, in starting with this "psychological theory of the belief in an external world:" (1) that we have a mind; (2) that the mind has actual sensations; (3) that it is capable of expectation, and (4) that it is guided by the laws of the association of ideas." Now, all these, we admit, can

be made out, but it remains to be seen how they can be established if we take pure sensations as the only facts with which we begin to philosophize. It was, at the very least, a singular thing, to proceed to account for our belief in an external world, when the proof depended on these assumptions, and when all these must be made good sooner or later, in order to gain assent to the validity of the professed proof.

Let us now look at this statement of "*what we mean* when we say that the object we perceive is external to us, and not a part of our own thoughts." It would have been much more in keeping with the accredited method of philosophizing, had our author prosecuted an analysis of consciousness, with the view of ascertaining whether there are any facts which warrant us to affirm that we have a perception of objects external to ourselves. And if such mental facts had been discovered, it would have followed naturally as part of the psychologist's work, to discover and express the distinguishing marks of these perceptions, separating them from other mental facts. Rather than follow this course, however, Mr. Mill prefers to give us something like a very extended definition of what we mean, when we say that the object we perceive is external to us. Judging from the results, we wish that we had rather been in the hands of one of "the introspective school." This statement, or definition, involves no fewer than *five* distinct assertions, as will be seen by looking back on the subdivisions of the sentence. It is possible to obtain *very wide definitions* when we desire something definite, but we should think it hard to get anything wider than the answer which Mr. Mill has here given to his own, simple question, unless, indeed, a man wished to make game of his answer.

The question is put by our author in the following terms, "What is it that we mean when we say that the object we perceive is external to us?" This question then implies these *three things:* 1. there is an *object;* 2. we *perceive* the object; and 3. we "say" that the object perceived is external to us. Having noticed this threefold assertion, as involved in the question, we hope to be forgiven for our obtuseness, when we affirm that the question answers itself. "We mean" just what "we say," that the object of perception is external to the perceiving mind. But instead of admitting that his question answers itself, Mr. Mill has a very long answer to offer of quite a different nature.

There are five distinct assertions in the answer, and we undertake to show that not one of the five can be accepted as any part of an answer to the question put. That question is, "What is it we mean when we say that the object we perceive is external to us?" Mr. Mill answers, we mean, *first*, that there is "*something which exists when we are not thinking of it.*" This is an answer to a totally different question. It is an answer to the question, What do we mean when we say that we *believe* in the existence of an object though it is *not* perceived by us? But when we say that we *perceive* an object external to us, we do not mean to say that there "is something which exists *when we are not thinking of it;*" we mean to say that there is an object external to us, *when we perceive it.* Again Mr. Mill says, that when we say the object we perceive is external to us, we mean, *secondly*, that there is something "which *existed* before we had ever thought of it." When we say that the object *is external* to us, we mean to say that *it existed* before, or at least, that something existed *before!* There is all the difference here between the *present* and the *past*, and that is considerable, unless "sensations" and "perceptions" have no relation to time. Further, Mr. Mill says, when we affirm that the object we perceive is external to us, we mean, *thirdly*, that it "*would exist* if we were annihilated." The question concerns a *present* experience; this part of the answer refers to a *future* possibility, and is altogether wide of the mark. Again, Mr. Mill says, when we declare that the object we perceive is external, we mean *fourthly*, that "there exist things which we never saw, touched, or otherwise perceived." When we speak of an object which we perceive, we mean to speak of objects which we never perceived! Having been asked to confound the present both with the past and with the future, we are now *led away from* the object of perception, to roam among an indefinite number of objects which we have never perceived! This is still further off from an answer to the question put. Once more, Mr. Mill says, when we state that the object we perceive is external to us, we mean *fifthly*, that there exist "things which have never been perceived by man." When we speak of an object which we perceive, we mean to speak of objects which were never perceived by man! We must be excused for saying, that this is the most unmeaning form of speech which could well be employed, admirably fitted to occasion increased perplexity to inquiries already complicated

enough. We offer to our readers this passage from Mr. Mill's examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy, as one of the most astounding examples in philosophical literature of an author's answer to a question of his own framing. And this comes from a man of Mr. Mill's high ability, simply because of the neglect of the psychological method, and the attempt to frame theories without materials on hand, out of which to elaborate them. Let our readers turn to Dr. M'Cosh's chapter on "Body," and they will find much more to the purpose, concerning our knowledge of external objects, than in Mr. Mill's chapter now under review.

In connection with the foregoing criticism, it will be apparent to every one, that when we say that the object we perceive is external to us, we do not mean to speak of "what is involved in our perceptions" generally. And if we did mean to make this wide reference, we could not even then mean to speak of what was never involved in our perceptions, nor in the perceptions of our fellow men. It is no doubt true that we do *believe* that objects exist when we are not thinking of them, and did exist before we thought of them, and would exist though we were annihilated, and that there exist things which have not been seen either by us or by our fellow men. But we cannot be said to *perceive* such objects, nor can they in any sense be said to be "*involved in* our perceptions." We fear, however, that we must go to "the introspective school" of philosophy for an adequate account of this belief, since we hardly expect to obtain it from the "sensational school."

Before, however, we dismiss Mr. Mill's view of "what we mean when we say that the object we perceive is external to us," we wish to look back upon it just once more, for the purpose of considering the various terms in it, which designate mental operations, commonly regarded as distinct. Taking them as they stand, they are "perception," the troublesomely vague word "idea," "complex conception," "sensations." In what connection do these words stand to each other? Is there, or is there not, progression of thought in their use? And by what process is their relation to each other made out? These are the questions we should like to urge, though we fear our space will not allow us to offer anything approaching the full answer to them. It is said first that we *perceive* an object; then we are told, in a most unfortunate manner, as we have endeavored to show, what is "in-

volved in our perceptions;" next we are informed that we have an "*idea* of external substance;" forthwith the "idea" becomes a "complex conception;" and lastly, the "complex conception" is said to be a "*form* impressed upon the *conception* or *notion* of contingent sensations." Now, keeping before us the particular line upon which Mr. Mill is moving, in dealing with the existence of matter before mind, it must be observed what addition is here made to the points requiring to be established, in order that the present line of argument may be accepted. These are, (1) that a perception is an idea, or, throwing out the word "idea," that a perception is a complex conception; (2) that a complex conception is a "form" impressed upon a simple conception; and (3) that the mind has the power to "impress" this form upon a simple conception. Our author is preparing abundant work for himself in order to gain the assent of his readers, but we do not find that he overtakes thoroughly this self-appointed work, in the subsequent part of his treatise. The reckoning of what stands to be proved must, however, be carefully kept, in order to do him justice.

We have now only to deal with the last part of the quotation marked 7 in the summary view of the theory. To save our readers the annoyance of reference, we quote it again, and that all the more readily, as it needs to be looked at somewhat carefully. All this (above described as involved in our perceptions), according to the psychological theory, is but the *form impressed* by the known laws of association, upon the *conception or notion*, obtained by experience, of *contingent sensations*, by which are meant sensations that *are not* in our present consciousness, and *perhaps never were* in our consciousness at all, but which, in virtue of the laws to which we have learned by experience that our sensations are subject, we *know* that we should have felt under given supposable circumstances, and under these same circumstances might still feel. "Contingent sensations!" What are these? Mr. Mill replies, *first*, "sensations that are not in our present consciousness." But, if they are not in consciousness, *where* are these sensations? Rather, *how* can there be sensations which are not in consciousness? When we cease to be conscious of a sensation, the sensation ceases. There is nothing remaining to be called a sensation. There is no alternative, therefore, but to reject the first part of the answer, for sensations out of consciousness are novelties of an order rather startling to find a place

within the territory of mental science. Having nothing left in our possession from this explanation, we inquire again, what are "contingent sensations?" Can anything more be said for them? Mr. Mill replies, *secondly*, they are sensations that "perhaps never were in our consciousness at all." Sensations which never were in our consciousness! This is still more startling. Is this offered to us as part of a "psychological theory?" We had supposed that psychology was an analysis of states of consciousness with a view to distinguish clearly the several facts in consciousness, and so discover the powers of the mind. But here is psychology beyond consciousness! If contingent sensation "never were in our consciousness," contingent sensations are things which never existed; that is to say, there are no things to which the designation is applicable. And yet Mr. Mill insists that "we *know* that we should have felt (these sensations) under given supposable circumstances." Had Mr. Mill said that it is a conceivable thing, that the mind may yet experience sensations, never before experienced, that is to say, that the mind's capacity of sensation is larger than experience has yet disclosed, we could have understood his meaning and assented to it. This is a simple assertion concerning mental capacity, founded on what we do know. We may *believe* much regarding the powers of our mind, but to say that we *know* that in certain supposable circumstances we should feel certain sensations whose very nature *we do not know*, is to speak without meaning. It is to say that we know the unknown.

Mr. Mill must, therefore, introduce a new word, "believe," which is the name for a different exercise of the mind. And this accordingly we find him do in the very next sentence, and without the slightest warning to his readers—even without any apparent notice on his own part—that a new element has been introduced. The sentence presents us with an example by which we may test his theory, and we are glad to have such an advantage given. "I *see* a piece of white paper on a table. I go into another room, and though I have *ceased to see it*, I am *persuaded* that the paper is still there. I no longer have the sensations which it gave me; but I *believe*, that when I again place myself in the circumstances in which I had those sensations, that is, when I go again into the room, I shall again have them; and further, that there has been no intervening movement at which this would not have been the case." (p. 192). This example, it will be seen refers to sensations experienced, and to the possibility of their

recurrence in consciousness. Further, to avoid misunderstanding, we notice that when it is said that the person places himself in the circumstances in which he had the sensations, it is meant simply that he goes into the room again and not anything more. Now let us look at the example. These steps are involved in it; (1) "I see a piece a paper." (2) "I have ceased to see it." (3) On this account, "I no longer have the sensations" which I had; and (4) "I *believe* I shall again have the sensations," if I go into the room. All the steps are clear, save the last, which is the only one which can be of any service for Mr. Mill's purpose. We see a piece of paper, and have certain sensations while we see it. We cease to see it, and with the sight, the sensations cease. But is it true, when we go into another room, and leave the paper on the table, that we are *persuaded* that the paper is still there? Having once seen an object, do we thenceforth *believe* that it continues where we saw it, and that we shall find it when we go back? Such a persuasion or belief is *not involved in* our perception. In leaving a room, we *may not* have any such persuasion. There may be many things which lead to an *opposite conviction*, such as the fact of rapidly closing the door, or leaving the window wide open. This fourth element, which is a belief, must therefore be thrown out of account, as not essential to our act of perception, and if it be thrown out, Mr. Mill loses what he needs in order to make up his theory. Nay more, even if there be in any case such a persuasion as he describes, it is a *belief* that there is not any disturbing cause in operation, likely to affect the position of the perceived object, and such a belief must rest on grounds quite distinct from the act of perception, and not on the perception itself. The perception and persuasion are so distinct from each other, that even though the one follows the other, it cannot be shown that the second is a consequence of the first, and once more the example fails to serve the purpose it was designed to accomplish. Thus, accepting the example as given, we say, *first*, the belief is not essential to the perception; and *secondly*, when the belief exists, it is not even a consequence of it, far less a component part of it. Mr. Mill has failed to make good a single step towards the formation of a theory, and this "belief" here introduced must be added to the stock of facts to be accounted for at a subsequent stage of inquiry.

We wish that we could now step on a few paces into the next chapter, where our author treats of belief in the existence of

mind, but we must forbear. We have indicated the method which we would employ in dealing with the statements of our author, and we must wait for another opportunity of prosecuting our criticism. What we have brought under review will be sufficient to suggest towards what conclusion Mr. Mill is attempting to work. We wish greatly that we could have traced his efforts one by one until the grand result is proclaimed in this brief but wonderful sentence: "*Matter may be defined, a permanent possibility of sensation!*" (p. 198). Sensation,—a possibility of sensation,—a permanent possibility of sensation. This is matter! Where is this possibility? Does it belong to us who are distinct from the object, or to the object which is distinct from us? Is the possibility of sensation not characteristic of *mind?* Then this is not a definition of matter. But, is the possibility of sensation also characteristic of matter? Then matter is not distinct from mind. What confusion have we here! Philosophy has a poor history appointed for it in our land for some time to come, if such theorizing as this can pass under the honored name, and be upheld with personal satisfaction by a writer of such eminent ability as Mr. John Stuart Mill. We do not account the constructive part of this volume as altogether worthless, but we consider that its main worth, after supplying the intuitional school with abundant material for the exercise of logical acuteness, consists in showing how hopeless it is to expect to have a complete philosophy reared on a sensational basis.

We have not left ourselves space for more than a brief reference to the work of Dr. M'Cosh, which is recently published, and is a valuable contribution to the philosophical controversy now being waged. The battle must be one of psychology, rather than of speculation, and Dr. M'Cosh shows himself a skillful psychologist. We can assure our readers that they will find in the "Examination of Mr. Mill's Philosophy" a most thorough scrutiny of the teachings which the champion of sensationalism would place in the room of the teaching of Reid, and Stewart, and Hamilton. After a very candid view, sketched in true philosophical spirit of the position of Hamilton and Mill as philosophers, there is an admirable chapter on the method of investigation. Then comes another very interesting preliminary chapter, entitled, "Mr. Mill's Admissions." Any one who has read with care the writings of Mr. Mill must have been disturbed with the uneasy sense of an element of assumption flowing in, as

a quiet streamlet, on the main current of thought. Dr. M'Cosh has subjected the current at various stages of its course to fresh tests, and has given us the results. And here we have a large number of admissions which look exceedingly singular when we remember the source from which they have been drawn. It would afford matter for no ordinary curiosity, to those interested in philosophical investigation, to see by what means Mr. Mill would attempt to vindicate himself, or in what form he would offer explanations. Dr. M'Cosh here shows great acquaintance with the writings of Mr. Mill, and this volume is not to be considered as a mere review of one work, but a critical examination of Mr. Mill's philosophy as a whole, including his psychology, and logic, and moral philosophy.

What is the general result, our readers may judge from the following extract, which we specially introduce for the purpose of affording a glimpse of the range of consequences connected with Mr. Mill's philosophy, stretching beyond those which we have been able to bring under review:

"We now see the issues in which the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, as held by Mr. Mill, lands us. The geometrical demonstrations of Euclid, Apolonius, and Newton may hold good only within our experience, and 'a reasonable distance beyond!' The mathematics taught in Cambridge may differ in their fundamental principles from those taught in the corresponding university of the planet Jupiter: where two and two make five, where two straight lines may inclose a space, and where the three angles of a triangle are more than two right angles. Mr. Mill is exceedingly indignant at Dr. Mansel for maintaining that the divine morality is not to be measured by human morality, declaring that 'it is simply the most morally pernicious doctrine now current.' But I can discover no grounds on which the rebuker can stand, in pronouncing such a judgment on Dr. Mansel's application of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. Any one with half the acuteness of Dr. Mansel could show that if two and two make five, it is supposable that lying may be a virtue, and veracity a vice, in other worlds; and that God (if there be a God) may commend deceit in the constellation of the plough, even as he encourages doubtfulness in our world." (p. 35).

Dr. M'Cosh does not, in this passage, too strongly color the ultimate results of such a system of philosophy as that pro-

pounded by Mr. J. S. Mill. Beginning with sensations alone, and making these the only guarantee of certainty, it is impossible to go far in a legitimate course of philosophizing. Attempts to step beyond what is warranted by the sensations with which we start, will lead to the utmost confusion of thought; the unauthorized use of natural beliefs will tend to throw discredit on them all; while, at the same time, the claims of exclusive philosophical authority for sensations will end in dishonor to philosophy itself. Most important service we reckon it to the cause of philosophy at the present time, to subject to searching scrutiny the teachings of the sincere admirers and singularly able upholders of sensationalism. Dr. M'Cosh has done his part well, though at times we have thought that it might have been with more destructive effect. A most ungracious task it is which falls to the hands of a philosopher, when he is called to assail the theories of another, but ofttimes a most necessary work. And, for the most part, such a task, if done in philosophic earnestness and fairness, yields important results to the good of all interested in the issue; for we have no faith in the superficial view of the history of philosophy which represents it as the record of uniform action and reaction between the same extremes of thought. Neither in mental science, nor in physical, is human thought in vain; in neither is the conflict of opinion to be regarded as disturbance, and nothing more. Mr. Mill has assailed the theories of Hamilton; and Dr. M'Cosh, without directly attempting the defence of Hamilton, has, with still greater success, as we think, assailed the theories of Mr. Mill. We are under a debt of gratitude to both. Philosophy is, beyond doubt, a gainer. According to our thinking, the intuitional philosophy, even with serious odds against it, is more secure of its sway than at any previous period. We are satisfied that this age will repudiate a philosophy which tells us that "matter is a permanent *possibility* of sensations;" that "mind is a nothing but the *series* of our sensations;"—"a series of feelings, with a background of possibilities of feeling;" that truth may vary as sensations change; and that morality must be content to seek its authority among the variable feelings, claiming no more to be accounted eternal and immutable. This professed philosophy is doomed to lose what little credit it has, because it is based on a psychology so insufficient that but a few experiments are enough to expose its philosophic narrowness.

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE.

The *London Quarterly Review*, (Methodist) in a notice of Wilson's *Prehistoric Man*, makes the following statement: "It may not be uninteresting to him to be acquainted with two facts connected with certain passages of his work, and with the data upon which some of his conclusions are founded. The first has reference to the human *crania* collected by Dr. Morton in Egypt, and now, we presume, forming part of the great Philadelphia collection. We know, on unquestionable authority, that Dr. Morton was practiced upon by the persons who assisted him in the collecting of these *crania*, and the skulls were palmed upon him as ancient Egyptian, which were worn by men of much younger date, and of other than Egyptian stock. The second fact belongs to the famous Horner borings in the Nile mud, of which Dr. Wilson speaks with quite as much respect as they are worth. On the same authority which enables us to make our first statement we further know that (in the neighborhood of Damietta, we believe), the late Sir Robert Stephenson found in the Delta, at a greater depth than was ever reached by Mr. Horner's deepest diggings, a brick bearing upon it the stamp of *Mohammed Ali!*"

—At least a dozen volumes upon "The First Man's Place in Nature," most of them by eminent writers, are advertised in the latest English papers.

—A translation of Schenkel's work on the Character of Jesus, which excited serious dissatisfaction among the author's former friends in Germany, is soon to appear in this country.

—Dr. Pressense, in a late number of the *Bulletin Theologique*, characterizes the anonymous work, recently issued in England, entitled *Ecce Homo*, as presenting a Christianity of moral force, rather than the Christianity of grace and pardon. The idea of redemption, he observes, is almost completely effaced.

The following works have been recently published, or placed on sale, in the United States:

M'Cosh, Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill's Philosophy, being a defence of Fundamental truth. 8vo.—Alford, How to Study the New Testament. 16mo., $2.—Balfour, Plants of the Bible. 12mo., $1.50.—De Liefde, Six Months Among the Charities of Europe. 2 vols., 8vo., $6.—Guthrie, The Parables Read in the Light of the Present Day. 8vo., $2.50.—Janet, The Materialism of the Present Day: a Critique of Dr. Büchner's System. 16mo., $1.50.—Renan, The Apostles, translated from the French. 12mo., $1.75.—Hartwig, The Harmonies of Nature: or, The Unity of Creation. 8vo., $7.50.—Whedon, Commentary on the Gospels: Luke, John. 12mo., $1.75.—Clarke, (James Freeman), Orthodoxy, Its Truths and its Errors. pp. 512.—Masson, Recent British Philosophy. 12mo., $2.00.—Young, John, The Life and Light

of Men. 12mo., $2.50.—D'Aubigne, History of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin, Vol. IV., England, Geneva, France, Germany, and Italy; 12mo., $2.—Robinson, Discourses of Redemption. 8vo., $3.

Great Britain.—Blunt, The Annotated Book of Common Prayer, being an Historic, Ritual, and Theological Commentary on the Devotional System of the Church of England; Part I, 8vo., 15*s.*—Crawford, Fatherhood of God. 8vo., 6*s.*—Laurie, Philosophy of Ethics; 8vo., 6*s.*—Moore, The First Man, and His Place in Creation. 8vo, 8*s.* 6*d.*—Dewes, Plea for a New Translation of the Scriptures. 8vo., 3*s.*—Wordsworth, The Holy Bible, with Notes and Commentaries, Vol. II, Part 2: The Books of Samuel.—Bolton, Inquisitio Philosophica, an Examination of the Principles of Kant and Hamilton. 8vo., 8*s.* 6*d.*-Bray, on Force and Its Moral Correlates. 8vo., 5*s.*—Hunt, Essay on Pantheism. 8vo., 12*s.* 6*d.*—Philpot, Nine Lectures on the Second Advent of Christ. 4*s.* 6*d.*

France, Germany, and Italy.—Bagge, Fermenta theologica. Zur freien Theologie. Leipzig, 1866. Breitkopf & Härtel. 1 Thl. 6 sgr.—Bouttevillle, La morale de l'eglise et la morale naturelle, études critiques. 580 pp. —Castelli, D., Il libro del Cohelet volgarmente detto ecclesiaste. Tradotto dal testo ebraico con introduzione critica e note. Pisa, 1866. 8°. 308 pp —Cassian, O., Das katholicshe Deutschland im 15te Jahrhundert oder der selige Canisius u. seine Zeit. Wien, 583 pp.—De Castro, Adf., Geschichte der spanischen Protestanten u. ihrer Verfolgung durch Philipp II. Nach dem Spanischen bearbeitet von H. Hertz.—S. Ephraemi Syri Carmina Nisibena additis prolegomenis et supplemento lexicorum syriacorum primus edidit, vertit, explicavit Gst. Bickel. Leipsig. 8°. III, 382 pp.—Chery le R. P., Les Apôtres de M. Ernest Renan devant la philosophie, l'histoire et la morale. 8°. 4 fr. 25c.—Laprade, Le sentiment de la nature avant le christianisme. 7 fr. 50c.—Levallois, Déisme et christianisme. 2 fr. 50c.—Beauregard, Les divinités égyptiennes, leur origine, leur culte et son expansion dans le monde. 10 fr.—Lacour, Dieu et la Creation. 5 fr.—Perroit, Les Preuves de l'immortalité de l'âme. 5 fr.—Sabatier, Essai sur les sources de la vie de Iésus. 2 fr.—Secretan, Philosophie de la liberté. 5 fr.

XVII.—THE ORTHODOX DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

BY PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., NEW YORK.

The Council of Chalcedon, held in 451, which is the fourth in the series of ecumenical Councils, forms an epoch in the history of Christology, as the Council of Nicaea, in 325, in the history of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. It gave authoritative symbolical expression to the orthodox view of the constitution of Christ's Person, and summed up the final result of the violent Apollinarian, Nestorian, and Eutychian controversies which preceded it. For the ecumenical Councils of the ancient Church are in theology what the great pitched battles are in military history, which decide the fate of provinces and empires.

The Christology of Chalcedon is summed up in the following brief symbol which was solemnly adopted at the fifth session, on the 22d of October, 451, and subsequently confirmed and enjoined by all the authorities in Church and State:

"Following the holy fathers, we unanimously teach one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, complete as to his Godhead, and complete as to his manhood; truly God, and truly man of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting; consubstantial with the Father as to His Godhead, and consubstantial also with us as to His manhood; like unto us in all things, yet without sin; as to his Godhead begotten of the Father before all worlds, but as to his manhood, in these last days born, for us men, and for our salvation, of the Virgin Mary, mother of God; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only begotten, known *in (of) two natures, without confusion, without conversion, without severance, and without division;* the distinction of the natures being in no wise abolished by their union, but the peculiarity of each nature being maintained, and both concurring in one person and hypostasis. We confess not a Son divided and sundered into two persons, but one and the same Son, and only-begotten, and God Logos, our Lord Jesus Christ; even as the Prophets had before proclaimed concerning him, and he himself hath taught us, and the symbol of the Fathers hath handed down to us."

"Since now we have drawn up this decision with the most comprehensive exactness and circumspection, the holy and ecumenical synod hath ordained, that no one shall presume to propose, orally or in writing, another faith, or to entertain or teach it to others; and that those who shall dare to give another symbol or to teach another faith to converts from heathenism, or Judaism, or any heresy, shall, if they be bishops or clergymen, be deposed from their bishopric and spiritual function, or if they be monks or laymen, shall be excommunicated."

This Chalcedon symbol yields in authority and importance only to the Apostles', the Nicene, and the so-called Athanasian Creeds. It substantially completes the orthodox Christology of the ancient Church; for the definitions added by the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies are few and comparatively unessential.

The same doctrine, in its main features, and almost in its very words, (though with less definite reference to Nestorianism and Eutychianism) was adopted in the second part of the pseudo-Athanasian creed; and in the sixteenth century passed into all the confessions of the Protestant Churches. Like the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, it is the common inheritance of Greek, Latin, and Evangelical Christendom—except that Protestantism, here as elsewhere, reserves the right of searching, to ever new depths, the inexhaustible stores of this mystery in the living Christ of the Gospels and the apostolic writings.

The real, living, divine-human person of Jesus Christ cannot be exhaustively stated by any formulas of human logic. Even the imperfect, finite personality of man has a mysterious background, that escapes comprehension; how much more then the perfect personality of Christ, in which the tremendous antithesis of Creator and creature, infinite and finite, immutable, eternal being and changing, temporal becoming, are harmoniously conjoined! The formulas of orthodoxy can neither beget the true faith, nor nourish it; they are not the bread and the water of life, but a standard for theological investigation and a rule of public teaching.

Such considerations suggest the true position and the just value of the creed of Chalcedon, against both exaggeration and disparagement. That symbol does not aspire to comprehend the Christological mystery, but contents itself with setting forth the facts and establishing the boundaries of orthodox doctrine. It

does not mean to preclude further theological discussion, but to guard against such erroneous conceptions as would mutilate either the divine or the human in Christ, or would place the two in a false relation. It is a lighthouse to point out to the ship of Christological speculation the channel between Scylla and Charybdis, and to save it from stranding upon the reefs of Nestorian Dyophysitismus or of Eutychian Monophysitism. It contents itself with settling, in clear outlines, the eternal *result* of the theanthropic process of incarnation, leaving the study of the *process* itself to scientific theology. The great letter of Leo of Rome, it is true, takes a step beyond this, towards a theological interpretation of the doctrine; but for this very reason it cannot have the same binding and normative force as the symbol itself.

As the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity stands midway between Tritheism and Sabellianism, so the Chalcedonian formula strikes the true mean between Nestorianism and Eutychianism. It accepts Dyophysitism, and, so far, unquestionably it favored and satisfied the moderate Antiochian party, rather than the Egyptian. But at the same time it teaches with equal distinctness, in opposition to consistent Nestorianism, the inseparable unity of the person of Christ.

The following are the leading ideas of this symbol:

1. A true *Incarnation* of the Logos, or of the second person in the Godhead. The motive is the unfathomable love of God; the end, the redemption of the fallen race, and its reconciliation with God. This incarnation is neither a conversion of God into a man nor a conversion of a man into God; neither a humanizing of the divine, nor a deification or apotheosis of the human; nor, on the other hand, is it a mere outward, transitory connection of the two factors; but an actual and abiding union of the two in one personal life.

It is primarily and preëminently a condescension and self-humiliation of the divine Logos to human nature, and at the same time a consequent assumption and exaltation of the human nature to inseparable and eternal communion with the divine person.

The Logos assumes the body, soul, and spirit of man, and enters into all the circumstances and infirmities of human life on earth, with the single exception of sin, which indeed is not an essential or necessary element of humanity, but accidental to it.

"The Lord of the universe," as Leo puts the matter in his epistle, "took the form of a servant; the impassible God became a suffering man; the immortal One submitted himself to the dominion of death; majesty assumed into itself lowliness; strength, weakness; eternity, mortality." The same, who is true God, is also true man, without either element being altered or annihilated by the other or being degraded into a mere accident.

This mysterious union came to pass, in an incomprehensible way, through the power of the Holy Ghost, in the virgin womb of Mary. But whether the miraculous conception was only the beginning, or whether it at the same time completed the union, is not decided in the creed of Chalcedon. According to his human nature, at least, Christ submitted himself to the laws of gradual development and moral conflict, without which, indeed, he could be no example at all for us.

2. The precise distinction between *nature* and *person*. Nature or Substance is the totality of powers and qualities which constitute a being; person is the Ego, the self-conscious, self-asserting, and acting subject. There is no person without nature, but there may be nature without person (as in irrational beings). The Church doctrine distinguishes in the Holy Trinity three persons (though not in the ordinary human sense of the word) in one divine nature or substance which they have in common; in its Christology it teaches conversely, two natures in one person which pervades both. Therefore it cannot be said: The Logos assumed a human person or united himself with a definite human individual; for then the God-man would consist of two persons; but he took upon himself the human *nature*, which is common to all men; and therefore he redeemed not a particular man, but all men, as partakers of the same nature and substance. The personal Logos did not become an individual ἄνθρωπος but σάρξ, flesh, which includes the whole of human nature, body, soul, and spirit. The personal self-conscious Ego resides in the Logos. But into this point we shall enter more fully below.

3. The result of the Incarnation, that infinite act of divine love, is the *God-man*. Not a (Nestorian) *double* being, with *two* persons; nor a compound (Apollinarian or Monophysite) middle being, a *tertium quid*, *neither* divine *nor* human; but *one* person, which is *both* divine *and* human. Christ has a rational human soul and—according to a definition afterwards added—human will—

and is therefore in the full sense of the word a Son of man: while yet at the same time he is the eternal Son of God in One Person, with one undivided self-consciousness.

4. The *Duality of the Natures.* This was the element of truth in Nestorianism, and on this the council of Chalcedon laid chief stress, because this council was principally concerned with the condemnation of Eutychianism, or Monophysitism, as that of Ephesus (431) had been with the condemnation of Nestorianism, or abstract Dyophysitism. Both views, indeed, admitted the distinction of the natures, but Eutychianism denied it after the act of the Incarnation, and (like Apollinarianism) made Christ a middle being, an amalgam, as it were, of the two natures, or, more accurately, one nature in which the human element is absorbed and deified.

Against this it is affirmed by the creed of Chalcedon that even after the Incarnation, and to all eternity, the distinction of the natures continues, without confusion or conversion, yet, on the other hand, without separation or division, so that the divine will remains ever divine, and the human ever human, and yet the two have continually one common life, and interpenetrate each other, like the persons of the Trinity.

The continuance of the divine nature unaltered is involved in its unchangeableness, and was substantially conceded by all parties. The controversy therefore had reference only to the human nature.

And here the Scriptures are plainly not on the Eutychian side. The Christ of the Gospels by no means makes the impression of a person in whom the human nature had been absorbed or extinguished or even weakened by the divine; on the contrary, he appears, from the nativity to the sepulchre, as genuinely and truly human in the highest and fullest sense of the word. The body which he had of the substance of Mary, was born, grew, hungered and thirsted, slept and woke, suffered and died, and was buried, like any other human body. His rational soul felt joy and sorrow, thought, spoke, and acted after the manner of men. The only change which his human nature underwent, was its development to full manhood, mental and physical, in common with other men, according to the laws of growth, yet nominally, without sin or inward schism, and its ennoblement and completion by its union with the divine.

5. The *Unity of the Person*. This was the element of truth in Eutychianism and the later Monophysitism, which, however, they urged at the expense of the human factor. There is only one and the self-same Christ, one Lord, one Redeemer. There is a unity in the distinction, as well as distinction in the unity. "The same who is true God," says Leo, "is also true man, and in this unity there is no deceit, for in it the lowliness of man and the majesty of God perfectly pervade one another . . . Because the two natures make only one person, we read on the one hand: The Son of *Man* came down from Heaven (John iii: 13), while yet the Son of *God* took flesh from the Virgin; and on the other: the Son of *God* was crucified and buried (1 Cor. ii: 8), while yet he suffered not in his Godhead as co-eternal and consubstantial with the Father, but in the weakness of human nature."

Here again the Chalcedonian formula has a firm basis in Scripture. In the Gospel history this personal unity everywhere unmistakably appears. The self-consciousness of Christ is not divided. It is one and the self-same theanthropic subject that speaks, acts, and suffers, that rises from the dead, ascends to heaven, sits at the right hand of God, and shall come again in glory to judge the quick and the dead.

The divine and the human are as far from forming a double personality in Christ, as the soul and the body in man, or as the regenerate and the natural life in the believer. As the human personality consists of such a union of the material and the spiritual natures that the spirit is the ruling principle and personal center, so does the person of Christ consist in such a union of the human and the divine natures, that the divine nature is the seat of self-consciousness, and pervades and animates the human.

6. The whole *work* of Christ is to be referred to His *person*, and not to be attributed to the one or the other nature exclusively. It is the one divine-human Christ, who wrought miracles of almighty power—by virtue of the divine nature dwelling in him—and who suffered and was buried, according to his passible, human nature. The person was the subject, the human nature the seat and the sensorium, of the passion. It is by this hypostatical union of the divine and the human nature in all the stages of the humiliation and exaltation of Christ that His work and His merits acquire an infinite and at the same time a genuinely human and exemplary significance for us. Because the *God*-man suffer-

ed, His death is the reconciliation of the world with God; and because he suffered as *man*, he has left us an example, that we should follow his steps.

7. The *Anypostasia*, impersonality, or, to speak more accurately, the *Enypostasia* of the human nature of Christ. This is a difficult point, but a necessary member in the orthodox doctrine of the one God-man; otherwise we must have two persons in Christ, and, after the incarnation, a fourth, and that a human, person in the divine Trinity. The impersonality of Christ's human nature, however, is not to be taken as absolute, but relative, as the following considerations will show.

The center of personal life in the God-man resides unquestionably in the Logos, who was from eternity the second person in the Godhead, and could not lose his personality. He united himself, as has been already observed, not with a human person, but with human nature. The divine nature is therefore the root and basis of the personality of Christ. Christ himself, moreover, always speaks and acts in the full consciousness of his divine origin and character; as having come from the Father, having been sent by him, and, even during his earthly life, living in heaven and in unbroken communion with the Father. And the human nature of Christ had no independent personality of its own, besides the divine; it had no existence at all before the incarnation, but began with this act, and was so incorporated with the preëxistent Logos personality, as to find in this alone its own full self-consciousness, and to be permeated and controlled by it in every stage of its development. But the human nature forms a necessary element in the divine personality, and in this view we may say with the older Protestant theologians, that Christ is a persona *σύνθετος*, which was divine and human at once.

Thus interpreted, the Church doctrine of the Enypostasia presents no very great metaphysical or psychological difficulty. It is true, we cannot, according to our modern way of thinking, conceive a complete human nature without personality. We make personality itself consist in intelligence and free will, so that without it the nature sinks to a mere abstraction of powers, qualities, and functions. But the human nature of Jesus never was in fact alone; it was from the beginning inseparably united with another nature, which is personal, and which assumed the human into a unity of life with itself. The Logos personality is

in this case the light of self-consciousness, and the impelling power of will, and pervades as well the human nature as the divine.

8. *Criticism* and *Development.* This Chalcedonian Christology has latterly been subjected to a rigorous criticism, and has been charged now with dualism, now with docetism, as its distinction of the two natures or its impersonality of the human has most struck the eye.

Dr. Baur (*Geschichte der Trinitätslehre*, Bd. I, p. 823 f.) imputes to the creed of Chalcedon untenable inconsistency, equivocal indefiniteness, and discordant incompleteness, but ascribes to it the merit of insisting upon the human in Christ as having equal claims with the divine, and of thus leaving the possibility of two equally legitimate points of view.

Dr. Dorner regards the Chalcedonian statement as premature and inadequate, (*Geschichte der Christologie*, Bd. II, p. 83, 130), and raises against it the double objection of leaning to docetism on the one hand and to dualism on the other. He sums up his judgment of the labors of the ancient Church down to John of Damascus in the sphere of Christology, in the following words (II, 273):—"If we review the result of the Christological speculation of the ancient Church, it is undeniable, that the satisfying and final result cannot be found in it, great as its traditional influence even to this day is. It mutilates the human nature, inasmuch as in an Apollinarian way it joins to the trunk of a human nature the head of the divine hypostasis, and thus sacrifices the integrity of the humanity to the unity of the person. Yet, after all—and this is only the converse of the same fault—in its whole doctrine of the natures and the will, it gives the divine and the human only an outward connection, and only, as it were, pushes the two natures into each other, without modification even of their properties. We discover, it is true, endeavors after something better, which indicate that the Christological image hovering before the mind has not yet, with all the apparent completeness of the theory, found its adequate expression. But these endeavors are unfruitful."

Dr. W. Beyschlag, in his essay before the German *Evangelische Kirchentag*, at Altenburg, 1864, p. 12, concurs with these remarks, and says of the Chalcedonian dogma:—"Instead of starting from the living intuition of the God-filled humanity of Christ, it proceeded from the defective and abstract conception of

two separate natures to be, as it were, added together in Christ; introduced thereby an irremediable dualism into his personal life; and at the same time, by transferring the personality wholly to the divine nature, depressed the humanity which *in thesi* it recognized, to a mere unsubstantial accident of the Godhead, at bottom only apparent and Docetistic."

But Beyschlag denies the real, personal preëxistence of Christ and consequently a proper incarnation, and has by this denial caused no small scandal among the believing party in Germany. Dorner holds firmly to the preëxistence and incarnation, but makes the latter a gradual ethical unification of the Logos and the human nature, consummated in the baptism and the exaltation of Christ.

These and similar imputations neutralize each other, like the imputations of Tritheism and Modalism, which may be made against the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity when either the tri-personality or the consubstantiality is taken alone. This, indeed, is the peculiar excellence of the creed of Chalcedon, that it exhibits so sure a tact and so wise a circumspection in uniting the colossal antitheses in Christ, and seeks to do justice alike to the distinction of the natures and to the unity of the person.

Within these limits there remains indeed ample scope for further Christological speculations on the possibility, reality, and the mode of the incarnation; on its relation to the revelation of God and the development of man; on its relation to the immutability of God and to the trinity of essence and the trinity of revelation: questions which, in recent times especially, have been earnestly and profoundly discussed by the Protestant theologians of Germany. We may mention here especially the Christological investigations of Schleiermacher, R. Rothe, Göschel, Dorner, Liebner, J. P. Lange, Thomasius, Martensen, Gess, Ebrard, Schöberlein, Plitt, Beyschlag, and others. A thorough criticism of the latest theories is given by Dr. Dorner in his large work on Christology, (Bd. II, p. 1260 ff., *Eng. transl.* Division Second, Vol. III, p. 100, sqq.), and in several dissertations of Dorner upon the immutability of God found in the Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie, 1856 and 1858; also by Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, iv, 1. p. 344–382; Plitt: Evangelische Glaubenslehre (1863) I, p. 360 ff.; and Woldemar Schmidt, Das Dogma vom Gottmenschen, mit Beziehung auf die neuesten Lösungsversuche der Gegensätze, Leipzig, 1865.

The English theology has contented itself with the traditional acceptance and vindication of the old Catholic doctrine of Christ's person, without instituting any special investigations of its own, while the doctrine of the Trinity has been thoroughly reproduced and vindicated by Cudworth, Bull, and Waterland, without, however, being developed further. Dr. Shedd, also, considers the Chalcedonian symbol as the *ne plus ultra* of Christological knowledge "beyond which it is probable the human mind is unable to go, in the endeavor to unfold the mystery of Christ's complex person, which in some of its aspects is even more baffling than the mystery of the Trinity," (History of Christian Doctrine, I, p. 408). This is probably also the reason why this work, in surprising contrast with every other History of Doctrines, makes no mention whatever of the Monophysite, Monothelite, Adoptian, Scholastic, Lutheran, Socinian, Rationalistic, and later Evangelical controversies and theories respecting this central dogma of Christianity.

The great want, in the present state of the controversy, is on the one hand a closer discussion of the Pauline idea of the *Kenosis*, the self-limitation, self-renunciation of the Logos, and on the other hand, a truly human portrait of Jesus in his earthly development, from childhood to the full maturity of manhood, without prejudice to his deity, but rather showing his absolute uniqueness and sinless perfection as a proof of his Godhead. Both these tasks can and should be so performed as that the enormous labor of deep and earnest thought in the ancient Church be not condemned as a sheer waste of strength, but in substance confirmed, expanded, and perfected.

And even among believing Protestant scholars, who agree in the main views of the theanthropic glory of the person of Christ, opinions still diverge. Some restrict the kenosis to laying aside the divine form of existence, and divine dignity and glory, others strain it, in different degrees, even to a partial or entire emptying of the divine essence out of himself, so that the inner trinitarian process between Father and Son, and the government of the world through the Son, were partially or wholly suspended during his earthly life. Some, again, view the incarnation as an instantaneous act, consummated in the miraculous conception and nativity; others, as a gradual process, an ethical unification of the eternal Logos and the man Jesus in continuous development, so

that the complete God-man would be not so much the beginning as the consummation of the earthly life of Jesus.

But all these more recent inquiries, earnest, profound, and valuable as they are, have not as yet led to any important or generally accepted results, and cannot supersede the Chalcedonian Christology. The theology of the Church will ever return anew to deeper and still deeper contemplation and adoration of the theanthropic person of Jesus Christ, which is, and ever will be, the sun of history, the miracle of miracles, the central mystery of godliness, and the inexhaustible fountain of salvation and life for the lost race of man.

Thomasius, of Erlangen, and W. F. Gess, of Göttingen, (Doctrine of the Person of Christ, Basle, 1856), are the chief champions of the modern kenotic view, which has also been adopted by a few prominent evangelical French divines; Jules Godet, of Neuchatel, (in his excellent Commentary on the Gospel of St. John), and Pressense, of Paris, (in his Life of Christ against Renan). Dr. Dorner, on the contrary, strongly opposes the kenotic theory, and calls it simply a new form of the old heresy of Patripassianism and Theopaschitism. There is, however, an essential difference between the two, inasmuch as the Monophysite Theopaschitism reduced the human nature of Christ to a mere accident of his Godhead, while Thomasius, Gess, and the other modern German and French kenotics acknowledge the full humanity of Christ, and lay great stress on it.

XVIII.—SCOTTISH PRESBYTERIANISM AS IT IS.*

The month of May—that month so much associated with the Christian benevolence of the time—witnesses the annual assemblies of the great Scottish Presbyterian Churches. Then all accounts are balanced; all controversies *attempted* to be settled; the explosive vapors which have accumulated during the year are subjected to thorough ventilation; the Churches deem another milestone on the road to be passed, and, with more or less of faith and hopeful energy, gird themselves for the exigencies of the future. The scene of their meeting is Edinburgh—at that season, perhaps, more beautiful than at any other—newly warmed with the breath of the tardy Northern Spring—wrapping the fresh leafage round its crags—lying in sunshine between the Firth of Forth, and the Pentland Hills, with its bold but graceful outlines, and streets open to all the winds of heaven, and gardens gleaming greenly everywhere, and its sea seen afar with its many ships, like a blue heaven traversed by white-winged birds—the city of a poet's dream. The two assemblies of the Established and Free Churches are to be found on the Castle Hill, with only a narrow street between the halls in which they meet. Across the gardened valley in the New Town meets the synod of the United Presbyterian Church. The rivals on the Hill seldom separate without exchanging shots; the leaders especially, whose recollections of the days of conflict are like ineffaceable scars, are great in contemptuous allusions, in which it is customary to abstain from even naming the Church to which reference is made. The feuds of kinsfolks and near neighbors, it is well known, are always peculiarly deadly. We shall give the precedence to the State-endowed denomination. We shall pass beneath the singularly graceful spire which surmounts the entrance to its hall, and enter into the presence of its august general assembly. The moderator, or president, for the year, is Dr. Macfarlane, of Duddingstone, a portly personage, who is the author of a book on "The Late Secession," as he calls it—the disruption to wit—which is a curious

* From the *London Quarterly Review*, (Methodist) January, 1866.

rigmarole, not without a certain ponderous vivacity. Behind and above him sits Lord Belhaven, the representative of Her Majesty and the visible pledge of State recognition and State support; and now, also, alas! of State Supremacy. All the old formalities are kept up in this assembly; lawyers, for example, plead at its bar in wig and gown; but the galleries appropriated to the public are sure to be sparsely filled. It would never occur to any visitor that this is the National Church of Scotland; the shell is certainly still there but the kernel of life and influence is in great measure gone. A few steps will take us into the presence of the Free Church Assembly. We feel ourselves at once in a warmer atmosphere. Through the crowds of loiterers in the corridor we make our way, into, perhaps, the finest hall in Edinburgh; for which this Church has exchanged dingy Tanfield of glorious memory. Two galleries are filled with ladies, who spend the whole day in listening to the discussions, and eating biscuits or fruit, or even knitting stockings. The ladies have always mustered strongly on the side of the Free Church. They love the romantic and heroical; they are fond critics of clerical eloquence, of which here there is plenty; but, better still, they, some of them at least, are not unworthy followers of the women who ministered of their substance in the Gospels. They collected the funds for building this beautiful hall, and therefore have a right to use it. It is thought that, sometimes, their presence in the gallery affects the judgment of the house and that they are able to confer on their favorite speakers a disproportionate influence. The first sounds we hear when we enter will most likely be the stumbling speech of Dr. Gibson, or the smoothly flowing tones of Dr. Robert Buchanan, or the ringing voice of Dr. Candlish. These are members of a little group of leaders, who are returned, on one pretext or another, as representatives to every general assembly, and who have carried their leadership to an extent almost beyond what is compatible with the parity of presbyters, which the Church professes to maintain. The peculiar circumstances in which the separate existence of the Free Church commenced account for this; it has been the source of great compactness and unity of movement; but it tends to produce in time a general listlessness and lack of interest; it puts a frequent taunt in the mouth of enemies; and against it some of the noblest and freest spirits of the Church have chafed in vain. It is alleged that a clerical

humorist, who, of course, had "stayed in," preached to his people on the subject of the Disruption, the Sunday after it took place, from the text, 2 Sam. xv, 11: "And with Absalom went two hundred men out of Jerusalem, *that were called; and they went in their simplicity, and they knew not anything.*" The history of the Free Church has, in some measure, justified the application of the scripture in which the wit indulged, for, in whichsoever way the leaders have gone of late years, they have had little difficulty in inducing the rank and file of the Church to follow. A prominent leader this year occupies the moderator's chair—Dr. James Begg, of Edinburgh, a man of mark and distinctive character, who will deserve further notice, when we speak of the parties and tendencies of the time. We now wend our way to the meeting-place of the United Presbyterian Church, in Queen street, facing across the blue waters of the Firth to the Fifeshire Hills. It meets as synod, that is, without any clerical representation, all its ministers being members of synod every year. Dr. Marshall, of Coupar-Angus, is moderator—a man of vigorous logical power and keenly-flashing wit, a trenchant debater on the floor of the house, and a prompt and peremptory president in the chair. Here there is, perhaps, more varied and effective speaking than in the two assemblies. The peculiar constitution of this church-court, its non-representative character accounts for that; and perhaps, also, the great freedom and intense progressiveness of the body, which is not so much bound by its traditions as the others, and throws whatever of talent and energy it contains to the surface. Here are many venerable fathers of the Secession and Relief Churches, who, in their own lifetime have followed and shared in the greatest changes through which the religious body of which they are ministers has passed; and here are the young men, who have known the Church only in its united state, and in whom all its impulses of freedom and progress most fully dwell. This also is manifestly a popular church, and its energetic clergy and teeming congregations exert a mighty and growing influence on many classes of the Scottish population.

The quarter of a century which has elapsed since the Disruption has made many changes. It is long enough to have laid low in death many of the men whose names were most prominent, and whose influence was greatest, twenty-five years ago. The representative men of that period are almost all gone. Drs. Cook,

and Mearns, and Lee, chiefs of the old school, enthralled by the traditions of the Robertsonian period, have passed away, and their spirit has in great measure departed with them. Prof. Robertson, the representative of the sounder and more earnest State Churchmen, has also departed, with his touchingly simple utterances of Christian faith and hope. "I would have gladly remained a little longer, and worked God's work here, not as I would, but as I could, had such been His blessed will; but if He sees it best to take me now, I am ready. I am a poor sinful creature, but all my hope of salvation is in the righteousness that is of God in Christ. I place no confidence whatever in anything I may have done; my alone rest for acceptance is in the righteousness of God by faith!" After a pause, he continued, "And, as to the Free Church and Established Church, I care not. Give me the man that has such faith. Him I respect and love. We shall be together united with God in Christ for ever!" Almost the earliest breach in the Free Church ranks was the death of Dr. Chalmers. No one can read Dr. Hanna's Life, one of the noblest of biographies, the book to which the Free Church owes far more than to any other, without feeling himself in the presence of one of the greatest, not only of ecclesiastics, but of men, in any age or country. It is difficult to estimate the influence which he has exerted on the Churches in Scotland. One is almost ready to say that the present age has been shaped to what it is by him. The start which the Free Church made, full formed like the Tay from Loch-Tay, large almost at its source as at its meeting with the tides of the ocean, was due to him; he was the master-spirit, the all pervading energy at least. He was one of those men who are always a generation ahead. And so, in the last volume of Dr. Hanna's Life, it is only too plain, that even his immediate disciples did not comprehend him, nor rise to the largeness of his thoughts. His counsels, in many important matters, were rejected in the organizations of his beloved Free Church; he was driven into retirement before the close of his life by the pushing ambition of meaner men. Only at present is his dream of the future of Presbyterianism in Scotland beginning to be understood. The finance of the Free Church owes to him its very existence; but, whenever it began to be, was taken out of his hands; and the day of retribution has come. On the subject of union with other Churches, his fellow Churchmen are now almost at the point

which he reached more than twenty years ago. We think that it could be made out in every particular, that, wherever the Free Church has realized the ideas of Dr. Chalmers, it has been true and great, and wherever it has departed from them it has blundered and failed. So far as there is truth in Carlyle's heroic theory it might be applied here. This man and his time were one. Another great Free Church man has gone hence more recently—the theologian of the Church, Dr. Wm. Cunningham. His influence as a theological teacher is only beginning to be felt, but will long continue to be felt in Scotland. Unhappily, he too, because his views on the subject of theological education were more advanced than those of his contemporaries, was driven from the ecclesiastical arena, to die amidst his books, and join the company of the great souls of other ages, with whom he had long delighted to hold communion. The United Presbyterian Church mourns its most illustrious divine, Dr. John Brown, of Edinburgh. His life is written by an admiring disciple, Dr. Cairns, of Berwick. A clerical family, long known and honored in the Secession Church bore in him its choicest scion. He is the father of Biblical theology in Scotland. He was the first to use openly, and confess the value of, the German exegesis. He insisted rigidly on letting the scripture utter its own meaning in each particular passage, without reference to the theological system, at a time when to do so was a kind of heresy. "He was deaf," says Dr. Cairns, "to the charm of tradition, and could set aside the most venerable and time-hallowed misinterpretations without mercy. Nothing was more common from the pulpit than the sentence passed on some current sense: "This is truth, important truth, and truth taught elsewhere in Scripture, but not the truth contained in this passage." This was often repeated in the hall, with the more curt definition of an interpreter's business, "*Expositio non impositio.*" His determination to satisfy at all hazards the demands of the words of inspiration, led him to maintain a certain *general* as well as *particular* reference in Christ's atonement, more strongly than seemed to be consistent with his professed Calvinism. The year 1845 saw him before the bar of the Church, to answer to a libel, which charged him with a departure from its standards. We suspect that the struggle was between the rigorous dogmatical and the freer Biblical, expressions of the very same truths. The trial resulted in an acquittal, with which we may connect, per-

haps, as its reward, the great and special eminence of United Presbyterian divines in the department of Biblical Theology.

The worship of the Presbyterian Churches in Scotland, despite threatenings of change, is still very uniform. It consists of singing the metrical psalms, (Francis Rouse's version), two or sometimes three extempore prayers, the reading of a brief passage of Scripture, and a sermon varying in length from forty minutes to an hour and a quarter. The congregation sit to sing, and stand, in no very reverent attitude for the most part, at prayer. This mode of worship dates only from the Westminster Assembly, and is not therefore, distinctively, either Scottish or Presbyterian. The great feature of the service, everywhere, and more especially in the congregations where innovations are most unacceptable, is the sermon. So much is this the case that a Scotchman seldom speaks of going to church or chapel, almost always of going to "hear" some particular preacher. A stranger from the South on one occasion visited the church of a popular Presbyterian clergyman, no matter where. He was somewhat late, and found that he had to wait out of hearing till the devotional services were concluded. A doorkeeper comforted him by saying, "Ye'll sune get in. The doctor's no lang in getting through the *preleeminaries!*" A Scotch audience is able, or pretends to be able, to consume and digest as its Sunday meal an amount of theology which no audience anywhere else could possibly endure. There is some reason to fear that a good deal of the laborious doctrinal preaching common in Scotland is lost between the preacher and the hearer or is almost utterly fruitless. Still, it is due to and tends to perpetuate habits of thoughtfulness about divine things. The Scottish peasantry are sometimes exact and profound theologians. Early instructed in the Westminster Assembly's shorter catechism, and accustomed to hard-headed and logical preaching, they can conduct an argument, in their own quaint phraseology, in a way which would astonish any one unfamiliar with the national character and habits. One good result of the great importance attached to the sermon in Presbyterian worship is, that the theological education of the Presbyterian clergy is of the most elaborate description. Over and above the years of study in philosophy and literature, four, or even five, are devoted to the study of dogmatic, historical, and Biblical theology. The consequence of this is, at present, a somewhat high average of able and

cultivated preaching; and, as is usually the case, when the average is high, a rarity of outstanding names, and an absence of these electrical effects which great preachers are wont to produce. Dr. Chalmers has left no successor in his volcano-like force and power; Dr. Guthrie is laid aside from ill health; and, with the exception of Dr. Candlish, who does not owe his reputation to his preaching powers alone, the honors of the pulpit are distributed among younger men.

The Scottish clergy and laity seem less easily affected by passing winds of theological opinion than the clergy and laity elsewhere. This is partly explained by the national characteristic already mentioned. The soil is not favorable to the reception and development of germs of broad-churchism or negative theology. People who have been drilled in the Assembly's shorter catechism are fond of sacrificing all things, even depth, to precision, and have no patience with any cloudiness of language or of thought. A scholarly and amiable minister of the Free Church, in the remote highlands of Scotland, became interested in the works of Maurice and Kingsley, and, perhaps unconsciously, while attached to the former truth, adopted an unusual phraseology in expounding it. His flock detected the change at once, and brought the authority of the presbytery to bear upon him. He was not disposed to suffer martyrdom for a mere manner of speech, and made the concessions required. Severer judges a man cannot have than his compeers in a presbytery; and so, in the non-conforming Presbyterian Churches at least, heresy would be stamped out at the very moment of its appearance. Still, it would seem that the difficulties and testing questions of the day do make their voice heard even amidst the decorous orthodoxy of Scottish Presbyterianism. Ignorance of them at least is no longer possible. The shelves of Scotch ministers are crowded with translations from the German, published by Clark, of Edinburgh; and the names and writings of the Broad Church school are as familiar on the one side of the border as on the other. A stranger divine from England is said to have put to two eminent Scotch brethren, whom he knew to represent different schools of thought in the same denomination, the same question—Whether the perplexity and disquiet among thinking minds, which have been caused elsewhere by the writings of the Broad Church school, prevailed in Scotland? The first re-

plied, "No, not at all! our thinking people are too firmly grounded in the faith to be disturbed in their belief by misty theologizings of that sort." The answer of the other was to the very opposite effect; "Yes, a very great deal everywhere." Betaking himself to a third clerical brother, the inquirer asked him to explain this strange contradiction. "Oh!" said he, "Dr——'s intercourse is chiefly with the old women, and Dr——'s with the young men of Edinburgh!" We pronounce no opinion on these three replies which the inquiring stranger carried home, except that they had all three some reasons at bottom. The truth may be held to be this, that, while among the clergy there is substantial agreement, the younger portion of the laity do feel and acknowledge the existence of doubts and difficulties. So long as he is beset by these, a conscientious Scotchman will not enter the Church, but betake himself to some other profession. And there are many at present in Scotland who have not by any means gone over to the ranks of irreligion and infidelity, but who listen eagerly for the sound of a sympathetic voice endeavoring to lead them aright, and offering them a helping hand from the tossing ocean of doubt, to the peaceful shore of faith. In Scotland, as everywhere, the Church must be militant in these days, must sleep with its armor on, for the enemy comes in like a flood, and the love of many is waxing cold.

Existing tendencies and men must be sketched together. The thoughts which are stirring in the general mind have ever their most articulate and advanced expression in some representative man. Biography, therefore, may become the most veracious, as well as the most vivid history. Abstract ideas thus receive a concrete representation; the doctrine of the schools is taught in the drama of human life. The Presbyterian churches, however alienated from each other, have all the same standards of doctrine, the same platform of church-government, the same directories of worship. When we come to speak then of character and tendencies, our field of view is much narrowed. There are better and worse, safer and more dangerous, warm and cold, but the difference between them cannot possibly be great. And this also follows, that our representative men must be gleaned from all the Churches, in all of which, more or less actively, the same tendencies operate. We avoid the word *party*, and prefer to speak of tendencies instead; for parties, distinct from each other, as High

and Low and Broad in the Church of England, for example, or as the moderate and Evangelical, before the Disruption, there are not, in the whole Presbyterianism of Scotland, "bond" and "free."

In the matter of theology and general literature, the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, although they contain no sinecure offices, and their clergy are wholly a working clergy, are not undistinguished. The Free Church has its Fairbairn, and Brown, and James Buchanan, and Candlish; the first, the author of the "Typology of Scripture," learned, broad-minded, comprehensive, tolerant; the second, a charming expositor, uniting scholarly exactness with a tender spirituality of tone, something like Ellicott; the third, a clear, yet massive thinker, the author of more than one able book on the Christian evidences; the fourth, an ingenious theologian, as well as expert ecclesiastical politician. It has its Guthrie, and Hanna, and Bonar, and Blaikie, the most eloquent of sermon writers, most chaste and classic of historians, sweetest of hymn writers, most genial of philanthropists; its Bannerman, and Robert Buchanan; its Walter Smith; its Islay Burns. The Established Church can point to Dr. Robert Lee, the most advanced of Scottish religious thinkers; to Principal Tulloch, a theologian of singular refinement in thought and expression; to Dr. Norman McLeod, the hierarch of popular religious periodical literature; to Dr. Caird, a preacher favored by royalty, and A. K. H. B., *i. e.* Dr. Boyd, parish minister of St. Andrew. The United Presbyterians have their Eadie, famed as a commentator, their Ring, and Edward, and Macfarland, and Andrew Thomson, and Calderwood; above all, their Cairns, whose comprehension of the past and sympathy with the present, whose happy union of conservatism and progress, point him out as one of the men who must shape more or less the period in the history of Presbyterianism which has now arrived. Our enumeration, we know, is imperfect. The line of selection is hard to draw. From these, learn all.

But, owing to the peculiar Church life of Presbyterian Scotland, it is on the floor of Church Courts, and in dealing with the numerous questions which come or are forced within their sweep, that the tendency and position of the leaders of the Scottish Church become most apparent. Here we find two tendencies in operation—as indeed they are everywhere—conservatism and pro-

gress. In the Established Church, the progressive tendency has been most developed, and has caused what, but for the peculiar attachment to their minutest traditions of the Scottish Presbyterians, would be deemed a very groundless alarm. Doctrine, worship, and government are the three particulars in which the Church of Scotland is proposed, by some of its members, to be reformed. Dr. Robert Lee is the champion of reform, and is much ahead of many who would on some grounds be classed with him, the Tullochs, and Milligans, and Macleods. He is engaged in issuing a treatise on reform, under the three heads already specified. Only the first part has as yet been given to the world, the part which treats of "Reform in Worship." It proposes some changes in the simple ritual of the Scottish Church, such as a combination of liturgical and free prayer, kneeling at prayer and standing at praise, responses, and the use of instrumental music. Such a proposal could not excite alarm, nor be held to betoken a return to Episcopacy, anywhere but in Scotland. What changes he proposes in the matter of doctrine and government, we do not know. His views of the former are suspected—for which suspicion he has himself to blame—of considerable breadth; his views of the latter are more free than many of his fellow churchmen relish. He is the advocate of national education, and of voluntary liberality in support of the Church. Taste and culture gain for him the ear of the cultivated classes, and the regard of the younger ministers of the Established Church. There is some reason to believe, that, like all men who have strong views, and are little seconded in their own immediate circle, his opinions seem more extreme in the expression which he gives to them, and more contrary to what is generally accepted and held, than they really are. In the General Assembly of this year he was signally defeated at all points, though he was able to summon around him more ability in debate than has been known in the Established Church since the Disruption. And yet the current would seem to be setting in the direction in which he points; for the organ, disapproved of and all but expressly forbidden, by the General Assembly, is being introduced, with the consent of presbyteries, into many congregations of the Established Church. Other men, more likely, perhaps, to move the Church itself, though less likely to reach the ear of the public, have gone further than Dr. Lee, and laid themselves open to the charge of aping Episco-

pacy. A former moderator, Dr. Bissett of Bourtie, in one of his addresses from the moderator's chair, advised an adoption of certain changes in the Presbyterian Church government; with the explicit purpose of staying the flight of the upper classes in Scotland to the Episcopal Church. It must be confessed, that, how to avoid the evil of having different Churches for different classes in society, for different grades even of culture and intelligence, is a problem of the day in Scotland and elsewhere. The solution, however, pointed at by Bissett of Bourtie, and other Established Churchmen, would, there is little reason to doubt, dissolve the present Scotch establishment between Episcopacy on the one side, and nonconforming Presbyterianism on the other.

Progressive tendencies so pronounced cannot be discussed in the Free or United Presbyterian Churches, unless by one who brings with him a preconceived theory, or who listens to alarmist cries. We have spoken already of the only storm which has ruffled the calm, swift stream of United Presbyterianism. And, in the Free Church, the only heresies whispered about have been a denial, on the part of some, of the divine right of Presbyterianism, and a refusal, on the part of some, to concur in the charge often brought against the Established Church, of having, by its Erastian compliances, deliberately denied and repudiated the headship of Christ over the visible Church. These are not heresies which could be made the subject of libel, or condemned otherwise than by awful head-shakings on the part of the denominationally orthodox. Libels for heresy in the Scotch Presbyterian Churches are rare, this being by no means due to any laxity of discipline; libels for immorality are not uncommon; and it is hard to say which would give reason for the profounder humiliation. The Free Church contains a strongly marked group among its leading men, who might be called ultramontane in their views and position. Drs. Forbes and Gibson, of Glasgow—we refer mainly to the latter—are the most consistent and thorough-going of its members. They are—we mean, of course, not in natural character, but in view and position—of the hardest grain, of the most antique conformation, and have come into the world two centuries too late. They worship the seventeenth century, and swear by all its Shibboleths. The former is a great mathematician; the latter, a laborious writer on "Man's natural and moral inability." They hate and fear all that bears the name of progress. On

every question which has arisen they have taken up the most intolerant and condemnatory position. Their most recent struggles have been against the proposed union of Presbyterian dissenters. Beside these, though he is a man of wider sympathies, a social reformer and philanthropist, must be set the present moderator of the General Assembly, Dr. Begg. His addresses from the moderator's chair are as angular, sectarian, and denunciatory as it was possible for him to make them. The pins of the tabernacle are as sacred to him as its golden vessels, its ark, and incense altar. He will not suffer an attitude in worship to be changed if he can help it. The requirements of the time receive nothing from him but anathemas or contemptuous neglect. His idea of improvement is a return to the opinions, and more especially the phraseology, of the Puritan and Covenanting period. Dr. Begg, the advocate of extended franchise and coöperative societies, and improved houses for the working classes, and Dr. Begg, the moderator of the General Assembly, rigid and conservative in the last degree, are not easily reconciled. These leaders draw their followers from a certain class of country elders, mostly engaged in the practice of agriculture, and from the clergy of the remote highlands and islands of Scotland; and their power is on the wane. Dr. Robert Buchanan, of Glasgow, and Dr. Candlish, of Edinburgh, in whom the Free Church enjoys a double head, much more harmonious, however, than the Popedoms of Rome and Avignon, cannot be classed as decidedly conservative or decidedly progressive. By heart and inclination they are understood to be the latter; by polite necessities they are often made to appear the former. If they have been a little peremptory, it must be admitted that they have steered the ecclesiastical ship well; a little too craftily, a little too time-servingly, a little too much after the maxims of human expediency; but still well. They have held the reins and whip, to change our figure, sometimes restraining an impetuous, sometimes hurrying on a laggard, steed; and they can be trusted, if they are not constrained to fall into the arms of those on either side of them, to take the lead in safe and useful change. Behind these leaders are new powers of thought and life, voices of the new age to which swift heed must be given; the post-disruption Free Church, with its eager pressure onwards, not to dissolve, but to unite, not to preach Free Churchism, or Presbyterianism to the world, but the great coming kingdom of

Christ. Here are men, pondering thoughtfully on the thousand doctrinal questions of this troubled age; facing its doubts, and endeavoring to deal with them in the firmness of faith and the tenderness of sympathy; here are ardent souls, baptized with fire, who have given themselves with heart and might to the movements of religious revival, in the Church and country; here are the advocates of union, who see in one great nonconformist Presbyterian Church the hope of Scotland; here are the reformers, if they can be so called, who would serve God with the best, who advocate improved Church architecture—a worship divested of its roughness, while retaining its simplicity—a ministry able to reach the highest class as well as the lowest, the learned and unlearned, the rich and poor, and gather them all into the same fold—a removal of those peculiar strictnesses, such as the prohibition of the use of hymns in public worship, which separate the Free Church from all its sister Churches, and involve it in inconsistencies—a larger tolerance and more catholic spirit. These are the hope of the Church of the Disruption, a token of its unquenched vitality, a pledge of its continuance. The voice of the benevolent Dr. Guthrie is silent, Dr. Hanna has forsaken the arena of Church business for literary retirement. To Dr. Blaikie, Dr. Islay Burns, Principal Fairbairn, Dr. Horatius Bonar of Kelso, Dr. Brown of Aberdeen, Mr. Arnot of Edinburgh, to mention no younger men, the representation of the Free Church which is, and is to be, especially belongs.

There are those also in the United Presbyterian Church, who, on their part, are grimly conservative; making the most of their distinctive badge, the voluntary principle, and striving to erect it into, what it has never yet been, a term of communion among ministers and people. In that Church, however, the large and liberal spirit of Drs. King, and Harper, and Cairns, seems to sweep all before it. An address of Dr. King, in the United Presbyterian Synod, when the first overtures of union among nonconformist Presbyterians were proposed to be made, and the conferences were originated, two years ago, melted the resistance of every heart by its genial warmth; and Dr. Cairns, at an aggregate meeting in the Assembly Hall of the Free Church, in May last, speaking on the seemingly neutral subject of the Church abroad, carried his hearers, with all their shades of opinion, up to a mount of vision, and obliged the blindest to behold, not far off, but near,

the promised land of unity, and life, and heavenly blessing. The Church, which still bears in popular speech the name of Richard Cameron, has not been behind its neighbors in sympathetic ardor, and by its Goold, and Binnie, and Graham, has spoken frank words, and stretched out friendly hands. We can scarcely doubt, that, for the Presbyterian Church in Scotland, the present is a transition period, and the coming years are big with change—change in the direction of Christian Union, of freer and yet equally sound theology, intenser evangelistic activity, less conventional and more simple and ardent religious life. The ranks of the Episcopalian Church may gain something when the Presbyterian ones are sifted as wheat; the Scottish establishment may next be threatened with, and may endure, the fate which impends already over the Established Church of Ireland; but the vision which our review of Scottish Presbyterianism as a whole most surely suggests, is of a non-conforming Church, wide in its influence, vast in its numbers, addressing itself with heart a d might to the evangelization of the world, cherishing, but not slavishly, the spirit of the Puritans, the spirit of the Covenanters, the spirit of the Erskines, and Gillespie, and Chalmers, linked in close fellowship with all other evangelical Churches, and watching and waiting for the time when the oneness in Christ of all true believers shall be visible and manifest, as it is hiddenly real now, and, in its own unseen, undreampt of glory, humbling all human ideals, the kingdom of God shall fully come.

XIX.—ECCE HOMO.*

The writer of *Ecce Homo* keeps his secret well. He is still shrouded in a mystery that doubtless adds much to the popularity of his remarkable work. But he is evidently watchful of all the currents of opinion concerning his essay; and the new preface appended to the fifth edition shows that he is keenly sensitive to the reception accorded to his speculations. We have waited with considerable interest for the explanation which we felt sure would sooner or later be evoked. It has in some measure disappointed our expectation; but it contributes a few additional elements for a due appreciation of the writer's design, and enables us to speak on certain points with a more absolute confidence than we could have felt before it appeared.

However fascinating these views of an unknown thinker concerning our Saviour's mission have proved, we feel assured that the class of persons to whom they are entirely acceptable is exceedingly small. The reason of this is plain enough. They are far too high in their tone, and pay too loyal a tribute to Christ, for the multitudes who, in the recklessness of unbelief, revolt against the orthodox faith, and treat Christianity as a human device amenable to human criticism. Hence they give no satisfaction to any of the sceptical schools of the day. On the other hand, they ignore, and sometimes seem to outrage, the principles of belief that are profoundly dear to the true Church of the Redeemer; and whatever approbation they have received from the too hasty and too generous verdicts of some orthodox writers we are sure will be withdrawn on maturer consideration. The middle path which this anonymous writer aims to strike out is one that can never be beaten into a Christian highway by him or any man. The Rationalist sceptic must needs turn back from it after a very few steps, and the simple believer in the inspired volume must, if he remain faithful to his principles, recoil from it with pure dissatisfaction. These two assertions we will endeavor to establish.

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* From the *London Quarterly Review*, (Methodist) Oct., 1866.

There are two things that cannot fail to neutralize the author's honest effort to conciliate the free thinkers of our time: one is the arbitrary use which he makes of the Christian documents, and the other is the undefinably superhuman view which he gives of the person and character of the Redeemer. With regard to the Gospels, he assumes a position which will never be allowed him by the spirit of Rationalism. It is in vain that he is willing to renounce St. John as savoring too much of a free and idealized portraiture; and equally in vain that he surrenders some parts of the other three Gospels to the demands of criticism. The fact remains that he accepts all the essentials of the evangelical exhibition of the Redeemer, and that he makes precisely the same use of them that believers in inspiration make. The simple criterion that he adopts, viz., the assuming as undeniably true what all the evangelists concur in narrating, will not satisfy the critical school. They reject it by simply asserting that each of the writers might have drawn from a common tradition, or that they copied one another's record. But it is not so much the quantity that he receives as the manner in which he receives it; it is the general tone of his submissive appeal to the Gospels that must mar his endeavor to conciliate the sceptics. They cannot but resent the confidence, very much resembling reverence, with which the narratives of the evangelists, and especially the words of our Lord, are made the basis of argument and teaching. They must feel sometimes tempted to suspect that the author is a true believer in disguise, imposing on their simplicity; or, that being impossible, they will aver, and we heartily agree with them, that he has no right to eliminate what he pleases from the records, trace out his own gospel in the Gospels, and build the superstructure of so imposing a system upon so arbitrary a foundation. At any rate, they will feel, as we also feel, that his hold of the Four Gospels is not much more tenacious than their own, while his use of them as a teacher, professing to inaugurate a new inquiry, is far too confident for such a faith in them as he professes. They will say, in a word, that while he accepts the Gospels in the spirit of a Rationalist he preaches his own Gospel in the spirit of a dogmatic theologian.

Again, the Christ exhibited in this book can never be understood or accepted by our sceptical inquirers. It is true that up to a certain point the picture of the Founder of Christianity drawn by this artist is perfectly in accordance with their views; but be-

fore he finishes the sketch he throws around it a dignity and majesty that cannot but repel them. They will cheerfully accept the "young man of promise" in Nazareth, and feel strong sympathy with all that is here described as the gradual formation of the plans and projects of the great Innovator; they will assent to very much of the eloquent and discriminating estimate of the value of Christianity in human progress; but they will not follow the writer when he proceeds to place Jesus of Nazareth in a position of transcendent superiority to the rest of mankind, and in a relation of unique worship to the Father in Heaven. There is no school of sceptical opinion that will own such a Christ as this. There is no possibility of reconciling such a Christ with the fundamental principles of Rationalism. He is immeasurably too high for man, while immeasurably too low for God incarnate. Through all the phases of modern free speculation concerning Christ, the watchful eye of faith never fails to discern that His mere and simple humanity is inflexibly maintained. Socinianism and not Arianism lies at the basis of all. Not one of them but postulates for Jesus the limitations, infirmities, errors, and failures of our common humanity, reverencing Him not for His absolute, but for His relative, superiority to other men. Hence it enters into their systems as a necessity that Christ should be compared with other benefactors of the race; in most of them He is made to suffer disparagement in some points of the comparison. But this book marks off Jesus of Nazareth from the rest of mankind, and that with a solemnity and earnestness that will never be tolerated by "free thought." Here, again, it is not so much the direct statement of the author as the tone of his entire speculation. However low that tone may be in the estimation of a humble worshiper of the God-man, it is altogether too high and too intolerant for the Socinianism of modern theology.

But while we are persuaded that our author will not exert much influence for good upon the restless spirits whom he seeks to help, we think there are many whom he will injure. Sturdy and consistent Rationalists will be repelled. But there is a large class of Christians, or semi-Christians, to whom the fascination of this book will be perilous. There is in it a certain quiet mystic tenderness which has an inexpressible charm for multitudes of thinkers in our time. They have no relish for the coarse infidelity that has, for a quarter of a century past, in Germany,

France, and England, commented upon the person and merits of Jesus. They sigh for something better than that. The exposition of Christianity that they desire must unite elements that are not found in the dreary systems of pure Rationalism; it must unite with a suppression of the doctrine of the Trinity, a lofty respect for the wonderful being of Christ; it must combine with a denial of the main dogmas of Christian faith a certain mystical substitute for them; and it must reconcile a refusal to admit the Divine evidences of Christianity with a high estimate of its moral power in the history of human advancement. It is our sincere conviction that there has been no book published of late that will do more to conciliate that class. *Ecce Homo* ministers largely to a kind of human passion for Christ, while it breathes no hint of His true Divinity. It has no dogmatic theology, while it has a quaint substitute for all Christian doctrine under other names. It admits no supreme Divine credentials for Christianity, and yet its delineation of the work of Christianity in the world is most enthusiastic in its tone. The great popularity of the work induces us to fear that this midway class is increasing, and it is for the sake of some of them who may read our pages that we shall now show why we think a sound Christian faith must entirely discard this new and unknown teacher, and reject his version of Christianity.

We go to the very root of the matter when we charge this inquiry with neglect or suppression of the first fundamental principle of all human study of the person and work of Christ—the teaching of the Holy Spirit. When it pleased God to send His Son into the world for man's salvation, He sent His Spirit, His personal Spirit, to reveal to man the true being of that Saviour, and the nature, and terms, and processes of that salvation. It is He who presents Jesus of Nazareth to the human race, and says *Ecce Homo*, "*Behold the Man*, raised up to be your Redeemer and your Ruler forever." And the mystery of the natures, and person, and work of the Redeemer He committed to the keeping of the Holy Ghost, whose office it is to prepare man's ears to hear and his eyes to see the Being on whom all his hopes depend. In the economy of our salvation, the Son revealing the Father is Himself revealed by the Spirit; the teaching of the Holy Ghost is as absolutely essential as the atonement of the Son. In other words, the doctrine of the New Testament is that the great sub-

ject it presents is inacessible to human faculties without a Divine Teacher. The author of *Ecce Homo*, like all others of the same class, sets out with an entire renunciation of this truth. He professes, from an induction of passages gathered out of the sacred writings, to arrive, by the simple study of an honest mind, at a better view of Christian truth than is generally held.

He may demur to this, and deny that any such direct teaching of a Divine person is promised in the records which he accepts as authentic. But we hold it impossible to construct a fair epitome of the statements common to the Four Gospels without including this great truth. If not so plainly stated in St. Mark, the evangelist whom our author makes his central authority, it is laid down by the other three in the most express terms; they unite to represent our Lord as declaring that nothing short of a direct illumination from the Father can enable the believer rightly to apprehend and rightly to confess the Son. And St. John, whose testimony is not impeached in this book, gives us the final assurance of Christ, that the teaching to which He had previously referred as the teaching of the Father should be the revelation of the Holy Ghost, a Person distinct from the Father and the Son, but manifesting both with Himself to the human heart. Surely any account of the witness borne by Jesus to Himself must be incomplete which omits to include that He always claimed to be an Object unapproachable to human understanding, except under the condition of an immediate personal Divine guidance.

If it be insisted that the language thus interpreted is capable of another meaning, and that Divine teaching signifies no more than the general help which God affords to every honest inquirer, we can only reply that we have not so learned the sense of New Testament phraseology. We collate the Gospel with the Epistles, and listen reverently to St. Paul when he tells us, with express allusion to the very point under present discussion, that *no man can call Jesus Lord but by the Holy Ghost.* We make our appeal to any dispassionate reader of the New Testament, and rely upon his assent when we assert that the spirit of the whole series of its collected writings enforces the necessity of a specific submission to the Holy Ghost as the Divine Interpreter of the doings of Christ. There is a knowledge of the letter of Christianity that man may gain for himself and teach his fellow;

but there is also an interior wisdom that comes only from above. There is a study of Christ which is after the flesh, but there is also another and better knowledge of Him that "flesh and blood" cannot acquire, but which must be taught by His Father in Heaven.

It may be objected, finally, that the design and scope of the author's inquiry precluded any reference to this higher teaching and interior knowledge. He may plead that he had to do with those who would be insensible to such a truth, and that his work simply aims to conduct an inquiry which might serve to assist many in disencumbering themselves of their prejudices, and approaching the greatest subject of human thought with every possible advantage. But here again our unbending principle comes to our help. The doctrine of the New Testament is that, without the illumination of the Spirit, no man can either know or teach the things of Christ with any effectual result. If the work before us had a negative character, if it challenged infidelity and argued away its objections, if it occupied itself with clearing from the threshold preliminary obstacles, leaving the entrance into the sanctuary for another time or another teacher, the case would be widely different, and these remarks would be misplaced. But the author of this inquiry lifts the veil from the recesses of Christ's nature, shows us his secret thoughts, and the gradual shaping of those most wonderful plans that have changed the course of the world's history, traces the establishment of the Christian commonwealth and all the great principles that adapted it to the world, and attracted the world to it—deals, in short, with all the new mysteries of our Saviour's mission—without one word of reference to the necessity of a stronger light than mortal intellect can kindle. It is this deplorable and fatal defect that mars and misleads this and so many other well-intended efforts to help a perplexed generation out of its difficulties. Let us now mark what effect it has upon the present work, as seen in the great omisions it occasions, and in the errors it engenders.

The Jesus of this work is presented to us as man, and nothing more than man. It is not merely that the human aspect of his person and work is alone exhibited; any other and higher nature is passed by and, as it were, studiously rendered needless. The miraculous birth of the eternal Son of God in human nature is nowhere hinted at; it is not, indeed, denied in word, but the

theory of the book is constructed on a foundation with which the mystery of the Incarnation is incompatible. The curtain rises on the form of "a young man of promise in Nazareth, not yet called the Christ;" the evangelical record of His birth and His own testimonies to His coming forth from the Father, wrought though they are into the tissue of His whole teaching, are simply passed by; they are not postponed for after consideration, but omitted as embarrassing and, indeed, fatal to the scheme of the whole argument, which purports to investigate and disclose certain principles laid hold of by the profound mind and noble heart of a perfect man for the lasting benefit of his race. We see throughout the volume nothing beyond the elaboration of a scheme of marvellous wisdom, goodness, and foresight by a personage whose enthusiasm even to death has been sufficient to kindle the enthusiasm of countless followers. That our Saviour came into the world to execute a commission given to Him in eternity, to carry out into their accomplishment purposes which He had "heard of the Father," and plans which had been matured in Heaven before the earth was, is a truth which, though it runs through the Bible, and was always on the lips of Jesus, never enters into the system of this author, or of the school that finds in him its latest exponent.

The treatment of the baptism by the river Jordan gives ample evidence of this. The relation between John the Baptist and Jesus of Nazareth is the relation between a feeble and a stronger enthusiast pursuing the same design. John "successfully revived the function of the prophet;" "he attempted in an imperfect manner that which Christ afterwards fully accomplished." Of his predestination as the forerunner of Jesus, and of his own most clear testimony to the eternal sonship of the Messiah whom he announced, not a word is said. He simply recognized in Jesus a lamb-like soul, which—unlike his own turbulent spirit, "whose recklessness had driven him into the desert, where he had contended for years with thoughts he could not master, *among the dogs rather than among the lambs of the Shepherd*—had never been disturbed, whose stedfast peace no agitations of life had ever ruffled," and whom therefore he announced as the *Lamb of God*. John's baptism "had something cold and negative about it." He proclaimed that his successor's baptism would be "with a holy spirit and with fire"—that is, according to our author's

interpretation of these great words, with a moral warmth that should cleanse, with an enthusiastic virtue which is the soul of Christianity. The baptism of our Lord Himself—that wonderful scene which, to the eye of faith, connects the glory of the Trinity with the entrance of the Messiah on His work—is introduced as an "incident which is said to have occured just before Christ entered upon the work of his life."

"Signs miraculous, or considered miraculous, are said to have attested the greatness of Christ's mission at the moment of his baptism. There settled on his head a dove, in which the Baptist saw a visible incarnation of that Holy Spirit with which he declared that Christ should baptise. A sound was heard in the sky, which was interpreted as the voice of God Himself, acknowledging His beloved Son. In the agitation of mind caused by his baptism, by the Baptist's designation of him as the future Prophet, and by these signs, Christ retired into the wilderness; and there in solitude, and after a mental struggle such as John, perhaps, had undergone before he appeared as the prophet of the nation, matured that plan of action which we see him executing with the firmest assurance and consistency from the moment of his return to society. A particular account, also involving some miraculous circumstances, of the temptation with which he contended successfully in the wilderness, is given in our biographies."

The account of our Saviour's temptation is then subjected to a very strange and very subtile criticism, the style of which is such as to make us glad that the author nowhere afterwards attempts to comment upon the great crises of the Redeemer's life. The miracles that cling to the narrative of the temptation are done away with by an innuendo. "Nothing is more natural than that exaggerations and even inventions should be mixed in our biographies with genuine facts." No eye-witness describes them; we have no positive assurance that Christ Himself communicated them to His followers; they may pass. But the temptation itself was a reality; the gentle Lamb of God becomes for the first time conscious of His miraculous powers, and this, though none of our biographers point it out, "is visibly the key to the whole narrative. What is called Christ's temptation is the excitement of his mind which was caused by the nascent consciousness of supernatural power." In His extreme need He "declines to use for his own convenience what He regards as a sacred deposit committed to Him for the good of others;" thus was the first temptation

surmounted. But we fail to see the virtue of this resistance if we regard it as simply the Saviour's refusal to make bread for Himself; nor can we see that the answer, "Man doth not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God," so "exquisitely became the Lamb of God," unless we bear in mind, what our author's theory omits, that out of the mouth of another than God the temptation to make stones into bread had proceeded. It was the suggestion that would separate His will from His Father's that constituted this mysterious temptation, not the mere thought of using His own divine power for His own urgent need. With the account of the second temptation we have not the same fault to find. But the exposition of the third, which furnishes the key of the whole volume, is grievous to the spirit of a Christian:

"A vision of universal monarchy rose before him. What suggested such thoughts to the son of a carpenter? What but the same new sense of supernatural power which tempted Him to turn stones into bread and to throw himself into the arms of ministering angels? These, together with the Baptist's predictions and those Messianic predictions of the ancient prophets, on which we can imagine that he had been intensely brooding, might naturally suggest such an imagination. He pictured himself enthroned in Jerusalem as Messiah and the gold of Arabia offered in tribute to Him. But, says the narrative, *the devil said to him, If thou wilt fall down and worship me, all shall be thine.* * * * We are perhaps to understand that he was tempted to do something which on reflection appeared to him equivalent to an act of homage to the evil spirit. What, then, could this be? It will explain much that follows in Christ's life, and render the whole story very complete and consistent, if we suppose that what he was tempted to do was to employ force in the establishment of his Messianic kingdom. * * * He must have heard from his instructors that the Messiah was to put all enemies under his feet, and to crush all opposition by irresistible God-given might. * * * And, in the request, it was because Christ refused to use his supernatural power in this way that his countrymen rejected him. * * * And as this caused so much surprise to his countrymen, it was natural that he should himself have undergone a struggle before he determined thus to run counter to the traditional theory of the Messiah and to all the prejudices of his nation. * * * But he deliberately determines to adopt another course, to found his empire upon the consent, and not upon the fears of mankind, to trust himself with his royal claims and his terrible purity and superiority defenceless against mankind, and, however bitterly their envy may per-

secute him, to use his supernatural powers only in doing good. This he actually did, and evidently in pursuance of a fixed plan; he persevered in his course, although politically, so to speak, it was fatal to his position, and though it bewildered his most attached followers; but by doing so, he raised himself to a throne on which he has been seated for nigh two thousand years, and gained an authority over men greater far than they have allowed to any legislator, greater than prophecy had ever attributed to the Messiah himself. As the time of his retirement in the wilderness was the season in which we may suppose the plan of his subsequent career was formed, and the only season in which he betrayed any hesitation or mental perplexity, it is natural to suppose that he formed this particular determination at this time; and, if so, the narrative gains completeness and consistency by the hypothesis that the act of homage to the evil spirit by which Christ was tempted, was the founding his Messianic kingdom upon force."

It is to us an astonishing fact that a book of which this passage strikes the key-note can find such favor with many who accept the Divinity of Christ and the Divine origin of Christianity We shall not attempt to discuss point by point the erroneous assumptions that pervade it, but must be content with hinting at them. The "hesitation and mental perplexity" which is attributed to the Redeemer finds no place in the record; the temptation is repelled before it is fully uttered, and in such a way as to overthrow this ingenious superstructure. Had the subtle writer given the Saviour's reply in this case as in the others, it would have answered his own folly as well as Satan's temptation. It would have told him that there was another reason which induced the Redeemer's holy indignation; that tempted as our representative, He would teach us how to overcome by enforcing the supreme claims of God. It would have pointed to another occasion on which the same words, *Get thee behind me, Satan*, were uttered to the same tempter who invisibly and through Simon Peter would turn him away from His cross. That might have reminded the author of another season, when Jesus did betray mental perplexity in the presence of His dark hour and final agony. And this again might have suggested to him, what it has suggested to the thoughtful reverence of multitudes who hold "the current conceptions concerning Christ," that so far as the experiment of the Prince of darkness would try whether or not Jesus might be deterred from obtaining the

world's allegiance by another method than the cross—entering in *some other way* to His kingdom,—the vain temptation was repelled by a Divine human person that could not thus be tempted.

It is unfortunate for this theory that the forty days' trial in the wilderness preceded these last temptations, which took place at the close, and when Christ was emerging again from His mysterious retirement. The author, however, may make light of this difficulty, being prepared to surrender the historical correctness of the narrative whenever his theory may require it. Suffice for him and the multitudes of readers who admire him, that Jesus had in the wilderness a "vision of universal monarchy;" that He there matured a scheme of realizing that vision in a way that no man could have been prepared to anticipate; and that he immediately began on His "return to society," to carry out that scheme. For ourselves, we confess that the manner in which this writer, and others of the same class, speak of the private cogitations of Jesus, of His plans, schemes, and contrivances, (for this last word is not wanting), outrages the deepest instincts of our Christian faith. It is not that we object to the idea of a plan according to which the Redeemer conducted His saving work. The scheme, the counsel, the economy of redemption, runs through the entire Scripture; it is sketched for the future Messiah in the Old Testament (though not, as our author says, with a more restricted range than the reality); it is evidently present to the Redeemer from the beginning to the end of His ministry; it is grandly dilated upon by the Apostles, from their first speeches in the Acts through the theology of the Apostles, down to the visions of the Apocalypse. But the eternal purpose of God, the mystery hid, revealed, and in some sense hidden again until the end shall come, is in the Scripture something very different from the scheme and calculation of human benevolence and foresight which lies at the foundation of *Ecce Homo.* To us, it seems as if this interpreter of Christ's mission studiously endeavors to make the idea as opposite as possible to the "current conception" which Holy Scripture gives to those who reverently read it. Not a word is said of the Spirit who led Jesus into that wilderness where He is supposed to have laid His plans; not a word of His being inspired, and taught, and directed of God; any reference to His calm consciousness of the *hour* appointed for every movement of His life is excluded. All is constructed on a notion

that savors too much of the purely human. The loftiest things that are said of the transcendent dignity of the new legislator fall immeasurably below the standard of the New Testament, and the transition from the pages of this essay on Christ's plan to the pages of the Evangelists is, as it were, rising from earthly to heavenly things.

It is impossible but that an error so fundamental as this is, should stamp its effect upon the entire argumentation. Hence we find its influence neutralizing much that is otherwise very striking and suggestive, not to say beautiful, in the delineation of the new Divine Theocracy which it was the purpose of Christ to set up. "The prophetic designation which had fallen upon him, perhaps, revealed to himself for the first time his own royal qualities; and the mental struggles which followed, if they had led him to a peculiar view of the kind of sovereignty to which he was destined, had left upon his mind a most absolute and serene conviction of his royal rights. During his whole public life he is distinguished from the other prominent characters of Jewish history by his unbounded personal pretensions. He calls himself habitually King and Master, he claims expressly the character of that Divine Messiah for which the ancient prophets had directed the nation to look. He came forth from the wilderness with the deep resolution to be the King of a new society, "representing the majesty of the invisible King of a theocracy, as its Founder, Legislator and Judge." Not, however, a king according to the conception current among the Jews. "The Christ himself, meditating upon his mission in the desert, saw difficulties such as other men had no suspicion of. He saw that he must lead a life altogether different from that of David, that the pictures drawn by the prophets of an ideal Jewish King were colored by the manners of the times in which they had lived; that these pictures bore indeed a certain resemblance to the truth, but that the work before him was far more complicated and more delicate than the wisest prophet had suspected." The measures which He adopted disappointed the expectations of the people, and His death was the result.

But what were His credentials? The chapter that answers this vital question discloses the subtle error of the volume as to the kingdom of God. We have his own testimony that Christ did not simply represent the invisible King of the theocracy; He

was Himself the King, and asserted and proved His Divinity by his word and works. He came, however, according to the Scripture, to found another kingdom than that of his absolute Divine authority, by dying for the sins of the world. Hence, although He always spoke and acted as the supreme King, it was, as it were, by anticipation; the foundation of His kingdom was His cross, and not till after His resurrection did He declare Himself invested with all power. His true credentials were His vicarious sufferings for the sins of men, sealed by His resurrection from the dead as the conquerer of sin and Lord of a redeemed earth. Of this we hear nothing, and yet the author approaches the subject near enough to indicate that he deliberately evades it, as the following quotation will show:

"This temperance in the use of supernatural power is the masterpiece of Christ, * * and it is precisely this trait which gave him his immense and immediate ascendency over men. If the question be put—Why was Christ so successful? Some will answer, because of the miracles which attested his Divine character; others, because of the intrinsic beauty and divinity of the great law of love that he propounded! But miracles, as we have seen, have not by themselves the persuasive power. * * On the other hand, the law of love, however Divine, was but a precept. It was neither for his miracles, nor for the beauty of his doctrine, that Christ was worshiped. Nor was it for his winning personal character, nor for the persecutions He endured, nor for His martyrdom. It was for the inimitable unity which all these things made when taken together. In other words, it was for this, that He whose power and greatness, as shown in his miracles, were overwhelming, denied himself the use of His power, treated it as a slight thing, walked among men as though he were one of them, relieved them in distress, taught them to love each other, bore with undisturbed patience a perpetual hailstorm of calumny; and, when His enemies grew fiercer, continued still to endure their attacks in silence, until, petrified and bewildered with astonishment, men saw him arrested and put to death with torture, refusing steadfastly to use in his own behalf the power He conceived He held for the benefit of others. It was the combination of greatness and self-sacrifice which won their hearts, the mighty powers held under a mighty control, the unspeakable condemner, the *Cross of Christ.*"

These eloquent words are followed by others still more eloquent, depicting the effect upon men of such sufferings voluntarily endured. But they fail to touch the secret of the constraining

power of the Passion. There was more in the cross to St. Paul than "the voluntary submission to death of one who had the power to escape death." "Christ's voluntary surrender of power," simply and apart from the atoning virtue of His death, was *not* the favorite subject of all the Apostles. The absolute devotion which should requite it was not simply matter of human "opinion and feeling;" nor was this "the ground of that obedience to Christ and acceptance of His legislation which made the success of His scheme." As St. Paul is here for once referred to, he may be permitted to speak for himself; and his uniform testimony is that only a Divine revelation through the Holy Ghost of the saving power and cleansing virtue of the blood of atonement, could kindle the love of Christ in the soul. It is scarcely true to say that those who witnessed our Saviour's abstinence from self-vindication by the use of His miraculous power, felt any such influence from it as is here asserted. The cross with all its preparatory sufferings, passed from their eyes without enkindling this profound devotion, until a power from on high revealed the sacred mystery of its meaning to the life and destiny of the believer. When they came to know that in His cross He had been made a curse for them, and that His crucifixion was the sacrifice of a Divine human victim to the claims of the law, then, but not till then, "the law and the law-giver were enshrined in their inmost hearts for inseparable veneration."

In the chapters which treat of our Saviour's kingdom, and the terms of admission to it, we have a clear and undisguised picture of the religion of nature placed under certain Christian influences. Nothing is brought to man; all is evoked from his nature as Christ finds it. This radical defect, in our judgment, mainly characterises the whole treatise, and may be taken as a key to the errors, which, however beautifully veiled, are errors fatal to the foundation. Let the following words be well weighed; they close the striking exposition of that "winnowing-fan" which the Baptist predicted as Christ's method of testing human nature:—

"When he rejected the test of correct conduct which society uses, Christ substituted the test of faith. It is to be understood that this is not strictly a Christian virtue; it is the virtue required of one who wishes to become a Christian. So much a man must bring with him; without it he is not worthy of the kingdom of God. To those who lack faith, Christ will not be Legislator or

King. He does not, indeed, dismiss them, but he suffers them to abandon a society which now ceases to have any attraction for them. Such, then, is the new test, and it will be found the only one which could answer Christ's purpose of excluding all hollow disciples. * * * We want a test which shall admit all who have it in them to be good, whether their good qualities be trained or no. Such a test is found in faith. He who, when goodness is impressively put before him, exhibits an instinctive loyalty to it, starts forward to take its side, trusts himself to it, such a man has faith, and the root of the matter is in such a man."

From this it would appear that the work of Christ in the world is to find out and bind to Himself all those who have "the root of the matter" in them. The test is the presentation of His living person, and the attraction is the effort of goodness upon a soul having already in it a touch of goodness, and already justified by that faith. Hence we are told that Jesus obtained the unlimited devotion and obedience of His servants, even to the sacrifice of life, "by no other means than the natural influence of a natural superiority." An endless succession of variations follow on this theme: its music is played, and with no small charm, throughout the remaining chapters. It is made the one and supreme prerogative of Christ as a legislator that He did not trust to reason, but to example; this is represented as the grand distinction between His work and that of all the philosophers who went before Him. His ultimate object, like theirs, was the moral improvement of mankind, a statement to which it may seem captious to take exception, but which we hold to be absolutely wrong in the sense in which it is here understood. But in *improving* the morality of men, Christ differs from Socrates, inasmuch as He imposes the authority of His own excellence upon His followers, and kindles the natural faith of man into an enthusiasm of devotion to Himself and imitation of His virtues that effectually kills all sin in the soul. "As love provokes love, many have found it possible to conceive for Christ an attachment, the closeness of which no words can describe." And as love to Christ is excited by the contemplation of his goodness, so there is in the nature of man "a love for humanity as such; a natural passion, which would be universal if special causes did not extinguish it in special cases, but, like all other human passions, it may be indefinitely increased and purified by training and by extraordinary influences that may be brought to bear upon it. Now this

is the passion on which Christ seized and treated it as the law-making power or root of morality in human nature, trained and developed it into that Christian spirit which received the new name of ἀγάπη."

It is needlees to remind our readers that there is a deep double error pervading all this—an error as to the true character of original sin and an error as to the nature of the "extraordinary influences" brought to bear on it by the Redeemer. Surely there are some words spoken by our Lord, which the author of *Ecce Homo* well knows and would admit to be the "true sayings of Christ," that teach a doctrine very different from those which he takes such delight in propounding. He himself, when speaking of baptism, gives us a somewhat elaborate exposition of the night-scene with Nicodemus, in which he represents the Redeemer as teaching the ruler that men must not think of giving their name to the founder of the kingdom at a secret interview, to return afterwards to the routine of secular life; "those who would enrol themselves among the citizens of it were to understand that they began their life anew, as truly as if they had been born again." But why, admitting the importance of this conversation with Nicodemus, does he deliberately pass by those clear and piercing sentences which enforce the necessity of the soul's new birth? Why does he omit, as if they had not been spoken, any reference to the words, "*That which is born of the flesh is flesh, that which is born of the spirit is spirit?*" We have no disposition to deny to our poor humanity what capacities of goodness the fall has left it, still less to restrict the measure of good influence which His alliance with our nature has put forth upon it. But we must protest with all earnestness against a style of teachings that studiously and with a seeming emphasis on the word, speaks of the natural man as having in him, as it were, a natural Christianity which needs only to be placed in the presence of Christ to become active.

When we read of "extraordinary influences brought to bear" upon man's natural instinct of love, we supposed that possibly some concession was about to be made to the "current opinion" as to the renewing of the Holy Ghost. But it is far otherwise. The Holy Ghost is, indeed, spoken of, but only as a term used to signify the power of ardent feeling excited in the soul. The strain is faithful to the end, and this is the conclusion of it:—

"A single conception enthusiastically grasped is found powerful enough to destroy the very root of all immorality within the heart. As every enthusiasm that a man can conceive makes a certain class of sins impossible to him, and raises him, not only above the commission of them, but beyond the very temptation to commit them, so there exists an enthusiasm which make all sin whatever impossible. This enthusiasm is emphatically the presence of the Holy Spirit. It is called here the enthusiasm of *humanity*, because it is that respect for human beings which no one altogether wants, raised to the point of enthusiasm."

How is this enthusiasm kindled? This vital question has been present to the writer's mind throughout his book, and has received a great many kinds of indirect and vague reply. But as if conscious that here has been his failure, the question is asked again at the close, in the tone of a note of despair. At an earlier stage of his investigation St. John's Gospel is appealed to for help; for, although scarcely admitted as a text-book, St. John plays a prominent part in *Ecce Homo*. "The enthusiasm can hardly be kindled, except by a personal influence, acting through example or impassioned exhalation. When Christ would kindle it in His disciples, he *breathed* on them and said, 'Receive the Holy Ghost;' intimating by this great symbolical act that life passes into the soul of a man, as it were, by contagion from another living soul." But it would be a great mistake to infer from this, or any other reference to the Holy Spirit, that the writer means the gift of the Holy Ghost as a regenerating Spirit, in the current Christian sense. Nothing seems further from his thought. His last word on the subject is, that this enthusiasm "was shown to men in its most consummate form in Jesus Christ." Christ did not obtain by his death, and send down as the gift of His ascension, the Holy Ghost. He himself had the enthusiasm kindled in Him —*how*, no one can tell; for "it was the will of God to beget no second son like Him." But since He has shown it, men have found it possible to imitate Him; and every new imitation revives the power of the original. Not, however, that "Christ is the direct source of all humanity:" in Him it was diplayed in a supreme and unique manner; but the examples of His imitator, who came nearer to us, may do more to "hand on the torch from runner to runner in the race of life." Hence we cannot but feel that *Ecce Homo* leaves its readers in a state of hopeless confusion as to the redeeming power of Christ in human nature. It disguises, by fair words, the absence of those cardinal doctrines of

atonement and regeneration which gives meaning to the words that Christ is the *life of the world.*

If anywhere we might expect an utterance approaching to clearness on this vital subject, it is in a description on the meaning of the Lord's Supper. But we find no satisfaction there, and should not allude to this chapter were it not for the view given of the Christian sacraments generally. These solemn observances were "most desirable," indeed "matters of extreme importance," in order to preserve the distinctness of the Christian society from the world, baptism serving that purpose, and the unity of the Christian Church in itself, an end effected by the common supper. The Christian communion is, as it were—the author feels, but evades the degradation of the term—"a club dinner," symbolically expressing the fact and the manner of their union; but the fact first—the fact of the universal brotherhood of mankind, "pensioners on the bounty of the universal Father." When Christ declared that the bread was His body, and the wine His blood, and said—to appeal once more to St. John—"Except ye eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man, ye have no life in you," He taught that *life*, the healthy condition of the mind, consisting "in a certain enthusiasm for human beings as such," will not spring up spontaneously, or by any effort of our own, but that men must learn to love each other by eating His flesh and drinking his blood. "This metaphor belongs to a style of 'vehement' language by which Christ and His apostles were wont to express intense personal devotion to the Lord; it is precisely this intense personal devotion, this habitual feeding on the character of Christ, so that the essential nature of the Master seems to pass into and become the essential nature of the servant —loyally carried to the point of self-annihilation—that is expressed by the words 'eating the flesh and drinking the blood of Christ.'" The writer seems to feel the insufficiency of this interpretation; he is himself amazed, and teaches us to feel amazed at the unbounded personal pretensions which Christ advances. To us, knowing full well the Divine Person who utters these words, His pretensions are indeed amazing, but they are perfectly consistent, and receive the full homage of our reason, as well as our hearts. But how strange, and, indeed, incomprehensive, is the demand of Christ on any other theory, as the following extract shows. We have to select the sentences, but only for the sake of brevity:—

"It is common in human history to meet with those who claim some superiority over their fellows. Few, indeed, are those to whom it is given to influence future ages. Homer, by creating literature; Socrates, by creating science; Cæsar, by carrying civilization inland from the shores of the Mediterranean; Newton, by starting science upon a career of steady progress, may be said to have attained this eminence. But these men gave a single impact like that which is conceived to have first set the planets in motion: Christ claims to be a perpetual attractive power, like the sun which determines their orbits. They contributed to men some discoveries, and passed away; Christ's discovery is himself. To humanity, struggling with its passions and its destiny, he says, 'Cling close to me, cling ever closer to me.' * * * * But it is doubly surprising that these enormous pretensions were advanced by one whose special peculiarity, not only among his contemporaries, but among the remarkable men that have appeared before and since, was an almost feminine tenderness and humanity. This characteristic was remarked, as we have seen, by the Baptist, and Christ himself was fully conscious of it. If he judged himself correctly, and if the Baptist described him well when he compared him to a lamb, and, we may add, if his biographers have delineated his character faithfully, Christ was one naturally contented with obscurity, wanting the restless desire for distinction and eminence which is common in great men, hating to put forward personal claims, disliking competition and 'disputes who should be greatest' so much, finding something bombastic in the titles of royalty, fond of what is simple and homely —of children, of poor people—occupying himself with the concerns of others, with the relief of sickness and want, that the temptation to exaggerate the importance of his own thoughts and plans was not likely to master him; lastly, entertaining for the human race a feeling so singularly fraternal, that he was likely to reject, as a sort of treason, the impulse to set himself in any manner above them. Christ, it appears, was this humble man. When we have fully pondered the facts, we may be in a condition to estimate the force of the evidence, which, submitted to his mind, would induce him, in direct opposition to all his tastes and instincts, to lay claim, persistently, with the calmness of entire conviction, in spite of the offence which his own followers conceived, to a dominion more transcendent, more universal, more complete, than the most delirious votary of glory ever aspired to in his dreams."

With this extract we leave the reader to judge for himself what the conception of Christ will be when the author of *Ecce Homo* shall have delivered himself fully on Christian theology, and expanded his half views into their complete exhibition. The last

sentences of the volume—though marred by a display of bad taste, which runs more or less through the whole work, and is singularly at variance with the general grace of its style—might seem to promise that the sequel of this undertaking will do something to vindicate the majesty of the person and the Divinity of the work of Christ. "The new Jerusalem descended *out of heaven from God.*" "The creative effort which produced that, against which, it is said, the gates of hell shall not prevail, cannot be analyzed. No architects' designs were furnished for the new Jerusalem; no committee drew up rules for the Universal Commonwealth. It was an achievement of Christ's will and power that has no rival on earth." In what sense the Christian state came down from heaven, and what was the power that, with such mysterious calmness and inconceivable power, created it, we presume we have yet to be told. But whatever may hereafter be said as to the superhuman origin of Christianity—if, indeed, anything will be said—we cannot forget that throughout the whole of this work Christ's motives, calculations, aims, contrivances and expedients, are analyzed by a human critic, in a style that seems strangely to contradict the words we have just quoted. And to us the concluding words of the volume come with a feeling of inexpressible relief—whatever the sense may be in which the author uses them—*out of heaven from God.*

Christ's legislation for the Christian commonwealth occupies a large portion of the volume. It is elaborately worked out, but contains nothing that may be termed new, although the terminology and manner of presentation differ from that to which Christian writers are wont to adhere. We shall not be able to do more than make a few remarks on some of the fundamental principles that are here assumed.

And, first, it seems to us that there is a great and needless effort to separate between the ethics of Christianity and its doctrines. In other words, the idea of Christ as a teacher, sent from God to communicate, by Himself and through His apostles, a system of doctrine—which is everywhere in the later New Testament called the Gospel, or the Faith, or the Truth—is kept too entirely in the background, and by implication suppressed altogether. The volume proceeds on the supposition that the Lord completed His legislation for His kingdom before he left the world, and that the whole of the Christian scheme may be found

within the compass of the Four Gospels. Whereas, if we take the entire New Testament in our hands, we find that the code of Christian ethics does not assume its complete and full form until the spirit of inspiration has gathered the Church around the "apostles' doctrine" concerning the cross. It is true that the fundamental principles of morality were not, and could not be essentially changed by the promulgation of Christ's new doctrine; but it is equally true that the entire system of Christian ethics is seen in all its clearness, and receives its most impressive sanctions, only when connected with the peculiar doctrines of Christianity. The several chapters of *Ecce Homo* which treat of the laws of philanthropy, mercy, forgiveness, beautiful and searching as they are, would be infinitely more beautiful, and more true to the New Testament, if they were re-written with a constant reference to those doctrines of the incarnation, atonement, and eternal judgment with which they are always connected in Scripture, but from which in this treatise they are entirely disjoined. In short, however effectually it serves the writer's purpose to take the "morality" of Christianity first, we think the order an inverted one, and shall not occupy much time with the "ethics" of this treatise until we have the promised "theology" to examine.

This, however, leads to another observation. The Christianity taught by this volume, or rather for which this volume conciliates the favor of sceptical inquirers, is of the freest possible type of latitudinarianism, as it regards the letter of revelation on the one hand, and the personal independence of the individual spirit, as its own law-maker, on the other.

"The Christian, a Law to Himself," is the title of one chapter. It dwells with much emphasis upon that enthusiasm or Divine inspiration which makes the subject of it independent of all external commandment. It is impossible not to sympathise with this principle or fact—for fact it is—when rightly stated, and free from exaggeration. "Love is the fulfilling of the law," and when the supreme love of God becomes the "royal law" of the soul, it must needs expel every other alien passion, rendering to God all service of devotion, and, for God's sake, rendering to man all service of charity. But the positions of this chapter are amenable to the charge of onesideness and exaggeration. It makes this "all purifying passion" simply the passion for man as such, for the race in the individual; in short, the enthusiasm in humanity.

Now we cannot but think that this sovereign inspiration within the soul is not the love of man, but of God; the sacred fervor which, when it is shed abroad in the spirit of man, restores him to his rest, and furnishes him with the impulse and the strength for every relative duty. It is not the human race, but God, that is the object of this central enthusiasm; not man in the individual, but God in man. Hence we have the highest authority saying, "Ye did it unto Me." Further, there is a spirit of exaggeration reigning in the whole argument, which is characteristic of this free and idealist school. It is scarcely true to say that Christ "did not have a code of morals in the ordinary sense of the term —that is, an enumeration of actions prescribed and prohibited. Two or three prohibitions, two or three commands, he is, indeed, recorded to have delivered; but on the greater number of questions on which men require moral guidance, he has left no direction whatever." Among our Lord's last words to His apostles, he bade them go forth and "teach all men to observe all things that he had commanded them," an injunction which, as it looks back upon a long series of commandments, delivered in the gospels in a variety of forms, and not always as positive injunctions, so it looks forward to a still more plenary communication of His will through the Holy Spirit. Let any one with an unbiased mind take the entire New Testament, and examine how far it is a directory of conduct, and a code of ordinances and prohibitions, and he will find that the Christian instinct of health is not thus absolutely confided in. While he will feel the truth of the remark that "in the language of Hebrew poetry, a voice behind is saying, 'This is the way, walk ye in it,'" he will also feel that all the stress is not to be laid upon the voice, but some of it must be reserved for the way.

The same exaggeration appears in the discussion on "Positive Morality," which seems to us to place the New Testament in such a relation to the Old as is fatal to the unity of Divine revelation, and extremely perilous to the foundations of the then faith. Here we must make a few extracts:

"Of the Scriptures of the Old Testament he always spoke with the utmost reverence, and he seems never to have called in question the Jewish view of them as infallible oracles of God. Some parts of them, particularly the book of Deuteronomy seem to have been often present to his thoughts. Yet even the Old Testa-

ment he regarded in a sense critically, and he introduced canons of interpretation which must have astonished, by their boldness, the religious men of the day. For he regarded the laws of Moses, though divine, as capable of becoming obsolete, and also incomplete. On the question of divorce, he declared the Mosaic arrangement to have been well suited for the hard-heartedness of a semi-barbarous age, but to be not longer justifiable in the advanced condition of morals. So, too, in the matter of oaths, the permission of private revenge, and other points on which the Mosaic legislation had necessarily something of a barbaric character, he unhesitatingly repealed the acts of the lawgiver, and introduced new provisions. . . . . It was the inspiration, the law-making power, that gave Christ and his disciples courage to shake themselves free from the fetters even of a Divine law. Their position was a new and delicate one, and nothing but such an inspiration could have enabled them to maintain it. To pronounce the old law entirely true, or entirely false, would have been easy; but to consider it as true and Divine, yet no longer true for them, no longer their authoritative guide, must have seemed, and must seem even to us, at first sight, unnatural and paradoxical. It may be illustrated, however, by what every one has observed to happen in the process of learning and art. For the beginner rigid rules are prescribed, which it will be well for him for a time to follow, punctiliously and blindly. . . . . But the principle, at the same time that it explains the rules, supercedes them. It was in this manner that Christ found the Mosaic law at once divine and in part obsolete. But not only did he find it in part obsolete he found it throughout utterly meager and imperfect."

There is much confusion in these statements, which it would require a long dissertation to expose and clear up. Let it be remembered, generally, that it was the same Lawgiver who gave the laws of morality on Mount Sinai and the Mount of Beatitudes; and that He said, "I came not to destroy the law and the prophets, but to fulfill them." Whatever changes he introduced were not changes in the code of morals, as the word is understood in this volume; whatever relaxations he permitted in observances formerly binding upon a nation, were far from being a release "from the fetters even of a Divine law." Surely there can be given a better and more reverent account of our Lord's more spiritual republication of a law which, in all its essentials, He retained, than this. Is it not evident in every page of the gospels that he honored the decalogue, for instance, so far as to remit men's consciences to its precepts, "Ye know the commandments?"

The style in which a higher and better interpreter of Christ's will delivers Himself, is a sufficient protest against all this. If there be *any other commandment*, it is briefly *comprehended*, not abolished or lost, in the saying, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Now where is this saying found, "*Thou shalt* love thy neighbor as thyself," but in that very law of which the author of *Ecce Homo* says that it was a system of passive morality, in opposition to the Christian, which is active and positive, *thou shalt* superceding *thou shalt not?*

"The Christian moral reformation may indeed be summed up in this—humanity changed from a restraint to a motive." This is a dictum to which, on many grounds, exception may be taken. The motive power of good-will to man reigns in the Old Testament as well as in the New; we cannot imagine the God of holiness omitting that, when teaching His creatures their duty, and bidding them "Be ye holy, for I am holy." The entire series of the ancient Scriptures, with all their charity in precept and example—the laws, the psalms and the prophets—protest against this unguarded statement. *Thou shalt* and *thou shalt not* are inseparably intertwined throughout the Bible, and while man is in his earthly probation, God hath joined them as the united sanction of human duty; let not man put them asunder. But our objection goes deeper still; it is one that has again and again been hinted at. Humanity is not the sphere of the Christian moral reformation: it is only one element in it. Christ has shown the spirituality of the requirements of the law in both its prohibitions and its injunctions; He has pointed to the recesses of the human heart as the seat of holiness; this holiness he nowhere declares to be, what it is constantly asserted to be in this volume, the enthusiasm of love to humanity, but something of which this enthusiasm is only one, and that an accidental development. It is the supreme ascendency of love to God in the soul, expelling, not selfishness only, but sin, the root of it, and bringing the will of man into perfect accordance with the will of God. The kingdom of God is not only the Christian commonwealth, it is also the indwelling of the Holy Trinity, "righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost," communion with God, as well as fellowship with man in charity. And beautiful, touching, and holy as is the idea of the "enthusiasm of humanity," it is doing it great injustice to make it the final end of our Saviour's new legislation among men.

We must quote one more passage, which strikes a chord so grateful to our feeling, that we regret to have to censure it in any measure. But censurable it is, when we comprehend all the meaning of its theme—*Christian morality:*—

"Those who stood by watching His career felt that his teaching, but probably still more his deeds, were creating a revolution in morality, and were setting to all previous legislations, Mosaic or Gentile, that seal which is at once ratification and abolition. While they watched, they felt the rules and maxims by which they had hither o lived, die into a higher and larger life. They felt the freedom which is gained by destroying selfishness, instead of restraining it, by crucifying the flesh instead of circumcising it. In this new rule they perceived all old rules to be included, but so included as to seem insignificant, axioms of moral science, beggarly elements. It no longer seemed to them necessary to prohibit in detail, and with laborious enumeration, the different acts by which a man may injure his neighbor. Now, that they had at heart, as the first of interests, the happiness of all with whom they might be brought in contact, they no longer required a law, for they had acquired a quiet and sensitive instinct, which restrained them from doing harm. But while the new morality incorporated into itself the old, how much ampler was its compass! A new continent in the moral globe was discovered. Positive morality took its place by the side of negative. To the duty of not doing harm, which may be called justice, was added the duty of doing good, which may properly receive the distinctively Christian name of charity. And this is the meaning of that prediction which certain shepherds, reported to have come to them in a mystic song, heard under the open sky of night ('carmine perfidiæ quod post nulla arguet ætas'), proclaiming the commencement of an era of 'good will to men.'"

The angels have given us a better interpretation of their song than this. It was not the advent of One who was to exalt justice into charity, but rather to make both one, by saving his people from their sins. They did not sing between the two Testaments that now at length good-will should reign *among* men only, but rather that the gospel of God's good-will was to be revealed in the sacrifice of Christ, bringing God's peace to man, and returning in glory to God in the highest. But it is not with this rhetorical use of the mystic word the shepherds "reported" that we quarrel. It is with the sweeping assertion that morality or Christian charity is doing good to man, "briefly comprehended," as it were, in this one saying, good will towards men;

and with the no less indefensible assertion that "all old rules" were made by Christ to seem "beggarly elements." Neither Christ nor His apostles ever countenanced the restriction of the former position, nor the positive error of the latter. St. Paul's authority—and we are bound to think St. Paul a high authority with the author of *Ecce Homo*—may be appealed to as repudiating both in one sentence. "The grace of God, that bringeth salvation, teacheth us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly." Here we have the true fundamental principles of positive morality that supersede all formulated enactments, the principles of all human holiness. But he does not teach us that the grace of God leaves man—leaves the subjects of the Christian commonwealth—to the spontaneous development of these principles; it *disciplines* us, it instructs, guides, and trains, by gentler and severer means, its pupils or its patients, to deny ungodliness and worldly lusts; and by this process of education, purifies a holy people unto Christ, who died to redeem us from the penalty of our sins, and to give us the spirit of a new obedience. If St. Paul's nervous word, "beggarly elements," is borrowed from him, he should be allowed to put his own meaning on the term. But we are very sure that he would never have mentioned its application in this passage; he would not have permitted it to be used by all those innumerable precepts of self-government, righteousness and devotion, by the painful observance of which human nature rises to the perfection of an instinctive obedience to all the laws of God. The Supreme Legislator knew "what was in man," and while He made love to Himself—not love to man—the test and impulse of all obedience, He required that it should be shown by *keeping all His commandments.*

The sum of all is, that this book gives us, we were about to say—the ideal legislator of an ideal community. Now, that there is an ideal commonwealth ever before the Legislator's view, we admit as heartily as the author of *Ecce Homo.* Indeed, we think those parts of his work are the most valuable in which he insists on the necessity of regarding the Saviour's ideal, and not the sad reality in the world, as the standard of our estimate of Christianity.

But this idealism—if the term may be so used—is carried much too far. It tends to obscure, while it seems to brighten, the form

of the founder of Christianity, as legislating for the souls whom He came to prepare, by a teaching condescension the counterpart of His atoning love, for a future kingdom, as yet existing only in the ideal. Making Him only man—so far as we can see—it yet leaves Him not enough of man for the need of mortals. It seems paradoxical, but if we may trust our feeling after reading this book very carefully, it is true, that while the Redeemer is bereft of His eternal Divinity, the true secret of His supreme authority and majesty, He is, at the same time, depicted as a Legislator of such awful grandeur and severity, that only very few can hear His words and live. As Legislator, He is not brought down to the need of those for whom He legislates. He delivers, as it were, councils of perfection to an exceedingly elect few, and His law is too simple, too high, too stringent for any but the interior circle. There are always some souls, multitudes of souls, who enter into that relation with Christ in which He rules without law. But there are always, in the Christian commonwealth, an infinitely larger number who are under the legislation of a gentle and meek Saviour, laying His burden upon them, that they may find rest, and bringing them under a yoke of merciful severity. He is a Legislator of more tender and gracious accommodation to poor human nature than this book makes Him. He is more actual and nearer to us than this ideal law-giver. His Saviour-heart, and His skill as the physician of human souls, however much talked about in this book, are not allowed to leave the right impression on our minds. He is too much the Legislator, too little the Saviour.

This undue ascendency of the ideal affects the view given of the Christian Church. With many of the eloquent paragraphs that describe and enforce the universal benevolence of the community bearing the name of Christ, we heartily agree. But the end, and government, and life of the Church are evermore referred, in the spirit of onesidedness and exaggeration that pervades the book, to one idea—the enthusiasm of humanity. It is, indeed, truly, though not altogether gracefully, said, that "the Church has sustained another part on earth besides that of the sister of charity; she has not merely sat by sick beds, and played the Lady Bountiful to poor people." And still better we read: "Accordingly, the enthusiasm of humanity in Christ did not propose to itself principally to procure qualifications and enjoyments

for the senses of men, but to make the Divine image more glorious in them, and to purge it, as far as possible, from impurities." But in his enthusiasm for the enthusiasm of humanity. the writer represents Christ as ordaining preaching and baptism, "because he regarded it as essential to the diffusion of true humanity, that men should form themselves into a society of which humanity should be the law, and that they should signalize their entrance into it by undergoing a special rite of purification." When the glow of this ardor for man declines, St. Paul reminds Christians "of their ideal;" that ideal being expressed as "putting on Christ," "Christ formed within," "filling up the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ." In other words, the great Christian law of edification is the building of the Church; the second great obligation of Christianity was to "convert mankind to Christian humanity, or holiness." This ideal of the end of the Christian Church brings all into subordination to it, removing out of sight all the New Testament teaching as to the external constitution of the Church as a society governed by the Holy Spirit, and setting only in a prominent light those portions of it that are concerned with the diffusion of the spirit of humanity. Hence the tendency of the whole is to make the Church not so much the conservator of the truth—a body growing up into the fullness of Christ, by the edification of a ministry and ordinances settled forever, and thus slowly but surely winning the world to the obedience of the faith—as a mystical community kept together by the enthusiasm for the human race, and forever varying its expedients according to the fluctuations of human misery, and the exigencies of every age. "At last the time came when the hidden principle of all law was revealed, and Christian humanity became the self-legislating life of mankind."

Once more, the idealist influence is seen in the morbid and exaggerated estimate which is expressed, and when not expressed, implied, of the success of Christianity in the world from age to age. The ideal that the Christian poet saw coming from heaven was "for a moment almost realized, and may be realized again. But what we see in history behind us, and the world around us, is, it must be confessed, not 'like a bride adorned for her husband.' The bridal dress is worn out, and the orange-flower is faded." This is not only bad taste, it is unsound theology and hollow criticism. The writer has an ideal of the militant Church

in his mind, which fairly belongs only to the Church when it has attained its perfection. Hence the constant tone of disparagement that pervades all his descriptions. Although he admits that the Christian Church "still displays vigor, and a capacity of adjusting itself to new conditions, and in all the transformations it undergoes remains visibly the same thing, and inspired by its Founder's universal and unquenchable spirit," yet he has but a slight respect for what it has done in the world at large—"it is possible to make it a question whether mankind has gained on the whole"—and by a variety of hints betrays his conviction that it is an unrealized ideal still. Hence it is easy, and almost necessary, that he should glide into the notion that too much has been expected of Christianity from its votaries. It is, after all, only "one of many revelations, and is very insufficient by itself for man's happiness." Its ideal cannot be worked out but by the coöperation of another revelation, reserved for these last days. "We live under the blessed light of science, a light yet far from its meridian, and dispersing every day some noxious superstition, some cowardice of the human spirit." It is true that "Christian morality, if somewhat less safe and exempt from perversion than science, is more directly and vitally beneficial to mankind." But he does not expect much from the Christian institute so long as it exacts supreme homage as the only regenerator of society. He has pitched his ideal, we repeat, too high; and finding it incapable of adjustment with the facts of the world, he seems to turn in despair to other more practical agents, attaining more sure results. What his real thoughts are as to the work of Christianity in the world, we may gather from the rash and irreverent words in which he classes those who, "content with Christianity, disregard science," with the enemies of light, "who took away the keys of knowledge" in Christ's day, and then utters his final indignation thus: "Assuredly they are graceless zealots who quote Moses against the expounders of a wisdom which Moses denied in vain, because it was reserved for a far later generation, for these modern men, to whom we may, with accurate truth, apply Christ's words, and say that the least among them is greater than Moses." Charges such as we have now brought against this book have, it would seem, been urged by others. The writer refers to them in his new preface, but in such a way, it seems to us, as to show that it is far easier to write paradoxes than to defend them.

We here close for the present, not doubting that we shall meet the author of *Ecce Homo* again in these pages. In shutting the book, after a careful reading, we cease to wonder at its popularity with a large class of the religiously-disposed public. It is carefully adapted to meet the case of all who, "musing in their hearts" concerning Jesus of Nazareth, are repelled, on the one hand, by the coarse infidelity of the modern critical school, while, on the other, they think it freedom to spurn the restraints of theological Christianity. To them it offers a free, but not, on the whole, irreverent handling of the "mysteries of Christ." The style in which its investigations are conducted is graceful and eloquent, such, indeed, as to win most upon those who study it most carefully. But, for ourselves, we have no doubt that its charm will be gone when the song is sung out, and that it will sink into the mass of that spent literature, which figures conspicuously for a season, excites an expectation which it disappoints, and sooner or later gives place to the teaching that gives a more "certain sound."

XX.—THE 'MORAL VIEW' OF THE ATONEMENT.*

The ancient limits between the great schools of theological thought seem temporarily effaced, and the dogmatic map of Christendom must be drawn anew. Before the commencement of the present century, nearly all who acknowledged the divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ maintained that the direct intention of his sufferings and death was to re-adjust the relations of the Divine government to the human race. Only those who affirmed the simple humanity of our Lord, rejected altogether the catholic idea of the Atonement. Arianism itself constructed a theory on which the humiliation and dying agonies of the Son of God were represented, as in some sense, satisfying the exigencies of Divine justice, and providing a reason for the remission of human sin.

But during the last fifty or sixty years, there have risen up in Germany and France, in England and America, distinguished theologians who have dissolved what appeared to be the natural and necessary alliance between the orthodox doctrine of the person of Christ, and the doctrine that by His death He made a true and proper atonement for the sins of mankind. They adore Him as God manifest in the flesh. If they shrink from accepting the intricate definitions of the Athanasian creed, it is not because they are disposed to withhold from our Lord any of the prerogatives or glories of Divinity. They even insist that the modern Church has degenerated from the faith of the fourth century; and they proclaim the fact of the Incarnation with all the energy and fervor of men who believe it to be their mission to re-assert a forgotten or neglected truth. But they repudiate the interpretation which, from the days of Polycarp to the days of Anselm, and from Anselm's days to our own, the vast majority of Christian theologians have attached to those passages of Holy Scripture which repre-

* A Review of Bushnell's *Vicarious Sacrifice*, and *The Life and the Light of Men*, by John Young: from the *British Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1866.

sent the death of Christ as a sacrifice, a ransom, a propitiation, for the sins of men. Their Gospel begins and ends with the song which the angels sang to the shepherds of Bethlehem. They contract their creed within the first fourteen verses of St. John's Gospel.

We propose to discuss in this article the principal objections of this new theological school—of which Dr. Bushnell and Dr. Young may be taken as among the fairest and ablest representatives—to the orthodox conception of the Atonement, and, in doing this, we shall be able both to illustrate and to sustain our own position. If, in the course of this discussion, Dr. Young's name occurs less frequently than Dr. Bushnell's, it is not because we are unimpressed by the great power and the admirable spirit of the English divine, but because Dr. Bushnell's treatise presents the 'Moral View' in a form rather more convenient for criticism. The two writers agree in their rejection of the theory of Expiation; and in answering one, we answer both.

1. We take objection to the very first sentences of Dr. Bushnell's argument. He thinks it will he conceded that the whole theory of the Atonement is still an open question in the Christian Church, and that after the lapse of more than eighteen centuries of Christian life and controversy, we have just arrived at that point at which some satisfactory solution may be possible. He claims to be no mere innovator—but one who is trying in good faith to make up some *defect*, more or less consciously felt by everybody, and bring on just that stage of progress in the truth, which its own past ages of history have been steadily preparing and asking for. In an historical review of the doctrine which he had prepared, but which he has not published, he believes that he was able to show "that no doctrine of the Atonement, or reconciliating work of Christ, has ever yet been developed, that can be said to have received the consent of the Christian world." In a sense, this is true; but not in a sense that can be of any use to Dr. Bushnell. No doubt the *doctrine* of the Atonement has assumed, in successive ages of the Church, very various forms—some of them grotesque, some of them horribly repulsive. Nor has the Church ever accepted any definition of the doctrine with the unanimity with which it has accepted the Athanasian definition of the Trinity. The theory of the relation of the death of Christ to God's moral government, has been entangled in the

philosophical and ethical speculations of many different schools of thought, and has never assumed a form to which the consent of hostile churches, and a long line of theologians, could be secured. But had Dr. Bushnell published the chapter he has suppressed, it would have been evident to his readers, that in every theory which has found general acceptance, there has been present the very idea which provokes his antagonism.

The Apostolic Fathers attempted no scientific development of the doctrine; but that they connected the sacrifice of Christ directly with the Divine forgiveness, it is difficult to dispute. The vicarious idea is as distinctly present in their representations of our Lord's death, as in the representations of any Calvinistic divine. They do not teach that Christ suffered simply to make us better, and so to effect our rescue from sin, but that "He gave His body for our body, His soul for our soul," and that "the remission of sins is by the shedding of [His] blood." If anything could demonstrate the depth and strength of the convictions of the early church, that the Atonement was not intended merely to exert a sanctifying influence on the human soul, but to accomplish a strictly objective deliverance from the penalties of wrongdoing, it would be the strange fancy that our Lord's death was a price paid to the devil for our release from his power. Had any tendency to the "Moral View" prevailed in the first five centuries, it is inexplicable how this revolting form of the doctrine could have arisen. It can be accounted for only on the hypothesis that, unable as the theologians of those times were to develop the true philosophy of the Atonement, it was a matter of faith that Christ died to deliver man from great objective evils. The notion that Christ died to satisfy the claims of the devil would never have been suggested, had the Church believed that the only, or even the principal purpose of His death, was to reveal to the soul the infinite mercy of God. The errors of theologians are sometimes among the plainest and most valuable indications of where Christian truth really lies.

We do not care to challenge the accuracy of Dr. Bushnell's account of Anselm's theory, in his famous *Cur Deus Homo.* Even if it be true that, according to Anselm, "retributive justice or penal suffering has nothing to do with the supposed satisfaction," and that "the satisfaction to God's honor turns wholly on the matter of Christ's obedience unto death," the objective ele-

ment of the Atonement is not eliminated.* The whole argument of Anselm's treatise rests on the principle that "with God there is no freedom but to do what is expedient or *fitting*;" and that "if it is not fitting for God to do anything unjustly or out of order, it does not belong to His freedom, or His kindness, or His will, to let go unpunished the sinner who does not pay that of which he has robbed God."† The same moral necessities which forbid God to lie or to act unjustly, forbid Him, according to Anselm, to pardon sin without satisfaction. Whether that satisfaction consists in what theologians have called the active obedience of Christ, or in His suffering, or in both, is unimportant in relation to the characteristic principle of Dr. Bushnell's book.

"After Anselm," writes Dr. Bushnell, "comes a long roll of teachers, reaching down to our own time, who have it as their endeavor, more or less distinctly, to unfold some conception of the cross, that will make it a salvation by its power on life and character. In this line we have Abelard, Hugo of St. Victor, Robert Pulleyn, Peter Lombard, Wycliffe, and Wessel, and Tauler; and nearer our own time John Locke, Dr. J. Taylor, Kant, DeWette and Schleiermacher." (p. 31.)

The necessary limits of this article forbid us to develop the theories of the theologians to whose reputation Dr. Bushnell virtually appeals on behalf of his own position; but it may be worth while to consider what is the real weight to be attached to these imposing names. That Abelard found the whole significance of the sufferings and death of Christ in the revelation they gave of the Divine love to man is admitted; but Abelard, throughout his life, was in open antagonism to the prevailing faith of Christendom. Hugo of St. Victor, while asserting strongly the importance of the moral influence of our Lord's death, did not abandon even the earlier notion of a legal transaction with the devil, and explicitly maintained the doctrine of expiation.‡ Peter Lombard, who, like Pulleyn, adhered to the general theory of Abelard, retained the proper idea of vicariousness, and he revived, in a most ludicrous form, one of the most eccentric fancies about the

* See the discussion of Neander's account of Anselm's theory in Shedd's History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. ii, pp. 281, 282, Note.

† Cur Deus Homo, Lib. I, C. 12.

‡ Christus ergo nascendo debitum hominis Patri solvit et *moriendo reatum hominis* expiavit. *De Sac.* Cap. 4. (Hagenbach.)

relation of Christ's death to Satan.* As for Wycliffe, he taught that "it is a light word to say that God might, of His power, forgive this sin [Adam's] without the aseeth [satisfaction] which was made for it, for God might do so if He would; but *His justice would not suffer it*, but requires that each trespass be punished, either on earth or in hell. And God may not accept a person to forgive him his sin without satisfaction."† Wessel is not less explicit. He says "According to the second or servant form, the Lord Jesus is not only Mediator between God and man, but rather Mediator for man between the God of justice and the God of mercy; for *it behooves that the whole law* of God's justice should be fulfilled, without failure of one jot or title, and as this has been achieved by Jesus, it is easy to find the way in which mercy can flow forth in streams of compassion. The wisdom of the Father, however, made the way by the device (artificio) of a mediator.‡ Even Locke said, in reply to the charge of Socinianism, "It is very hard for a Christian who reads the Scriptures with attention and unprejudiced mind, to deny the satisfaction of Christ;"§ and Dr. John Taylor, unable wholly to escape from the traditional faith that it is "for Christ's sake" that God saves mankind, taught that "obedience, or doing the will of God, was the sacrifice of a sweet smelling savor, which Christ offered unto God for us. It was His righteousness, or righteous, kind, benevolent actions, His obedient death, or the sacrifice of His blood and obedience, which made atonement for the sins of the world; so far, and in this sense, that God, *on account* of His goodness or perfect obedience so highly pleasing to Him, thought fit to grant unto mankind, whom he might in strict justice have destroyed for their sin and wickedness, the forgiveness of sin."‖

There is something more than Dr. Bushnell's theory here.¶ To

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* Non enim sufficeret illa poena, qua poenitentes ligat ecclesia, *nisi poena Christi co-operaretur*, qui pro nobis solvit. Quid fecit Redemptor captivatori nostro? *Tetendit ei muscipulam* crucem suam, posuit ibi *quasi escam* sanguinem suum. (Hagenbach.)

† Tracts and Treatises of Wycliffe, p. 84.

‡ Ullmann's Reformers before the Reformation, Vol. ii, p. 450.

§ A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity. Works, Vol vi. p. 418.

‖ Taylor's "Key to Apostolic Writings," pp. 45, 46.

¶ Even the theory developed in the striking and profound treatise on the Atonement by Mr. McLeod Campbell goes farther than Dr. Bushnell's. Mr. Campbell acknowledges what might be called a vicarious repentance and a vicarious confession on our Lord's part, by which our sins were expiated.

maintain that the "moral view" of the death of Christ is an adequate account of the awful mystery, is an innovation after all; an innovation which, we acknowledge, has been attempted more than once in past centuries, by some of the most distinguished genius, but which has never been able to secure a firm hold on the faith of the Church. The essential principle of Dr. Bushnell's scheme, is not a new contribution towards the settlement of a doctrine never yet fully matured; it is the revival of a rejected error. Whatever authority belongs to what we know to have been the faith of Christendom, from the earliest times to our own, though it cannot be invoked for any developed theory of the Atonement, sustains its objective character.

2. But it was not Dr. Bushnell's intention to claim these illustrious names on behalf of his own position; he only mentions them as belonging to a long roll of teachers who have it as their endeavor, more or less distinctly, to unfold some conception of the cross, that will make it a salvation by its power on life and character. (p. 31.) Indeed, he thinks that "Gospel teachers appear to have been trying everywhere, and in all the past ages, if not consciously, yet unconsciously, *to get beyond their own doctrine*, and to bring out some practically moral-power view of the cross, more fruitful and sanctifying than by their own particular doctrine it possibly can be." (p. 30.) We challenge Dr. Bushnell to give us a solitary name in support of the statement implied in this sentence. Let him quote a single line, or a single phrase, or the fragment of a phrase, which indicates that the theologians who have insisted on the direct relation of the death of Christ to the divine government, have had any consciousness of the necessity *of getting beyond their own doctrine*, in order to recognize its relation to the moral and spiritual life of man. He might as well say that those who believe in the Divinity of our Lord have to "get beyond their own doctrine," in order to illustrate the sympathies of His humanity, and the pathetic beauty of His earthly history. There is no need to deny the penal character of our Lord's death, in order to maintain that the infinite tenderness of the Divine heart was revealed in the sorrows and humiliation, the patience and compassion of Jesus of Nazareth. Our theory does not exclude—does not merely supplement—the "moral view," by insisting that Christ died to atone for sin. We augment that very power of His life and death over the souls of men, which Dr. Bushnell and Dr. Young,

and a number of other men not less able or less devout, charge us with ignoring.

We appeal to Dr. Bushnell himself. After writing four hundred and fifty pages to demonstrate that Expiation, Substitution, Propitiation, are the pernicious fancies of theologians, that the ideas they involve are morally revolting, that the theories they represent are hostile to the very genius and spirit of the Christian revelation, that the whole object of Christ's coming was to regenerate human nature by revealing God, he asks how the doctrine he has determined is to be used and preached. The answer, given roughly and briefly, amounts to this: Do not preach it at all; or rather, preach the other doctrine which has been under the fire of the author's logic, passion, denunciation, wit, from the first page to the four hundred and fiftieth. The "Moral View" is the only true one, but very little good, and some mischief may come of preaching it. The objective view is false, but it is necessary for the health and energy of human souls. The common belief about Christ dying as a sacrifice for sin, is offensive to the moral sense, but without it the death of Christ will produce no moral impression. The whole conception of an altar, a victim, an atonement, is a mistake; and yet the "most cultivated, most intellectual disciples" cannot do without it. The notions about a propitiation are an insult to God, but we must "get our dearest approaches to God in their use." Some care, indeed, is necessary to prevent misconception. The preacher should begin with "one or two discourses, showing what the sacrifices were not, and what they were,"—showing, that is, that they had no relation to God, but only to man—and then "let him throw himself on all these altar figures freely, allowing just such impressions to be taken, as there probably will be," (wrong impressions, in all probability, notwithstanding the one or two discourses) still going on without concern. (p. 471.)

That we have given the true sense of Dr. Bushnell's last chapter will appear from the following passages:—

"For, besides the outward figure of the facts, occuring under conditions of space and time, and significant to human feeling in that manner, *God has contrived* a thought-form, to assist us in that kind of use which may conduct us into the desired state of practical reconciliation with Himself. In the facts outwardly re-

garded there is no sacrifice, or oblation, or atonement, or propitiation, but simply a living and dying thus and thus. The facts are impressive, the person is clad in a wonderful dignity and beauty, the agony is eloquent of love, and the cross a very shocking murder triumphantly met; and *if then the question rises, how we are to use such a history so as to be reconciled by it, we hardly know in what way to begin. How shall we come unto God by help of this martyrdom? How shall we turn it, or turn ourselves under it, so as to be justified, and set in peace with God? Plainly there is a want here*, and this want is met by giving a *thought-form to the facts which is not in the facts themselves.* They are put directly into the molds of the altar, and we *are called to accept the crucified God-man as our sacrifice, an offering or oblation for us, our propitiation;* so to be sprinkled from our evil conscience, washed, purged, purified, cleansed from our sin. Instead of leaving the matter of the facts just as they occurred, there is a reverting to familiar forms of thought, made familiar partly for this purpose, and we are told, in brief, to use the facts just as we would the sin offerings of the altar, and make an altar grace of them—only a grace complete and perfect, an offering once for all. According to the Epistle to the Hebrews, this ancient ritual was devised by God, apart from its liturgical uses, to be the vehicle in words of the heavenly things in Christ, molds of thought for the world's grand altar-service in Christ—the universal offering, regulative conceptions for the fit receiving and effective use of the Gospel. And so much is there in this that, *without these forms of the altar, we should be utterly at a loss in making any use of the Christian facts, that would set us in a condition of practical reconciliation with God.* Christ is good, beautiful, wonderful. His disinterested love is a picture by itself; His forgiving patience melts into my feeling, His passion rends open my heart; but what is He for, and how shall He be made unto me the salvation I want? One word—He is my sacrifice—opens all to me; and beholding Him with all my sin upon Him, I count Him my offering, I come unto God by Him, and enter into the Holiest by His blood." (p. 460.) Again:—

"The principal reason for setting forth the matter of Christ's life and death as an oblation remains to be stated, viz., the necessity of somehow preventing an over-conscious state in the receiver. It was going to be a great fault in the use, that the disciple, looking for a power on his character, would keep himself too entirely in this attitude of consciousness, or voluntary self-application. He would be hanging round each fact and scene, to get some eloquent moving effect from it. And he would not only study how to get impressions, but, almost ere he is aware of it, to make them. Just here accordingly it was that the Scripture symbols, and especially those of the altar service, were to come to our aid, putting us into *a use of the Gospel so entirely objective* as to

scarcely suffer a recoil on our consciousness at all. When I conceive that Christ is my offering before God, my own choice lamb and God's, brought to the slaying, and that for my sin, my thought moves wholly outward and upward, bathing itself in the goodness and grace of the sacrifice. Doubtless there will be a power in it, *all the greater power that I am not looking after power*, and that nothing puts me thinking of effects upon myself. . . . . *We want, in short, to use these altar terms, just as freely as they are used by those who accept the formula of expiation, or judicial satisfaction for sin;* in just their manner too, when they are using them most practically. We cannot afford to lose these sacred forms of the altar. They fill an office which nothing else can fill, and serve a use which cannot be served without them. It may, perhaps, be granted that, considering the advances of culture and reflection now made, we should use them less, and the forms of common language more: still we have not gotten by the want of them, and we never shall. The most cultivated, most intellectual disciple wants them now, and will get his dearest approaches to God in their use. We can do without them, it may be, for a little while; but after a time we seem to be in *a Gospel that has no atmosphere*, and our breathing is a gasping state. Our very repentances are hampered by too great subjectivity, becoming, as it were, a pulling at our own shoulders. Our subjective applications of Christ get confused, and grow inefficacious. Our very prayers and thanksgivings get introverted and muddled. Trying to fight ourselves on in our own wars, courage dies, and impulse flags. And so we begin to sigh for some altar, whither we may go and just see the fire burning, and the smoke going up, on its own account, and circle it about with our believing hymns; some element of day, unto which we may come and simply see, without superintending the light." (pp. 462–3.)

Dr. Bushnell could hardly have cast this chapter when he wrote that sentence in his Introduction about the theologians who maintain the expiatory theory, trying "*to get beyond their own doctrine*, and bring out some practically moral-power view of the cross, more fruitful and sanctifying than by their own particular doctrine it can possibly be;" for his closing advice to his readers amounts to this: "My theory is the only one which can satisfy the speculative intellect, or endure the criticism of conscience, but the theory which I have destroyed is necessary to give depth and freedom to the spiritual life of man; the "moral view" is the only tolerable one in the lecture room, but to "make the cross a salvation by its own power on life and character," we must fall

back on the very conceptions which I have proved to be offensive to the conscience, and philosophically absurd." Dr. Bushnell begins by telling us that those who hold the expiatory theory have been always trying "to get beyond their own doctrine," in order to develop the moral power of the cross. He ends by recommending his own disciples to make use of all those conceptions of Christ's death, which the expiatory theory alone can justify, if they wish men to escape from a morbid self-consciousness, into the free state of faith and love.

It appears, therefore, that the "moral view" is morally powerless; and that the objective view, though utterly untenable, is necessary for the salvation of the world. The stone which the builders rejected has become the head stone of the corner.

3. We cannot allow that the common representation of the Atonement springs either from an ungenerous distrust of the Divine mercy, or from the presumptuous activity of the mere speculative intellect. There may be reason enough for Dr. Young's tone when he says, that in certain theories of expiation "God's procedure is not only vindicated, it is demonstrated to be correct politically, judically, even commercially correct in every point, to the very letter" (p. 64.); but it is the conscience of man which asks even more urgently than his intellect, for the facts which these theories are intended to illustrate. The conviction that it belongs to God to punish sin, is at least as deeply rooted in the soul as the conviction that God is infinitely merciful. It may be granted that the bare word of God should be enough to awaken, and to perpetuate faith in God's willingness to pardon; and yet it is not a restless spirit of speculation, or an unacknowledged distrust which asks for something more. It is no sign of defective confidence in God's righteousness and benevolence, to desire a solution of any of the perplexing mysteries of the moral universe, but rather a sign of the soul's indestructible conviction that if God were fully known, all perplexity would cease; and a sign, too, of the unexpressed conviction that since man was made in the Divine image, he has a capacity which, if undeveloped in this world, will be developed in the next, of understanding the moral reasons of the Divine acts, and perceiving their perfect justice and goodness. The question, "How can the just and Holy One forgive?" is no more the suggestion of a faltering confidence in the Divine mercy than the question, "Shall not the judge of all the

earth do right?" was the suggestion of faltering confidence in the Divine equity. The revelation of the Atonement — not the Atonement itself—is God's response to the homage of man's moral nature to the awful and inviolable majesty of the eternal law of righteousness. It is God's guarantee of man's innate belief that wrong-doing ought not to be simply passed by and forgotten. The moral perfections of God are not revealed alone. From the very first they have been developed harmoniously. As the early ages of the world's history knew less than we know of His goodness, they knew less of His justice too. In the Christian revelation, in which God has manifested Himself more fully than ever before to the human heart, He has also manifested Himself more fully to the human conscience. The moral sense of man would have been overborne, if, when the Holy God revealed so amazingly His infinite love for His sinful creature, there had not been a corresponding revelation of His judgment of that creature's guilt. The prophets and saints of the old world had little more than the general promise of the Divine mercy to rely upon; and such a promise, if nothing more had been given, should be enough for us; but the higher development of the moral life and thought of the human race, which is one of the results of the coming of Christ, has made the cry for an expiation more urgent and passionate.

Some of man's strongest moral instincts — instincts which Christianity itself has helped to intensify—will remain unsatisfied, if Christian theology cannot affirm that, in the old meaning of the words, the sin of the world was laid upon Christ.

4. The denial of the expiatory character of the Atonement introduces inextricable confusion into the theory of God's relations to the eternal law of righteousness. It is indeed quite possible to construct a philosophical scheme of the Divine government, which, if its first principles are conceded, will leave no room, or at least no necessity, for the vicarious element in the death of Christ. Deny the absolute and independent authority of the moral law; maintain that the mere will of God is the ultimate ground of all moral distinctions, and of all moral obligation, and you may have a theory of moral government, in which the penalties of sin may be remitted without reference to an objective atonement. But this theory is most energetically repudiated by the theologians represented by Dr. Bushnell and Dr. Young.

They believe, with Plato,* that actions are good, not because the gods are pleased with them, but that the gods are pleased with them because they are good; and that God's own highest perfections are illustrated in His eternal fidelity to the eternal right.

"The grand, primal fact then is, that God's own nature was in law, or crystallizing in eternal obligation, before He became a law-giver, and that He became a law-giver only because He was already in the power of law. Not that He was in obligation to any governing force above Him, or back of Him; for He was himself the only Being, and the container of all forces to be. The law was ideal, and not governmental; a simple thought, which, to think, was to be in everlasting, necessary obligation to it. There was no command upon God, no penalty hovered by to threaten; but, thinking *right*, His whole nature answered in sublime, self-prompted allegiance. And this allegiance to an idea, viz., *right*, was His righteousness, the sum of all His perfections, and the root and spring, in that manner, of all He governs for, or by instituted government maintains.—*Bushnell*, p. 187.

It is this eternal law which is the ultimate ground of the Divine government, and of creation itself; for, "the end of Creation is not happiness, but the virtue of rational souls."†

The constitution of our own moral nature, the relations between the soul and the material universe, were determined by it. It speaks in the human conscience. It was translated into human language by inspired men, and into a human life in the character and history of our Lord Jesus Christ. If its independent authority be denied, and the Divine Will be affirmed to be the original fountain of moral distinctions, the moral perfections of God have no splendor, and His commands no moral obligation—"*on peut être forcé d'obéir au plus fort on n'y est pas obligé.*"‡ It is because God is Righteous, not because He is Almighty, that it is our duty to obey Him.

Dr. Young is as firm as Dr Bushnell§ in maintaining what we believe to be the fundamental principle, both of theology and

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* Euthypro.

† Cobbe, *Intuitive Morals*, p. 7.

‡ Cousin, *Cours de Phil*, Serie II., Vol. ii, p. 272.

§ Our space does not permit us to refute Dr. Bushnell's singular chapters on "The Law before Government," and "Instituted Government." If the principles for which we contend, in replying to Dr. Young, are admitted, this part of Dr. Bushnell's theory requires no separate discussion.

ethics; and his chapter on "Spiritual Laws" illustrates very instructively the difficulties and confusion into which a very ingenious thinker must be plunged, in attempting to harmonize a great Truth with a very serious error. He begins by asserting the eternal and absolute authority of the laws of the spiritual universe; they are unchangeably the same; it lies in the essential nature of things that veracity, fidelity, rectitude, purity, loving-kindness, are good; they could never have been, they never can be, anything else. The "order of nature," on the other hand, is contingent; it might have been different from what it is—we have no certainty that it will not some day be altogether changed. As for the laws of human states, they are immutable; it is a necessity of their origin that they must be more or less unwise and unjust; at the best, there is an inevitable uncertainty about them, a doubtfulness and a degree of untrustworthiness, which tend to shake confidence, and materially to weaken the foundations of authority; they need, in all that is manifestly right, the utmost possible vindication and support.

"But on no such grounds as these, nor or any other grounds whatever, do spiritual ordinances need or admit of either vindication or protection, or support from human or Divine hands. Defender or avenger they have none, and they need none. Without aid from any quarter they avenge themselves, and exact, and continue without fail to exact, so long as the evil remains, the amount of penalty—visible and invisible—to the veriest jot and title which the deed of violation deserves. Essentially and perfectly wise and right, they are irresistible, in the case of the obedient and rebellious alike. There is no formal trial of the criminal; there is no need for investigating the question, and determining the amount of guilt or of innocence. Without inquiry, and without effort, each case discovers and exposes itself. No judicial verdict is pronounced, and no officer of justice is appointed to carry out the sentence; but, at once, punishment or reward, visible or invisible, or both, dispenses itself, and in the amount in which either is merited. Spiritual laws are self-acting; with *all their penalties and sanctions they are immediately* self-acting, and without the remotest possibility of failure or mistake."—*Young*, p. 87.

The *proton pseudos* of the "Moral View" of the Atonement lies in this passage. Unconsciously Dr. Young has glided away from the ideal law of right, which is the rule of God's eternal life, and of our own humbler activity, to the structural laws of man's

moral and spiritual nature. The ideal law is simply imperative; it defines righteousness and commands it; it condemns sin. But the "spiritual laws," of which Dr. Young is speaking now, which are "irresistible in the case of the obedient and rebellious alike," which do not "need or admit of either vindication or support from human or divine hand," are not ideal; they are not simply imperative; they exactly correspond in the soul to the laws of health and sickness in the body; they have their original ground in the eternal law, but are not identical with it.

Dr. Young leaves no place for the moral government of God. By the necessary constitution of man's moral nature, sin is followed with an inevitable and adequate penalty, and holiness crowned with a certain and complete reward. God has simply to look on and see the great machine work. As a moral ruler, He has nothing to do—He can do nothing. His moral activity is exhausted in sustaining the integrity of the righteous, and, by regenerating and sanctifying the wicked, recovering them from the corruption of sin.

But is there such a thing as Divine forgiveness? We do not raise any question at present, as to its connection with the change of moral and spiritual character which all admit to be necessary to salvation. It matters not, for our immediate purpose, whether forgiveness is supposed to be antecedent to regeneration or subsequent to it: or whether the two are supposed to be contemporaneous. It matters not on what grounds forgiveness is supposed to rest—whether God forgives men because Christ has died for the sin of the world, or whether He requires from men themselves penitence, or good works, or both, as an atonement for past wrong doing, or whether He forgives at the sole impulse of His infinite mercy. Let it be granted that the agonizing cry of the heart for God's pardon can be answered, and the narrow limits within which Dr. Young's philosophy would confine the functions of the moral Ruler of the Universe break down and disappear. For the Divine pardon is not identical with the moral transformation of the sinner. Forgiveness cancels guilt; absolves the sinner from liability to the penal consequences of past wrong doing. The interior energy of the Divine grace changes the very life of the soul and creates the dispositions which ensure future righteousness. The one deals with sin already committed, the other inspires the soul with strength to do better in the time to

come. To identify these two distinct Divine acts is to violate the laws of language and of thought, and to introduce confusion into the philosophy of man's spiritual life as well as into the theory of God's moral government.

The cry for pardon is the expression of a profound conviction of the soul that God may justly punish it for former crime; the prayer for regeneration expresses a desire for future holiness. If, as Athanasius said, long ago, the question of salvation pertained only to the corruption of sin and not to the guilt or ill desert of it, salvation would be effected by the moral change to which we give the name of repentance, but, if forgiveness is necessary, the guilt has to be cancelled as well the corruption purified.

The question is therefore immediately raised,—Does God forgive? or, as soon as we repent, are we released from the penalty of wrong doing, without His direct interference, and by the natural and necessary relenting of "spiritual laws?" If He forgives, on what grounds does He dissolve the connection between sin and its penalties? The penalties are deserved;—is God free to remit them? It is God's function to acknowledge the principles of the eternal law in government, as it is our's to acknowledge them in obedience; does it not belong to Him to recognize the ill-desert of sin, as well as to command righteousness, and to give us strength to obey Him? The penalties as well as the precepts of the moral government which God administers rest upon an eternal foundation. How, then, can He forgive?

It is not clear to us that either Dr. Bushnell or Dr. Young believes in what is commonly understood by the Divine forgiveness. Their theory of the constitution of the spiritual universe leaves no place for it. "In the very act, in the very moment of evil," according to Dr. Young, "the real penalty descends irresistibly, and in the very amount which is deserved. The sin insures, because it is, its own punishment." "Punishment or reward, visible or invisible, or both, dispenses itself, and in the amount in which either is merited." This is surely "rectilineal justice." But he also says:—"It can readily be shown that rectilineal justice, in the sense of apportioning exact desert, neither less nor more, is not an attribute of God at all." "He does not need to be, and He *is* not just in the human, rectilineal sense at all."

What then are we to believe? Can the penalties of sin be

remitted, averted, or not? Are we in the power of the "spiritual laws" which "never slumber," "and are never defrauded for a moment," whose "dire sanction" "there is no evading," from whose "retributive awards" there is no escape (pp. 96, 97), which infallibly and inevitably dispense "punishment or reward" "in the amount in which either is merited?" (*Young*, pp. 96, 97, 115), or are we in the good hands of Him who is "more and better than merely just, and acts on the ground of pure mercy?" (p. 119). "Ever, and ever," says Dr. Young, elsewhere, "justice inflicts an inevitable penalty and expects the *completest* satisfaction" (p. 115). And yet "the whole course of the world from the creation till now, and the manifest system of Divine Providence towards the good and towards the bad are right in the face of rectilineal justice" (p. 115).

Into such irreconcilable contradictions is an able man betrayed, when he constructs a theory which begins by affirming the independent and immutable authority of the eternal law of righteousness, and then denies the necessity of an Atonement as a condition of Divine pardon. Abelard was more consistent. He rejected the idea of expiation; but he also maintained that the Divine will is the fountain of moral law.

A reconciliation of these apparently conflicting statements is attempted in the following passage, which states very concisely the theory of redemption which is offered to us in the place of that which is commonly received in the Church:—

"There is no such attribute in God [as rectilineal justice]. But the inevitable punishment of moral evil always and everywhere, is certain nevertheless. The justice of the universe, in this sense, is a tremendous fact, an eternal and necessary fact which even God could not set aside. There is an irresistible, a real force, springing out of the essential constitution whereby sin punishes itself. This is the fixed law of the moral universe, a law in perfect harmony with the eternal will, and which never is, and never can be broken. God's mercy in our Lord Jesus Christ does not in the least set aside this justice; what it does is to remove and render non-existent, the only ground on which the claim of justice stands. Instead of arbitrarily withdrawing the criminal from punishment, it destroys in his soul that evil which is the only cause and reason of punishment, and which being removed, punishment ceases of itself." (pp. 115, 116).

Again we ask—Does God forgive? or does He simply change

the condition of a man so that he does not need forgiveness? We further deny that Dr. Young is entitled to affirm that his theory does not represent God "as arbitrarily withdrawing the criminal from punishment." If sin is not merely the only cause and reason of punishment," but, as is elsewhere maintained "its *own* punishment,"—the moral disorder and tendency to evil which every act of transgression increases, being the worst consequence of disobeying the Divine precepts—is not the punishment, after all, "arbitrarily withdrawn," if God by a supernatural interference restores the harmony and purity of the soul?

No natural law was violated when, at the Divine word, Lazarus, after he had been dead four days, left his sepulcher and came back to Bethany; for his resurrection was not an abnormal result of the common forces of the universe, whose regular action constitutes the "order of nature;" it was the immediate effect of a volition which is above all natural law. But is the Divine will superior to the laws of the spiritual universe? Does it move in a region where their obligation does not bind? Is it absolutely free to dissolve the connection between sin and its penalty? This passage of Dr. Young's alleviates no difficulty, and creates new confusion.

We believe that the sense of guilt in the human heart is a true witness to impending evils which past sin has provoked, and which future obedience cannot of itself avert; that sin is more than a moral disease which has simply to be cured; that it is a crime which must be either punished or forgiven. We reject, too, that conception of punishment, which represents it as simply an expedient to prevent wrong-doing; an expedient which may be arbitrarily dispensed with by the Moral Ruler of the universe, if wrong-doing can be prevented by other means. There is a story of an English judge, who once said to a criminal, "You are condemned to be transported, not because you have stolen these goods, but that goods may not be stolen." No principle more false in itself, or more ruinous to public morality, was ever announced from the English bench. The whole moral effect of punishment lies in its being just. The man who suffers for the benefit of others is a martyr, not a convict. When a great crime has been committed, which awakens the moral nature of a nation into fiery life, the cry is for justice, not for a great and edifying moral lesson; the salutary impression produced by a stern

sentence is only an incidental thing. "The suffering of a criminal benefits the public because it is deserved; it is not deserved because it benefits the public."

God cannot ignore the ill-desert of a sinner. By giving existence to creatures capable of obeying the eternal law, and therefore capable of transgressing it, He came into relations to the universe, and to the law itself, which oblige Him to recognize the guilt of wrong-doing. The penalties of sin are not arbitrary in their origin, and cannot, therefore, be arbitrarily annulled; God is free to determine how the principle to which these penalties do homage shall be honored, but not to violate the principle itself.

5. We have now to examine how the "moral view" of the atonement can be harmonized with the teaching of Holy Scripture; and although Dr. Bushnell is "clear in the conviction" that his theory has the "particular merit" of giving to the strong, substitutional or imputational phrases applied to Christ, "their most easy and genuinely natural meaning" (pp. 332–333), the language of inspired men writhes in torture under his hand; and, in the discussion of Jewish sacrifices, and of memorable facts in Old Testament history, he is habitually compelled, in the exegesis of a solitary quotation from Isaiah in St. Matthew's Gospel, to resort to that "heavy practice" with which he charges Dr. Magee.

This quotation is Dr. Bushnell's strong point. Matthew tells us (chap. viii, 17) that, "When the even was come, they brought unto Him many that were possessed with devils; and He cast out the spirits with His word, and healed all that were sick; that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying, Himself took our infirmities, and bare our sickness." This passage is introduced by Dr. Bushnell in his first chapter, as "being the one Scriptural citation that gives, beyond a question, the *usus loquendi* of all the vicarious and sacrificial language of the New Testament." He says:—

"Christ has been pouring out His sympathies all day, in acts of healing, run down, as it were, by the wretched multitudes crowding about Him, and imploring His pity. No humblest, most repulsive creature is neglected, or fails to receive His tenderest, most brotherly consideration. His heart accepts each one as a burden upon its feeling, and by that feeling, He is inserted into the lot, the pain, the sickness, the sorrow of each. And so the evangelist, having, as we see, no reference whatever to the substi-

tution for sin, says, "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying, Himself took our infirmities, and bare our sickness." And the text is the more remarkable that the passage he cites from Isaiah, is from his 53d chapter, which is, in fact, a kind of stock chapter, whence all the most vicarious language of the New Testament is drawn. Besides, the word *bare* occurs in the citation, a word that is based on the very same figure of carrying as that which is used in the expression, 'bare our sins,' 'bare the sins of many,' and is moreover precisely the same word which is used by the apostle when he says [βαστάζετε] "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfill the law of Christ." If, then, we desire to know exactly what the substitution of Christ for sin was, and how far it went—what it means, for example, that He bare our sins—we have only to revert back to what is here said of his relation to sicknesses, and our question is resolved.

"What, then, does it mean, that Christ 'bare our sicknesses?' Does it mean that He literally had our sicknesses transferred to Him, and so taken off from us? Does it mean that He became blind for the blind, lame for the lame, a leper for the lepers, suffering in Himself all the fevers and pains He took away from others? No one had ever such a thought. How then did He bear our sicknessess, or in what sense? In the sense that He took them on His feeling, had his heart burdened by the sense of them, bore the disgusts of their loathsome decays, felt their pains over again, in the tenderness of His more than human sensibility. Thus manifestly it was that He bare our sicknesses. His very love to us put Him, so far, in a vicarious relation to them, and made Him, so far, a partaker in them." (pp. 8–9).

Remembering how the very straitest of orthodox interpreters relax their rigor in discussing quotations from the Old Testament in the New, we are greatly edified, as well as a little astonished, by the severity with which Dr. Bushnell can, for once, play the precisian. We should no more dream of determining the *usus loquendi* of a common Biblical phrase, by its application in a single passage in which it happened to be quoted by an evangelist than we should think of determining the meaning of a line in Milton or Shakespeare by the use which Mr. Gladstone or Mr. Bright might make of it in a political debate. It is one of the cardinal principles of modern exegesis that the New Testament writers quote the language of psalmists and prophets very freely; that even the formula "that it might be fulfilled," sometimes means very little more than that the old words, though not perhaps in their exact and grammatical sense, may be used to describe the new fact. This exegetical principle is sometimes carried to a

perilous excess, so as to impeach, not the inspiration merely, but the common sense of the writers of the Christian Scriptures; but scarcely any thoughtful scholar will deny its essential soundness. We altogether deny that even if St. Matthew quoted the words in the sense which Dr. Bushnell suggests, this would reveal "the true law of interpretation" to be applied to the almost innumerable expressions which affirm "the vicarious relation of Christ to our sins."

But without availing ourselves of the theory that all the human sorrows of Christ entered into His expiatory work, there is no reason for those who maintain the unique significance of His death to dispute the accuracy of the evangelist in the present instance. With all respect for those orthodox interpreters who have thought otherwise, we believe that the original passage in Isaiah means exactly what the vast majority of theologians have supposed.* The words themselves, and the line of the prophet's thoughts, require the common interpretation. So far as we remember, there is no case in which *nasa* ("Surely he hath borne our griefs," Is. liii. 4) is used in the sense of "taking away," *apart from the idea that he who takes away, himself carries the burden which he removes from another.* The apparent exceptions, which occur to us are only apparent. The word *hh°layenu*, translated "our griefs" in Is. liii. 4, and "our infirmities" in Matt. viii, 17, is a general term for evils of all kinds. The verb *nasa* is accurately rendered "carried." The whole verse is very properly rendered "Surely He bore our griefs and carried our sorrows." That the prophet

* Dr. John Brown ("Sufferings and Glories of the Messiah," p. 205), denies that the vicarious idea is present in Is. liii. 4, at all. He says "the word rendered "bear," signifies to carry away, except when it is connected with sin, iniquity, or some such word, in which case it uniformly signifies to bear the punishment of sin or to forgive sin." He quotes 1 Sam. xvii, 37; Hos. v. 14; Judges xvi, 31. The first reference is a mistake, as *nasa* does not occur in the verse. It occurs, however, in v. 34: "there came a lion and a bear, and took [bore away, not simply removed, but carried off] a lamb out of the flock." The passage in Hosea is of the same kind: "I will be unto Ephraim as a lion, and as a young lion to the house of Judah; I, even I will tear and go away; I will *take away* [carry off, bear away], and none shall rescue him." The passage in Judges is the account of Samson's burial: "Then his brethren and all the house of his father came down and *took* [carried him, bore him] and brought him and buried him, etc.

The second half of the verse, "he carried our sorrows," Dr. Brown thinks refers to that deep sympathy with the sufferings of the afflicted, which induced him to labor even to fatigue in order to relieve them.

did not mean to say that "He took our griefs on His feeling; had His heart burdened by the sense of them," is plain from the second clause of the verse, "And we thought him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted." He endured visible sufferings, which made men suppose that He was under Divine chastisement. Had He simply *felt our pains over again, and in the tenderness of His more than human sensibility*, no such impression would have been given to the men who watched His history. The fifth verse, "But He was wounded for our transgressions," &c., confirms our interpretation. The natural meaning of the whole passage is, that the Messiah was to suffer, not merely in sympathy with suffering men, but for their sake, and as the direct result of their sins.

Nor does St. Matthew's use of the prophecy impeach this interpretation. The very object for which Christ *bore our griefs* was, that He might *bear them away* from us; He *carried our sorrows* that we might be *relieved from the burden of them.* Matthew saw in the benignant and merciful acts of Christ's miraculous power, an anticipation of the result of His predicted sufferings. Every cure that He wrought was a visible sign that His vicarious sorrows were already effecting their object. That the evangelist, or the author of the Greek version of His Gospel, wrote ἀσθενείας ἡμών as a translation of the Hebrew *hh°layenu*, which has a far wider meaning, is explained by the special occasion which suggested the quotation; and it is instructive to notice that instead of translating *nasa* by φέρει, (LXX) he has translated it by ἔλαβε; φέρει brings out most prominently the idea that Christ himself *bore* our griefs; but ἔλαβε suited Matthew's purpose better, as giving prominence to the idea that He *removed* them from us—though, as Dr. Bushnell justly says, λαμβάνω is not a mere taking away, but an appropriation on the part of the person who takes away.

That the Messiah was merely to take our sufferings as a burden upon His feeling, is a conception which the original passage resents; the prophet declares distinctly that in the ordinary sense of the words He was actually to bear them, and men were to think that He was being punished for His own sins when He was really bearing the punishment of ours. The quotation in St. Matthew will as little submit to what Dr. Bushnell thinks to be a "most natural, and certainly great and worthy meaning." The evangelist says nothing of a subjective sympathy with human dis-

tresses, but of that objective removal of them which, according to the orthodox theory, is the result of our Lord's atonement. The only difference between the Old Testament writer and the New, is, that the one thinks most of the vicarious suffering which constituted the Atonement, and the other of the benefits which flow from it; in neither the one nor the other is there any thought of a mere sympathetic sorrow.

This solitary passage is the great Scriptural argument for Dr. Bushnell's theory of our Lord's vicarious sacrifice. Every reference to the substitutionary character of His sufferings is to be interpreted by the testimony which has been extorted by rack and thumb-screw from this martyred text. An accidental application of a single prophecy is to determine the *usus loquendi* of innumerable expressions, the plain meaning of which can hardly be missed.

We should greatly regret to give our readers a false impression of Dr. Bushnell's treatise. Nothing that he writes can be common-place or worthless. In the development of his system, there are many paradoxes, but also many noble thoughts vividly expressed; and there is an intense glow of spiritual fervor on almost every page. But, in the way of positive teaching on our Lord's sufferings, he has nothing more to tell us than, that "Love is a principle essentially vicarious in its own nature, identifying the subject with others, so as to suffer their adversities and pains, and taking on itself the burden of their evil." In the sacrifice of Christ there is nothing unique. "Whatever we may say or hold, or believe concerning the vicarious sacrifice of Christ, we are to affirm in the same manner of God. The whole Deity is in it from eternity, and will to eternity be. . . . . There is a cross in God before the wood is seen upon Calvary; hid in God's own virtue itself, struggling on heavily in burdened feeling through all the previous ages, and struggling on heavily now, even in the throne of the world" (p. 36). The Holy Spirit bears the sins of men, precisely as Christ did Himself in His sacrifice" (p. 37). "All holy beings created are in exactly the same vicarious spirit and suffering way of love as Christ was, only not doing and suffering exactly the same things" (p. 54). Vicarious sacrifice is not "a point where Christ is distinguished from His followers, but the very life to which He restores them, in restoring them to God." "He lays it on His disciples to follow Him, and be, if they may,

the ransom purchase of others, saying, "Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and give His life a ransom for many." The profound spiritual truths which are implicated in this process of thought, it is not our present duty to dwell upon, but that this is nothing like an account of the Scriptural representation of our Lord's death may be made clear in a few paragraphs.

Dr. Bushnell contends that the phrases which speak of Christ as *bearing our sins* mean nothing more than "He took them on His feeling, had His heart burdened with them." That the pure nature of our Lord was distressed by the wickedness which was always about Him—by the insincerity, the sensuality, and the godlessness of the priests and of the people, is certain. There is something horrible in the number and variety of the forms of evil which pressed upon Him during the last few hours of His mortal life—the treachery of Judas, Peter's blasphemy and cowardice, the lying of the false witnesses, the malignity and hypocrisy of the priests, who were plotting murder, and would not go into the hall of the heathen governor, "lest they should be defiled;" Pilate's betrayal of justice, the brutal cruelty of the soldiers, the reckless bloodthirstiness of the people among whom He had gone about doing good, the heartless mockery of those who witnessed His dying agonies, the revilings of the impenitent thief. No doubt there was torture and unutterable anguish in His soul when He was in the immediate presence of these ghastly crimes —crimes committed by creatures for whom He had more than a brother's love, and whose flesh and blood He had assumed that He might be one of themselves, their very brother, by community of nature, through eternity. But neither evangelist nor apostles give us any hint that they are thinking of His moral sufferings when they speak of Christ's bearing the sin of the world. Any such interpretation of their language is specifically met and destroyed by the well-known passage in 1 Peter, ii, 24; "Who His own self bare our sins"—not "on His feeling" merely, as Dr. Bushnell would have it—but "in His own *body* on the tree."

There has been a disposition of late years, even among orthodox theologians, in developing the doctrine of the Atonement, to insist more strongly upon the mysterious sorrows of the soul of Christ than upon His death. This is a natural reaction and protest against the hypothesis that God found satisfaction in our

Lord's physical agonies, and against the coarse and intolerable representation of the tortures of the crucifixion, which were once common in Protestant pulpits, and which, we believe, are still frequently heard from Roman Catholic preachers. A place is still left for the significance of His death, but what is essential and most prominent with the writers of the New Testament is thrown back into a subordinate and inferior position. The "moral view," however, as illustrated by Dr. Bushnell, would be complete if the four Gospels closed with the story of Gethsemane, and if our Lord had been miraculously delivered from the death which was then threatening Him; or if Pilate's proposal had been accepted, and Jesus of Nazareth had been released, instead of Barabbas the robber.

"The Agony gives in a sense the key-note of his ministry, because it is pure moral suffering; the suffering, that is, of a burdened love, and of a holy and pure sensibility, on which the hell of the world's curse and retributive madness is just about to burst." "The moral tragedy of the garden is *supplemented* by the physical tragedy of the cross; where Jesus, by not shrinking from so great bodily pains which the coarse and sensuous mind of the world will more easily appreciate, shows the moral suffering of God for sinners more affectingly, because He does it in a lower phase of natural sensibility."—*Bushnell*, pp. 178, 179.

Can anything be more out of harmony with the whole strain of apostolic thought than to speak of the "physical tragedy of the cross *supplementing* the moral tragedy in the garden?" Throughout the New Testament, in the Gospels and in the Epistles alike, it is the *death* of Christ on which the salvation of the world is made to rest. Our Lord Himself speaks the same language as His inspired disciples. St. Paul does not say, "While we were yet sinners *Christ endured the agony of Gethsemane*," but "Christ *died* for us;" nor that "we have redemption through the moral sufferings of Christ," but "through His *blood;*" nor that "we were reconciled to God *by the mental distress* of our Lord," but "by the *death* of His Son." St. Peter says that we were redeemed "with the precious *blood* of Christ," that "He *died* the just for the unjust to bring us to God." St. John says, "The *blood* of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin." Our Lord said that His "*blood*" was "shed for many, for the remission of sins." Waiving, for the present, all controversy as to whether any or all of

these passages can be fairly interpreted as meaning that the direct end of our Lord's sufferings was to exert a moral and spiritual influence over us, not to atone for our sins, we contend that they at least demonstrate this point—that our Lord Himself and the apostles attach supreme importance to that "physical tragedy" which, according to Dr. Bushnell's theory, is consistently regarded as merely supplementary to what was far more significant. It is not the moral anguish of Christ which the New Testament connects with the forgiveness of sins, but His death. His death, not His agony, is "the key-note of His ministry."

Are we, then, to be driven back upon the revolting conception, that the value of our Lord's atonement is determined by the degree of the physical torture that He passed through during His passion? Must we take the crucifix as the visible type of our sermons? Must we speak incessantly of the nails crushing their way through His hands and feet, of the festering, fiery torment of the wounds, of His muscles convulsively contracting, of His feverish thirst? If we do, we cannot appeal in our defense to the authority of apostolic example. It is deeply suggestive that the New Testament writers, in speaking of the death of Christ in relation to the forgiveness of sin, do not dwell upon the horrors which aggravated it. It is not the suffering which preceded the death, but the death itself, which is always present to their thoughts when they refer to its atoning power. This is the more striking, because when the humiliation and death of our Lord are appealed to as an example, the apostolic manner is different. When the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, exhorting the Jewish Christians to constancy and endurance, turns aside from the long and illustrious procession of saints who had all "died in faith" to Jesus Himself, he reminds his readers that our Lord not only *died*, but "for the joy that was set before Him, *endured the cross, despising the shame;*" and they are exhorted to "consider Him that endured such *contradiction of sinners* against Himself, that they might not be "wearied and faint in their minds." When St. Paul charges the Christians at Philippi to show a spirit of self-sacrifice, to "look every man, not on his own things, but also on the things of others," and recalls the example of our Lord Jesus, he accumulates all the circumstances which illustrate the magnitude of His voluntary self-denial for the sake of mankind. "Being in the form of God (He) thought it not rob-

bery to be equal with God; but made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself," and not merely died, but "became obedient unto death, *even the death of the cross.*" Peter, speaking of Christ as atoning for human sin, says simply, "He died the just for the unjust, to bring us to God;" but in the verses immediately preceding this, having spoken of Christ as "leaving us an example that we should follow in His steps," he adds, "Who, when He *was reviled*, reviled not again; when He suffered, threatened not."

Of course, there are passages in which the duty of self-sacrifice is enforced by an appeal to the death of our Lord without any attempt to emphasize its terrors; but the point of our argument is, that though the Apostles dwell upon the ignominy and sufferings of the crucifixion when it is their intention to exalt a virtue which Christ manifested in dying for mankind, and which it is the duty of His followers to imitate, they limit themselves to a bare reference to His death, or His blood, when they are speaking of the means of our redemption. Not His moral sufferings, not His physical tortures, but the mere laying down of His life is what they connect with the forgiveness of sins.

Those who are interested in discovering the moral ideas of the Christian faith in the typical institutions of Judaism, will remember that no tortures were inflicted upon the animals offered as expiatory sacrifices; the shedding of their blood, not the amount of pain they endured, constituted the atonement.

That the distinction we have asserted between the death of Christ and the distress which He suffered from mere contact with human sin is not arbitrary and technical, is sufficiently proved by the profound influence it exerted on the whole structure of Apostolic thought. The distinction is never formally expressed, but it moulds and shapes all the references of the inspired writers to our Lord's work. It is inseparable from their thoughts. It determines their idiom. The principle of the distinction is perfectly intelligible. The grief and anger which our Lord felt at the "hardness of human hearts" were not, in any legitimate meaning of the word, penal consequences of sin. They had no more expiatory power than the sorrow of a father for his son's profligacy, or the anguish of a mother for her daughter's shame. That the moral pains of our Lord were in a sense voluntary,—because

his assumption of humanity was voluntary, and apart from the incarnation he would not, of course, have known the new experiences which were rendered possible by his human sensibilities, —does not change their essential nature.* We believe, too, that these moral pains were a revelation of Divine facts. He was "the image of God" when He wept over the crimes and impending calamities of Jerusalem, as well as when He wept at the grave of Lazarus. Men saw the Father, when they saw Christ's sorrow for their sins, as well as when they saw His compassion for their sufferings, and His joy over their repentance and well-doing. Dr. Bushnell cannot justify what he has said about "the *cross* in God before the wood is seen upon Calvary,"—but whatever difficulties may be involved in assigning to the vivid anthropomorphic language of the Old Testament its natural meaning, we think it most perilous to impeach the reality of God's displeasure and grief because of the wickedness of our race. There is a sorrow inseparable from love, when the objects of love are guilty of sin or are involved in great calamities. But this sorrow, we repeat, is not penal. It is no disgrace to feel it keenly. It belongs to the noblest natures to suffer its sharpest pangs. It is an indirect, not a direct consequence of wrong-doing. No matter how agonizing it may be, it does not satisfy the moral principle

* It will be observed—and we desire to call special attention to this point—that our argument is intended simply to show that *so far* as the moral sufferings of Christ were of *the same character as the sorrows occasioned to any holy being* by witnessing sin, they were not expiatory. The 'Moral View' recognizes in our Lord's distresses nothing that distinguishes them in their essential principle from what St. Paul felt when he thought of the unbelief and guilt of his countrymen—nothing that distinguishes them from the anguish of ordinary men occasioned by the sin and shame of relatives and friends. The elder divines believed that the "wrath of God" rested on the soul of Christ; this, if the theory could be made out, would produce moral sufferings truly penal. Some modern theologians, too, contend that the voluntary humiliation of the Eternal Word was in itself an expiatory act, and that therefore *all* the sorrows which came of it were expiatory. To criticise these positions would lead us far away from our immediate purpose. With those who insist upon the presence of the penal element in our Lord's moral sufferings—an element discriminating them in their very essence from all the common experiences of pure and upright beings—we do not desire to raise any controversy. But even to these, the characteristic manner of the inspired writers, who always connect forgiveness with the death of Christ, should suggest caution. The indispensable condition of *expiatory* suffering is that it should have a penal character. We hope to have an early opportunity of developing our own theory of the relations of the sufferings of our Lord to God's moral government. The present article is necessarily polemical and negative.

which imposes a penalty on the sinner. The criminal cannot allege the pain his crime has inflicted on pure and virtuous souls as a reason why he should be forgiven, and escape punishment. That pain has no expiatory value.

But the death of Christ has no analogy to the suffering occasioned to a holy being by witnessing moral evil. It cannot in any way be identified with the sorrow which a parent feels for the crime of a child, or a sister for a brother's ruin. It was not among the indirect sufferings which sin entails on the good; it was the specific punishment which sin was to entail on the sinner. In all the moral distress that our Lord felt for the crimes of our race, He was still standing out of the direct line of the penal consequences of wrong-doing; but when He died for us, He endured what no holy being ever endured before, or will endure again, a penalty with which Divine justice had guarded the eternal law of righteousness.* This was a new fact in the history of the universe. He who had ordained and inflicted the terrible sanctions of the law, is now seen, not in the place of the legislator and ruler, but in the place of the transgressor. He had, no doubt, been "burdened in feeling" by the sin of mankind before; but now He submits to what He had appointed to be the punishment of sin.

It may, however, be objected, that this is only an *explanation* of the death of Christ. It may be alleged that the emphasis with which our Lord Himself and the apostles insist upon His death, may be accounted for in another way. The theory of "the agony" being "the key-note of our Lord's ministry" may not be in harmony with the prevailing spirit of the New Testament writers, and yet Christ may have offered no expiatory sacrifice. His death on the cross may have had the supreme place in the thoughts of inspired men for other reasons; it may have been because the surrender of life is the consummation of self-sacrifice, or because, whatever the sorrows through which our Lord passed before, they culminated, not in the mere physical sufferings of the crucifixion, but in the moral anguish of his last hours—an-

* That infants die though they have not personally sinned may be alleged against the fundamental idea of our argument; the allegation may be satisfactorily met, but this article would extend through a whole number, and through many numbers of the *Review*, if we attempted a detailed reply to all objections, or even to important objections.

guish of which the Evangelists give us no uncertain intimations, and which has always exerted an awful and mysterious power over devout souls. He may had died to "*draw all men to Himself*," not to atone for sin; "the tragedy of the cross" may have been intended to produce, as it has in fact produced, the profoundest impressions on the hearts of men. The death of Christ may be the last and completest expression of that infinite love which was striving, at once, to shame the world for its sin, and to awaken confidence in the divine mercy. The death, even more than the agony, may have been "God's instrument of reconciliation and redemption, God's method of conquering the human heart, and of subduing a revolted world, and attaching it to His throne—pure love, self-sacrificing love, crucified dying love!"—*Young*, p. 313.

That this was one of the ends for which Christ died, as it was one of the ends for which He lived, is not conceded merely, but strenuously maintained by theologians who believe in the theory of expiation. They contend that Christ's endurance of the penalty of sin, is that element in His sufferings which gives greatest intensity to their influence over the human soul. But what we have called "the idiom" of the inspired writers is inexplicable if the solitary and immediate intention of our Lord's death was to inspire the heart with penitence and trust, and, by a transcendent revelation of the moral character of God, to restore the nature of man to the Divine image. Had this been Isaiah's conception of the Messiah's sufferings, he would surely have said, "He was wounded" for our *future obedience*, "bruised" for our *future holiness*. What he did say was, "He was wounded for our *transgressions*, and bruised for our *iniquities*." Paul would not have written, "He was delivered for our *offences*," "He gave Himself for our *sins*;" but He was delivered—He gave Himself—to awaken in us a keen love for *righteousness*, and to give us strength to *do the will of God*. Peter should have told us that "Christ also hath once suffered," not for our "*sins*," but—for our *sanctification*. These quotations—and they might be indefinitely multiplied—grew out of a different habit of thought about the death of Christ from that which the "Moral View" would have necessarily created.

Dr. Bushnell speaks more than once of the "charlatanism of interpretation," and tells us that "it is one of the saddest chap-

ters of our Christian history" (p. 409). It is "a considerable and sad part of his duty to reclaim the lost proof texts which have been carried over to the side of the satisfaction theory, and away from their very obvious natural meaning" (p. 119). We have no anxiety to press the right of "the satisfaction theory" to every proof text which has been appealed to in support of it, either in sermons or in grave theological treatises; let half of them go, and enough will be left to make that theory perfectly secure. But there is a "charlatanism of interpretation" possible on the other side. The mystery of the art is easily explained. There are texts which teach that Christ died to make men holy; *therefore*, according to Dr. Bushnell, other texts which teach that He died to atone for sin must be explained to mean that He died —not to expiate its guilt, but to cleanse us from its impurity. Because the ultimate object of Christ's death, as far as man is concerned, was to restore the soul to its lost integrity, therefore the immediate object could have had no relation to the remission of penalty for past offences.

Are there not innumerable cases in which our ultimate intention is spoken of as our immediate purpose—cases in which our declared object can be secured only by the intervention of an act to which our words only implicitly refer? Dr. Bushnell, let us suppose, has a son who has always had an unreasonable and uncomfortable distrust of his father's affection for him—we are sure our supposition is not a fact, for there is a glowing kindliness in his writings which makes us certain that all who know him must love and trust him. Young Horace is in great trouble about pecuniary obligations which have somehow come upon him, and which the severest economy and incessant industry will not enable him to discharge; the poor lad is wretched, and his health is giving way, but he shrinks from telling his father. The generous doctor finds the secret out, goes to him and exclaims—"I will put everything right, my boy! I can't endure to see your anxiety; you shall be happy again; I want the old light in your face once more, and the old ring in your voice; and Horace, my son, never distrust me in future. I think I am showing you now that I love you." "Thank you, father," replies the lad, "for your cheerful and affectionate moral influence on my mind." "Moral influence!" we think we hear the doctor saying, with a look of blank astonishment, "Why, I am going to set you right,

at the bank, Horace, I have written a check for ten thousand dollars." "But, father," young Horace answers, "I thought you said you merely wanted me to be happy again, and never to distrust you any more; it is surely not my past debts that you are thinking of; you don't mean to pay *them;* it is my future peace and my future confidence in your affection that you are anxious about." We think Dr. Bushnell would be quite clever enough to make the hopeful Horace, who had profited so much by the exegetical principles of his father's treatise on "Vicarious Sacrifice," understand that he intended to pay the debts just because he wanted his son to be free from trouble, and to be sure of his father's love. The "moral effect" might be his ultimate object; but the settlement of the balance on the wrong side at the bank might be the precise thing on which his mind was at that moment set.

In the light of this illustration—let us look at some of "the lost proof texts," which have "been stolen away from their rightful use and import,"—texts which, according to Dr. Bushnell really show that "Christ is here for what He can do in the restoration of character." We say that we will look at *some* of these texts which it was "a sad part of our author's duty to reclaim;" for we venture to say that several of them, if they were ever used on behalf of the expiatory theory, have been restored long ago by orthodox theologians, who are supposed still to retain them—to retain them not exactly feloniously, for Dr. Bushnell expressly exculpates us from the charge of "fraud" but without any sound proprietary right.

"Who gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us from this present evil world. It is not from God's justice, nor from any future wrath, that Christ will deliver when He gives Himself for our sins—no compensation to God's law is even thought of—but He gave Himself to deliver us from a state of evil now present; from corrupt custom, the law of this world, 'the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience.'"—*Bushnell*, p. 120.

But surely it is at least conceivable that though the ultimate object of our Lord was to "deliver us from this present evil world," it was indispensable that He should first suffer for the sins, of which we have already been guilty; and that this is the meaning of the phrase, "He gave Himself for our sins," is strongly

sustained by a subsequent passage in the same epistle;—Christ came to redeem us "from the curse of the law;" but He redeemed us by "being made a curse for us." The paragraph on this last text is too exquisite to be omitted.

"Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, that the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ." "Probably," says Dr. Bushnell—*very* probably, we should think—"the expression, *being made a curse* for us, does *imply* He somehow comes under the retributive consequences of sin—(imply!—if this is only implied, what is explicitly declared?)—in what manner will hereafter be explained,* but that will not justify the conclusion that Christ's *chief errand* was to satisfy God's justice (but was it part of "Christ's errand" at all? Dr. Bushnell says, no), and so to prepare the forgiveness of sin. Is not the object plainly declared, viz., "that the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles." "Is it then the blessing of Abraham, that God is satisfied, in Him, and forgiveness of sins obtained by Him? or is it rather that the Gentiles might come as near to God as Abraham was, and be so brought in as to be also friends of God with Him."

Here again the ultimate effect of our Lord's sacrifice is illegitimately made to exclude the intermediate conditions on which that effect depends. Again:—

"For Christ also hath suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us unto God." As if this suffering, the just for the unjust, must, of course, mean a suffering of penalty for the unjust, when it is even declared as the object of the suffering ministry and mission, that "He might bring us to God."—*Bushnell*, p. 120.

The "heavy practice" necessary to "reclaim" this "lost proof text" may well have made Dr. Bushnell's duty "sad." No one denies that Christ suffered "to bring us to God," but Dr. Bushnell denies what St. Peter plainly asserts, that He effected this by suffering, not merely for our future righteousness, but for our past iniquities. For he is saying to "the strangers scattered

* The promised explanation is given on page 442. "The meaning [of "Christ is made a curse for us,"] is exhausted when He is conceived to simply come into the corporate state of evil, and bear it with us—faithful unto death for our recovery." "Bear it *with* us!" This is what the 'Moral View' requires Dr. Bushnell to say; but St. Paul says, He bears it '*for* us,' which is a very different thing. How is it that the apostles uniformly avoid the "*with*" when they are speaking of Christ's death in relation to human forgiveness and justification?

abroad throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia and Bithynia, that it is better if the will of God be so that ye suffer for well-doing than for evil doing;" better, that is, they should suffer *punishment* from wicked men for their fidelity to Christ than for offences, for which God Himself would condemn them; and then he reminds them that Christ Himself "*suffered* for sins, the just for the unjust." They were likely to suffer, not in their moral sympathies, or their burdened feelings, but by the loss of property, by public shame, by expulsion from their homes, perhaps by death itself; and Peter charges them to see to it, that they suffered not for real crimes but for "well doing." They ought to suffer with the same patience and courage which Christ Himself manifested—for He too suffered—suffered, as they knew, for *sins*, not indeed for His own sins but for the sins of men; died the just *for* the unjust. Dr. Bushnell's theory would have given this verse a different turn. It would have read, "Christ also suffered for *well-doing*—and He the Just One died *unjustly;*" or else, "He the Just One, like you had to suffer cruel wrongs from unjust and wicked men;" but though Peter had once told the Jews that the Christ, whom God had sent to them, they "with wicked hands had crucified and slain," he is thinking here, not of what Christ suffered *from* His enemies, but of what He suffered *for* them.

We have space for only one more illustration of the treatment to which texts of this class are subjected.

"Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sins of the world." It is not said that He taketh away the punishments of the world, but "the sins"—just that which was signified by the sacrifices of the altar, and the scape-goat sent away into the wilderness. The lamb was not punished, neither was the goat. The very thing signified was the removal, or deportation of the sin! —*Bushnell*, p. 119.

When John delivered this testimony it is practically certain that the great prophecy of Isaiah was prominently before his mind, and would be instantly brought before the minds of those who heard him. If this is granted, then the expiatory sufferings of our Lord were the direct subject of John's testimony. But suppose that John's words had no connection with that memorable passage, the words themselves are in irreconcilable hostility to Dr. Bushnell's interpretation. "The Lamb," he says, "was not

punished. What lamb does he mean? The paschal lamb was slain; the lamb offered as a "burnt-offering" at the morning and evening sacrifice was slain; and death, in the ordinary opinion of mankind, is the last and supreme penalty of sin. About the "scape-goat" being sent away into the wilderness, it is not necessary for us to say anything simply because John says nothing about it.

"The thing signified," Dr. Bushnell tells us, "was the removal or deportation of the sin." Signified by what? By the scape-goat, no doubt, and Dr. Bushnell should have remembered that one goat was slain before "the deportation of the sin" was symbolized, by the sending of the other into the wilderness; but whether it was Isaiah's prophecy that suggested the form of John's testimony, or any of the lambs offered for sin under the Jewish law, the idea of suffering in order that sin might be removed, cannot be separated from the passage. There was no scape-*lamb*, though there was a scape-*goat*. Both the Messiah of Isaiah liii, and the sin-offerings of the Temple are represented as *taking away sin* by making expiation for it.

It is due, however, to Dr. Bushnell, that we should consider the positive arguments by which he attempts to demonstrate that the expiatory theory has no place in Holy Scripture. "Is there," he inquires, "any such theory as expiation contained or supposed to be wrought in the Scripture sacrifices?" He replies, "I am able, after a most thorough and complete examination of the Scriptures, to affirm with confidence, that they exhibit no trace of expiation" (p. 425).

His first point is, that "nothing was made of the victim's death, or pain of dying, in the ancient sacrifices." To this it is only necessary to reply, that *death* and the *pain* of dying, are two very different things. English law requires that a murderer should be hung; but the whole nation would now cry out against subjecting him to torture; the "death" is required, but not the pain of dying; the "pain" is reduced to the lowest possible amount consistent with a shameful execution. As the infliction of death was uniformly and imperatively required as part of the ritual of the sin-offering, it is rather bold to affirm that "nothing was made of the victim's death." It is quite true that it was "the blood" which was "all-purifying" (p. 401); but no purification could be effected by the blood of a living animal: the

death of the animal was necessary before its blood could symbolize "the sacred, mystic, new creating of life."

His second point is, that—

"Expiations are always conspicuous in their meaning. No man could ever raise a doubt of the expiatory object of the pagan sacrifices; no such doubt was ever entertained. In this view, if the Scripture sacrifices do not show an expiatory meaning on their face, and declare themselves unmistakably in that character—if it is a matter of rational doubt or debate, such doubt is a clear presumptive evidence that their object is somehow different." (p. 426).

It might not be courteous to reply, that the chief reason that men do not perceive "the expiatory object" of the Mosaic sacrifices is a desire to eliminate the expiatory element from the sacrifice of Christ; but Dr. Bushnell will allow us to say, that in the judgment of nearly all Christendom, from the earliest centuries till now, it has not been "a matter of rational doubt or debate," that the sin-offerings of the Levitical system had an "expiatory meaning." We hope to show that nothing he has said calls for any reversal of this judgment.

Thirdly, he objects that—

"The original of the word atone, or *make atonement* in the Hebrew Scripture, carries no such idea of expiation. It simply speaks of *covering*, or *making cover* for sin, and is sufficiently answered by anything which removes it, hides it from the sight, brings into a state of reconciliation, where the impeachment of it is gone. . . . . Everything turns here, manifestly on the meaning of the original Hebrew word; and as the root or symbol of this word means simply *to cover*, we can see for ourselves that, while it might be applied as a figure, to denote a covering by expiation, it can certainly as well and as naturally be applied to anything which hides or takes away transgression" (p. 427).

But if the word is almost uniformly used in a connection which shows that the "covering" was effected by "expiation," it is to no purpose to urge that it can "as well and as naturally be applied to anything which hides or takes away transgression." Can he give us any instance in which atonement can possibly mean the awakening of repentance in the wrong-doer?

The true explanation of the word is, that it means originally to "cover;" that, in relation to sin, it always means so to cover it

as to avert the *penalty* due to it; and that this covering is almost always effected by expiation. It is, without exception, an objective effect that is said to be accomplished by atonement.

The fourth point is, that—

"Atonements are accordingly said to be made, where the very idea of expiation is excluded, and sometimes where there is in fact no sacrifice at all."

He instances first the atonements which were made for the sanctifying of the altar; the altar could not sin; and, therefore, no expiation could be made for its sin. But the ceremony of making an atonement for the altar, and indeed for "the holy place" itself, was repeated every year on the great day of atonement; and the reason of the ceremony is given in Leviticus xvi. 16: "He shall make an atonement for the holy place, because of the uncleanness of *the children of Israel*, and because of their transgressions in all their sins." Kurtz gives a very just interpretation of the ritual, when he says that, "having been erected in the midst of the sinful nation they might be regarded as having been contaminated and defiled by the impurity of the atmosphere that surrounded them."* The sanctification of the altar "in men's feeling," was the result of the atonement for the sins which had defiled it.

The other case, "where expiation is excluded because there is no sacrifice," is that of the intercession of Moses, who, when the people had sinned by making and worshiping the golden calf, said, "Now I will go up unto the Lord, peradventure I shall make an atonement for your sins." No more fatal illustration could have been alleged on behalf of the theory it is quoted to support.

For (1), according to the "Moral View," Moses should have preached to the people to bring them to a better mind; instead of this, he went up into the mount to pray to God. Plainly he must have thought that the immediate object of atonement was not to make men better, but to avert God's displeasure. (2) Did Dr. Bushnell forget the sublime spirit of self-sacrifice which was in the heart of the great legislator, when he went back into the solitudes of Sinai to meet God. "Yet now, if thou wilt forgive their sin," he exclaimed, "and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of

* Sacrificial Worship of the Old Testament, p. 386.

thy book;" anticipating the passionate exclamation of St. Paul, "I could wish myself accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh." It is clear that the immediate purpose of Moses was to obtain Divine pardon for the sins which the people had already committed, not to keep them from sin in the time to come; and it is even possible that, when he spoke to them of "atonement" he was meditating an appeal to God that he might himself be punished in their stead. In any case he was endeavoring to "cover" the sin, not by leading the idolaters to repentance, but by interposing something—perhaps his own vicarious intercession merely—between the anger of God and the guilt of the people.

Fifthly:—

"It is a great point that expiations or expiatory sacrifices are certainly not offered where we should expect them to be, if they are offered at all." He instances again the case of the golden calf, also the meeting which followed the judgment of Korah, and the reformation of Jonah and of Ezra.* "In all such cases," he says, "and they are many, we look for expiation, and do not find it, and what is quite as remarkable, there is no case to be found where God's anger in a day of guilt and fear is placated, or ever attempted to be, by a clearly expiatory sacrifice." (pp. 428–430).

The reference to the popular discontent which followed the destruction of Korah, Datha, and Abiram, is singularly infelicitous. Moses said unto "Aaron, take a censer and put fire thereon from off the altar, and put on incense, and go quickly into the congregation, and make an atonement for them." Dr. Bushnell says "It is never supposed that there is any such thing as expiation by incense." But (1), what was the object of the act which Moses suggested? To use Dr. Bushnell's language, no one supposes "that it was intended to touch the hearts of the people. There is wrath gone out from the Lord; *the plague is begun;* and Aaron's direct and sole purpose was to appeal to the Divine Mercy, and to avert the wrath against the whole nation which threatened to consume them as in a moment." If there was no "expiation," there was certainly not "such a working on the bad mind of sin as . . . . . reconciles it to God." "The effect" was not what Dr. Bushnell declares the effect of atonement to

* But Ezra did offer "twelve he-goats for a sin-offering," Ezra viii, 35.

be, "wholly subjective, being a change wrought in all the principles of life and character, and dispositions of the soul." And (2) the fire is distinctly stated to have been taken "*from the altar.*" The burning incense was thus connected with the ritual of expiation.

It is, however, perfectly true that the Jewish law did not provide for the expiation by sacrifice of definite moral offences, strictly so called.* This act of Aaron's stands alone, so far as we remember, in old Testament history. It was the natural impulse of a moment of agony, and the spirit in which the appeal was made to the Divine mercy was a reason for the Divine response to it; no such use either of incense or of sacrifices was contemplated in the Levitical institutions. We shall have occasion to speak of the great annual atonement in reply to another passage in Dr. Bushnell's treatise; but, apart from that ceremonial, prescribed for a particular day once a year, the Jewish sacrifices did not profess to atone for violations of the moral law. Only involuntary ceremonial offences, which were but the symbols of real moral transgressions, could be expiated by sacrifices which were but the symbols of the real atonement for sin. Had it been otherwise the worst and most fatal consequences would have followed. If, when an individual or the whole nation had committed any moral offence, or intentionally violated any ceremonial law, the Levitical system had provided a ritual of atonement, nothing could have prevented the external act from being regarded as a means, divinely appointed, for canceling the guilt. No exhortations about the necessity of repentance would have had any practical effect. "The moral sense of the nation would have been enfeebled and paralyzed by the natural influence of its religious institutions." When, therefore, Dr. Bushnell says that "expiatory sacrifices are certainly not offered where he should expect them to be," he shows that he has failed to recognize a most remarkable proof of the profound wisdom of the Mosaic legislation. In such cases as he instances—cases of gross moral offences—expiatory sacrifices were not offered, because they were not prescribed; to have prescribed them would have been to inflict the gravest injury on the moral life of the people.†

* For a fuller discussion of the whole question, and for the limitations with which this statement is to be taken, see "*The Jewish Temple and the Christian Church*," by R. W. Dale, M. A., pp. 270–296.

† The "sin-offerings" of Ezra (Ezra viii, 35) and of Hezekiah (2 Chron. xxix,

Sixthly:—

"The requirement of the heart, as a condition necessary to acceptance in the sacrifice, is a very strong presumptive evidence that no idea of expiation belonged to sacrifice. At first nothing appears to be said of the spirit in which the offering is to be made, though it is not to be supposed that it was ever accepted, in any but a merely ritual and ceremonial sense, unless coupled unconsciously, or implicitly, with a true feeling of repentance." (p. 430).

A closer investigation of the Jewish sacrificial system, would have led to the canceling not only of these two sentences, but of the four or five paragraphs which follow them. For (1) it is a fact which any one may verify for himself that, though four books of the Pentateuch are almost filled with ritualistic laws, there is not a single line to remind the man who brings a sin-offering to the priest, that its atoning efficacy will depend upon "the spirit" in which the offering is made. (2). The offences which could be expiated by sacrifices, were not, generally speaking, such as could be thought of "unconsciously or implicitly with a true feeling of repentance," and in the special cases, in which acts of injustice were atoned for by "trespass-offerings," the wrong had actually been undone by voluntary restitution to the injured person, and the shame of public confession had been voluntarily endured, before the sacrifice was presented. (3). The denunciations of the prophets, directed against the hypocrisy and formalism of the Jewish people, were not intended to show that ceremonial atonements could not expiate involuntary ceremonial offences unless there was a right "spirit" in the offerer. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Amos, and Micah insist upon the great moral duties which the nation had neglected, denounce the moral offences of which the kings, priests, and commonalty were guilty, and in the very spirit of the ancient legislation, maintain that no ritualistic services can compensate for disobeying the moral law.

A singular use is made of Saul's haste to offer sacrifices at the commencement of his campaign against the Philistines, and his sparing of the spoil taken from Agag.

"We find that Saul, an overgrown child of superstition,

20 seq.) do not invalidate the general principles maintained above. They were in strict harmony with the spirit of the Mosaic legislation, though not prescribed for such occasions by the letter of the law. They also show how deep was the conviction that the "sin-offerings" had symbolically an expiatory value.

offers a sacrifice on two several occasions in his own way, disregarding God's appointed way, and even His special command,—in the first instance, because, in going to battle, he wants to 'make supplication to the Lord;' and in the second, because, having gained a victory, he wants to honor God in a grand ovation of sacrifice—whereupon Samuel meets him in sharp rebuke, saying, 'Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices as in obeying the voice of the Lord?' Behold (this appears to be an already accepted proverb) to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams."—*Bushnell*, p. 431.

Surely this does not prove that "the spirit" in which the offering was made was essential to whatever expiatory effect the sin-offerings were supposed to produce. For (1) it is not said that Saul offered, or intended to offer, any "sin-offerings" at all. (2) Saul committed, in the first instance, a moral offence in not waiting till Samuel came. As Samuel had told the king to wait for his coming, Saul was guilty of impatience and distrust by precipitately offering the sacrifice before the prophet's arrival. It was of the greatest importance that the first human monarch of the elect nation should recognize God as the true invisible king, under whose authority he reigned:—

> "Ere Saul they chose,
> God was their King, and God they durst depose,"—

but Saul was about to attack the Philistines without the Divine directions which Samuel would have given him. "He disregarded," as Dr. Bushnell says, "God's special command," and did not merely fail to offer his sacrifices in the right "spirit." In the second instance, Saul had already disobeyed "the voice of the Lord" in preserving the spoil which he had been told to destroy. Samuel does not condemn him for being about to sacrifice "the sheep and oxen," without "the requirement of the heart," which was "a condition necessary to acceptance in the sacrifices," but for rebellion and stubbornness.

Dr. Bushnell's seventh point, that it was not the death, but the blood which was the significant element in the Jewish sacrifice, and that as "the blood is the life, so it is life-giving; a symbol of God's inward purifying and regenerating baptism in the remission of sins," has already been answered. Even if it be true that this was the meaning of the sprinkling of the blood of the victim, it only shows that after the death had expiated guilt, and

so averted penalty, the removal of the interior pollution was still necessary.

Eighthly, it is maintained that "the passover sacrifice has certainly nothing of expiation in it," and that as "the Christian supper, which commemorates our Lord's death, is the continuance of this ceremony," it is unlikely that the death of Christ was expiatory. This argument we can afford to let go; to discuss it would carry us far beyond the space to which the present article must be limited; but that there was an expiatory value in the blood of the paschal lamb is confessed by some who deny that it was properly a sin-offering.*

Ninthly, Dr. Bushnell cannot believe that the sacrifices were associated with "notions of penal sanction for sin," because all "the most joyous and grandest religious festivals were celebrated in rivers of blood." But (1) why should not the Jews rejoice when their sins had been atoned for; and especially when by "burnt offerings," between which and "offerings for sin," Dr. Bushnell makes no distinction, "they had surrendered themselves afresh to God?" Nehemiah and Ezra checked the grief occasioned by the reading of the law, and charged the people at the very time they were distressed by their long neglect, to go their way, eat the fat, and drink the sweet, and send portions to them for whom nothing is provided." (2) The day on which the annual atonement was effected was not a day of gladness; there were no "processions of music and songs of praise;" but the people were to afflict their souls.

Finally, it is alleged that:—

> "When the rite of sacrifice bears a look of expiation, and the instances are taken as facts of expiation, a closer examination shows, in every case, that the impression is not supported by the transaction."

The sacrifice of Job for his sins is the single historical example on which Dr. Bushnell relies, and as we believe that in the "burnt offerings" of patriarchal times, the expiatory idea, if present at all, was exceedingly obscure, we do not take any exception to the paragraph in which it is contended, that this was at most a supplicatory offering.

We cannot extract, nor indeed is it necessary that we should,

* See KURTZ, *Sacrificial Worship of the Old Testament*, p. 367.

Dr. Bushnell's account of the solemnities of the day of atonement. A single paragraph in which, under the influence of the fundamental mistake of his whole argument, he implies that what is intended to produce a moral effect upon man, cannot, at the same time, be expiatory before God, will adequately represent his account of these remarkable ceremonies.

"We shall be struck, in the review of them, *not with any discovery of an expiatory element*, but with the fact that everything is ordered with such a manifestly artistic study and skill, to beget, in minds too crude for the reflective modes of exercise, a whole set of impressions answering to those of the Christian doctrine of salvation; the holiness of God, the uncleanness and deep guilt of sin, and the faith of God's forgiving mercy" (p. 438).

Expiation, as defined by Dr. J. Pye Smith, "denotes anything that may supply an *adequate reason* for exempting the criminal from the penalty due,"* and it admits of proof that expiation was the most conspicuous and sometimes the only idea of all the sin-offerings" and "trespass-offerings," of the Mosaic legislation. The subjective effect was secured by the presentation of an objective atonement.

Dr. Bushnell discovers no "expiatory element" in the service on the great Day of Atonement; but what was a Jew likely to discover in it? If the "Moral View" had been suggested to a devout worshiper in the Tabernacle or the Temple, we can imagine him giving some such reply as this:—"What atonement is, I know. More than once, ignorantly and unintentionally, I have broken the precepts of the law, and when I discovered my offence, I was troubled by fear of the Divine displeasure. I brought a kid of the goats to the priest, and he offered it as a 'sin offering,'—it was an expiation for the transgression I did not mean to commit; when it was offered my involuntary offence was blotted out. But I have been guilty of sins innumerable for which I could not offer any expiation. For my ungoverned anger, for my selfishness, for my want of pity for the poor, for the ingratitude of my heart to Jehovah for all his goodness to me, the law permits me to bring no sacrifice. If my lesser offences can only be forgiven when the priest has atoned for them, these greater sins must surely need atonement too. My case is that of

* *Outlines of Christian Theology*, p. 531.

the whole nation. We have all sinned and done wickedly; and though we have expiated involuntary transgressions, for our worst crimes no expiation has been made. But year by year, we call to mind all our iniquities and we "afflict our souls." We assemble before the holy place, and sacrifices are slain, for us all. They are called "sin offerings"—the very name which is given to the atonements for our inferior transgressions of the law. We cannot, indeed, believe that if one man must bring a goat to expiate an unintentional breach of God's lighter precepts, these two goats can expiate all the great offences of which all the people have been guilty; and yet these two goats are also "a sin-offering;" over the head of one of them the high priest confesses "all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins." Lev. xvi. 21. Surely I am to think of the sacrifices offered for the nation as I think of the sacrifices which I have offered for myself; when the annual atonement is made, I may look to God to pardon me. God means me to think of all my sins as expiated by the death of the goat that is slain, and as removed from me, "far as the east is from the west," by the goat that is driven into the wilderness. No promise, indeed, is given that when the day is over, all our iniquities shall be forgiven;* and in this the law of the Great Day of Atonement is unlike the laws which direct us how to atone individually for our ceremonial offences. The reason of the difference is plain, for in other cases a full expiation is made; in this case, there is only the form of an expiation. But it is just because I see on this great day what exactly corresponds to the common atonements for ceremonial transgressions, that I dare to trust in the Divine Mercy, and to hope that God will pardon all my sins. It is only a form; it has no real atoning power; and this prevents me sometimes from finding perfect peace;† but God means that I should think of my worst sins as expiated, and though sometimes heart and flesh fail when I remember my transgressions, I will believe that He is willing to forgive them all."

Our imaginary Jew's account is, we think, truer to the genius

* No Jew was likely to confound the "cleansing" which was to follow the annual atonement with the Divine forgiveness. The conspicuous absence of the formula, "it shall be forgiven him," from Leviticus xvi, was very suggestive.

† "The law can never, with those sacrifices which they offer year by year continually, make the comers thereunto perfect." Heb. x, 1.

of the Levitical institutions, and to the ritual of the Day of Atonement itself, than Dr. Bushnell's: nor would the Jew be at all perplexed by the suggestion that the goat "by which the people are to be personally cleansed themselves, suffers no death or dying pain at all, as their substitute, but having their sins all put upon his head by the priest's confession, is turned loose alive, and driven off into the wilderness; so to signify the deportation or clean removal of their guiltiness" (p. 395). It is expressly said that the two goats constituted the sin-offering; they cannot be severed. The one is sent off into the wilderness as a visible sign that the sins confessed over him are utterly removed, because the other has first been put to death.

The idea of a real expiation cannot be separated from the sin-offerings for individual and ceremonial offences; the idea of a symbolic expiation cannot be separated from the sacrifices annually offered for the sins of the whole people. The institutions of Judaism, as well as the explicit teaching of Christ and the apostles, protest against the theory of an Atonement from which the expiatory idea is excluded.

We regard with serious apprehension the silent but rapid advance of the theological tendencies which we have combated in these pages. It will not be supposed that we are inclined to under-estimate the infinite importance of the confession that our Lord Jesus Christ is the "brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of His person," the eternal Word who "was with God, and was God." The whole structure of Christian theology rests on this stupendous fact; and the most urgent practical questions affecting man's religious life and destiny are answered, when it is determined that he who hath seen Christ, hath seen the Father. Nor is it wonderful if, in the present chaotic condition of European thought, many who themselves believe in the old doctrine of expiation, sometimes speak as though everything important in the Christian faith is secure, while the divinity of our Lord is firmly maintained. At a moment when, among the foremost nations of Christendom, the foundations of all religious faith are shaken by the portentous triumphs of a philosophy which treats as obsolete and insoluble all the questions which have agitated past ages in relation to the higher life of our race, and the mysteries of the invisible and spiritual world; a philosophy which paralyzes the noblest energies of human nature, and robs it

of all its glory: which ignores rather than denies—and to deny is less insolent than to ignore—the existence of a Personal Deity, and proclaims that whether there be a "High and Lofty One inhabiting eternity" or not, is practically unimportant to mankind,—it is natural that the fact of the Incarnation—the supreme witness to the moral freedom of God, and to the immortal dignity of man—should be asserted with a passionate and exclusive devotion. We thought that the Materialistic Philosophy of the last century had rotted back to corruption, but "out of its tomb," to avail ourselves of the magnificent imagery of Edmund Burke, has arisen, "a vast, tremendous, unformed specter," overpowering the imagination, and subduing the fortitude of the most devout and courageous souls. They find that in the presence of the Incarnate God, the evil power of this terrific vision is baffled and broken, and grateful for a Divine security and peace, they care to know nothing more than that in Jesus Christ our Lord, God was manifest in the flesh.

It must also be remembered that both in Europe and America, the whole system of Christian doctrine is passing into new forms and undergoing complete reconstruction; and it may be, that as the Incarnation was the first truth which was elaborated and defined by the scientific thought of the early Church, the Person of Christ, which many theologians regard as the solitary problem of modern Theology, must, for a time, again absorb the chief thought and strength of Christendom. But the theory of the Christian faith will be ignominiously impoverished, and the power of the Gospel over the moral and religious life of mankind injuriously diminished, if the expiatory value of the death of Christ is finally rejected. The doctrine of the Atonement cannot be eliminated from the Christian system without imperiling the authority of its inspired teachers; contradicting some of the strongest and deepest instincts of man's moral nature, and undermining the noblest theory of God's moral government; repudiating communion with the religious life and faith of the nineteen Christian centuries, and impeaching the wisdom and work of the characteristic institutions of that earlier revelation, which, for fifteen centuries before the coming of Christ, testified to the unity of God, and sustained the hope of human redemption. The issues of this controversy are infinitely momentous, *Ab actu ad posse valet illatio.* For a time, those who refuse to acknowledge that Christ

has redeemed us with His "precious blood" may still confess that He is "the King of glory," and "the everlasting Son of the Father," may cling to Him with enthusiastic love, may adore His bright perfections, and from the depths of their spiritual nature, may confess that in Christ are treasured up the immortal hopes of our race. While this Faith lasts, their hearts will be true to Him, and in Him they will find eternal life. But with the new generation this theology must either return to the ancient creed of the Church, or drift away into mortal heresy. For eighteen hundred years, the Divinity of our Lord's person, and the expiation effected by His death for human sin, have stood and fallen together; the rejection of either has been always followed by the rejection of both. The doctrine of expiation, profoundly true in itself, and of transcendent value to the religious development of the soul, is the surest defence of the only Christian truth which can claim to be of still higher worth to the spiritual life of our race—the personal manifestation of God in Jesus Christ our Lord.

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE.

The *Atheneum* gives the following interesting account of the report of Mr. G. Grove on the topographical results of the first expedition sent out by the Palestine Exploration Committee.

"The expedition was placed under the charge of Capt. C. W. Wilson, R. E., with whom was associated Lieut. Anderson, R. E., and Corporal Phillips, as photographer. The party were well supplied with chronometers and other instruments, and their instructions were to make accurate and systematic observations between Damascus and Jerusalem. They were constantly occupied from December, 1865, to May, 1866. The present Report embraced the topographical investigations only, which, however, were very important. Forty-nine separate places, the positions of which were before unknown, have been accurately fixed, both in longitude and latitude, detailed reconnoissance sketches have been made, on a large scale, of the whole backbone of the country from North to South, and of several outlying districts, such as the basin of the Lake of Galilee, the district of Samaria, and the valleys between Jerusalem and the sea. Passages were read from reports by Capt. Wilson and Mr. Anderson, detailing the method pursued in obtaining the observations, and testifying how carefully and systematically their work was done. An arrangement had been made with Mr. Murray by which these maps would very

shortly be made public, under the superintendence of Mr. Grove himself. A very substantial step has been taken by this association towards putting the map of the Holy Land right, and one which should encourage its supporters to still further efforts. The Report comprised a recommendation by Capt. Wilson, that stations should be established and supplied with instruments for regular meteorological observations. Competent persons resident in the country had promised their services, and thus a great want would be supplied, as no observations on climate have been taken, except at Jerusalem and Damascus. Mr. Grove announced the attention of the association to persevere until every square mile in Palestine has been properly and accurately surveyed and mapped; till every mound of ruins has been examined and sifted; the name of every village ascertained, recorded, and compared with the lists in the Bible; till all the ancient roads have been traced; the geology made out; the natural history and botany fully known. In furtherance of these intentions, a second expedition will shortly be sent out to excavate in detail at Capernaum, Cana, Samaria, Nazareth and Jerusalem. Another party (of whom it was hoped Mr. Prestwich, the eminent geologist would be chief) will attack the geology and the natural history, so ably begun by Mr. Tristram. A work on the modern Syrians is in preparation by Mr. Rogers, of Damascus, under the encouragement of the Palestine Fund, as a companion to Lane's 'Modern Egyptians.' The names of villages, &c. are being collected by a competent resident Arabic scholar, and five meteorological stations have been taken to which instruments will be furnished under the sanction of the Kew committee. In conclusion, Mr. Grove drew the attention of the meeting to the importance of these researches as corroborating the statements of the Bible, which purport to be mainly a record of facts, and of facts about certain definite localities. Hitherto the Book has been tested by internal evidence chiefly: the time has arrived when other tests must be applied to it—the tests afforded by a comparison of its descriptions with the country it describes. This test he was confident it would stand, and he called on the members of the British association to support the investigation.

The September number of the Groningen *Waarheid in Liefde*, calls the attention of scholars to the statement of the French *Moniteur* that the valuable library belonging to the Armenian Monastery, Etschmiazin, near the foot of Mt. Ararat and containing three thousand manuscripts wholly unknown to the learned, has recently been thrown open. A catalogue has been published, and every facility for investigation will be offered. The library contains works, not hitherto known, of church fathers and fragments of Diodorus Siculus and Aristides. A thorough examination of these Armenian manuscripts can hardly fail, it is thought, to bring out important results for the literature of the New Testament.

Messrs. Hurd & Houghton, of New York, are about to issue an American edition of Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, edited by Prof. Hackett, of Newton Theological Seminary, and Mr. Ezra Abbot, assistant librarian of Harvard

College, with the co-operation of a number of American scholars. It will be given without abridgment, but will contain numerous additions, and be carefully corrected throughout. There can be no question that it will be greatly superior to the English edition. It will be published by subscription, in about thirty monthly numbers of 112 pages each, at the price of seventy-five cents for each number.

The *Bulletin* of the *Société de l' histoire de Protestantisme Français* for October states that the correspondence of Alphonso Turretin, with an extended biography of this learned Genevan theologian, is about to be published in three volumes at Geneva. It will be a valuable addition to the history of the philosophical and religious ideas of the eighteenth century.

The subject for the next prize offered by the association of the Pastors of Geneva is, "The Influence of the School of Saumur on the developments of the Reformed Theology."

The late English papers attribute the authorship of *Ecce Homo* to Professor Seeley, of the University of London.

The *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* speaks in the highest terms of Professor Phelps's article on "the instrumentality of truth in regeneration" in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1866, and says "had space permitted, we would gladly have transferred the whole article to our pages, so full is it of sound sense and discriminating doctrine."

The August number of the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne* announces that in February last, Dr. Tischendorf visited Rome for the purpose of obtaining permission to publish a *fac simile* of the Vatican manuscript of the Bible, in a style similar to that in which the Sinai Manuscript was issued at St. Petersburg. The Pope it is said has given his full consent, but "wishes to reserve to the Holy See the exclusive honor of its execution." The editor of the *Annales* favors the proposition on the ground that it would give to Cardinal Mai's edition an authority which many now dispute, "since the discovery by the learned of a certain number of errors in it has led to a general suspicion of every verse."

"The Minor Prophets, with Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical, designed for both pastors and people," by Rev. Henry Cowles, Professor at Oberlin, which has just appeared, is designed to be a popular commentary on these imperfectly understood books. It is evidently written in the spirit of careful and conscientious Christian scholarship, and as compared with any of the popular commentaries on these books, gives manifest signs of progress in tracing the connection and course of thought. In this last respect, however, it is sometimes behind the latest and best results of biblical study, and some of his conclusions would not secure the general assent of critical students.

The "Elementary Hebrew Grammar" of Professor Green, of Princeton, just published by John Wiley & Son, New York, contains a concise statement

of the leading facts of the language, exercises in reading, the three first chapters in Genesis, a vocabulary for the same, and full grammatical tables and paradigms. It can be confidently recommended to beginners and to those who wish to obtain a general acquaintance with Hebrew, as containing all the apparatus needed for an elementary knowledge of the language. A brief appendix containing exercises in syllabification and grammatical notes would be a valuable addition.

1.—United States—*Mansel*, The Philosophy of the Conditional, comprising some remarks on Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, and on Mr. J. S. Mill's Examination of that Philosophy. 8vo. pp. 189, $1.75.—*Hopkins*, The Laws of Ritualism, examined in its relation to the Word of God, to the Primitive Church, to the Church of England and to the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States. 12mo. pp. 98, $1.25—*Naville*, The Heavenly Father, Lecture on Modern Atheism. 12mo. pp. 375, $1.75.—*Tyler*, American Ecclesiastical Law: the Law of Religious Societies, Church Government and Creeds, Disturbing Religious Meetings, and the Laws of Burial Grounds in the United States, 8vo. pp. 539, $5.50.—*Schenkel*, The Character of Jesus portrayed, translated with Introduction and Notes by W. H. Furness, D.D.—*Lange*, Commentary on the Holy Scripture: Vol. IV, The Acts of the Apostles, 8vo. $5.00. *Plumer*, Critical and Expository Commentary on the Book of Psalms, 8vo. pp. 1211, $6.00.

2.—Great Britain.—*Morison*, Critical Exposition of the Third Chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans: A Monograph, 8vo. pp. 422, 12*s.* 6*d*—*Fürst*, Hebrew Lexicon, translated by Davidson. 8vo. 21*s.*—*Knight*, The Law, the Prophets and the Psalms: their divine inspiration asserted.—Peile, Sermons, doctrinal and didactic, bearing on the religious topics of the day.—*Kitto*, Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature, edited by Dr. W. L. Alexander, (an entirely new edition, increased by a whole volume). 3 vols. 8vo. £4, 4*s.*—*Fairbairn*, Imperial Bible Dictionary, Vol. 2d, imp. 8vo. 38*s.* *Quarry*, Genesis and its Authorship, 8vo. pp. 650, 18*s*—Garbell, God's Word written: the doctrine of the Inspiration of Holy Scripture explained and enforced, 4*s.* 6*d.* *Vaughan*, Ritualism in the English Church, in its relations to Scripture, Piety and Law. 12mo. 4*s.* 6*d.*—*Zincke*, The Duty and Discipline of Extemporary Preaching. 8vo. 5*s.*

3.—France, Germany and Holland.—*Alzog*, Grundriss der Patrologie oder des ältern Christichen Literärgeschichte, 8vo.—*Baur*, Paulus der Apostel Jesu Christ, 2 ed. Bd I.—*Cremer*, Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der N. T. Gräcitat, Theil I.—*Ewald*, Die Psalmen und die Klagelieder. 3 ed.—*Greard*, De la morale de Plutarque, 8vo. 7 *fr.* 50*c.*—*Ziehte*, De waarheid en herlijkheid des Christendoms.

XXI.—REV. F. W. ROBERTSON—WHAT GOSPEL DID HE PREACH?*

Let us seek to ascertain what is the Gospel that Robertson preached, and what is its character and value. For an answer to these questions, we take up the published volumes of his sermons, and opening the first of them, we find at its very beginning a number of sermons which may serve as a fitting introduction to the subject. Of course we do not attach any importance to their position in the published volume, in which the several sermons do not seem to be arranged on any very obvious principles of order or connection. But the group with which the first series opens, all belong to nearly the same time, a time when his powers were in their full vigor, and they bear more or less directly on central themes. We shall therefore take them for our starting-point, comparing as we go along any passages in other places, or in his letters, that may explain or modify his views. We do not think it is of much consequence to take note of the different dates of the sermons, as we cannot recognize any important difference of views in them; it is pleasing to observe that his later productions do not contain such offensive caricatures of evangelicalism as the earlier, but we fail to see any approach to a more full and satisfactory teaching.

The first sermon in the first series is entitled, "God's Revelation of Heaven," and it is one of the very finest of them all. It contains a most admirable and beautiful statement of the need of a revelation of spiritual truth to man, of the impossibility of discovering or knowing the highest truth by any of the lower faculties of the soul, and the need of the enlightenment and teaching of the Spirit of God. There is nothing in this sermon that can be called positively wrong; it would be almost hypercritical to say even that there was anything seriously defective, considering the subject he is treating of, and the propriety of making allowance in a spoken discourse for finding everything looked at from one particular point of view. Still there are passages even here that seem to imply that a revelation of heavenly things is all that man needs. Revelation is, no doubt, here used in a somewhat

* From the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, October, 1866.

unusual, though a scriptural sense, as equivalent to what in Evangelical terminology would be called the enlightenment of the soul by the Holy Spirit. But such a passage as the following seems to convey the idea that nothing more than a clear discovery of the spiritual world is needed for the soul's restoration. He says: "Now the Spirit of God lies touching, as it were, the soul of man—ever around and near. On the outside of earth man stands with the boundless heaven above him; nothing between him and space—space around him and above him—the confines of the sky touching him. So is the Spirit of man to the Spirit of the Ever Near. They mingle. In every man this is true. The spiritual in him, by which he might become a recipient of God, may be dulled, deadened, by a life of sense; but in this world never lost. All men are not spiritual men; but all have spiritual sensibilities which might awake. All that is wanted is to become conscious of the nearness of God. God has placed men here to feel after him, if haply they might find him, albeit he be not far from any one of them. Our souls float in the immeasurable ocean of Spirit. God lies around us; at any moment we might be conscious of the contact."—(Sermon i, p. 12). Now we do not object to this as pantheistic; we do not think it is so, or that it is a stronger expression than may be defended, of the omnipresence of God. But we think it seems to take for granted, that what man needs is simply to become conscious of his actual relation to God, not to have that relation changed or rectified. And this suspicion is confirmed when we mark how he goes on to say, "The condition on which this self-revelation is made to man, is love." And then after describing, and describing well, the meaning of love, he says, "Love is the condition without which revelation does not take place. As in the natural, so in the spiritual world. By compliance with the laws of the universe, we put ourselves in possession of its blessing. Obey the laws of health, and you obtain health. Temperance, sufficiency of light and air, and exercise, these are the conditions of health. Arm yourself with the laws of nature, and you can call down the lightning from the sky; surround yourself with glass, and the lightning may play innocently a few inches from you—it cannot touch you—you may defy it—you have obeyed the conditions of nature, and nature is on your side against it. In the same way, there are conditions in the world of spirit, by compliance with which God's Spirit

comes into the soul with all its revelations, as surely as lightning from the sky, and as invariably."—(Ib., p. 14). Nor is it merely meant that compliance with the condition of love is the only thing needed for the revelation of God to the soul; but that revelation, thus attained, is represented as the only thing needed for the full and perfect blessedness of man. Now that a spiritual revelation such as Robertson describes, is needed, all thoughtful men will admit; and thankful we are to the preacher for such a powerful and beautiful vindication of this truth; but we think it will be found by all who make the experiment, that this is not all that is needed. Nay, we can appeal to Robertson himself. In the third sermon of this same series, on "Jacob's wrestling," he describes a kind of manifestation of God's nearness, which instead of being blessed is unspeakably painful to the soul." It was no longer God the Forgiver, God the Protector, God the Covenanting Love, that met Jacob; but God the Awful, the Unnameable, whose breath blasts, at whose touch the flesh of the mortal shrinks and shrivels up," (p. 44). This aspect of God's character towards us, he traces, in part at least, to the consciousness of a "deep pervading sinfulness;" and elsewhere he speaks of this as the very hell of the soul—"the hell of having done wrong—the hell of having had a spirit from God, pure with high aspirations, and to be conscious of having dulled its delicacy, and degraded its desires—the hell of having quenched a light brighter than the sun's—of having done to another an injury that through time and eternity never can be undone—infinite maddening remorse—the hell of knowing that every chance of excellence, and every opportunity of good, has been lost for ever. This is the infinite terror—this is wrath to come," (p. 134). These are solemn and awful words; but they are most true, and they indicate that a mere revelation of God will not meet the sinner's case. Simply to awaken in him a spiritual apprehension, by which a light bursts in upon his soul, revealing in its real colors what God is to him and he to God, this, so far from being heaven, would, in some cases at least, be absolute hell. Something more than this plainly is needed.

Perhaps, however, our preacher might here object, and say, 'This is not a fair, at least not a full, view of my teaching. The revelation of which I speak, carries with it far more than you have made allowance for: it requires, as a necessary condition,

an essential change in the soul, the death-blow of self and sin, and the birth of a new emotion, love, to be the animating and ruling principle from henceforth. Or it produces this change as a necessary result; or it may be, it is not possible to say with exactness which is the cause and which the effect, they may act and react on one another; it suffices to know that they are intimately bound up together, so that the one never takes place without the other. And this delivers us from that awful sense of remorse of which I spoke.' "Realize the spirit of the cross, the surrender of self-will in love; feel, that is, believe, that God is love; in all the sharpest suffering, feel that, and do you then ask if hell can be your portion? Can love endure hell? pain? yes: agony? yes: He did—hell never. That is, you are redeemed—redeemed by love from remorse, from the disposition to repeat wrong, from the sense of God's displeasure; and the pain you bear is not taken away, but transmuted. The spirit in which you bear it makes all the difference; it changes it from penal fire into wise, loving, corrective discipline," &c. (Life, vol. i. p. 305). We waive for the present any remarks on the peculiar view of the relation of sin and its punishment that underlies this passage; as it is our present object to bring out the precise nature of the gospel that Robertson preached to sinners, and to bring it to the test of its suitability to meet their wants. Now we can well understand how a revelation by the Spirit of God to the spirit of man, such as is described in the first sermon, having for its subject matter the Cross of Christ, may produce such a change in the soul as will lead to the realization and appropriation of the Spirit of the Cross, giving a death blow to selfishness, and implanting a new principle of self-sacrifice and love. But is this enough? is it all that is needed? The whole future prospects and present peace of the soul are made to depend on the victory of the new love over the old sinfulness; and so far as this goes it may be all very well. But what of the sense of wrong-doing in the past? the feeling of guilt and ill-desert, how is that to be disposed of? Let us pursue our analysis of Robertson's teaching, to see if any answer can be discovered to this question. The second sermon in the first volume, on the parable of the Sower, so far supplements the first that it describes the revelation of God on its human side, showing the different ways in which it is received and dealt with by men, and the various issues to which

these lead; but it contains nothing very directly applicable to our present purpose. The third, on Jacob's wrestling, brings out more fully the human soul in its dealings with the divine manifestation. It contains in the striking passage already quoted, a distinct recognition of a felt presence and nearness of God to the soul that would be simply awful and terrible; but there is no indication how such a state of things, supposing it to exist, is to be altered for the better, unless, indeed, we are to take the passing assertion of the universal fatherhood and love of God as such an indication. This is no doubt, a capital point in our preacher's theology; the great truth that Christ came to reveal, and that the Church exists to proclaim, is that all men alike, whether they know it or not, are children of God; to call them to recognize the fact, and to live as such, is in his eyes the great work of the missionary and the preacher. This is brought out fully and unambiguously, not only in many incidental statements, but especially in his two sermons, (the fourth and fifth of the second series) on baptism, in a letter (Life, vol. ii. p. 66) on the baptismal controversy, and in the notes of questions on the subject for candidates for confirmation given by his biographer in an appendix (Life, vol. ii. pp. 350–63). To discuss this position as it ought to be treated as a theological theme on its own merits would lead us too far away from the line of thought we are following; we need only take it so far into view as to consider whether it really satisfies, or contributes to satisfy what we have seen to be the need of man as a sinner. Let us see then how this principle is applied by our eloquent preacher to this purpose.

Returning to the first volume of Sermons, we find the fourth sermon very memorable, inasmuch as it goes somewhat further than the preceding ones in indicating how, with such a revelation of God as has been before described, we are to act so as to make progress. It is on Phil. iii, 13, 14, and is entitled, "Christian Progress by Oblivion of the Past," the leading idea being that in order to advance towards perfection, we must forget what lies behind us in the past. There is much wisdom in such counsel as this in many respects; but, among other things, he comes to apply this principle of progress by oblivion to past guilt. He says, "Finally, Past guilt lies behind us and is well forgotten. There is a way in which even sin may be banished from the memory. * * * * Bad as the results have been in the world of

making light of sin, those of brooding over it too much have been worse. Remorse has done more harm than even hardihood. It was remorse which fixed Judas in an unalterable destiny; it was remorse which filled the monasteries for ages with men and women whose lives became useless to their fellow creatures; it is remorse which so remembers by-gone faults as to paralyze the energies for doing Christ's work; for when you break a Christian's spirit, it is all over with progress. Oh! we want everything that is hopeful and encouraging for our work; for, God knows, it is not an easy one! and therefore it is that the gospel comes to the guiltiest of us all at the very outset with the inspiring news of pardon. . . . Christian brethren, *do not stop too long to weep over spilt water.* Forget your guilt, and wait to see what eternity has to say to it. You have other work to do now."—(Sermons, first series, pp. 75, 76). Alas! is this all? is this the good news you have to tell me? no more than this? must it indeed be left over as a matter of uncertainty, what eternity has to say to my sin? and can I on any such terms as these dismiss it from my mind? It were wise and good counsel this, if only it could be done; but we greatly fear the specter of past guilt will not, in many a soul at least, be so easily laid. What medicine does this physician bring that can avail to "minister to a mind diseased"?

He recognizes as we have already seen, the evil, the sense of guilt; he does so still more explicitly in the following sermon on Zaccheus, where he describes, in his case, the recollection of past guilt as one of the hindrances to a religious life; he is not so shallow a thinker as to overlook or deny it. Neither does he propose to deal with it by an assurance that the penalties of sin will be averted and its consequences arrested. Far from it. His teaching on this point is very far from being of an indulgent or easy character; it is very stern and severe; he holds out no hope to the transgressor of deliverance from the consequences of his act. Nor would any such assurance avail to meet the soul's want. It will not do for one who is really awakened and in earnest, to be told that God is forbearing and indulgent, and will let the sinner alone now, and let him off at the last. Something far more than that is needed.

What is it, then, that our preacher has to offer? It is the love, the forgiveness of God. That which saved Zaccheus was the

feeling that he was sublimely loved, that God cared for him. "It was the manifested fellowship of the Son of man that brought salvation to that house. Learn this: When we live the gospel so, and preach the gospel so, sinners will be brought to God. We know not yet the gospel power, for who trusts, as Jesus did, all to that? Who ventures as he did upon the power of love, in sanguine hopefulness of the most irreclaimable? Who makes that, the divine humility of Christ, 'the gospel'? More than by eloquence, more than by accurate doctrine, more than by ecclesiastical order, more than by any doctrine trusted to by the most earnest and holy men, shall we and others, sinful rebels, outcasts, be won to Christ by that central truth of all the gospel—the entireness of the Redeemer's sympathy. In other words, the love of Jesus." (Sermons, 1st series, p. 95). This love and forgiveness transmits remorse into penitence, and penalty into chastisement; and so effects the reconciliation of man to God. Now we acknowledge all this and much to the same purpose in other of the sermons, as most true and well and beautifully put. Unquestionable, the discovery of the infinite love of God and the free forgiveness of sins lies at the very heart of the gospel; but this by itself will not suffice to give ease and peace to the evil conscience. You may tell me that God is love; that he will not, it may be, remit the penalty of my sin, but freely forgive the sin that deserved it, and you may urge upon me to forget all my past offences and begin to live anew, turn over a new leaf, as the saying is, and hide the one that is all blurred and blotted. But alas! I cannot forget them, my conscience will not let me so easily get rid of them. The most thorough repentance on my part, and the most ample assurance of forgiveness on God's part, cannot undo what is past, or restore me to the state of innocence and righteousness I have lost; it cannot remove my sense of wrong-doing and ill-desert or make me as if I never had sinned. There is an innate sense of justice in the soul which craves satisfaction and will not be pacified until I see how I can be justly forgiven, how justice can be done while I am saved. This is all expressed in the following words of Tholuck, who will not be suspected of an undue leaning to evangelicalism.

"The innate sense of divine justice, which all men possess, demands that the sinner should receive his due, that the stroke he has given to the law should recoil upon himself. The deeper

his sense of guilt, the less can he be satisfied with mere pardon, and the more does he demand punishment, for by punishment he is JUSTIFIED. Whence do we derive his intimate persuasion of God's justice? Not from without; because men, as empirically guided, regard freedom from suffering as the highest good; it must therefore be implanted in our nature by God himself. The holiness of God, which reveals itself to the sinner by the connection between suffering and transgression, has, therefore, a witness for itself in every human breast. Hence, on the one hand, the proclamation of pardon and reconciliation could not satisfy the conscience of the sinner, unless his guilt had been atoned for by punishment; and, on the other hand, divine love could not offer its blessing to the sinner unless holiness was revealed together with love. It was therefore necessary that suffering commensurate with the apostasy of man should be endured, which men would impute to themselves as their own. Such was the suffering, inward and outward, of the Redeemer. Two things were necessary: 1. That those sufferings should correspond to the greatness of the sin of mankind: 2. That the sinner could rightfully impute them to himself."

It may be objected, perhaps, that such deep and intense feelings of guilt are not by any means universal; that in many cases there is much more prominent a sense of God's love, and a much simpler and easier acquiescence in his forgiveness, and that it is productive of great insincerity and evil, to represent the awful sense of guilt as the necessary and normal experience of the converted soul. Robertson has some wise and good remarks to this effect in his sermon on Jacob's wrestling. Now this opens a very wide and difficult question, which we cannot here enter into, How far and in what sense a sense of guilt is an essential element in the turning of a sinner's soul to God? It is enough for our present argument that such a feeling is found to exist in some cases. It is not requisite to prove it to be universal, provided only it be natural and reasonable. Even although a simple assurance of pardon might suffice in many cases to meet the soul's wants, still, if there are any cases in which there is a feeling that this will not satisfy or set at rest, and if that feeling be not morbid or imaginary, but healthy and right, then we are entitled to say, that a gospel which does not provide for its satisfaction is not really sufficient to meet the wants of the guilty soul.

Now it is precisely here that we feel a defect in Robertson's preaching. The gospel that he preaches makes, as far as we can discover, no provision for this sense of righteousness, this craving after a just reconciliation to God, which is one of the deepest feelings of our nature. But, it may be said, is it not enough to know that there is forgiveness, and to believe that it is a just one, without demanding to be satisfied how it is so? Cannot the guilty soul find peace in the simple promise of forgiveness from the holy and righteous God, without craving to be informed how it is that such forgiveness is consistent with his holiness and justice? Nay, is not this a humbler position to occupy? Is not the opposite course, as Robertson puts it, attempting to put on the intellect the work of healing that can only be done by the heart? Now there may be a measure of truth in this stricture, and it may apply with some force to that hard, dry, merely intellectual kind of religion with which Robertson seems to have come so much in contact. But it is not upon the intellect, but upon the conscience, that we lay the stress of our argument. We think that all profound views of moral science, and all the teaching of Scripture on the subject, concur in the conviction that the wounded conscience must be dealt with by something more than mere moving representations of the love of God that touch the heart; and that practically, the only way in which it can be thoroughly pacified, is by having some insight into the way in which forgiveness can be justly offered on the part of God, and frankly accepted on the part of man. Nay, there are in some of his sermons indications that our preacher himself felt that something more than the mere assurance of forgiveness is needed to meet the case, though the way in which he proposes to supply this felt want is a very strange one. In his sermon on absolution, in the third series, this comes out most strongly, though the same ideas seem to underlie several of the others as well. Referring to the fact that, notwithstanding all controversial arguments against the system of the confessional, still confession and absolution were practiced in the English Church, he sets himself to inquire what it is that lies at the bottom of this craving. "We keep asserting," he says, "Man cannot give assurance that sin is pardoned; in other words, man cannot absolve; but still the heart craves human assurance of forgiveness. What truth have we got to supply that craving"? (Series

iii, p. 72). Then after showing the impotence of mere negative teaching, such as that of the Scribes and Pharisees, he proceeds to unfold the truth which has power to meet and satisfy the cravings of the soul. And this is briefly stated as follows: "What is forgiveness? It is God reconciled to us. What is absolution? It is the authoritative declaration that God is reconciled. Authoritative: that is, a real power of conveying a sense and feeling of forgiveness. It is the power of the Son of man *on earth* to forgive sin. It is man, God's image, representing, by his forgiveness on earth, God's forgiveness in heaven" (Ibid. pp. 77, 78). Then he enlarges powerfully and well on the fullness and freeness of Christ's forgiveness of sin, and the power that this gave him to give peace and comfort to the troubled conscience; and he argues that this power is delegated to the Church, and defends on this principle the formula of absolution in the English prayer-book, not on the ground of priestly prerogative, but on that of the Church and every true Christian being a representative of humanity, and the forgiveness of humanity conveying a seal and pledge of the forgiveness of God. He says, "The church is the ideal of humanity. It represents what God intended man to be —what man is in God's sight as beheld in Christ by him; and the minister of the church speaks as the representative of that ideal humanity. Church absolution is an eternal protest in the name of God the Absolver, against the false judgment of society. . . . . It is a power delegated to you and to me, and just so far as we exercise it lovingly and wisely in our lives, and with our lips, we help men away from sin. . . . . By every magnanimous act, by every free forgiveness, with which a pure man forgives, or pleads for mercy, or assures the penitent, he proclaims the truth that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins—he exhibits the priestly power of humanity—he does absolve, let theology say what it will of absolution, he gives peace to the conscience—he is a type and assurance of what God is—he breaks the chains and lets the captive go free."—(Ibid. pp. 85, 86.) Now all this indicates a sense that something more than mere bare forgiveness is needed to meet the soul's wants, and give peace to the awakened conscience; and the preacher seeks to find this something more in an authoritative declaration of forgiveness, in the forgiveness of man, the image of God, as a pledge and token of the forgiveness of God. But surely this is

a poor and miserable contrivance at the best. If I could be sure that the judgment of man was always in accordance with that of God; or even that the judgment of the Church or of some ideal humanity was so; there might be something in it; but who shall assure me that this is so? True, man can never be more compassionate, more loving than God; but may he not be less righteous, less holy? may he not be inclined, out of weak partiality, or lurking tenderness for sin, to pardon where God has not pardoned? Would it not be better, if we must have some representative of God on earth, to take conscience which is the voice of God in the soul, rather than the church, or humanity, which, as the image of God, is faint and wavering, like the reflection of heaven in broken and troubled water? Conscience, when really awakened and in earnest, will speak for God with less partial or selfish voice; and when our own conscience forgives and acquits us, we may have here a truer pledge of God's forgiveness than any our author can offer. And it does and will satisfy the conscience, to be shown how past sin is not merely ignored by God and forgotten by us, but righteously dealt with and thoroughly made an end of by the infliction and endurance of the appropriate punishment, its infliction on Christ for us, its endurance by us in Christ, when by faith we became dead unto sin, but alive to God, in Jesus Christ our Lord. May not the charm and attraction of the confessional to sin-burdened souls lie partly at least, in the system of penance and satisfaction by which it professes to wipe out the guilt of sin, as well as in the authority with which it pronounces absolution? And if any still crave for some such authority in addition to the voice of satisfied conscience, is not the true counterpart to the priestly absolution to be found, not in the voice of some ideal church or humanity, but in the testimony of the Spirit, sealing our forgiveness and shedding abroad in our hearts the love of God? This is surely a more deep and thorough satisfaction of a real want than any which Robertson can give; he seems to have felt the want, and to be striving to attain something to meet it, but in vain. For indeed he seems to know of no idea of the gospel, between that of a mere scheme or plan on the part of God, which we have simply to understand and acquiesce in, which is what he ascribes to evangelicals; and that of a mere display of divine love, which is all that his own representation amounts to. But

may it not be something equally distant from both? May it not be the glad news of a work of love that God has done and is doing for sinners? not the mere manifestation of love, but that love actually accomplishing a work which really changes the sinner's position and reconciles him to God—is not this the true idea of evangelical Christianity?

If we turn now from the human to the divine side of religion and consider what Robertson has to say, not only on the condition and wants of man, but upon the work of God for his salvation, we shall find further confirmation of the existence of that fatal defect we have noted in his preaching. A system which recognizes in man only the need of spiritual enlightenment, repentance, and a change of heart towards God; and considers that the guilt of sin is adequately disposed of by a bare amnesty on the part of God and a mere oblivion on the part of man—and this is all that Robertson explicitly recognizes, though he seems to have vague surmises that something more is wanted; such a system can have no work left for Christ to do for man's salvation, save only to manifest the love of God, and so assure men of his forgiveness. And this is virtually all that we find in Robertson's teaching. But there are two facts which require to be reconciled to this view of the matter, and which both stand somewhat in its way; the one is the incarnation, and the other the atonement of Christ. We say the incarnation, as well as the atonement; for in truth a real incarnation is as much a superfluity on the Broad Church view as a real atonement, though the name of both may be retained, and perhaps a more plausible appearance of the former than of the latter.

It is sometimes said, that the popular evangelical theology exalts the work of Christ at the expense of his person; and that the more liberal views that so largely prevail are a return to an older and better way of thinking in which the incarnation and person of the Saviour occupied the first place in the church's thoughts. We are persuaded, however, that there is at best but a half truth in such assertions. It may be that in some quarters a tendency has existed to throw into the background the person of Christ, with the idea of magnifying his work; but the denial or explaining away of the atonement can have no tendency to promote right views of the incarnation. On the contrary, the two doctrines are intimately bound up together; and any error

on the one head is pretty sure, in the long run, to lead to error on the other. It is true that error on the subject of the incarnation and the person of Christ, is more difficult of detection, and more apt to escape notice, especially among English writers, than error on the atonement. For the Church of England has so emphatically adopted the definitions of the old creeds on the former subject, and her divines usually manifest so much regard for antiquity, that they are very slow and reserved in adopting any statement that palpably and explicitly clashes with these definitions, even when the exigencies of their system compel them to hold, and they unconsciously perhaps do hold, notions deviating in one direction or other from the orthodoxy they cling to. But the doctrine of the atonement has not been thus elaborately defined in the patristic creeds; and hence there is not the same jealousy of it, but a departure from it is much more apt to be open and avowed, when there is no apparent heresy on other points. Where this peculiarly Anglican tendency is not felt as a check to the free development of theological ideas, we find the connection between unsound views of the person and work of Christ much more obvious and prominent, as is seen in many of the German divines, and in Bushnell in America. But if we look a little below the surface, we shall see the germs at least of the same thing in Robertson's view of Christ and his redemption.

There are many of his sermons in which he speaks in various points of view of the man Christ Jesus; it is a favorite topic with him; he delights to dwell on it; and indeed it may be reckoned one of the peculiar excellencies and charms of his teaching, that both in doctrine and precept the living person of the Saviour is so prominently brought forward. To venture to criticise him on this ground might seem to be assailing him where he is strongest. And in terms at least he seems to be perfectly orthodox on the incarnation. In several of his sermons he vindicates earnestly and ably the true humanity of Jesus; and he is equally sincere in maintaining his proper divinity. But let us observe the way in which he follows up his statements on these points. In a sermon in the first volume on the sympathy of Christ, after an assertion of the reality of his human nature, he goes on to say:—"And this typifies to us a very grand and important truth. It is this, if I may venture so to express myself,

the truth of the human heart of God. We think of God as a Spirit, infinitely removed from and unlike the creatures he has made. But the truth is, man resembles God; all spirits, all minds, are of the same family. The Father bears a likeness to the Son whom he has created. The mind of God is similar to the mind of man. Love does not mean one thing in man, and another thing in God. Holiness, justice, pity, tenderness,—these are in the Eternal the same in kind which they are in the finite being. The present manhood of Christ conveys this deeply important truth, that the divine heart is human in its sympathies." (Sermons, ser. i, pp. 114, 116). And that this is not a mere passing thought, inadvertently let drop in the current of animated discourse, but a view deliberately held, appears from the frequency with which it recurs and the important part it plays in our author's system. Thus, in his sermon on baptism, where he is unfolding his all-important doctrine of the universal fatherhood of God, he says, "Christ came to reveal a name—the Father. He abolished the exclusive 'my,' and taught to pray 'our Father.' He proclaimed God the Father—man the Son; revealed that the Son of Man is also the son of God. Man—as man,—God's child. He came to redeem the world from that ignorance of the relationship which had left them in heart aliens and unregenerate. Human nature then became viewed in Christ, a holy thing and divine. The revelation is a common humanity sanctified in God. The appearance of the Son of God is the sanctification of the human race"—(Sermons, ser. ii). Again, in a Christmas sermon on Christ the Son (second series, sermon xii), the same idea is brought out still more fully, though it is not so well adapted for quotation, as the whole is just an elaborate assertion of the identity of the Son of God with humanity. And once more, in the sermon on absolution, to which we have already referred in another connection, the same idea plays an important part. Commenting on our Lord's saying, "The Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins," he says, "It was said by the High Priest of humanity in the name of the race. It was said on the principle that human nature is the reflection of God's nature; that human love is the image of God's love; and that human forgiveness is the type and assurance of divine forgiveness. In Christ, humanity was the perfect type of deity, and therefore Christ's absolution was always the exact measure and

counterpart of God's forgiveness. Herein lies the deep truth of the doctrine of his eternal priesthood—the Eternal Son—the humanity of the being of God—the ever human mind of God." —(Sermons, ser. iii, pp. 81, 82. See also an extract from an unpublished sermon in the Life, vol. ii, p. 169). In the face of passages like these we cannot regard such often recurring phrases as "the divine man," "divine humanity," &c., as mere inaccuracies of expression; they are but the legitimate expressions of a deliberately and strongly expressed view of our author on the person of Christ, which implies a confusion or identification of the two natures in him.

No doubt, in drawing inferences from the incarnation, he is justified in regarding it as a signal proof of the great truth that man was made in the image of God, and still retains, in the essential principles of his nature, the lineaments of that image; for, without such a resemblance, it would be impossible to believe the two natures to be united in one person; and if this were all that he meant, no fault could be found with him, save that of using extreme and unguarded language. But he evidently goes much further than this. His idea seems to be that there is such a similarity or sameness between the divine and human natures, that the perfection of humanity is *ipso facto* divine; and conversely, that the divine nature, as existing in the Son, is *ipso facto* human. What else can be meant by the often repeated statement that Christ is the Son of God, just because he is the Son of Man? His perfect human nature, according to this view, is his divinity; his divine Sonship is the glorification of humanity. This view seems to us to deny or abolish the essential and infinite distance between the finite and infinite, the Creator and the creature. And, whatever may be said on that score, it is certainly not the view that the Church has commonly taken of the teaching of holy writ on this subject; it does not represent God as sending his Son, who as such, is essentially and eternally divine, to become also really human, the Son of Man as well; the nearest idea we can form of what it suggests is, that of God sending his Son, who, as such, is essentially and eternally, in idea at least, the human manifestation of his nature, to be actually in time such a manifestation, as the Son of Man, the ideal of humanity. We do not mean to insinuate that Robertson was consciously and intentionally unsound in the doctrine of the incarnation; we

believe he was thoroughly in earnest in asserting both the true deity and the true humanity of the Saviour; and we admire exceedingly the way he makes everything, both in his preaching and in his life, to center in the person of the Redeemer as the one supreme object of love and imitation. He was entirely unconscious of the real scope and tendency of the language he used; and had he seen it to be inconsistent with a true incarnation, we believe that, rather than give up that doctrine, he would have suffered himself to be led to these higher views of the work of Christ, which alone are consistent with the orthodox doctrine of the person of Christ. Still it is not after all a real incarnation that Robertson teaches; that is not required by his system, which, on the contrary requires something else—a uniting or commingling of the divine and the human. A mere theophany is all that is needed, and indeed all that is admitted by the view Robertson takes of the exigencies and wants of man's condition as a sinner. If he really admitted the idea of an incarnation, he would be almost compelled to acknowledge something more in the work of Christ than he is willing to do. But, since according to him, what is needed is not an actual work to restore and rectify man's position in the sight of God, but a mere manifestation of the love of God, and drawing out of the love of man to him; anything beyond a mere self-revelation of God, in and through human nature, is superfluous. A divine person assuming human nature necessarily implies that some work has to be done on behalf of man which God alone can do. So wondrous an event as this cannot have for its purpose merely the manifestation of the divine nature, for that might be done by an appearance without an incarnation of God; nor can it be merely to exhibit a type or ideal of perfect humanity, for that might be effected by a divine influence, and not a divine person, dwelling in man; nor can it be even to show the essential affinity, and unity between God and man, for that is only consistent with a blending or fusing of the two natures into one; while the combination of the two natures, still distinct, in one person, necessarily suggests, not the manifestation of an already subsisting unity, but the bringing about of a new union, a reconciliation between God and man. A real incarnation is only logically consistent with a real atonement, and the sort of vague notion of the person of Christ as the divine man which seems to be all that Robertson teaches,

though it may not be reckoned very seriously erroneous by itself, is not the less dangerous on that account, because in the long run, it can hardly fail to run into one or other of two more serious errors. Failing to keep up the distinction of the two natures in Christ, the question cannot fail to arise, What then is his nature? divine or human? or something composed of, but different from, both? The last alternative can hardly be adopted; and there remains, then, only one or other of the former. Either, doing full justice to the divine nature of Christ, you reduce the humanity to a mere appearance, and see in him only God manifesting himself in the form of a man; or, preserving intact the humanity, you deny or explain away the deity, and make him only a perfect or ideal man, with a divine principle or influence dwelling in and animating him. The Eutychians, in the ancient church, manifested the former tendency to run into a sort of refined Docetism; perhaps the confusion of the natures in the present day is more likely to tend the other way, and lead to virtual Socinianism.

But if the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation presents a difficulty in the carrying out of the system of our preacher, that of the Atonement offers a more serious one; and here he is more openly at variance with evangelical teaching than anywhere else. Here, indeed, he has no scruples in denying and keenly controverting the commonly received doctrine of the Church. He denies altogether that Christ suffered the punishment due to our sins, as our substitute, that he died to satisfy divine justice and reconcile us to God, and denounces this with the utmost vehemence of which language is capable, calling it cruel, selfish, Shylock-like, a debtor and creditor account, Brahminical, borrowed from the bloody shambles of heathenism; a whole anthology of such like phrases might be collected from his letters and sermons. He charges the upholders of it with introducing the conception of vindictiveness or retaliation, speaking of appeasing fury, valuing the Saviour's sacrifice by the penalty paid.

We can only indignantly disclaim such representations, wondering and lamenting that such a man as Robertson should be found giving currency to them. There is no foundation for them whatever; and Robertson, who once himself held the doctrine he so abuses, might, one would think, have known better. It is needless to enter into a proof that these allegations are un-

founded and false; for they are mere assertions, that may be sufficiently met by a counter assertion. No authorities are quoted or referred to, and not the slightest attempt is made to prove that the doctrine of substitution is liable to such charges, charges which have been so often repudiated, that it is hardly possible to conceive how they can be reproduced without either the densest ignorance or the most bare-faced dishonesty. We could quote, were it at all needful, passage upon passage from evangelical writers of various ages and countries, in which the very same misrepresentations are denied and exposed; and we do not know that any passage has been adduced from any author of credit that gives the slightest shadow of countenance to them. We cannot help thinking that the violence of language Robertson indulged in upon this subject is a serious blemish in his character, and a symptom of that morbid state of mind into which he had latterly fallen.

But, seeing there can be no doubt of his rejection of the common doctrine, let us examine what it is that he would put in its stead. What is his own account of the work of Christ, especially of his sufferings and death? Perhaps the briefest, simplest, and clearest expression of it is to be found in a sermon on Reconciliation by Christ, in the fourth series; where he says (p. 246), "The atonement of the Redeemer has reconciled man to God, and that by a two-fold step, by exhibiting the character of God, and by that exhibition changing the character of man." So again he says, "We are redeemed by the life of God without us, manifested in the person of Christ, kindling into flame the life of God that is within us." (Ser. ii). These statements are clear and explicit enough, and we greatly fear they are all that we can get in this theology. For they fall in but too well with what we have already noted as the defect of his views of sin and of the person of the Saviour; he has left no room in his system for any thing more. It falls in admirably with a view of sin which ignores the consciousness of guilt and the demands of conscience; it provides all that on such a view is needful to save man from sin,—a revelation of divine love may both assuage his remorse and melt his heart. It falls in, too, with such a vague view of the person of Christ as we have seen to be all that Robertson gives. For all that is needed is one who may act for God, on his behalf and as his representative, exhibiting him to man, and attracting

man to him; there is no need recognized of one who shall act for man, on his behalf and as his representative, one who shall not only deal with man on behalf of God; but deal with God on behalf of man, "ordained for men in things pertaining to God." With this one-sided view of the office and work of Christ, if anything like an incarnation was to be recognized at all, some such confounding of the two natures as we have noted was almost inevitable.

But while this meager and defective view of the work of Christ falls in well with the other parts of Robertson's teaching, how is it to be reconciled with the recorded facts of his history? What explanation does our preacher offer of the sufferings and death of Jesus? For manifestly the statements above quoted on the nature of the atonement do not advance a single step towards such an explanation, since a manifestation of the character of God, and a change of the character of man, might, for all that appears from the surface of such statements, have both been made without the intervention of pain and death on the part of the Mediator. If this be all that is involved in the atonement, why was it needful that Christ should suffer? We find Robertson attempting an answer to this question in his sermon on Caiaphas's notion of vicarious sacrifice. He tells us, in the first place, that vicarious suffering is the law of being, and illustrates this by examples drawn from the various kingdoms of nature, where the loss, or suffering, or death of one being is the condition of the production, or life, or well-being of another. Now so far this may be admitted to be true, only it must be remembered that all these are instances of vicarious suffering, only in a very loose sense of the phrase. They are not instances of it in the strict and proper sense in which it is used by evangelical divines; they are examples of suffering for the good of others; but they are not and cannot be imagined to be cases of suffering on behalf or in the room of others; we doubt if any instance can be brought from nature or history that is strictly and exactly parallel to the sacrifice of Christ.

Keeping then in mind what is the real value of this universal law, let us follow the preacher in his exposition of the subject. He goes on to remark, that this universal law may be obeyed either consciously or unconsciously; that by multitudes it is only unconsciously obeyed, but that by Christ it was recognized as

he will of God, and lovingly adopted as the law of his mind. Hence he was not a mere victim, but a sacrifice. Further, he was not merely a sacrifice in general, but a sacrifice for sin; because the suffering he endured was the fruit of the world's sin. And here he unfolds his view of the connection between sin and punishment. Punishment, according to his view, is the necessary and inevitable consequence of the transgression of law, law of any kind, natural or moral, though indeed all laws are conceived of by Robertson simply as natural—regular and invariable sequences of effects on causes. The evil that comes in consequence of the disregard of any such law is penalty or punishment, whether for unconscious violations of law or for willful transgressions; the former of which he calls imputed guilt and the latter actual. It is needless to observe the outrageous violation of all theological usage of language in these definitions. Every author may of course use words in any sense he pleases, provided he explains in what sense he does so; but it can serve no purpose but to bewilder and confuse, to employ the phrases of orthodoxy, in a sense totally different from their ordinary and proper one. However, passing by this, we find our author next explaining that the consequences of the violation of law often come on the innocent as well as on the guilty, and that in this sense Christ bore imputed sin, the penalty of the sin of others. "Christ came into collision with the world's evil, and he bore the penalty of that daring. He approached the whirling wheel, and was torn in pieces. He laid his hand on the cockatrice's den, and its fangs pierced Him. It is the law which governs the conflict with evil. It can only be crushed by suffering from it. . . . . The Son of Man, who puts his naked foot on the serpent's head, crushes it, but the fang goes into his heel."—(Ser. i, p. 162).

Now on this we observe, in the first place, that such a view does not represent the sufferings of Christ as in any way different in kind from those of many other men. Others, besides Jesus of Nazareth, have come into contact with the world's evil, and suffered for their holy daring. The prophets, the apostles, the martyrs, have all in their measure done so; all who have borne faithful witness for God and for truth, and righteousness, have had to encounter the world's hostility, and to suffer persecution. If this be a complete account of the death of Christ, there is nothing essential in it more than in that of Peter or Paul, or any of

the martyrs; it may be infinitely more noble and glorious in degree, but there is no difference in kind. And once more, we notice that it chimes in ominously with this view, to find Christ spoken of in this connection as "the Highest Man;" for in truth no higher view of his person is consistent with so low a view of his work. But, secondly, although we can understand how the above view explains the sufferings of Christ; we cannot see on what principle the effects of these sufferings are to be accounted for. We can see how, by setting himself in opposition to the world and its sin, Jesus became a martyr, but we cannot see how by so doing he conquered the evil in the world. Is it merely on the principle that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church? for if so, this is still more completely to reduce the life and work of Christ to a level with that of his faithful followers; if it be not so, the whole matter is left in vagueness and obscurity. We cannot see what there is in the cross of Christ, as thus understood, that is fitted to be a gospel to sinners. It brings out, no doubt, the heinousness of sin in a more vivid light, in so far as I recognize in my sin the same evil principle that crucified the Lord of glory; but this is only fitted to plunge me deeper in sorrow and despair, when I see that my sin has slain the Holy One and the Just. What panacea has the preacher to offer to my wounded soul? He sets before me that meek and holy sufferer, and tells me to imbibe the spirit of the cross, the spirit of self-sacrifice, to accept the consequences of my sin with the same meek submission that he did, assuring me that so the penalty will be transmuted into loving discipline. But, alas! this is just what I cannot do in my present state; there is a fatal difference between my case and that of Jesus; he was guiltless, and suffered from no sin of his own; I feel that the suffering I dread is the deserved punishment of my sin. How can I imbibe his spirit? how can I dare to think of self-sacrifice? is the resignation of the martyr possible for the felon? True, I may be told that "Christ's sacrifice represents the sacrifice of all;" that "in him God beholds humanity, and sees perfected every one in whom Christ's spirit exists in germ;" I am told that "we present that sacrifice as ours;" and am assured that "there is an almost boundless joy in acquiescing in the life and death of Christ, recognizing it as ours, and representing it to ourselves and God as what we aim at." (Ser. iii, pp. 109–11). These are touching and beautiful

expressions; and, in the view here given, how near does our author come to a full and satisfactory one.

Let but that sense of guilt, which we have already seen to be ignored by our author, be recognized and brought in here, and we have all the elements of the evangelical view of the atonement. Let the voice of conscience be heard, and its testimony received; let my state be recognized as one, not only of selfishness and sin, but of guilt and ill-desert; then what I need will manifestly be, not self-sacrifice, but the endurance of punishment; that, and nothing short of that, will set me right with my own conscience, for nothing but the execution of the penalty can wipe away the stain of guilt; when the debt is paid, but not till then, will I cease to feel guilty and self-condemned. But how shall the debt be paid? I cannot do it myself, for so great is its amount, that, in paying it, it is impossible I should live. If it were possible for me to endure the penalty that my sin deserves, if meekly submitting to the Lord's righteous dealing, I could accept the punishment of my misdeeds, then I might feel that my standing before Him was thoroughly righted; then I might feel raised and restored to a free, guiltless, righteous state. Ah! now I see that it is precisely this, which I cannot do for myself, that the Saviour does for me. He comes down from Heaven; he becomes a man like myself, under all the obligations and liabilities under which I, a sinner, am. Holily he lives on earth; righteously he deals with the righteous Father; meekly he bows his head to bear my doom; patiently he endures it; completely he ends it. Ah! now the tale of his bitter cross is indeed good news to me; now I can imbibe the spirit of the crucified One, for it is a spirit appropriate to my standing, since he has made that same standing his. Now I can enter into the almost boundless joy of acquiescing in the life and death of Christ, recognizing it as mine, and representing it to myself and God as what I aim at. Now I see how Christ's life and death are far above those of any hero or martyr, and stand completely alone; for while he displayed all the faithfulness and meekness of the martyrs, he died in the character of a criminal,—not the blessed death of a saint, but the cursed death of the cross.

In using such language, we do not mean to assert that Jesus was troubled with the pangs of an evil conscience, or that he suffered the wrath of God in the sense of God being angry with his

Son. Robertson seems to take it for granted that these things are involved in the evangelical doctrine of the atonement; but we are not aware that they are held by any judicious defender of it. If the phrase "the wrath of God," (which is without express Scripture warrant), is sometimes used in this subject, it is ever in close connection with the correlative one, "the cursed death of the cross;" and it merely means to assert in a brief form these two truths, that the sufferings of Christ were inflicted by God, and that they were expressions of God's wrath against the sin of men, on whose behalf he suffered; and if some representations of the atonement may seem to ascribe to the Saviour a sense of the world's sin that appears to approach the state of an accusing conscience, these have been, for the most part, the efforts of profound and ingenious minds to fathom a mystery which is entirely inscrutable. We do not need to theorize as to the exact amount or the precise nature of the Saviour's sufferings; all that we are concerned with is, the character in which he suffered; and if it be admitted that he did so as the representative and substitute of sinners, the essential point is secured. Neither need we be at all jealous of the stress Robertson lays on entering into the spirit of the cross, as if that were inconsistent with our view. We do not think, indeed, that that is all; but it is unquestionably a very important element in the atonement, and it is that which decisively distinguishes the Christian idea of sacrifice from the heathen perversions of it. According to Robertson and others of his school, the idea of substitution or satisfactory suffering at all is essentially a heathen one, and in this lies the distinction between the Christian and the heathen idea of sacrifice. But this view, we think, is hardly so fair to the heathen sacrificial system as might be expected from men of such broad and catholic sympathies. No doubt it is easy to take such a view of them as would make them simply objects of loathing and abhorrence; it is easy to contemplate with the philosophic poet:

> "Aulide quo pacto Triviaï virginis aram
> Iphianassai turparunt sanguine foede,
> Ductores Danaum:"

with the reflection, "Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum." But there is a brighter side even to such a story as this. When viewed simply as the immolation of an unwilling victim to appease the wrath of an angry deity, it is horrible enough; but in-

troduce even the single element of willingness on the part of the victim, and even so its character is changed from a horrid murder to a heroic self-sacrifice; as witness the treatment of the very same subject by Euripides, who has drawn the touching picture of the maiden gladly dying for her country, while the brave and strong Achilles stands by her side ready, at a word or a look, to rescue her even at the last moment, from death. The oneness of spirit between the sufferer and those for whom he dies, makes all the difference. And when, in addition, we bring in the oneness of spirit between the sacrifice and the deity who requires and accepts it; when, instead of a relentless fury, we have the Righteous Father, not delighting in vengeance, but maintaining justice; and when we see how those for whom the sacrifice is offered are imbued with the same spirit that breathes both in the Judge and the sacrifice, then we have, purified from all heathen elements, the Christian notion of sacrifice, not as a means by which we keep aloof from God, at a safe distance from his vengeance, but a way through which we draw near to him, through that atonement which unites us both in Christ. It is possible, no doubt, that virtually heathenish notions may be to some extent mixed up with popular ideas and expositions of the atonement; for, indeed, the heathen corruptions of the truth are just those which the carnal mind is prone to make in all ages; but even as against these, such denunciations as Robertson's are surely injudicious. It is better far to deal with error in this, as in other departments, in his own often recommended way, not by mere negation and contradiction, but by building up the contrary truth.

But we must bring to a close our review of Robertson's teaching, though there are many other points on which it might be interesting to consider his opinions. We think we have sufficiently made out the position we laid down at starting, that though Robertson's theology is deeper and more spiritual than the superficial pseudo-evangelism which he renounced, it does not go to the root of the matter; and that there is a theology, more truly evangelical, which is deeper in its views and more satisfactory to the soul of man than any he ever attained. Nor are there lacking indications that he himself, at times at least, was feeling after a more full recognition of the eternal sanctions of justice as demanding penalty, than his scheme of thought allowed of. His soldier nature had the element of hate and indignation against evil very

strongly developed; and this is continually coming out in different forms in his sayings and writings. Sometimes this leads him to express convictions which only need to be consistently carried out to lay a firm basis for the evangelical doctrine of the atonement. Thus, for example, he writes: "Robespierre's theory of the abolition of the punishment of death, taken in connection with his subsequent atrocities, never startled me. He never could have understood Portia's refusal to put even Shylock to death illegally. The eternal sanctions of law were unintelligible to him. The transgression of law was a trifle in comparison with human life; and as you might have expected, human life was a trifle in comparison with a theory of his own. I should always anticipate that the rigorous expounder of law would be the one to be able to say most exquisitely in practice, 'The quality of mercy is not strained.' Did that rigor and mercy in Portia's character ever strike you as a union no less beautiful than true?" (Life, vol. i, p. 284.) And on the subject of capital punishment he writes, "There is a previous question to be settled: Is the object of punishment threefold only—to serve as an example to others, to ameliorate the offender, and in some cases, to defend society by his entire removal? Or is there a fourth element—the expression of righteous vengeance?—for I acknowledge I cannot look upon vengeance as merely remedial. The sense of indignation which arises in the human bosom spontaneously against some crimes, must, in a degree, be a reflection of that which exists in the mind of Deity. If so, there is in him that which the Scripture calls wrath; and we are not entitled, I think, to assume that all penalty is intended to effect, or can effect, the reformation of the offender. Probably some penalties are final, expressing infinite justice; and then the higher award of human law must resemble that. It is the indignation of society or mankind, purified of all vindictiveness, expressed in a final punishment. For, doubtless, man—that is society, as distinguished from individual man—speaks in a degree with the authority of God, 'He hath committed all judgment unto him, because he is the Son of man.' All hangs on that. Is final penalty the dignified expression of *vengeance*, putting aside the question of remedy or of social safety, and does not the element of vengeance enter into all punishment? If not, why does the feeling exist, not as a sinful, but as an essential part of human nature; in his words, too, and

acts?"—(Ibid, p. 278). From such passages as those, one would think that Robertson was very near a recognition of those great ideas of law and justice, retribution and satisfaction, which are the essential elements of evangelical theology. But his further advance in this line of thought seems to have been barred by the unfortunate confusion of ideas which prevails so largely as to the meaning of law. He is turned aside to regard that law on whose eternal sanctions he speaks so eloquently and well, as simply of the same kind and order with the so-called laws of nature. Thus in a subsequent letter he explains and modifies his statements in the passage last quoted, as follows: "I think a great deal of law. Law rules deity, and its awful majesty is above individual happiness. That is what Kant calls 'the categorical imperative,' that is a sense of duty which commands categorically or absolutely—not saying 'it is better,' but 'thou shalt.' Why? Because thou shalt, that is all. It is not best to do right, thou must do right; and the conscience that feels that, and in that way, is the nearest to divine humanity. Not that law was made, like the Sabbath, for man, but man was made for it. He is beneath it, a grain of dust before it; it moves on, and if he will not move before it, it crushes him; that is all, and that is punishment. I fancy that grand notion of law is what we have lost, what we require to get before we are in a position to discuss the question of punishment at all, or to understand what it is. Your criticism on my expression 'vengeance,' is just; but what I meant was a truth, though I expressed it badly. I have tried to restate it in what I have now said of law."—(Ibid, p. 292). Most true! we have lost to a large extent the true notion of law, and never was there a clearer proof of it than this very paragraph, for it exhibits a hopeless confusion of ideas. Certainly that idea of law as a force moving on and crushing him that resists it, is not Kant's categorical imperative. Neither can that be the law that rules Deity, else an iron fate is installed in the throne of the universe. Nor can any such conception of law ever generate the idea of duty; what it says is precisely 'It is best—to obey and not be crushed;' it never can say, or teach me to say, 'I ought—whether I am crushed or not; *Fiat justitia ruat coelum.*' It is an indispensable requisite for all correct thinking on the moral government of God, to come to a right understanding of what is the meaning and nature of the moral law that he administers; and

the want of this prevented Robertson from making any advance worth speaking of in the direction,—and we believe it was a right direction—in which his own instinctive feelings and convictions seem to have been impelling him. Had he been able to overcome this obstacle, and to get over his inveterate prejudice against evangelicalism, he might have been in a position to regain the substance at least of the old views, in a form that would have been most interesting and instructive, most fresh and original, and withal most suited to modern ways of thinking and feeling.

It is but a single aspect of Robertson's Life and Sermons that we have been able or indeed have attempted in some measure to estimate; and that aspect one which has inevitably led us to dwell almost exclusively on the serious and fatal defect of his teaching. It would be a more pleasing task, did our space permit, to dwell on the beauties and excellencies of his preaching at a length in some such proportion to our strictures, as our admiration of the good bears to our regret at the shortcomings of our author. But the work of controversy must ever, we fear, fill a larger space than that of eulogium; and it is impossible by any few words of praise, which might be regarded as mere formal compliments, to convey an impression of the admiration we cherish for the man and the sympathy we feel with the story of his life. His history makes on us an impression of inexpressible sadness; there is something melancholy in seeing so noble a mind and so lovable a heart led into fields of thought where there is so little to satisfy and cheer, and running a career so full of suffering and pain. No doubt the unhappiness that marked his later days is partly to be ascribed to his physical malady and partly to his morbid sensitiveness under the attacks of his opponents; but making allowance for these, it is true also that the sort of theology he embraced, though it might seem soft and easy to the superficial throng, is, to one so profound and conscientious as Robertson, but a dreary and cheerless thing, lacking the strength to comfort and uphold as well as to rebuke, of the good old theology of the Reformation. But sad as it is to trace Robertson's career, we may find this sadness relieved when we think that it might have been worse, and compare it with the course of others who, under the influence of the self-same tendencies that moved him, have diverged from the same sort of evangelism as he started from;—when we contrast the history of his religious opinions

with those of the brothers Newman, or of John Sterling, we cannot but feel thankful that he made the progress he did in an upward direction; and that by his teaching and remains he has done and is doing so much to settle the skeptical, to strengthen the wavering in the faith, to commend religion to the worldly-minded, to inculcate a genuine and high style of Christian life, and to enforce the mutual social duties of all classes of the community; much as we regret that he has done so much to give currency to a kind of teaching which we regard as seriously and fatally defective. And the regret we feel at seeing such noble and amiable minds driven away from evangelical doctrines ought not surely to be unmixed with self-reproach, when we consider that such aberrations are due in part to the narrowness and bigotry of many of the teachers of religion, yes, and to the worldliness and insincerity, and low standard of Christian life, on the part of many of its professors. Such are the miserable and fatal fruits of these things. May all lovers of the truth learn the lesson; may the teachers of the church be stirred up to a more fresh, spiritual, sympathetic exhibition of the gospel, and its members to a more consistent, godly walk, by the consideration of such histories as that of Frederick Robertson of Brighton.

XXII.—THE MILITARY METAPHORS OF ST. PAUL.*

BY REV. J. S. HOWSON.

Every part of Holy Scripture has its own distinctive imagery: and through the medium of this imagery its instruction is often conveyed. Thus, when we read the prophecies of Amos, "who was among the herdmen of Tekoa,"—himself a "herdman" in a wild and pastoral district,—the images are such as these: the fat "kine of Bashan, which say unto their masters, Bring and let us drink;" "the lion roaring in the forest;" "the seven stars of Orion, before the shadow of death is turned into the morning;" "the basket of summer fruit;" "the grasshoppers in the shooting up of the latter growth." Unless we rightly apprehend the circumstances, the scenery, and the pursuits, in connection with which it was God's will that his prophet should speak, we cannot fully understand the meaning of his words; and so far, to us, their force and instructiveness is diminished.

The imagery of the book of Amos is an emphatic and strongly marked instance of a principle which is applicable, in various degrees, to all parts of the Bible. The life of Joseph, the life of Moses, the life of Ruth, the life of Elijah, all have their appropriate atmosphere and coloring; and if we look at them without reference to these, they fade away into something abstract and dead. And so it is with the New Testament. But here, though the principle is the same, we feel that we are brought into a new world, and that the principle must be applied to very different details. Every part of the Old Testament has an oriental complexion. We illustrate it by referring to what travelers tell us of the tents of the Bedouin Arabs, of the courts of Eastern princes, of caravans and camels and palm trees. And so it is, no doubt, to some extent, in the case of the New Testament. But still, on the whole, in passing from one to the other, we are conscious that a change has come over the scene, and that God has begun to speak to us now through a different kind of imagery. We find ourselves brought in contact with circumstances far more

* From the *Sunday Magazine*, October, 1866. [H.]

nearly resembling those which surround us in modern life. We are in fact, when the New Testament is our study, on the borders or in the heart of Greek civilization, and we are always in the midst of the Roman Empire. It is no more possible fully to understand what the Apostles say to us, than what the Prophets say to us, if we dissever their words from the circumstances of their lives. The metaphors they use are drawn (as indeed they must have been drawn, to be intelligible at all) from the things which were around them. My endeavor will be, in four papers, to illustrate certain groups of images which are common in one part of the New Testament, and, in the present paper, while keeping in view especially one very conspicuous passage in the Epistle to the Ephesians, to elucidate *the military metaphors of St. Paul.*

It seldom occurs to us to consider how large a portion of his time St. Paul spent in the close proximity of soldiers. He lived under the shadow of the greatest military monarchy which the world has seen. Englishmen are less able than others to realize all that is implied in this simple fact: hence they are startled into the impression of novelty, when they first travel in France or Austria, and see troops filing through the streets of every city, and large barracks in every country town. But such sights were no novelty to St. Paul. No doubt they were more frequent and conspicuous in some parts of the Empire than others. In Philippi, for instance, in Troas and Antioch in Pisidia, which were Roman Colonies, we may well believe that the warlike symbols of Rome were more prominent than in other cities which he visited: and the state of Syria, which was a very uneasy province, and was held by a standing army of 60,000 men, was very different from that of Achaia or Bithynia, which were comparatively quiet and settled districts. But, wherever he resided, military uniforms and military quarters were familiar objects; wherever he traveled, he was liable to meet troops on their march from one province to another, or in the pursuit of banditti, or acting as an escort of prisoners.

But we are not left to this general kind of illustration. We are well acquainted with several incidents of his life, which connected him, in a manner peculiarly intimate, with Roman soldiers, and their officers, and their armor. It is enough to make a simple reference to his arrest in the court of the Temple, when

the commandant of the garrison of Antonia, with some of his subalterns and a body of troops, ran down and took him into custody,—then to the time which the Apostle spent in the barracks within Antonia, and to the events which took place there,—then to his night journey to Antipatris, under the charge of a guard almost as numerous as half an English regiment, besides a squadron of dragoons,—then to his captivity of two years at Cæsarea, the center of the provincial military government, where he was probably chained by the hand to a soldier, then to his adventurous voyage, when an officer of a distinguished corps was his close companion, and when the swords of the soldiers under his command, which had cut the fastenings of the boat, were only just prevented from taking the Apostle's life and the lives of his fellow-prisoners,—then to the delivering up of the prisoners to the commander of the Prætorian Guards, after which, though Paul was suffered to dwell by himself, yet it was not without "a soldier who kept him,"—and lastly, to the facts hinted at in passages of the Epistles written at Rome, as when he says, in affixing his autograph to the Colossian letter, "the salutation by the hand of me Paul," and then, feeling the chain clank on his wrist as he writes, he adds, "remember my chains,"—or, in the Ephesian letter, when he subscribes himself as "an ambassador in bonds,"—an ambassador of the free Gospel, fastened to a soldier;—it is enough to enumerate these things in order to see how natural it is that St. Paul should speak to us in military metaphors, nay, how unnatural it would be (if I may say so with reverence) were no such metaphors to be found in his writings.

Our best mode of approaching this direct illustration of our selected context is first to notice some of those other texts where imagery of the same kind is more lightly touched by St. Paul, and so to rise by successive steps to the passage in which the Christian warrior is set before us in the full panoply of God. Then it will not be irrelevant, if we turn in conclusion to some other passages, where similes from the same source are employed by the Apostle, less obviously but not less forcibly.

The first of these passages is in the thirteenth chapter of Romans.* That Epistle was written at Corinth, which, both as the seat of local government, and because of its critical position on a strait between two seas, must have been garrisoned by a

* Rom. xiii, 11—13.

strong military force. The image which always rises before my mind when I read the passage, is this: I fancy St. Paul—after a day spent in hard work, partly in tent-making and partly in preaching and in visitation among his converts—writing far through the night to the Christians at Rome, and just at daybreak, when the sentinels are changing guard, and the morning light glances on their armor—while at the same time the last sounds of debauched revellers in the street fall upon his ears,—expressing himself in the now familiar words: "The night is far spent, the day is at hand; let us therefore cast off the works of darkness, and let us put on *the armor of light:* let us walk honestly, as in the day, not in rioting and drunkenness."

As to the phrase "armor of light," it is evidently equivalent to the phrase "*armor of righteousness*," which he uses elsewhere,*—*i. e.*, spiritual armor for the contest against spiritual foes. But in the passage where this last expression occurs, the idea is more fully developed than in the former case. Here it is "the armor of righteousness on the right hand and on the left." We have not simply armor in the abstract, as in the other instance, but armor specifically described as of two kinds—"*on the right hand and on the left*," *i. e.*, offensive and defensive, represented generally by the sword and the shield. St. Paul is here describing himself, and his own attitude in reference to the resistance he had met with at Corinth in the progress of his apostolic work. This is not the only occasion in this severe epistle (as we shall see afterwards) where he uses military language in describing his own position in reference to the enemies of the truth.

We reach something still more definite and specific, when we come to the fifth chapter of the first letter to the Thessalonians.† "We are not of the night . . . therefore let us not sleep . . . They that be drunken, are drunken in the night . . . Let us, who are of the day, be sober, putting on the breastplate of faith and love; and for an helmet, the hope of salvation." The chief remarks to be made here, I think, are that this Epistle was written from Corinth, like that to the Romans, but on a previous visit; that the whole context is very similar to that which has been quoted from the Romans, and that while this passage contains many more details than that just adduced from the second Corinthian Epistle, yet it is entirely limited to defensive armor.

* 2 Cor. vi, 7. † 1 Thess. v, 5—8.

As to any observations on two pieces of armor that are specified —"the *breastplate* of faith and love," and the "*helmet* of salvation,"—these belong more properly to our discussion of the allegory in the sixth of Ephesians,* which claims from us now a more direct consideration.

Enough has been quoted already to prove that the use of military metaphor is a familiar thing to St. Paul. And in the passages hitherto adduced these metaphors have one general type, which is quite in harmony with the longer extract before us. In examining its different parts, I should wish to be guided by the reverent belief that each word has a meaning,—that each word is the best that could be used,—and, at the same time, I should wish to be on my guard against that pedantry of interpretation which tortures the Bible into meanings which it was never intended to bear, and which, in this case, would deprive the Apostle's imagery of all its freshness and elasticity.

I have called the passage an allegory. But it cannot strictly be described by that term. It is an allegory with a running explanation. In a strict allegory, the key of interpretation is to be derived from the context, or from the circumstances, or from analogy. But here the image and the interpretation are given side by side. We "wrestle" or engage in close conflict, but "not with flesh and blood," *i. e.* (as we see from a passage where the same phrase is used in Gallatians), not with man, but with spiritual foes. We wear "armor," but it is the armor of light, the armor of righteousness, the panoply of God. We carry a "shield," but it is the shield of faith. We wield a "sword," but it is the sword of the Spirit. This is St. Paul's manner. He explains his metaphors as he proceeds. We have, therefore, no need to waste our time in discussing the principles of the interpretation of allegory. We may begin at once to go in order through the clauses of which the passage is composed.

One of the first thoughts which occur to us in looking at the introductory words is this—that the armor is of no use to us unless we put it on. We are not to be passive in the matter. The opening words give a positive injunction: and the only way to obey the injunction is to put on the armor, and to wear it and use it. Another obvious thought relates to the perilous condition of those who are destitute of this armor. Without it we are

* Eph. vi, 10—17.

utterly defenseless. And it is no light matter to be defenseless in the presence of a foe, who is not only hostile, but accomplished in stratagem, and who commands an army such as that which is described in the verses before us. There is a story of a Spartan soldier, who went into battle without his armor, and who was fined by the Senate, though he had been victorious. This anecdote supplies a very useful admonition to the Christian soldier.

One word in this introductory portion is unfortunately translated in the Authorized Version. The phrase, "having done all," is by no means, in my opinion, an adequate rendering of the Greek. The marginal translation, "having *overcome*," is more correct. The original denotes that we are to beat down all opposition, and having done this, to "stand," to hold our ground. And this word "*stand*," which occurs once and again, sets before us the true nature of the Christian's conflict. We have a defensive military position to hold for God, and we must hold it. It is no light skirmish, which might be half an amusement to those who enjoy a fray: but it is a serious and momentous struggle to hold the field where we are posted, like the struggle of those who fought at Inkerman.

I find in two of Chrysostom's sermons on this chapter some remarks on these introductory verses, so good and forcible, that I think they deserve to be quoted. With reference to the wiles of the devil, he expresses himself as follows: "The Apostle saith not against the *fighting*, nor against the *hostilities*, but against the *wiles*. This enemy is at war with us, not simply, not openly, but by wiles: *i. e.*, he tries to deceive us and to take us by artifice. He never proposes to us sins in their proper colors. Thus he does not speak of idolatry, but he sets it off in another dress, making his discourse plausible and employing disguises." In reference to the expression just alluded to, "having subdued all," he adds:—"That is, having subdued our passions and vile lusts, and all things else that trouble us. The Apostle speaks not merely of doing the deed, but of completing it, so as not only to slay, but to stand after we have slain; for many who have gained this victory have failed again. *Having subdued all*, saith he, not, *having subdued one and not another:* for even after the victory we must stand. An enemy may be struck, but things that are struck revive again." And once more in reference to the word "stand," Chrysostom says: "The very first feature in tactics is

to know how to stand well; and many things will depend upon that. In the case of mere athletic exercises, the word of command which the trainer gives before anything else, is this, to stand firm. Much more will it be the first thing in military matters. The man who, in a true sense, stands, is upright; he stands not in a lazy attitude, not leaning upon anything. The luxurious man does not stand upright but stoops, so does the lewd man, so does the lover of money."

This is enough concerning the *attitude and posture* of the Christian warrior. We come now to *the armor itself* which he wears. As described to us here, we observe that it consists of six pieces. A few words may be devoted to each of them. But first let us bear in mind how much reality and life is communicated to the description, when we recollect where St. Paul was when he wrote it. He was in the midst of the Prætorian Guards, the *elite* of the Roman army, a body of men raised far more conspicuously above the legions than our Guards, or even the French Imperial Guard, are above the regiments of the line. But not only was he in the midst of them, seeing them continually, and hearing daily all the sounds of barrack life, but he was fastened to one of these guardsmen while he dictated the letter, and he felt the chain on his wrist while he affixed his signature.

First in order of enumeration we have the BELT—"having your loins girt about with *truth*." By this we are not to understand a loose sword-belt, like that which our own officers wear, nor any ornamented girdle, but a very strong girding apparatus, made of leather, and covered with metal plates, and fastened firmly round the loins. The appearance and use of it are best seen in ancient statues in the British Museum and elsewhere. It was the first part of the armor, which the soldier would put on, and it was of essential use to him for the purposes of safety, and especially for the sake of standing firmly. It was to the Roman soldier exactly what Truth is to the soldier of Christ. Of Christ himself it is said in the prophecy that, "righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness (the word is *truth* in the Septuagint) the girdle of his reins."*

The BREASTPLATE is next to be considered. It is described as the "breastplate of *righteousness*." A question might be raised here as to the meaning of the word "righteousness," whether it

* Isaiah xi, 5.

denotes the justification which belongs to the believer by virtue of his union with Christ, or refers to that rectitude of character which cannot be wanting in a true Christian. I feel little doubt that the latter is the true meaning of St. Paul; and this, for two or three reasons. In the first place, justification would seem to belong more naturally to the "shield of faith," which is mentioned below: but again, it appears to me that all the parts of defensive armor mentioned here designate graces of Christian character. Moreover, in the shorter allegory of the first Thessalonian letter, the breastplate is described as made up of "faith and love," a perfect account of that principle in a Christian which leads him to feel rightly, to think rightly, and to act rightly; but hardly such a definition as we should expect of a sinner's state of pardon and acceptance of God. But there is another reason which, to my mind, is almost decisive. St. Paul is here again using Greek words from the old Testament (and it is important to observe this: for there is seldom any long passage in St. Paul's writings without some quotation from the Septuagint), and there we find it said of the Lord himself that "He put on righteousness as a breastplate, and an helmet of salvation on his head."* The incongruity is obvious on the former interpretation: "It is God that justifieth."

This reference to Isaiah leads me to break the order of St. Paul's words, and to take "the helmet of *salvation*" next after the "breastplate of righteousness;" for they are coupled together in the same clause by the prophet from whom he quotes. Clearly we might have some difficulty here in assigning a precise meaning to the Christian's helmet, were it not that the Apostle himself comes to our assistance; for he says to the Thessalonians, that it is "the *hope* of salvation" which we are to take for a HELMET. I conceive then that we are to see here a representation of that cheerful and courageous hope, which is so important an element in the Christian's warfare, and so bright an ornament and crowning point to all the other graces of his character.

The helmet is perhaps the brightest and most conspicuous part of a soldier's equipment; but there are other parts, less showy, but not less essential. A soldier badly shod can never last well through a campaign. Many of us have a vivid remembrance of what we read in the newspapers concerning some passages of the

* Isaiah lix, 17.

Crimean war. St. Paul does not leave his description of the Christian warrior incomplete in this respect. "HAVE YOUR FEET SHOD," he says, with "*the preparation* (or, with the prompt ready movement) *of the Gospel of peace.*" It is needless to enter here into any details concerning the military equipment of the feet, which enabled the Roman armies to march to the conquest of the world. But we should observe the holy irony with which St. Paul gives an unexpected turn to his mention of this part of the Christian armor. The Roman soldiers were all on the alert to obey orders, to carry into all nations the miseries of *War.* The like alacrity ought to be shown by us in obedience to our Captain; and no slipshod indolence ought to make us slow in moving on this blessed errand of *Peace.*

The words in which the Authorized Version introduces the SHIELD are again (I conceive) inadequate, or at least obscure. "Above all," conveys the impression of "especially," as if the Apostle was now about to mention what is most important. And so perhaps "the shield of faith" is the most important of all the defences of the Christian soldier. But I think the Greek words mean simply "over all," "on the outside of all."* The great Roman shield referred to here was very different from the small bucklers which were used in some kinds of ancient warfare. Sculptured representations of it may be seen on Trajan's Column. It covered and protected the whole body; and whatever weak points there might be in other parts of the armor, this supplied their deficiencies, as faith comes to the rescue when all other graces are failing. True faith is invaluable and invulnerable. It is competent to quench even the "fiery arrows" of the Evil One. Here the image of the Christian conflict assumes all the animation of a *siege;* and one of the best illustrations I am acquainted with of the words used by the Apostles is in the history of one of the sieges of Rhodes, during which arrows charged with combustible materials were sent against the ships, and the very expression used here by St. Paul is used by Diodorus Siculus in describing the defences used for quenching the fire.

One part of the armor remains—the SWORD—"the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God,"—*i. e.*, the sword which the Spirit gives, and which is none other than God's revealed truth.

* [This force of the Greek expression is too doubtful to be made essential to the thought.—H.]

This is the one offensive weapon. We are not sanctioned in the use of any other: all the rest of our armor is defensive: and this is very instructive. Our conflict is not with man, but with sin. We have no angry passions of our own to gratify. Our duty is steadfastly to resist: and when we strike, we must strike only with the weapon which God puts into our hands. All this is made more emphatic, if we observe that one weapon—the most characteristic weapon of the Roman soldier—the great *pilum* or pike, which Macaulay has introduced with strict truth into one of his "Lays of Rome"—this weapon is entirely omitted. Here the parallel is left incomplete. Can we doubt that this was done purposely? The silence of Scripture has its meaning as well as its actual words.

I abstain from further and closer practical comments. These would enter into the region of Christian experience, and would belong to a treatise of a deeper kind. I will only now, through a few remaining paragraphs, follow the same thread of thought, where it conducts us to one or two other places, in which (as I have said) military metaphors are employed, less obviously at first sight, though not less forcibly.

Some of these relate to the long operation of *campaigning*, rather than the mere putting on of armor. Thus, when Timotheus is admonished to "endure hardness as a good soldier of Jesus Christ," it is added by the Apostle: "No man that goeth on a campaign entangleth himself with the common affairs of life, that he may please him who hath chosen him to be a soldier." * It is to be regretted that the expression "*this* life" should have found a place in the English Version, inasmuch as it mixes the metaphor with the thing intended, besides stating what is not true. For if one thing above all others belongs peculiarly to this life, it is War. This, however, does not hinder war, in the form of a prolonged campaign, from furnishing most apt illustrations of three things which are expected from the Christian,—patient endurance,—firm separation from those interests which are not compatible with his main purpose,—and an earnest desire to please his Commander.

There is again a passage in the early part of the second Epistle to the Corinthians,† which involves no difficulty as to its general meaning, but great part of the vividness of which we lose by not

* 2 Tim. ii, 3, 4. † 2 Cor. x, 3—6.

noticing how imagery, drawn from the conduct of a campaign, runs through the whole of the context. In the last passage the reference was to an individual soldier: here it is to a commander. St. Paul is speaking in peremptory language of his apostolic power and authority. The military phraseology starts suddenly to view in the third verse,—"Though we walk in the flesh, we do not war after the flesh." This is clear enough. But in what follows it is not always remarked that every phrase to the end of the sixth verse is appropriate to some part of a campaign, and drawn in fact from the familiar experience of those terrible Roman wars which were well remembered in every region through which the Apostle traveled. No one will question this as regards the words "weapons," and "warfare." But the "strongholds" are the rock forts such as those which once bristled along the coast of his native Cilicia, and of which he must often have heard. when his father told him how they were "pulled down" by the Romans in their war against the pirates. Those "high things that exalt themselves"—those high eminences of the pride of nature—occupied in force by hostile troops,—had been a familiar experience in many wars throughout Asia Minor, while one of the grandest of all was the Acropolis that towered over Corinth. But this is not all. Ancient warfare ended with the taking of prisoners, who were carried into some safe place (such as this very Acropolis) where obedience would be secure. So the Apostle speaks of "bringing into captivity every thought unto (or rather *into*) the obedience of Christ." And then, further, if in a country that had been conquered on the whole, rebellions were here and there to break out again, it was not the habit of the Romans to desist till complete subordination was established. So the Apostle holds himself in readiness to "revenge all disobedience," even when on the whole (for this he will not doubt) the general "obedience" of the Corinthian church is "fulfilled." Here then are a series of phrases which describe the vigorous prosecution of a campaign, and the determined subjugation of the last symptoms of rebellion. And who will say that we do not lose by failing to notice this character of the language? Who will say that we do not gain by allowing it to have its natural and close association with what history tells of the course and the consolidation of Roman military conquest?

And more yet remains to be said concerning even this section

of the subject. St. Paul pursues the progress of the campaign till it reaches that which, in a Roman's eyes, was the most glorious of all consummations, the progress of the triumphal procession after final victory; and he introduces God himself as the victor and the leader of the triumph. Twice we find this image expressed, with the technical and classical word which belongs to the subject: once when the great conquest effected through the death of Christ is the topic of the Apostle's enthusiastic sentences,* and once when the progressive advance of the Gospel of Christ is represented in language strictly suitable to the long procession of conqueror and captives by the Sacred way to the Capitol.† In the former case the words are brief and simple, which describe the "open display" of the defeat of "principalities and powers." In the latter the description is prolonged and given in detail. The doctrine preached by the Apostle "in every place" is compared to the fragrance which filled the streets from clouds of incense, while the fatal doom of the captives contrasted with the exulting joy of the citizens is an expressive image of the awful alternative which separates the hearers of the Gospel into "them that are saved," and "them that are lost."

And still the whole subject of the military metaphors of St. Paul is not exhausted. There are other passages where the same expressive imagery occurs: as when he tells us that "without were *fightings*, within were fears," a description of his own experience which may well give encouragement to us:‡ or as when he speaks of the "law in our members *waging war* against the law of the mind and taking us captive," and perhaps our own experience is enough to make us aware that no metaphor would be more suitable to the case than one derived from the dreadful realities of war:§ or as when he assures his most consistent converts that "the *peace* of God, which passeth all understanding, shall *garrison* their hearts and minds through Jesus Christ."‖ It is a beautiful instance of holy irony, like that which we noticed before, when we saw that "the preparation of the Gospel of peace" was an essential part of the "armor of God." And the natural conclusion of these remarks is an allusion to the Great Resurrection, when "*the trumpet shall sound*,",¶ and every faithful Christian warrior shall have his place in his own "order" or "*division*" of the vast Army of the Lord of Hosts.**

* Col. ii, 15. † 2 Cor. ii, 14—16. ‡ 2 Cor. vii, 5. § Rom. vii, 23.
‖ Phil. iv, 7. ¶ 1 Cor. xv, 52; see xiv, 8. ** 1 Cor. xv, 23.

XXIII.—SPURGEON AS A PREACHER.*

The Rev. C. H. Spurgeon is a fact. There can be no dispute about that; he has outlived the nine days' wonder, and earned for himself a place in history. The Metropolitan Tabernacle, too, is a fact, and a pretty large one. There it stands to speak for itself, crowded to suffocation every Sunday. And "The Metropolitan Tabernacle Pulpit" is a fact, a perfect marvel, even in this age, so marvellous for cheap and wide-spread letterpress. Some people were slow to realize the magnitude of these facts. Spurgeon, they said, was a charlatan—a sort of puritanic Punch; he would fret his hour on the stage of popularity, and be heard of no more. He had gone up like a rocket, but he would fall like a stick. These predictions have failed. The preacher has swollen out into the Metropolitan Tabernacle, and the Metropolitan Tabernacle has expanded into a monster balloon, seen from the Land's End to John o' Groat's; and the spectators, as they gaze up, know not which to admire most—the hight to which Spurgeon has soared, or the steadiness with which he maintains his position. In these circumstances, it will not be thought strange if we, attracted like the rest by the novelty of the spectacle, should devote a little attention to it in the character of reviewers.

Charles Hatton Spurgeon, it appears then, was born in Kelvedon, a country town of Essex, on the 19th of June, 1834. The father of our Southwark prodigy is Mr. John Spurgeon, who, though occupied as a layman during the week, is the pastor of a small Independent church at Tollesbury, in Essex. His grandfather, the Rev. James Spurgeon, still lives, we believe, and continues his ministerial duties as pastor of an Independent church at Stambourne, near Halsted, in the same county. The mother of Mr. Spurgeon was the youngest sister of Charles Parker Jarvis, Esq., of Colchester, a lady "remarkable for piety, useful-

* From the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, January, 1866.

ness, and humility." Here, then, we have presumptive evidence of the example of personal and family religion, for at least two generations, operating in favor of our youthful divine. When quite an infant, it seems, he was removed to his grandfather's house; and there, under the affectionate care of a maiden aunt, and under the eye of the venerable pastor, he soon developed into the thoughtful boy, fonder of his picture-book than of his play; for often would he sit for hours gazing with the round eyes of childish horror at the grim features of "old bloody Bonner" and "Giant Despair," or tracing the adventures of "Christian" and "Robinson Crusoe." The pious precocity of the child soon struck all around him with admiration. He would astonish the grave deacons and matrons who met in his grandfather's house on Sabbath evenings, by proposing subjects for conversation and making pertinent remarks upon them.

At this early period, too, he gave indications of that decision of character and boldness of address for which he afterwards became so remarkable. When under six years of age, seeing a person who made a profession of religion associating on the street of the village with others known to be bad characters, he made up to the big man, and astounded him by asking, "What doest thou here, Elijah?" At seven, his mental development was considerably in advance of his years, and his moral character, more especially his truthfulness, was even then conspicuous. There must have been something very striking about the boy, when the good Richard Knill, on hearing him read the chapter before family prayers, was so impressed that, calling him to his side and laying his venerable hand on his head, he said, "Never did I hear a little boy read so before; I believe God will raise him up for some remarkable work. I hope he will one day fill Rowland Hill's pulpit." And when scarcely in his teens, we learn that he would often be found in the hayrack or the manger, reading aloud; talking and even preaching to his little brothers and sisters. This is just what we might have expected from "the boy preacher." Of his education and subsequent history, we have less definite information; nor indeed has the time yet come for furnishing it. He appears to have had the advantages of a good education; to have acquired, in a respectable school, the elements of Latin, Greek and French, and in every branch of knowledge to which he devoted attention, he became a proficient; and yet,

strange to say, though residing in Cambridge, and urged by his father to complete his course of study at college, he steadily refused. Hitherto, Mr. Spurgeon had been brought up among the Independents; and, judging from the experience of as good and great men as himself, he might probably have continued so to this day, but for one of those circumstances which so often decide, almost unconsciously, a change of religious profession. In his sixteenth year he became usher in a school at Newmarket, under the care of one Mr. Swindell. Here his biographer remarks, very simply but significantly, "Mr. Swindell was a Baptist." During this period, the youthful usher passed through what he afterwards called his "mad voyage" over the ocean of infidelity; after which, faith came to the aid of bewildered reason, and brought back the wanderer "safe to land."

After some correspondence with his father on the subject, (a form of filial deference and respect seldom observed in similar cases), he joined himself to the communion generally known, we believe, as Calvinistic or General Baptists. On one of his visits to his home, his excellent mother told him that she had prayed for him as a servant of Christ and a preacher of righteousness, but added that she had never prayed for him as *a Baptist.* "Then, mother," replied her ready-witted son, "God has answered your prayer, and, like his bounty, has given you more than you asked." Again he declined the offer of his father to send him to college, assigning as his reason, the marks of Divine approval which accompanied his early ministrations. After a successful noviciate in a small Baptist chapel at Waterbeach, near Cambridge, where the pulpit gifts of the boy-preacher excited equal admiration and surprise, he was, in 1853, when only nineteen years of age, called to supply the chapel in New Park Street, London, formerly occupied by the well-known Benjamin Keach and Dr. Gill, but which had declined from its ancient popularity; and in the following year he was called to be the pastor of a church numbering forty members. Here the extreme juvenility, the singular style, and commanding powers of the preacher, soon attracted crowded audiences. "It was a remarkable sight," writes a member of the Society of Friends, "to see this round-faced country youth placed in a position of such solemn and arduous responsibility, yet addressing himself to the fulfillment of his duties with a gravity, self-possession and vigor

that proved him well fitted to the task he had assumed." In a few weeks the pews, which had been so long tenantless, were filled; and ere many months had elapsed, the astonished deacons, some of whom had shaken their heads at the proposal of calling such a raw stripling from the provinces, found their chapel besieged by clamorous crowds, rendering it imperatively necessary to furnish larger accommodation. This was followed by an adjournment to Exeter Hall, which, in its turn, was filled to overflowing. His subsequent career in Surrey Gardens, and afterwards in his magnificent Tabernacle, where he still labors, is too well known to be recapitulated.

During the early days of his popularity, nothing is more remarkable than the amount of labor undergone by the preacher. We hear of his preaching, not only every day, but twice or thrice a day; and that with undiminished force and unflagging zeal. For the achievement of such herculean tasks, he has doubtless been largely indebted to an excellent constitution, and to his simple habits of living, which have resulted in securing a healthy condition of both mind and body. "He knew not what illness was," says Mr. Stevenson, "till 'the Surrey Gardens' calamity, joined with the wicked calumnies of a portion of the press, laid prostrate even the strong man." In private life, so far as we have seen or heard of him, Mr. Spurgeon is the happiest and the heartiest of men. Brimming with *bonhommie*, throwing himself on the tide of social intercourse, with the freedom of one who has no tricks to exhibit, and no failings to conceal, he is said to be the most pleasant of companions. In short, he is decidedly a natural character; pious, without anything of the slang of piety; temperate, without a touch of asceticism; and devout, with none, perhaps too little, of the solemnity of the devotee.

Turning from the personal history of Mr. Spurgeon, to view him in his character as a preacher, we feel somewhat at a loss how to classify him with any of the ancient or modern types of pulpit oratory. He has doubtless made the older puritans of England his special model, and drawn from them much of their inspiration. Yet we look in vain through Spurgeon's lively orations, for anything resembling the long-winded periods, the quaint and far-fetched similitudes, or the narrow and dreary passages through which these excellent men sought too often to guide their hearers to the truth. Mr. Spurgeon is not only popular, he represents

the popularity of his time. He is as unlike the popular preacher of the past, as his Tabernacle, with its stage, pit, and galleries, is unlike Westminster Abbey. He is "The Times" of modern evangelism. Many of his sermons would make good leading articles, and in the power, the profusion, and the rapidity with which they were poured forth, we are reminded of the steam press, and the electric telegraph. And not the less is he emblematic of the times, that in his case the pulpit is stripped of all its common accessories. It is doubtful if the squat and somewhat round figure of the preacher would admit of improvement by gown and cassock. In an age impatient of all kinds of pretence, he is anything but a clerical fop. There is no cant or whining about him; he is as natural as the day; and were it not for time and place, few would suppose from look, tone, or style, that they listened to a sermon. It is difficult, indeed, at first, to account for Mr. Spurgeon's popularity; he has neither the polish of Robert Hall, nor the momentum of Chalmers, nor the picturesqueness of Guthrie; he neither thunders like Irving, nor weeps like Whitfield. Wherein, then, lies the secret of his success?

It would be vain to fix on any one feature of the preacher in answer to this question. A combination of gifts as rare as startling, must account for his success in a career which, in the absence of any one of these gifts, might have proved a failure. There is the logical faculty appearing in the *lucidus ordo* of his discourses, combined with a fancy which brings up images at will, and scatters around the plainest subject a copiousness of illustration with the dexterity of the juggler, who brings out of an old hat an endless shower of flowers, feathers, and all sorts of unexpected things. Then there is the marvelous memory of the man, which, like some nimble servitor, seems to be always ready to supply him with the stores of his reading as they are needed; the sonorous voice, ringing like a church bell, the terse Saxon English of his style, the volubility of his elocution, joined with that perfect self-control, which prevents it from degenerating into declamation, and imparts to it something like the measured tramp of military precision. The whole structure of his sermons is conversational, but then it is conversation through a speaking-trumpet. The speaker is on fire throughout, but it is not in occasional flashes of flame that the fire appears, but in the sustained white-heat of the furnace. These are features well-known to all

who have listened to Spurgeon. One trait, however, though equally obvious, has not perhaps been so much marked as it deserves. We refer to what may be termed the *world-like* tone of his addresses. The world and the pulpit have long been at war with each other, and, it must be owned, with very varying success. If the preacher has it all his own way on Sunday, and launches his bolts at "the world" without any daring to gainsay him, the world in its turn takes its revenge on the pulpit during the week. Besides, no individual deems himself specially aimed at under that very general designation. Spurgeon, however, has the knack of making his shot tell upon the world. He has got into the way of talking for the gospel exactly as the world talks against it. In some of his happiest efforts, it strikes us as if religion had mounted "the seat of the scornful," and the poor world were groaning under reproach and persecution. This is intolerable, and Mr. Spurgeon must be made to smart for it. Hence the singular bitterness with which he has been assailed by the secular, the sceptical, and unprincipled portion of the press. The worldling feels as if the tables has been turned upon him; the sceptic finds his cavils met with a loud guffaw, converting his sneer into the lugubrious look of injured innocence; and the profligate, shamed out of his habitual bravado, is half inclined to complain of being personally insulted. The pungency of this treatment is considerably enhanced by the tact with which the preacher singles out his victim, and holds him up before his audience for general inspection. In the best sense of the word, Mr. Spurgeon deals largely in personalities; and as the fop in the play asks in high fume, "Do you mean to call me an individual, Sir?" each man feels as if he had been personally indicated. Sometimes this is done by a familiar tap upon the shoulder: "Away with all that affectation of modesty which some good people think to be so pretty, saying, 'I hope,' 'I trust,' 'But I feel such doubts and gloomy misgivings.' *My dear sir, that is not humility!*" Sometimes it is by interpreting the hidden language of the heart, thus: "How dishonorable is it in you to say you believe in the heart, and yet not make confession. *You are like a rat behind the wainscot*, coming out just now and then, when nobody is looking, and then running behind again! 'What a degrading metaphor!' you say; I meant to degrade you by it, so as to drive you out of your cowardice." Or let us listen

to his own account of the matter, in which he unconsciously reveals this secret of his success. In his sermon on "The Cripple at Lystra," referring to Paul, "steadfastly beholding him, and perceiving that he had faith to be healed," he observes that, "using his eyes to watch the audience, as all preachers should do, and not looking up at the ceiling, or at the gallery front, as some preachers are wont to do, he marks this cripple, fixes his eyes upon him, and looks earnestly in his face." And now let us hear what follows:

"Do you think I am overstraining the probabilities of the case You will perhaps say, 'It does not appear that Paul had any communication with the poor cripple before the miracle was performed.' Now I venture to draw quite an opposite inference. I know from my own experience that it is no uncommon thing for some one individual to arrest the preacher's attention. The group of countenances which lay before him in a large assembly like the present, might to the first glance of a stranger look confused and inexplicable, as a Chinese grammar does to those who know not the language. But you need not doubt that a practised eye can learn to read the one as well as the other. The languor and indifference of some; the curious, inquiring look of others; the cool, critical attention of a considerable number, and the countenances of those who are rather absorbed in a train of thought just awakened in their own minds,—these all have a peculiar impressiveness, and form a picture which often reacts upon us, and kindles a vehement desire in our breasts to reach the souls of those who, for a brief hour, hang upon our lips. But there will sometimes be one who has faith dazzling in his very eyes, as they are fixed with an intentness, of which it were in vain for me to attempt a description, seeming to drink in every word and every syllable of a word, till the preacher becomes as absorbed in that man as the man had been in the preacher. And while he pursues the discourse, gaining liberty at every step, till he forgets the formality of the pulpit in the freedom of conversation with the people, he perceives that at last this man has heard the very truth which meets his case. There is no concealing it. His features have suddenly relaxed. He listens still, but it is no longer with painful anxiety; a calm satisfaction is palpable on his face now. That soul of communion which is in the eye has unravelled the secret. Preacher and hearer, un-

known to all the rest of the audience, have secretly saluted each other, and met on the common ground of a vital faith."

Having thus, to use his own phrase, "picked him out," we need not bring forward illustrations of his mode of dealing with such characters; we need not show how, not merely addressing him, but actually embracing and grappling with him, as a strong wrestler, he never leaves him until he has fairly vanquished him. We intended to have adverted particularly to another talent for which Mr. Spurgeon is conspicuous—the division and arrangement of his discourses. Nothing can be more logical, and, at the same time, more natural, more simple, and at the same time more exhaustive, than the mode in which he disposes his thoughts on a passage. As a specimen of what we mean, we select the first that turns up to us among thousands. It is "The Queen of the South" who came to Solomon, Matt. xii: 42:—

"Will you kindly open your Bibles at the tenth chapter of the First of Kings, for I shall have constantly to refer to the historical narrative in order to bring out in full relief the conduct of the ancient queen. O that the spirit of God may convince some of you of sin by the example of that wise-hearted woman! The three points we shall consider this morning with regard to the Queen of Sheba, are these: First, let us *commend her for the possession of an inquiring spirit*, then let us observe *how she conducted her inquiry*, and, in closing, let us mark *the result of an inquiry so well conducted.*"

The ease and rapidity with which discourses so skillfully conceived, fraught with so much substance, and so happily illustrated, have been prepared for public delivery, are truly remarkable; and not the less so that they are, it would seem, the results of personal effort. "Once," Mr. Spurgeon says, "I put all my knowledge together in glorious confusion; but now I have a shelf in my head for everything, and whatever I read or hear I know where to stow it away for use at the proper time." But in connection with this we only advert to another characteristic feature of his sermons, which we cannot better express than by calling it his mode of *putting his matter*. Unless the reader has felt the peculiarity to which we refer, we despair of making it plainer by description. It resembles the art of the skillful angler, which no rule can teach, and no study can acquire. Indeed, in the craftiness with which he baits his hook at the commencement, and the

deftness with which he drops his line as he advances, we discover a "fisher of men," who knows how to "catch them by guile." Eminently textual in his mode of treatment, his text, it matters not what it may be, becomes, for the time being, the idol of his soul; he gazes at it admiringly, and handles it as Isaac Walton advises us to handle the worm while impaling it on the hook,—"tenderly, as if you loved it." And as he announces the "particulars," the thoughts seem somehow to drop out of the subject, rather than to be dragged into it; he gives you, not as other preachers do "the import" of the text, but rather its outgoings and self-revealings, as if it were a thing of life.

Admiring as we do his excellence, we are not blind to Mr. Spurgeon's faults as a preacher. With all the ardor that flows from conviction, from love to souls, and from high conscientiousness, his best friends must allow that he is lacking in the warmth of affection. He appeals to every faculty of the mind, but seldom, if ever, to the heart. Neither in the tones of his voice, nor in the strain of his address, is there even an attempt at the tender or the pathetic. We rise at the close of his discourses, admiring, convinced, impressed, but not melted. Not that the preacher shows any want of sympathy with the woes and weaknesses of humanity, but that from constitutional composure, he cannot help treating both of them somewhat coolly. When he takes up anything in the pathetic line, as in his sermon headed, "Alas for us, if thou wert all, and nought beyond, O Earth!" the attempt is a failure. His style of consolation mounts up to raptures and ecstacies, but never drops down in tears. His is a hardy religion. He succeeds, we doubt not, in healing many a broken heart, and binding up many a wounded spirit; but he is decidedly addicted (we do not use the image profanely), to the cold water cure. It is needless to advert to the common charge of levity brought against him, often by those who give small evidence of their reverence for sacred things. While, in general, we deprecate the practice of indulging in sly jokes, humorous allusions, and smart witticisms, as unbecoming the chair of verity, we have no sympathy with the squeamishness which would blackball Spurgeon, merely because, from the very buoyancy of his spirits, he cannot repress an occasional sally of humor, even when speaking on the most solemn subjects. Such as he have a sort of license to deal in these pyrotechnics, which few besides could

manage with safety to themselves or to those around them. Another charge is less easily rebutted, that of *egoism*. There can be no doubt that Spurgeon is fond of introducing himself as an illustration. That he does so frequently, as a mere figure of rhetoric, we can well believe; but with so many thousands before him, to whom he is the center of attraction, he is in great danger of indulging in this sort of personification to excess. Here, however, we drop our criticism on his preaching. God save the Preacher! Long may he be preserved to sound the trumpet of the Gospel, to hail from afar the guilty wanderers, and gather them into the fold of the Great Shepherd; to rebuke unbelief, to chastise hypocrisy, to scourge all iniquity, and to usher trembling faith into the peace and joy that reign in his own bosom!

XXIV—ORIGIN AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BIBLE NAMES.*

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In designating an object by a name the design is to distinguish it in thought from other objects. Such being the case names are not originally arbitrary verbal signs, but are determined by the peculiarities of the objects to be named; they are expressions of the impression which such objects make upon the originator of the name, or of the peculiar significance which in one way or another they have for him. Thus, evidently is the first instance of the giving of names recorded in Scripture (Gen. ii, 19, 20) to be understood. As a designation of the animals according to the different peculiarities they manifested, it brought to man's consciousness the difference between animal and human nature ("but for Adam there was not found a help meet for him"). In like manner the names of biblical localities are generally determined either by the natural peculiarities of such localities, as for example, Ramah (height) Mizpah (watch tower), Jericho (place of fragrance), &c., or by some special historical significance, which they may have acquired in consequence of some memorable event. In the latter case the name serves at the same time to perpetuate the memory of the event.†

NAMES OF PERSONS.

So with the names of persons. Originally they mark some prominent peculiarity of the individual, some characteristic circumstance or event connected with his birth or history,‡ or they serve to designate more distinctly the specific significance appertaining to the whole person.§ Even after the name has become more or less conventional, there remains a tendency to

* Translated from HERZOG's *Real-Encyklopädie*, by Rev. W. F. WARREN, D.D. Professor in the Methodist Episcopal Seminary, Mass.

† Comp. Gen. xi, 9; xxii, 14; xxvi, 20 ss.; xxviii, 19; xxxii, 2, 30; Ex. xvii, 7; Num. xi, 34; xxi, 3; Josh. vii, 26, &c., &c.

‡ See for instance, Gen. xxv, 25, 26, 30; xxix, 32 ss.; 1 Sam. iv, 21; 1 Chron. iv, 9.

§ e. g. Gen. iii, 20; iv, 25.

treat the *nomen* as *omen*, (hence the change of name in Gen. 17, 5), a tendency to seek out relations of resemblance or of contrast between the name and the character or experiences of a person.* This identification of name and person, and the consequent significance of names are especially observable in the history of revelation. In the spirit of that truthfulness, which desires to see all contradiction betwixt name and nature done away, and every one called by his right name, (comp. Is. v, 20; xxxii, 5; Rev. iii, 1), a series of names is here produced, which really express the personal significance and position in life of those who bear them and which thus themselves become attestations of Revelation, abiding pledges of divine guidance and promise. These significant names are partly birth-names,†—partly and more commonly, new appellations. As outside the circle of Revelation, particularly among the oriental nations,‡ it is customary to designate one's entrance into a new relation by a new name.§ in which case the acceptance of the new name involves an acknowledgment of the sovereignty of him who confers the name,‖ so the importance and new sphere assigned to the organs of Revelation in God's kingdom are frequently marked by a change of name. Examples of this are Abraham (Gen. xvii, 5); Sarah (xvii, 15); Israel (as designation of the spiritual character in place of Jacob which designated his natural character—xxxii, 28); Joshua (Num. xiii, 16); comp. also Jerubbaal (Judges vi, 32); in N. T. Cephas or Peter (John i, 42); Boanerges (Mar. iii, 17); Barnabas (Acts iv, 36). It is likewise probable that Paul, in assuming the name of his first convert among the Gentiles (Acts xiii, 12), designed thereby to commemorate his new calling.¶

CHARACTER REPRESENTED BY NAMES.

It is however, remarkable, that in many instances where no particular reason for the appellation is given, a striking corre-

* Comp. for instance 1 Sam. xxv, 25; Ruth 1, 20; and Hengstenberg's Observations, *Beiträge zur Einleitung ins Altes Test.* Bd. 2. S, 271.

† As for instance, Noah, Gen. v. 29; Ishmael, xvi, 11; Isaac, xxi, 3; Comp. xvii, 17–19; xviii, 12–14 &c.; Jesus, Matt. i, 21.

‡ See Rosenmüller, *Altes und Neues Morgenland*, Bd. I, S. 63.

§ Comp. Gen. xli, 45; Dan. i, 7; Esth. ii, 7. Probably, certain double names, as for example Azariah and Uzziah, are attributable to this custom of changing the name. (See Thenius on 2 Kings xiv, 21.)

‖ 2 Kings, xxiii, 34; xxiv, 17.

¶ Comp. also Glassii, *Philol. Sac. IV.* 3 Observ. 14.

pondence is seen between the significance of the name, and the character of the person; *e. g.* Saul, David, Solomon, (comp. however 1 Chron. xxii, 9), Elijah (1 Kings, xviii, 36). What peculiar weight the prophets attached to names is well known. Nathan gives Solomon the name Jedidiah "because of the Lord." Hosea (ch. i) and Isaiah (viii, 3; viii, 3) express their prophecies in the names of their children. Isaiah comforts himself with the merciful pledge contained in the significance of his own name (viii, 18). The prophets frequently play upon the names of persons and places, and such instances of paronomasia are not to be regarded as mere rhetorical ornaments. Compare Micah's play upon his own name ch. vii, 18;* such passages as Is. xxv, 10; Micah i, 10 seq.; Jer. xx, 3; xxiii, 6. (The last named passage having been spoken in the days of Zedekiah, we may discover in it a play upon the name of this king, the prophet contrasting with this caricature of theocratic royalty the true bearer of the name). This intimate concrete relation betwixt name and person explains finally certain biblical modes of speech When God elects a man by virtue of *personal* qualification, he is said to call him by name (Ex. xxxi, 2; Is. xlv, 3, 4). When Jehovah says to Moses: "I know thee by name" (Ex. xxxiii, 12), he means he has placed himself in a specifically personal relation to Moses, in a relation pertaining to Moses alone, and therefore connected with his name. This explains also (Is. xliii, 1:) "I have called thee by thy name, thou art mine" (comp. xlix, 1). Receiving a new name from God, (Is. lxv, 15; lxii, 2; Rev. ii, 17; iii, 12) is the expression employed to denote a new personal relation to him established by a divine act of grace. Finally, the frequent use of *nikra* (shall be called) to designate real conditions is not to be forgotten (see the Lexicons).

NAMES OF NATIONS.

But the personal names of Scripture deserve to be considered in another aspect. The names of every people constitute an important memorial of the spirit and manners of the people, and in Israel they furnish a significant testimony respecting the peculiar calling of this people. Among no other people of antiquity do we find, relatively, so many names of religious significance. The collection by Matthew Hiller in his *Onomasticon Sacrum*,

* Caspari, *Commentar*, p. 20 seq.

1706, which by the way needs some sifting, contains over one hundred names of men of this kind, and how much they outnumbered the others in use may be seen, for instance, in the longer registers of the Chronicles.* These names which in the earliest period appear to have been compounded with *el*, (God,) less frequently with *Shaddai*, (Almighty,) *tsur* (rock,) *e. g.* Zurischaddai, my rock is the Almighty, Pedahzur, whom the rock delivers;† later, particularly after the times of David, chiefly with *Jehovah*, contain assertions respecting the attributes of God, his relation to his elect people, his almighty, just and merciful dealings, &c.; they express gratitude, hope, prayer to God. Even formal prayers appear in certain names, as for example, Elioenai (1 Chron. iii, 24)—to Jehovah are my eyes (directed), Hodaiah (1 Chron. iii, 24; v, 24)—thank Jehovah. Particularly noticeable is the woman's name Hazelelponi (1 Chron. iv, 3)—give shade thou who turnest thy face to me.‡ The signification of these names remained for the most part transparent, though in some cases a considerable modification particularly of the *Jehovah* occurred.§ Frequently, no doubt, the giving of such religious names was a mere matter of custom; even an Ahab gave to sons borne him by Jezebel names compounded with *Jehovah*, as Ahaziah and Joram. Still, it cannot be denied, that in many cases the choice of the name (which seems to have often proceeded from the mother),‖ was an act of religious confession on the part of the parents. The religious significancy of names was yet further hightened by the circumstance, that in the case of boys they were given in connection with the rite of circumcision. This, it is true, is first explicitly stated (Luke i, 59; ii, 21), but it can also be inferred from the connection of the narrative (Gen. xvii and xxi, 3 *seq*). It signified, that the name ought to be an expression of the essential life-position of the man, that is, an

* The number of religious names for women, compared with those of a non religious character, particularly with those taken from graceful animals, vegetable growths, &c. is much smaller. The fact, that among the names of men, after those of religious significance comparatively many seem to have been taken from the animal kingdom, is attributable to the early nomadic life of the people. (See Simonis, *Onomast. V. T.* p. 393 seq.)

† Comp. Ewald, *Ausfürl. Lehrbuch der hebr. Sprache*, 6 Aufl. S. 586 ff.

‡ Comp. Ewald, *ibidem*, p. 590.

§ On this point see Caspari, *ibidem*, p. 8 seq.

‖ Gen. xxix, 32–35; ch. xxx; 1 Sam. i, 20; iv, 21.

expression of his position in the divine covenant. The adoption of new names by Jewish proselytes in later times is to be explained on the same principle. In the case of girls, the name is said to have been given at the time of weaning.

NAMES APPLIED TO FAMILIES AND GENERATIONS.

Finally, we may consider the significance of names for the connexion of families and generations. The name being so intimately identified with the person, the continuation of life in descendants is at the same time a continuation of the name; hence to be named after one signifies in Gen. xlviii, 16; Deut. xxv, 6, 7, to be his rightful heir. The preservation of this family connexion devolves on the male line, a fact which may explain the use of the word *zakar* (2 Sam. xviii, 18)=*per quem memoria parentum propagatur* (according to *Simonis* and *Winer*). This is also outwardly intimated by the addition "Son of"—(found even in the New Test. Matth. xvi, 17)—a designation whose absence frequently seems to indicate an inferior or foreign origin: (comp. Is. xxii, 15,) the mention of Shebna without naming his father with that of Eliakim the son of Hilkiah (verse 20). As a patronymic the name of the birth place was in such case often employed.* Not unfrequently patronymic names seem to have become principal names, and this not merely in later times (as *e. g.* Bartholmæus, Bartimæus, Barabas, Barjesus, &c.), but already in 1 Kings iv, 7, where we find, singularly enough, that five of the officers there mentioned are designated only by the names of their fathers, probably, as *Thenius* suggests, because they adopted the paternal name as their own, merely prefixing the syllable *Bar*. (For information respecting names compounded with *Abi* and *Ahhi* –Father and Brother—see Ewald, p. 583 seq., where the difference between their use and that of *Kunje*, the surname of the Arabs is also pointed out). Of course certain names were accustomed to descend as favorites in the family (Luke i, 61), particularly when they possessed a special significance.† Naming after the father occurs in Tob. i, 9 (comp. Luke i, 59), after the grandfather 2 Sam. viii, 17 (comp.

* Comp. Caspari's remarks, *Ibidem*, p. 45. On the other hand, in cases where the father was of humble rank, the mere designation according to his name might express a certain degree of contempt; so, for example, Is. vii, 4; 1 Sam. xxii, 8, &c.

† Comp. what is said on the levitical name Elkanah in Herzog, *Real-Encyklopädie*, Bd. VIII, S. 354.

1 Sam. xxx, 7), after an uncle 1 Chron. xxiii, 23 (Comp. ver. 21). Still the production of new names can be traced through the entire Old Testament down to the period after the exile, a fact which proves that a sense of the appellative significancy of names was continually alive among the people. Gradually, as this constructive instinct became weaker, they resorted to the older proper names again; in fact, as Ewald (p. 592) remarks, they rehabilitated with special partiality just those names, which in the earliest times had been current, but which at that time had been long out of use, *e. g.:* Jacob, Joseph, Simeon, Mary, &c.

THE LATE JEWISH NAMES.

Along with these appear in the later period Aramæan names, such as Martha, Tabitha, Caiaphas, &c.; after the Macedonian period numerous Greek, later Roman names, such as Alexander, Andreas, Andronicus, Antipater, Aquila, Marcus and others; even names suggestive of heathen gods were not despised, such as Apollonius, Bacchides, Demetrius, Epaphroditus, and others. Such names, borrowed from foreign languages, were often abbreviated in popular speech, as Antipas, Epaphras, &c.* Hebrew names were often græcised in form; hence Lazarus from Eleazer, Matthæus from Amitthai, Ananias from Chananiah, Alcimus from Eliakim, Jason from Jeshua,† Hircanus from *Yeragon*, (*i. e.* Flavius). Many Greek names might also pass for translations from the Hebrew, as for instance, Dositheus or Theodotus=*Nethanel* (Nathaniel,) or *Elnathan;* Nicolaus=*Bileam* (Balaam). Many Jews connected with the Hebrew name a Greek or Roman surname, as (Col. iv, 11), Jesus with the Hebrew surname Justus, (Acts xii, 12), John with the surname Mark.‡

NAMES OF GOD AND CHRIST.

Particularly important are the biblical *names of God and of Christ.* The principle, that all naming presupposes a self-manifestation of the thing to be named, and that on the other hand, that which secludes itself from cognition is, as such, ἀκατονόμαστον, holds good when applied to God. For false gods men can invent names, but the true God can be named by men only so far as he reveals himself to men and discloses his nature to

* See Winer's *Grammar of N. T.* § 16 seq.

† Comp. Josephus, Arch. XII, 5, 1.

‡ See Simonis, *Onomasticon Novi Test. et libr. apoc.* 1762.

them. The name of God is first *nomen editum* and then *nomen inditum*. On this account *Elohim*, which in its primary signification designates the Deity absolutely, without reference to his historical self-attestation,* is not regarded in the Old Testament as properly a *name* of God. (The expression 'name of Elohim,' occurs only in Psalm lxix, 30, 31, comp. xlviii, 11—where it is explained by the peculiar pregnant use of *Elohim* in the Eloistic Psalms). God designates himself to men, not according to the sum of his perfections (as writers have often defined the name of God), but according to the relation in which he places himself to men, according to the attributes, by which in his intercourse with men he desires to be known, confessed and prayed to; in short, not according to what he is *in and of himself* but according to what he is *for man*, on which account every form of God's self-manifestation in the world finds expression in corresponding divine names. The God, who shows the forsaken Hagar, that no helpless creature escapes his all-seeing eye, receives straightway the name *God of seeing*. (This is the only correct interpretation of Gen. xvi, 13. See Delitzsch *in loc*). The characteristic feature of the patriarchal stadium of revelation finds expression in the divine name *Elshaddai*, Gen. xvii, 1, which there corresponds with the change of Abram's name into Abraham, inasmuch as Shaddai designates God (with immediate reference to the numerous progeny promised to the childless Abraham) as Him, who by his resistless might forces nature to serve his purpose of revelation. Respecting the signification of the name Jehovah, (Ex. iii, 15; vi, 3 *seq.*) see the article "*Jehovah*" in *Herzog*. God having revealed himself after the first breach of the covenant, in grace, mercy and forbearance, a new manifestation of the corresponding names answers thereto (Ex. xxxiv, 6). In like manner the fact, that God desires to be called the "God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob" (Ex. iii, 6), and under the new dispensation, after that the only begotten Son has revealed the name of God to men (Joh. xvii, 6), as "Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," or, in order to express exhaustively the now completed soteriological relation, "Father, Son and Holy Ghost," (Matt. xxviii, 19), serves to mark the relation into which God has entered with men in the progress of revelation.

* See Herzog's *Theol. Real-Encykl.* Bd. VI. S. 459.

A DEEPER MEANING OF GOD'S NAME.

But the biblical conception of the name of God is not yet exhausted. The name of God is not merely the title, which God bears, and which corresponds to the relations into which he has entered with men,—it is at the same time a biblical expression for the whole action of God by which he attests himself as personally present in the relation assumed, a designation of the entire self-manifestation of God in its bearing upon men. Understand: not everywhere, where divine workings are in the world, is on that account the divine name there, but everywhere the God of revelation actively reveals himself as such and therefore as an object of confession and worship. Otto remarks (*Decalogische Untersuchungen*, p. 81), very correctly that the name of God is not the ideal existence of God in the consciousness of the created spirit but an objective existence independent of every subjectivity; still this objective, intramundane divine power, is, after all, God's name only so far as it allows itself to be named by man, approaches him, in other words, by revelation, only so far as man *can* know of it. Whether men *desire* to have this knowledge is another question, since they can deny and desecrate the name of God and that divine power which reveals itself to them. Now the Israelite who knows the God revealed to him as the Creator and Lord of the universe, beholds even in the course of nature God's personal agency, the manifestation of his power and glory. Hence the Psalmist (Ps. viii, 1) exclaims:—"How excellent (glorious) is thy name in all the earth!" But of course the divine name belongs peculiarly to the sphere of the divine kingdom. Here it designates the conspicuity [*Offenbarkeit*] of God, whether connected with a locality, or institution, an historical event, or with the Word of God. Here his name is everywhere, when he so descends into the earthly sphere and so manifests himself to men, that they can recognize, confess and adore him as present.

THE ANGEL OF JEHOVAH.

Of the *Malach*, in whom the divine countenance (Ex. xxxiii, 14, Eng. Vers. "presence") leads the people and who accordingly is the representative of God's gracious presence among the people, it is said, "My *name* is in him" (xxiii, 21). So the indwelling of the divine glory in the sanctuary, or the divine Shekinah (Ex. xl, 34; Lev. ix, 23; 1 Kings viii, 11), by virtue of which God is

personally and in a peculiar manner present in this place, manifesting himself and receiving worship, is a "dwelling of his *name* there" (Deut. xii, 5, 11; xiv, 23; 1 Kings viii, 29; comp. Jer. iii, 17), whence the service in the sanctuary is called a ministering in the name of Jehovah, (Deut. xviii, 5, 8). To explain the expression, 'God puts his name,' or causes it to dwell in a place, as merely equivalent to *locum eligere ubi sacris solemnibus colatur* (as even *Winer* in his Hebrew Lexicon does) is to confound the consequence of this indwelling of the divine name with the indwelling itself. It is furthermore plain from this, how the phrase "thy name is called upon us" (Jer. xvi, 9) is only a fuller explanation of the preceding clause, "Thou art in the midst of us," and how in the passage Deut. xxviii, 10, the idea of God's establishing Israel "a holy people unto himself" (verse 9) is expressed in the words, "The name of Jehovah shall be called upon thee." In the redemption of the people and in the establishment of his covenant the name of God is great and glorious, Ps. cxi, 9. (Comp. the equivalent terms Is. xliii, 7). Israel is said to walk in the name of his God in an objective sense, so far forth as he experiences the working of God's power manifested in the midst of him, (hence in Zech. x, 12, "I will strengthen them in the Lord," precedes "they shall walk up and down in my name"); in a subjective sense, so far forth as he confesses this God in word and deed, and in the fulfillment of his law fears his name, (Deut. xxviii, 58). In accordance with this view we are to interpret the often misunderstood passage Micah iv, 5. The reason why all nations must eventually come to Zion to receive there the law, lies in the fact, that Israel walks in the name of Jehovah, that is, stands in communion with the self-revealing true God, whilst the other nations, although standing under the power of the true God, walk in the name of their gods and in subjection to them, so long as they fail to recognize the power over them as that of the true God. The aim of God's kingdom is, that the name of the true God may be named even upon the remnants of the heathen rescued from God's judgments (Amos ix, 12; comp. Mal. i, 11), that is, that these, God entering into a kingly relation to them (Zech. xiv, 9), should become participants in his revelation and in consequence thereof on their part confess and worship the name of Jehovah (Zeph. iii, 9).

OTHER PHRASES ILLUSTRATED.

Of the numerous other terms of expression, in which the name of God occurs, the following may be introduced here in illustration of what has been said above. As Isaiah beholds the Lord approaching in judgment (xxx, 27), he exclaims, "Behold the *name* of the Jehovah cometh from far, burning with his anger, &c." Compare with this Is. xxvi, 8: "In the way of thy judgments, O Jehovah, have we waited for thee; the desire of our soul is to thy *name* and to the remembrance of thee." The Psalmist prays (liv, 3), "Save me by thy *name*;" and to this corresponds "by thy strength," (comp. Jer. x, 6), just as in 1 Kings, viii, 42, the "strong hand" and the "stretched-out arm" correspond to the "great name." Hence the propriety of the language in Prov. xviii, 10: "The name of Jehovah is a strong tower, the righteous runneth into it and is safe." Comp. Ps. xx, 1; 44, 5 ("through thy name will we tread them under that rise up against us"); cxxiv, 8, and other passages. When God manifests His mighty presence to the people by miraculous works, it is said: "Thy name is near," Ps. lxxv, 1. (Hengstenberg's attempt to give this expression a subjective turn is incorrect.) God gives glory unto His name (Ps. cxv, 1), sanctifies it, etc., when he asserts His right by manifestations of His power and glory as the true God; on the other hand to allow it to appear as if the power and glory of Israel's God were nugatory, as for instance by a final rejection of His people, would be to allow His name to be polluted in the objective sense (Ez. xx, 14, 22). God's name is hallowed or sanctified by men subjectively, when they make due acknowledgment of God's self-attestation and self-manifestation in the world. Both in the objective and subjective sense the prayer "Hallowed be thy name" constitutes the presupposition of the petition, "Thy kingdom come," Matt. vi, 9, &c. Men desecrate, on the other hand, the name of God, when they treat God's self-attestation and that in which this inheres, that is, what is the most real of all things, as something nugatory and powerless, something which one may neglect with impunity, whether they do this by words (Ex. xx, 7) or actions (comp. Prov. xxx, 9). God leads the pious for His name's sake (Ps xxv, 11, Comp. ciii, 1 *seq*); that is, He does this because He cannot come in conflict with what He has revealed and shown Himself to be. The different expressions, in

which the words "*in the name of God*" occur, are also explained by the above. In the objective sense the words mean, In God's power, by His authority or commission (Comp. Micah iv, 3), where "in the majesty of the name of Jehovah" corresponds with "in the strength of Jehovah," just as in Acts iv, 7, ἐν ποίᾳ δυνάμει stands alongside of ἐν ποίῳ ὀνόματι. Comp. Deut. xviii, 18 *seq.* With this corresponds the subjective signification, the naming and confessing of God, as the one by whose authority one speaks or acts, for whose cause one suffers, &c.

MEANING OF THE NAME OF CHRIST.

The same meaning attaches in the New Testament to the ὄνομα Χριστοῦ. This designates Christ according to what he is *for* Man, according to the whole saving power and answering dignity (Phil. ii, 9), in which He exhibits Himself to men, and desires to be accepted, confessed and worshiped by men. Hence the pregnant signification of such expressions as these:—"to bear the name of Christ" anywhere (Acts ix, 15), when the promulgation of the Gospel opens the way for the saving power of Christ; "to preach repentance and remission of sins ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ (Luke xxiv, 47), that is, so that the preaching receives its authority from the dignity of Christ, its effect from the saving fullness, in which he exhibits himself to man. Here belongs also πιστεύειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα Χριστοῦ John i, 12; 1 John v, 13, or τῷ ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ 1 John iii, 23. By the latter form of expression the ὄνομα is not merely suggested as the goal of faith, but as Düsterdieck (*in loc.*) happily remarks, the reference proceeding from the ὄνομα itself, to believers is also intimated. "The ὄνομα itself, he says, here appears in form, what it is in essence, as that, which to him that shall believe gives testimony of itself, reveals and offers itself in order to be laid hold of with trust and self-renunciation." Herewith accords the sense of the expressions, being saved by the name of Christ (Acts iv, 12), having life through his name (John xx, 31), in which both the objective element of Christ's freely offered saving energy and the subjective one of man's receiving, adoring, (comp. Phil. ii, 10) confessing and invoking are united. The objective signification of the expression must not be overlooked even in Matt. xviii, 20; συνηγμένοι εἰς τὸ ὄνομα Χριστοῦ are those it is true, who assemble for the purpose of invoking Christ, but because this invocation of

Christ pre-supposes a participation in the blessings of his salvation. In like manner *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ* (Mk. xvi, 18) is not merely in connexion with the invocation of Christ's name, but primarily in the power of Christ and of the plenary might which flows from that attribute (see above). Where this objective condition is lacking, there may be an invocation of Christ, which after all is not in his name, as in the case of those exorcists in Ephesus (Acts xix, 13); yea, there may be a naming of Christ accompanied by miraculous works and yet void of the saving virtue which proceeds from Christ (Matth. vii, 22; xxiv, v; Luke xxi, 8). Respecting prayer in the name of Jesus, see the article on that subject in Herzog, IV, 692, *seq.*

THE BAPTISMAL FORMULA.

Finally, the expression *βαπτίζειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα* is not to be explained, as is done by Bindseil,* as equivalent to "leading one through baptism to some one's name, *i. e.* to cause one by baptism to name himself after another." (1 Cor. i, 13 proves nothing for this explanation, but is against it; Paul there repudiates those naming themselves after him, because as he was not the author of the Christian communion, baptism in his name was an impossibility.) Vitringa's explanation, "to obligate one by baptism to the worship of some one," fails also to give the immediate sense of the phrase.† The naming and obligating one's self is only secondary; the primary thought is, that the name of God is pronounced over the one baptized, and that he by virtue thereof is received‡ into the saving communion established by the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and made to experience what God as Father Son and Spirit is for men. Thus *βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς Χριστὸν*, signifies in like manner, to be incorporated into Christ by baptism, (*βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς τὸν θάνατον Χριστοῦ*) to be translated by baptism into the fellowship of Christ's death. On this point the passage in 1 Cor. vi, 11 should be specially considered.

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* *Studien und Kritiken* 1832, S. 410. † Vitringa, *Observationes*, I, 813.

‡ [Or rather recognized as received. D.]

XXV.—LUTHER'S THEOLOGY.*

BY DR. J. A. DORNER, PROFESSOR IN BERLIN.

It is well known that Luther clearly recognized and fruitfully presented the two great principles of *justification by faith only*, and of the *sole divine authority of Scripture*, or what we may call the *material* and *formal* sides of the evangelic principle, each in its independent worth and right, and yet each as indissolubly connected with the other. We shall endeavor, first, to present his views in relation to each of these points separately, and then to ascertain how, taught by his own life of faith, he succeeded in harmonizing them.

For this purpose, before proceeding to the separate discussion of each of these points, we shall set before the reader the development of Luther's own convictions, and of his experience of the divine life.

And here it is necessary to recollect that faith, with its experience of salvation, was already present in him before he had a developed doctrine on the subject of Holy Writ, before he knew how he was to ascertain the canon, or how to interpret the canon when ascertained. His whole subsequent life was decided by the well-known saying of the monk, which referred him to the article in the Apostle's Creed, "I believe in the forgiveness of sins," a saying scriptural in its import but ecclesiastical in its form. Accordingly it was not in the first instance, by reading Holy Scripture, nor, on the other hand, by a method alien from history and purely internal, but rather by the living word of the Church, that he had arrived at clear convictions and peace of mind. The writings of the apostles and prophets became to him the decisive standard and judge of doctrine only after the message of salvation which the Church possessed, in common with Scripture, had proved itself efficacious by its own inward power. Before this decisive crisis of his life, Scripture had only operated upon him

* Abridged from the *Contemporary Review*, December, 1866. [P. S.]

as a means of grace, like preaching, not as a recognized, independent, divine standard of truth.

In order to understand the development of the complete principle of the Reformation in its double reference to faith and Scripture, we must briefly notice the period immediately preceding Luther's public appearance as a reformer. In working out and shaping his experience, he was chiefly attracted by the noblest representatives of the mystic school, Tauler and the "German theology," and employed their language and ideas, though pervaded by his own individuality, and by a more powerful moral tendency than they display. During this period (before 1517) it was that he acquired those anthropological and theological conceptions which are of chief moment to determine the evangelical principle of faith.

According to that living consciousness of the Deity which he shares with the mystics, the world is constantly upborne by God; its dependence on Him, and its vital connection with Him, are continuous. Hence, in opposition alike to Pelagianism and Deism, humility is to Luther the foundation of all piety; hence also all false substitutes for God, including all magic operations, are excluded. It is God himself we require; nothing created, no means of revelation of his will, which is not at the same time Himself, can satisfy the receptivity and the necessities of our nature. So much do we need God, that we have our true existence only in God; we are not in the truth if we have an existence for ourselves outside of God,—if, turned or "bent back" upon ourselves, we endeavor to make for ourselves a self-centred, self-sufficing existence of our own. Man must become nothing, God must accomplish everything in him.

By these expressions Luther does not mean to imply a pantheistic confusion of deity and humanity; but the union of Man with God belongs, in his view, to the true essence of humanity, and hence he requires the giving up, the dying off, of that false egoism which conceives itself independent of God, because that egoism excludes us from the true good which belongs to our essence, and shuts us up in our own poverty—in that nothing which to the natural man seems everything. And as we are not to seek for the highest good *within* ourselves, so neither are we to seek it *through* ourselves, through our own powers. In opposition also to that Pelagianizing mysticism which sets up a scale or ladder

of spiritual attainments, Luther lays down that it is *through* God that we must come *to* God; God must not only be the final end and aim, but also the way, the mediator and the guide to this aim. He must, therefore, as the Good Being κατ' ἐξόχην, offer us His love, otherwise there is no salvation for us. By his vigorous consciousness of sin and guilt it is that Luther goes beyond the bounds of mediæval mysticism, with its resignation to God and its passive expectation; and in place of that resignation, as also of the feeling of being abandoned by God—feelings with which the spiritual joy of the mystic alternates—he puts the fear of God connected with the feeling of sin and guilt; a not merely æsthetical, but ethical dissatisfaction, which requires a cure quite different from that offered by the transports of mysticism. That despair which is naturally implanted in us by the consciousness of our own unworthiness and of God's righteousness cannot be cured, nor can we be released from the slavery to which those feelings reduce us by love to God being suddenly implanted in us instead of fear; for to suppose this would be to deny the necessity and the propriety of fear, and these are involved in the fact that we are guilty before God. On the contrary, fear must remain in us, because it is based on truth, but it must become childlike fear. Fear and love must be no longer sundered but united, so that love, taking the form of trust, is incorporated with fear, which itself is transfigured into reverence. To attain this state may indeed be difficult, but it is nevertheless necessary to combine hope with trembling, faith with despondency, just as divine grace is combined with human sin.

Thus grace is not in the first place the effect or meritorious produce of holiness, nor even of infused love; but the union of these disparate quantities, viz., of fearing God on account of sin, and of resigning oneself up to fellowship with God, is effected by *faith*, which Luther, during this period, often terms also *hope*. But grace must offer itself free and uninvited in order that faith may apprehend it and sin be overpowered in its gradual growth, until, through fully ripened love, all slavish fear is banished. There is no other victory than our faith, which lays hold on the present Christ, who can subdue all things to Himself. Bodily exercise may be useful, or even necessary at the beginning; but later on in the Christian course, it impedes the progress from slavish to childlike fear. The most important of all exercises is to converse day and night with the Gospel.

2. But as the power of combining fear and love resides only in faith, while faith presupposes as the object which it must lay hold of, that revelation of the love of God which *anticipates* all our efforts, we are hereby led to the second premiss or postulate of his doctrine on the subject of faith, the theological one, in respect of which Luther again connects himself with the mystics. And here the first and most important point is Luther's theory of revelation, the tendency of which is a present God as a living Being, capable of being apprehended by us. In Luther's view God is not merely unlimited infinite existence, which is everywhere, but is capable of being apprehended nowhere. To His eternal living essence it rather pertains to define Himself in an (internal) movement, by which He determines Himself within Himself. By means of this movement is produced in the Deity the eternal Word of God: by means of this self determination which God's infinity assumes, and whereby it becomes apprehensible, the Deity has also, *ipso facto*, a relation to the world, especially to the spiritual world and its community of life with Himself. For by means of that everlasting inward movement and self-determination, the Deity is capable of being apprehended and of imparting Himself; and, on the other hand, our own nature possesses an original receptivity of God which sin has not deprived it of, or rather it is such a receptive power. Human nature is, as it were, the material which longs to be shaped by the Deity; it wishes through God to receive God into itself, and can do this when He presents Himself to it. But this eternal inward self-determination of the Deity cannot satisfy us; God is invisible, incapable of being apprehended by man in his present state, tied down, as it is, to the visible and sensible. God must therefore make Himself visible, apprehensible, *cosmical*, so to speak, that we may be capable of possessing Him. And this He has done in the Incarnation. God has in Christ not merely taken flesh on Him as a dress: Christ is not merely a medium of communication, a token of an absent Deity; but in Christ we actually lay hold on God. For His humanity belongs to the Word as God belongs to humanity; the Word is not *changed* into flesh, neither does it only possess and bear up the flesh; the Word was made flesh in order that the flesh might become the Word, the revelation of God: and thus in the Son we have the Father. The power and essence which belong to the inner Word in the

Trinity, in the eternal self-determination of the Deity, dwell also in the temporal or cosmical self-determination of the Deity, viz., in the Word made flesh: the Incarnation is only a second act of the self-determination of the Deity, by means of which God approaches still nearer to the creature. Finally, Holy Scripture too, which is the word of the Word incarnate, possesses in itself the power and essence of that incarnate Word, and can enter into those who desire it, can impart to them the substance of all divine blessings, yea change them into children of God, into brothers of the Firstborn, and thus make them partakers of the divine nature (2 Pet. i, 4). And if the faith which lays hold on the Word does not as yet possess all the power of the divine life, it does possess the whole treasure of a wealth which, in hope, extends to infinity.

By means of the doctrine of the Word of God making Himself apprehensible and historical, Luther is able, in spite of his complete antagonism to Pelagian error, to go beyond the mystic sinking of ourselves in God's infinity, and to attain a faith which is neither mere passive and indolent quietism, nor mere action, but which is both passive and active; on the one hand consisting actively in taking what God imparts, and on the other hand passively in willingness to be determined and ruled by God. And as his longing after communion with God is instinct with a deep consciousness of sin and guilt, and therefore with the fear of God, and the consciousness of our separation from Him, so, on the other hand, the complete revelation by which God draws near to faith possesses a moral character which unites justice and love. Christ's appearance in our world, his life, sufferings, and death, have the most direct reference to sin and guilt, and remove man's fear by the very confirmation of its propriety and of our deservingness of punishment which they afford: so that henceforth faith, in order to attain the certainty of being reconciled and united with God in filial fear, needs not to deprive of their due the justice of God and that just fear which the contemplation of his justice must excite.

Still Luther had not yet arrived at a clear and precise definition of saving faith. With Augustine and the mystics he had originally (in the "Resolutiones" of his ninety-five Theses) not distinctly separated justification and sanctification, conceiving the consciousness of reconciliation to flow partly from the good already implanted in us as well as from faith in the promises of

Christ. The very wish for forgiveness was, as he conceived, an operation of grace, and an introduction of it into the soul. This introduction of grace he terms the commencement of justification. Even according to this conception everything depends on grace; indeed, forgiveness on the part of God is conceived as preceding the introduction of grace into the soul, and not as conditioned in the first instance by the better motions of the soul. Still, the consciousness of justification is made dependent on the infusion of grace: and because man is not as yet certain of his justification through that infusion, priestly absolution is also requisite, and faith not so much in the person or the office of the priest, as in the promise of Christ, which promise, in the proffer of the Gospel, is objectively valid and true even when it is not subjectively apprehended. Faith, and repentance, without which faith is impossible, are not meritorious, do not *produce* the proffer of mercy. But erroneous as Luther deems all Pelagian teaching, just as erroneous does he consider the magic doctrine that salvation may be received objectively even without faith, provided that no bar be put against its reception. The Sacrament is the objective proffer of salvation, valid on God's part before faith exists: but faith, not the sacrament, justifies in the first place, because only by faith do we appropriate the benefits of the sacrament. This *possession* of proffered grace he terms *actual* justification: and in this justification he includes also the inner change and the new birth, which began with the infusion of divine grace into the soul already before faith was entertained, in order to produce conviction of sin and that desire for assurance which is then satisfied by faith in the absolution of the priest.

Even if this conception sufficiently distinguishes the *essence* of justification from that of sanctification, it does not discriminate between their *consciousness:* and hence, as well as because it makes the infusion of grace precede the faith which lays hold on justification, it is defective, inasmuch as it does not allow the full and perfect assurance of salvation to be developed. For as Sanctification is never perfect in this life, Justification too, if it be not more definitely distinguished from it, must be likewise only partial and incomplete.

Let us then proceed to the stage of Luther's more matured knowledge, and present a picture of the evangelical principle in the contrast and combination of its two aspects, the *material* and the *formal.*

I. The material aspect of the evangelical principle.

Grace, as productive of regeneration, of love, of sanctification, can only impart itself by degrees, agreeably to the laws of spiritual genesis: it is a *gift* which necessarily effects a *change* in the recipient. The prevenient character of free grace, accordingly, cannot show itself in the first instance in the gift of sanctification, but only in that of justification, at least if this latter includes more than a merely partial forgiveness of sins, dependent on present or future love. Already, in the "Resolutiones," Luther had laid down God's *internal* reconciliation with the sinner, as the foundation in the divine character of the work of grace in the human soul. But later on, he conceived this internal forgiveness more definitely as the first thing implied in justification: and he insists above all on the proffer of free and full forgiveness as an *objective* gift, as the disclosure of the generous and loving will of God, who has in his own counsels forgiven man for the sake of Christ, not *because* man *has*, but *in order that* he *may have*, repentance and faith. For that which is to be laid hold of must precede the act of laying hold of it. The revelation of this gracious will of God, by virtue of which He offers to enemies and sinners his reconciliation with them and his love, takes place in the general through the preaching of the Gospel, individually through Baptism and the absolution which renews baptismal grace, and through the Eucharist. This reconciliation of God with mankind at large and with individuals through Christ, by means of whose imputed righteousness God can treat sinners as his children, forms the permanent basis of all his relations with mankind, of the whole course of salvation, and of all the fullness of those graces which God intends for men, and which He gradually imparts in the process of sanctification. The internal reconciliation of God with sinners in the depths of the Divine Mind must ever remain the first step. But in order that it may take effect it must be made known: and this is the second step in the process of salvation.

The actual course of salvation in the history of each soul must copy and represent the internal relation of these parts in the mind of God. Hence it is not commenced by moral improvement, or by the work of regeneration and sanctification. In order that man may be open to the reception of sanctifying grace, he must be relieved of that fear and dread of God which result from

the consciousness of sin and guilt, and which separate him from God. Hence the work of salvation begins with the announcement of prevenient grace and of free forgiveness, by means of which God, on his part, presents himself as a Father to his children, in order that they, believing in this reconciliation, may live in faith, and attain eternal happiness.

But God's loving will does not exhaust itself in the mere act of forgiving. After restoring proper relations between Himself and man, He designs for man the fullness of those graces whose effects extend over eternity. Hence the faith which lays hold on this complete reconciliation on the part of God also receives the fullness of these graces, not at once, but gradually and increasingly, and appropriates them as a personal possession. But the first fruits of the Spirit are at once imparted as soon as faith has appropriated the proffer of forgiveness, becomes peculiarly clear when we reflect that belief in the forgiveness of sin is not merely belief in an *impersonal* merit of Christ, but a resigning of ourselves to Christ as a living Reconciler. In Him faith lays hold of personified reconciliation. It is His high-priestly love, full of the will and power to take our place, which faith has to answer by trustful resignation to his will. But faith, thus in communion with the living Saviour, is united with Christ in his whole nature, so that by virtue of this union not merely reconciliation and forgiveness, but all Christ's gifts, are gradually and progressively imparted to man. Hence Luther maintains that justifying faith virtually includes love, and implies good works at least in germ. The believer, therefore, does not continue what he was before: not merely is his position changed by the merit of Christ being imputed to him, but with faith a new life is imparted to him. Faith is a new tree of life, which necessarily bears the fruits of love and wisdom.

But as the life of love is always incomplete and struggling, as faith and childlike confidence are, after all, small and weak, though they must increase, the peace and joy in believing of the sinner throughout life can never depend on his own perfection in any one respect, nor on the excellence of any objective quality, but must always fall back upon the free prevenient forgiveness which dwells and has ever dwelt in the Divine Mind. The blessing which we possess entire and complete during our growth in grace is only forgiveness or reconciliation for Christ's sake, or the

fact that God, on his part, maintains unchanged his fatherly relation to us, so long as we have not, by unbelief and impenitence cut off ourselves from Christ. And this forgiveness remains assured, be our faith never so weak: the hand of faith is still a hand, although it tremble. And as by the forgiveness of sin we stand in a new covenant with God, and this covenant is the unchanging basis of the otherwise changeful life of the Christian, it follows, in respect to the relation between the righteousness of faith and the righteousness of life, that the consciousness of peace, yea, joy in God, exists along with the consciousness of sin, although that consciousness, so far from vanishing, is actually on the increase; inasmuch as communion with Christ through faith, and the faithfulness of Christ, covers our sins and supplements our imperfections in the sight of God, as well as guarantees our being actually perfected ourselves.

By faith man becomes actually and personally a partaker of the grace of God, especially of the forgiveness of sins. Faith is indeed an act of man, but an act produced in him by the love of God revealed in Christ, and the Spirit that proceeds from God. So soon as man has completed the act of trustfully resigning himself to Christ and accepting Him, that which he thus accepts becomes to him a secure and ascertained possession. There is a difference between accepting faith and faith already confirmed in grace, between confiding reception (*fiducia*) and assurance of salvation (*certitudo salutis*). Faith, when once created, receives the blessing of divine assurance, which consists not merely in the assurance of the individual being reconciled through his resigning himself to Christ, but also in the assurance of the dignity of Christ as the Redeemer of the world, and of the objective truth of the Gospel message. This message is perceived to be in itself divine truth, because it has proved itself to be a divine power, and has become a presence in the human spirit; and faith becomes aware of this from the testimony of the Holy Ghost. It is no mere theoretic truth, no dogma, *e. g.*, like the inspiration of Scripture, which is made known to faith; nor even personal feelings and circumstances, such as the renovation of the character, though doubtless that is an effect of faith—nay, not even the recognition of a new relation to God on our part. Accepting faith, once produced, is rather the recognition of a new relation to us on God's part; a recognition of one's personal salvation, of

the personal application of the love of God to the sinner. But God's intentions and declarations have creative power: his testimony produces the testimony of our own hearts that we are God's children, and that in such a way as to assure us that that testimony is the operation and testimony of the Spirit, and not a mere carnal imagination.

On this certainty of salvation and of the divine truth of Christianity Luther always laid the greatest stress. To him the fact of primal certainty, on which all other certainty depends, is the justification of the sinner for the sake of Christ, appropriated by faith; or, objectively expressed, Christ as the Redeemer is the fact of primal certainty, in resignation to whom faith enjoys full satisfaction, and a knowledge of its standing in the truth. Thus that fact of primal certainty which accredits all other truths, in Luther's estimation, is neither the authority of the Church, nor the authority of the canon of Scripture transmitted by the Church. It is rather the purport of the word of God, which, under whatever various forms, accredits itself to the human heart by its divine power as being the word of God. As Luther did not himself attain faith and assurance by reading Holy Scripture, or by relying on its authority, he could not assign to the primal authority of the canon the position of being the first object of belief. It is the *purport* of the Gospel message which laid hold on him so soon as the living need of it was awakened in him, and whose divine, self-evidencing power he experienced so soon as he gave himself up to it in simple trust.

Of course Scripture coöperated as one means of grace in thus producing faith, whether Luther was aware of it or not. Without the presumption that the historic truth of the testimony of the Church concerning Christ is, on the whole, guaranteed (and it can be guaranteed only through the documents of the New Testament), he could not have accomplished the act of believing on the historic Christ. But though historic faith presumes the credibility of this historic testimony, it is not true saving faith, nor is this historic belief true certainty. Considered as mere historic truth the Gospel would be past and dead, just as, considered in the light of a mere system of doctrine, it would be without life and without reference to the living Person. The Gospel is only then truly recognized and laid hold of, when the historic Christ is viewed at the same time as the Christ now existing, and who

will forever exist—passed away, indeed, from the domain of history, yet acting yesterday, to-day, and for ever onward into the depths of an eternity whose powers of life all dwell in Him. When the purport of the historic Gospel is thus laid hold of in its internal essence, as real in the past, and at the same time eternal and underlying all history, then it is that the abode of eternal life and peace has been found; and faith, once made partaker of the internal presence of the truth and of its power, no more needs any further assurance of its being true than the sun requires testimony from any other light that itself is light and that it diffuses warmth.

Let us now consider more precisely how this new internal creation, faith in justification before God through Christ, asserts its independence even in relation to Holy Writ. Whilst faith and Scripture are not materially different in reference to the purport of that which the one believes and the other states, faith is distinct from and independent of Scripture by means of its indwelling *assurance of salvation and of Christian truth*, an assurance obtained, not in the path of subjective mysticism or of natural reason (*Vernunft*), but by trustful resignation (*fiducia*) to that objective message of salvation which is to be received into us.

How high this assurance is ranked by Luther may be seen from numerous passages of his writings. Christ's warning against false prophets is, in Luther's judgment, a distinct recognition of the right of all Christians, and not merely of Popes and Councils, to judge of doctrine. To the Pope he says, "Thou, with thy councils, hast decided: I, too, have a right to judge whether or no I am to accept thy decision. And why? Thou wilt not stand and answer for me when I die: I must see that I be myself certain of my safety." Then, turning to the Christian, he says, "Thou must be as certain of the matter, that it is the word of God, as thou art of thy own life—nay, more certain. . . . And if all mankind were to come—yea, the angels and the whole universe to boot—and determine something, if *thou* canst not judge and determine it for thyself, thou art lost. For thou must not make thy judgment rest on the Pope or anybody else; thou must thyself be prepared to say, 'God says this and not that:' 'This is right, that is wrong:' otherwise it is impossible to stand. If thou dependest on Pope and Councils, the devil can at once find out some weak point, and whisper, 'But suppose this be

false? Suppose they have made a mistake?' and then thou art at once overthrown. Therefore thou must be certain for thyself, so that thou canst say, boldly and defiantly, '*That* is God's truth: on it I will venture life and soul and a hundred thousand lives, if I had them.'" He requires that the spirit shall not rest till Christ has accredited Himself to it, to the man's own innermost experience; and though he does not conceive the Holy Ghost as operating without the medium of the word, he not the less perceives that Scripture does not wish to keep men for ever dwelling on itself alone, but directs them onwards to the living Lord, of whom it testifies, and that it requires men's being individually assured of the truth, and that not on its own sole authority, nor on that of the Church; so that faith, wrought in us by the Holy Ghost and the Gospel, is an independent creation which maintains its independence even in the presence of Scripture. This is incontrovertibly shown by Luther's declarations on the subject of historic faith, and by the difference between his position and that occupied by the Waldenses, who assign to Scripture exactly the same place which Catholicism gives to the Church, *i. e.*, that of a merely authority. Luther allows historic faith its full value as the first form in which the Gospel is accepted; he denies not that Christian education claims from the learner that dutiful submission which accepts as true that which is not yet recognized in its truth by the individual, because it is taught by competent authority. But the Romish Church would fain detain us at this stage of formal obedience to the Church. It is on *her* authority that *Christ* is to be believed in, not on *Christ's* authority that the *Church* is to be believed in. Hence she denies to man immediate communion with Christ in the first place, and in the second she puts herself, in point of fact, above Christ—yea, designates as impiety every effort to go beyond the standpoint of obedience to herself, and to attain individual recognition of the truth itself. The position of the Waldenses is more nearly connected with Catholicism than appears at first sight, since they conceived faith in Christ as totally dependent upon Scripture, so that faith, cut off from immediate communion with Christ by the interposition of Scripture, is handed over to the jurisdiction of an external law. Luther had tasted the personal assurance of salvation through Christ; and to this assurance we must come by the operation of the Holy Ghost; and Scripture, so far from dispensing with this operation, only gives occasion for it.

"Romanists say, 'Yes, but how are we to know what is God's word, what is true and what is false? We must learn this from Pope and Councils.' Very well; let them determine and define what they will, I say, thou canst not confide in them, nor satisfy thy conscience by them: thou must determine for thyself: it is thy own neck, thy own life that is at stake. Therefore God must whisper into thy heart, 'This is God's word,' otherwise all is at sea. God has preached the same word by the apostles, and causes it still to be preached. But even though the angel Gabriel proclaimed it from heaven it would do me no good; I must have God's own word for it. It is easy enough to preach the word to me, but none but God can put it into my heart: He must speak to my heart: if he be silent the word is not really spoken at all. Therefore no one shall make me give up the word which God teaches me: and I must know this as surely as that two and three make five."

Luther thus places the attainable certainty of Christian truth quite on a level with that of necessary or eternal truth; and, hence it is characteristic that he calls Christian certainty "consciousness" (*Gewissen*). Faith, as he conceives it, is nothing but consciousness in Christian potentiality.

"To be assured is above all things necessary in Christian doctrine; for I must be sure of what I am to think concerning God or rather of what God thinks concerning me. The denial of this assurance has been a horrible error in the papistical teaching, whereby they have come to doubt of the forgiveness of sins and the grace of God. You must, say they, recognize yourself as a sinner, and such a sinner as cannot be sure of his salvation. Had the Papacy had no other sin and error, this in itself would have been a horrible blindness and error, that they taught one must be always going to and fro in doubt, and must be uncertain of one's state and doubtful of one's salvation; for such uncertainty takes from me my baptism and God's grace (Ps. li, 12; 1 Cor. ix, 26; Heb. xii, 12; 2 Pet. i, 10; Rom. xiv, 23). Therefore one must learn that God is not an uncertain, doubtful, or changeful God, not a God who has many meanings, and is like an uncertain reed; but a God who has only one meaning, and is quite certain when He says, 'I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost;' 'I absolve thee and pronounce thee free from sin.'" "God sends to Christians the very spirit which Christ has, who is also his Son; so that they, together with Christ, cry Abba, Father (Rom. viii, 15; Gal. iv, 1–8). But this filial crying to God is only experienced when the conscience (or consciousness) is quite sure that not merely one's sins are forgiven, but that he is a son of God, and sure of happiness. Of this he must be surer than of his very

life, and be ready to suffer all deaths, yea, hell itself, rather than allow this assurance to be taken from him, and to begin to doubt. There may be a struggle: the man may feel as if he were not a son; as if God were a severe and angry judge: but in this struggle childlike confidence must at length get the upper hand, even though in fear and trembling, otherwise all is lost. When Cain hears this, he will bless himself with hands and feet, and in his extreme humility will say, 'God shield me from such horrible heresy and presumption! What! I, a miserable sinner, can I be so proud as to say that I am a child of God? No! I will humble myself, and recognize myself to be a poor sinner,' &c. Let such folk go their ways, and do thou be ware of them as of the greatest enemies of Christian faith, and of thy own happiness! We know right well that we are poor sinners, but here it does not depend on what we are and do, but on what Christ is, and has done, and still does for us. If you think it a great thing to be a son of God, my friend, don't think it a small thing that God's Son came into the world, made of a woman, made under the law, that you too might be a son of God. What God does is always great. That we are permitted to deem ourselves children of God, we have not from ourselves nor from the law; it is the witness of the Spirit, that witnesses against the law and against the consciousness of our own unworthiness, and makes us certain of the fact."

Luther does not, however, at all mean, as might be fancied from isolated expressions, that we are to determine and decide in our own minds that we are God's children, and that the assurance of salvation rests solely on the strength of our determination to regard ourselves as God's children. The assurance of salvation is, in his mind, neither on the one hand a merely subjective human work, nor on the other hand, is it to be sought merely in the objective word, or the sacramental signs of grace, however certain both these may be. Rather is the *subjective* assurance a product of the *objective* spirit, brought about by the *objective* Gospel, and yet a different effect from that testimony which exists in the Gospel itself, though coincident therewith; for the filial spirit recognizes itself again in the Gospel. Were not a witness of the Spirit produced in our spirit, so that our very self-consciousness becomes a witness of our adoption, our own personality and the testimony of Scripture would not meet; Scripture would be a mere external law, and we should be without the true Christian consciousness. But, on the other side, he censures *false confidence*, the caricature of genuine divine assur-

ance, *securitas* in place of *certitudo*, in those proud spirits who dispute Scripture. The *royal* way to attain the consciousness of adoption is therefore this:—When a man becomes anxious by reason of sin, and doubtful of salvation, his faith is, in the first place, *accepting* faith. That which is accepted is the Gospel, which presents to faith its object, especially the forgiveness of sin; with which the Holy Spirit combines, in order to bring about acceptance of the truth by drawing men to their heavenly Father. *Accepting* faith is therefore not as yet *assured* faith, but only *trusting* faith, even though it be still accompanied by despondency. Now comes in the work of the Spirit, which is to make the accepted message powerful and vitally operative to bestow on accepting faith the full assurance of personal salvation, and to implant the new and self-conscious creature. And thus salvation has reached its goal in the creation of the new man, an independent creature which knows the fact of its own redemption, and knows Christ as its Redeemer; not merely from the hearing of the ear or from any external authority, even that of Scripture, nor through its own resolve, but from its own actual experience. This experience, which is the operation of the Holy Ghost, and the power to salvation of the word which brings Christ to us, transmutes our former trusting and hoping acceptance of the Gospel into a blessed assurance, an independent knowledge of Christ in his greatness and his merit. And now for the first time Holy Scripture, in its real message and purport, receives its full credentials to the heart, God, by the illumination of his Spirit, kindling in us a divine assurance of the truth of this message—an assurance infinitely superior to any mere reliance on the canon of the Church, and on the correctness of the Church's judgment with regard to Scripture. It must be carefully remarked that Luther does not esteem the strength of accepting faith as the ground of justification; the weakest faith is capable of justifying provided it believes the message of salvation. Similarly, he does not make justification and regeneration consist in the feeling and sense of happiness; for there may be a certainty of salvation in reliance upon Christ even when we have no such happy feelings.

But the assurance or certainty which faith receives through the Holy Spirit and the word of God, is not restricted by Luther to the mere assurance of the forgiveness of our sins; the whole

spiritual life is conditioned and upborne by it. Our talk and work, our meditations and our teaching, are all to be instinct with this divine assurance. No one must say anything in his ministerial capacity unless he is certain that he is speaking the word of God. "We must be so sure that God is speaking and acting in us, that our faith can say, 'What I have now spoken or done has been spoken or done by God.'" "True faith has a very sharp sight, and because it alone has true knowledge of God, and alone sees into the secrets of his kingdom, it eclipses the light of reason. It is a clear mirror and a constant view of Christ. Faith ends our minority, and sets us free from guardians and governors in point of doctrine; faith is master, judge, standard of all teaching and prophecy."

Nay, so determinately does he require individual divine assurance through the Holy Ghost, that, according to him, we must not even be satisfied with the mere dictum of an apostle (comp. Gal. i, 8); the import of the message guarantees itself, and cannot depend on the dignity of any creature. *Hence the position which Luther assigns to faith in relation to Scripture.*

1. Faith, and faith alone, can *expound* Scripture. Not that Luther wished for a spiritual as opposed to a grammatical exposition; on the contrary, his scientific accuracy and simplicity distinguishes itself especially in his teaching, as did Calvin, in opposition to the system of manifold interpretation held by the schoolmen, that the thorough divine is only produced by the literal sense. Hence he esteemed the cultivation of philology a matter of prime and absolute necessity. Here again, it is the principle of faith which combines with grammar and philology to secure itself against any falsification of the message which faith is to accept. Still, what is expressed by the letter is something spiritual, and hence Scripture can only be understood by a kindred mind and spirit. That which is necessary to salvation is intelligible to all who are spiritually disposed, and inequalities in mental culture and philological skill are in everything material compensated by this *perspicuity* of Scripture. But more is seen by faith when once firmly rooted: that which is spiritual is received by those who are spiritual. Faith is, as it were, the eye in which Scripture seeks to mirror itself, the mouth by which to express itself. The believer is the instrument which Scripture creates for itself, by means of which to interpret itself. To faith

is possible a reproduction of the word which shall not be merely a lifeless echo, but self-conscious and free, as well as true. But as the expounder is not to be merely an echo of the words of Scripture, so neither is he to expound it after the standard of any human conception of its doctrine, be that standard the Apostles' Creed, the *regula* or *analogia fidei*, or the teaching of the Church. He who asserts such standard to be necessary, denies the perspicuity of Scripture. The only analogy for exposition is the principle that one Scripture cannot contradict another; a unity, a homogeneous whole, is formed by the believing investigator out of the really canonical parts of the sacred volume, and by this *analogia fidei* even the teaching of the Church must be judged. To reverse this process would be to subject Scripture to the Church, whereas it is God's word that makes the Church.

2. Still more clearly does the independence of faith in relation to the written word appear in this, that when once faith has been kindled by the Spirit through the word, this faith has, in the second place, the right and duty of developing and applying the knowledge it has acquired; a process which certainly depends on the correct derivation of that which is developed from the true faith, not on the possibility of showing the truths thus developed to be verbally laid down in Scripture. Christian preaching, hymnody, and art also, all operate as God's word, though they must ever allow themselves to be measured by the standard of the canonical word of Scripture.

3. But most clearly does the relative independence of faith, even in the presence of Scripture, appear in that criticism or judgment which Luther ascribes to faith in regard to the canon, and which he himself exercised unstintingly. Thus, without denying the authenticity of the Epistle of James, he always denied its canonicity. Similarly he treated the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse, though on the latter he subsequently (1545), passed a more favorable judgment. Nay, even of an argument of Paul in Galatians he says that it is too weak to prove his point. He makes no difficulty in allowing, that in externals not only Stephen but the sacred writers themselves have fallen into inaccuracies. The worth of the Old Testament is not diminished in his eyes by the concession that several of its pieces have been worked up by various hands. What matters it, he asks, with reference to the Pentateuch, if Moses did not write

it? And of the prophets he says, that they studied Moses and each other's works, and that this study conditioned the form in which they wrote down the thoughts inspired by the Holy Ghost. And if these good and true teachers and searchers of Scripture sometimes built up much "hay, wood, and stubble," as well as "gold, silver, and precious stones," still the foundation is there, and everything else will be consumed by the fire of that day; for so, he urges, we deal with the writings of Augustine, &c. In the Old Testament he particularly prizes Genesis: it is the source from which all subsequent prophets flowed; Kings are much more trustworthy than Chronicles; Ecclesiastes is adulterated, and is not the work of Solomon, &c.; Esther, too, he deems uncanonical; he would be glad if it and the Maccabees were not extant, "for they Judaize too much, and have much heathenish naughtiness."

This testing of Scripture by faith may also result in one portion of Scripture having higher worth and higher inspiration than another. For we see that Luther recognizes in Scripture not merely something divine but something human, sometimes even something purely human. The German Reformer unquestionably draws a distinction between the word of God and Holy Scripture, not merely in the *form* but also in the *purport* of the message. In the New Testament he calls the fourth Gospel the unique, tender, chief Gospel, far preferable to the other three; as also the Epistles of Paul and Peter stand far above these last. On the whole, the Gospel and First Epistle of John, the Epistles of Paul, especially those to the Romans, Gallatians, and Ephesians, and 1 Peter, are to his mind the books which show Christ, and teach all that is needful and useful.*

Hence he can consistently say, "So, if any one urge thee with sayings which talk of works, and which thou canst not rhyme with the others, thou must answer, 'Because Christ himself is the treasure which has bought me, I don't want any sayings of Scripture wherewith to set up the righteousness of works, and so place the righteousness of faith beneath it. For I have on my side the Master and Lord of Scripture, with whom I hold, and know that he will not lie, nor lead me astray; and you may bawl as hotly as

[* The singular mixture of truth with error in these views will be observed by all. D.]

you please that I make Scripture contradict itself. Though, indeed, it is impossible that Scripture should contradict itself: only foolish, clumsy, obstinate hypocrites fancy that it does so.'"

But, side by side with such bold positions, he asserts with equal clearness,—

II. The essential independence of Scripture, in relation to faith and the Church.

It was history that especially showed to Luther the necessity of this. The Romish Church had shown how easily oral tradition becomes impure, and how, under such circumstances, continuous belief in the activity of the Holy Spirit in the Church necessarily serves only to cloak and justify error, inasmuch as it results in doing violence to Scripture, as if Scripture had to borrow light from the church, instead of sufficing to explain itself.

These dangers of arbitrary subjectivity, which are rather increased than diminished by the fact that a collective Person, the Church substitutes itself for true objectivity and for God, Luther recognized, even when fanatic subjectivity disguised itself in a Protestant dress. Clearly perceiving the essential identity of fanaticism and Romanism, he said, "Papatus simpliciter est merus enthusiasmus." To secure true Christian objectivity, on which the whole Church, as well as each individual, must depend, if they are to be Christian, he deems Scripture necessary; and for the very purpose of excluding arbitrary interpretation, he requires the exposition of the faith to be founded on grammar, and conducted according to general linguistic laws. It is in the very essence of faith, which is not yet sight, but holds to historic revelation, that Luther sees the necessity of Holy Writ. All true regeneration is, in his judgment, conditioned and produced by the Word, the sacraments, and Christian fellowship; but all these are the work of the historic Christ, and through them only is regeneration connected with the historic appearance of Jesus on earth. The union of the divine and human in Christ's person is an historic and permanent power, exerting itself through the message concerning Christ; not that his message takes the place of Christ, but that He acts through it. Hence Luther calls Scripture the *σὰρξ Χριστοῦ*; hence he fears, as the result of a teaching concerning the written word which is indifferent to the external word, the dissolution of all true doctrine concerning Christ, after the manner either of the Docetæ or of the Ebionites; *i. e.*, by

denying the reality either of Christ's human or of his divine nature. Only by means of these historic documents can we, separated from Him by so many centuries, lay hold on the historic Christ; he, therefore, who despises the testimony of Scripture to Christ, and undervalues the sacrament, is really sapping the foundation of the Church, and evaporating Christianity into a mere idea. Hence Luther calls the word of Scripture the true star that guides to Christ; the swaddling-clothes or manger in which He was laid: hence he says, "in the words of the apostles dwell Christ's passion and resurrection, heaven, and eternal life. Our Lord Jesus Christ says He hath set the forgiveness of sins in the word like a jewel in its frame." Fanatics destroy the connection between the eternal Word and the written word, and thus imperil the permanent revelation of the eternal Word. Hence Luther is indignant when he hears the preaching of the Gospel called an empty sound and voice, or when the inner word is opposed to the external word, as though the two had a different import from each other, or as though the one were effective without the other. The external word is the expression of approaching or present grace; it is, as it were, the historic body which grace has assumed agreeably to its historic character; and thus Scripture possesses an inherent efficacy. God speaks to man through the external word, and does not speak except through it. Unquestionably he maintains the difference between the living and creative Word of God and the written word, and excludes any magic operation of the latter by the forcible remark that the written word is not universally efficacious. Yet the efficacious Word will not work without it. He does not, however, conceive that God's word exists *only* in Scripture, any more than he conceives all to be God's word which is contained in Scripture. The first thing is the essential Word (λόγος), in which dwells the whole fullness of the Godhead; the utterer of this Word is God. But the essential Word is also a self-uttering word: all creatures are so many living signs of the Word of God. Yet the divine utterance in the world is various. It is always a revealing utterance: but it is one thing when God reveals Himself only in his power or holiness, another when He discloses Himself also in his grace and truth. The last alone is a revelation of God in the fullest sense, for *God* is the *Good* Being. Hence it is in the essential Word made Flesh that the revelation of God after his own heart, the

word out of the depths of his heart, is given. Scripture is the testimony of this revelation, and hence it brings to us the word of God. Yet the word of God did not commence with Scripture. Christ is the essential Word, operating through the Spirit, and to him the word of Scripture leads. But Luther sees the word of God in the thoughts and spiritual acts of faith as well as in Scripture. What the believer speaks and does under the influence of Christ's Spirit is a word of God, even more than that which the creature *ipso facto* is and does; for "what is born of Spirit is spirit." Hence he often speaks of preaching, and that not limited to the express words of Scripture, and of the hymns and prayers of the Church, as being words of God. Hence he could assign so free and lofty a position to Christian science, art, and teaching; and it is instructive to observe, that as a later period forgot this eternal self-renewal and rejuvenescence, this fructifying of the word in the spirits of the faithful, so did it likewise degrade Scripture itself into a mere dead external law. And this brings us to—

III. The internal connection of Scripture and faith, notwithstanding their mutual independence.

If we now ask, How can faith depend on Scripture, and yet have to determine the canonicity of each part of Scripture, this determination requiring to be made, in each case, on grounds of historic and critical research, which are independent of faith—the solution of this difficulty, which seems to involve reasoning in a circle, may be found in the idea that Scripture, by its import and message, has a meaning for the faith which is to be called into existence *before* it becomes an authoritative rule, as it becomes for faith when already existing. Scripture of itself points to faith, to the rise of which it is auxiliary, as a means of grace, and requires faith for its preservation, critical ascertainment, and exposition. On the other hand, faith by its very notion, refers us to Scripture and its authority. Let us examine each of these points separately.

1. Scripture requires, according to Luther, not merely reception into the memory or intellect (*fides historica*, or *assensus*); it requires a personal assent to its value by means of personal experience, and this can only be given when faith resigns itself to Scripture with perfect confidence. This trustful acceptance is by no means blind submission: nor is it that kind of certainty which

is produced by the Scripture message when it has been once for all appropriated to himself by the believer. Full and divine certainty works only in the faith which has already laid hold of Christ. Yet, through the power of grace, and the attraction of the Scripture message, a certainty of the duty of believing may be engendered, which shall be equal to any other religious or moral certainty of this grade of the divine life—nay, in so far superior to any other, as all healthy progress depends on the fulfillment of the duty of believing.

But with the new consciousness introduced by that experience of salvation which belongs to faith, comes the power of vision to which Scripture opens itself, after man on his part, has thrown himself open to Scripture. Now he begins to understand and appreciate Scripture properly, and now faith can do that for Scripture which Scripture needs. As faith has insight for what is Christian, as it can distinguish what is for Christ and what is against Christ, it must have a right to judge the canon. Any canonical writing not containing Christ, or having no reference to Christ, would not be Holy Writ. Thus Luther awards to faith a right of judging the canon on grounds not arbitrary, but objective and dogmatic, and quite distinct from any investigations of the genuineness and antiquity of its parts.' Not as though Scripture must contain nothing but what is already comprised in the consciousness of faith; in that case faith would be quite independent of Scripture, and the latter would have no authority whatever. But though Scripture may contribute to the enriching and purifying of the consciousness of faith, it must not contradict faith in those points which constitute faith, and of which faith possesses an historical divine assurance. In a word, the right of faith to judge and criticise Scripture is an altogether negative right, reducing itself to the denial of canonical authority to all that would contradict faith. And as faith must agree with Scripture, *this judgment of Scripture by faith* reduces itself ultimately to a *judgment of Scripture by itself*. Thus Luther lays down a canon within a canon, by the principle that Christ, as the center of Holy Writ, is the measure of its canonicity. To the power of interpreting itself which he ascribes to Scripture corresponds, in his system, the power of Scripture to decide what is really Scripture.

2. But as Scripture promotes faith, forming with it a "Bible

in the heart" (to use an expression of Harms, a writer who more than any other reproduces Luther's spirit), so does faith require Scripture as well for its continuance as for its origination. For although the word of God, even in the form of mere oral teaching, may awaken faith, yet all evangelic teaching must be referable to the standard of apostolic testimony, and this exists only in Scripture. And the proof that the word preached agrees with Scripture must be capable of being given at any moment, in order that each individual may compare with Scripture his belief and the teaching to which he listens. Hence Luther would give the Bible into the hands of the laity. Of course, to the man who has not yet arrived at faith in Christ, the authority of Scripture can only be assured *externally*. But when once faith, the purport and drift of the Gospel message, is created, Scripture itself acquires a new position and far higher value; it becomes an authority recognized not merely on external, but on internal grounds, and independent of anything but itself. Faith is simply the eye which discovers its divine purport; it traces that which has been spoken by the Spirit, and ascribes inspiration to the sacred writers. But Luther does not conceive the Holy Ghost as dictating the very words to those writers, as to so many amanuenses: the illumination of the Spirit produced that knowledge of the economy of salvation which the apostles and other sacred writers possessed, and this knowledge involved the clothing of divine truth in human expression. This combination of the divine and human, which on the side of the *intellect* is not exclusively attached to the moral and religious attainments of the sacred writers, continues indeed during the process of writing; but in that purely human act the sacred writers derive their historic material not from the illumination of the Spirit, but from the usual sources of historic truth, though they do sift, arrange, and place in due light their historic materials by the power and according to the measure of the indwelling Spirit. Further the superiority of Scripture is not to be sought in its alone having a divine spirit; for its superiority consists in this very thing, that by its witness it continues for ever to beget such spirit. As there is but one Faith, one Baptism, so is there but one Spirit, which enlightened the apostles, and still enlightens the Church; but this unity of spirit, so far from dispensing with the standard authority of Scripture, only makes that standard recognizable.

Hence, further, the importance of Scripture, not merely to *ascertain* the faith, but also to *nourish* and *increase* it. What is born must grow: growth depends on sustenance, and the sustenance of faith, again, is drawn from the same source which produced faith, viz., Scripture. Again, faith is indeed rich, for it possesses Christ, and in Him all wisdom implicitly; nothing from without can therefore be wanting to it. But that which faith possesses in principle or germ, is not on that account necessarily developed into definite and conscious possession; for there still remains, yea even for the believer, the possibility of error, nay, of a concatenation of error. Hence faith recognizes Scripture not merely as the food by which it is maintained, but as the sure guide and rule according to which it is developed, and by which it must judge of its own purity and soundness. Not in spite of, but by virtue of, that which it already has, does faith yield itself to be instructed by Christ and his apostles. The process of combining faith with the word of God must therefore be continuous; we must be always reconciling Scripture and the Christian consciousness, in order to obtain that full and undoubting certainty which consists in the union of the personal and subjective with the objective word of God in Scripture.

Thus the certainty and joy of faith is not suspended for Luther by allowing criticism all its rights; nor, on the other hand, does Scripture lose in value and authority by the emphasis he lays on faith, but rather gains in these respects, inasmuch as Scripture becomes an internal authority with which faith cannot dispense.

Certainly this question, more especially, remained unsettled, whether the importance of Scripture for the rise and progress of faith is not imperilled by the unlimited power granted to criticism of calling all Scripture into question? And such points could only be determined when, in the development of a scientific criticism, it had been perceived that there are laws and limits of historical criticism inherent in its nature.

In conclusion, let us cast a glance at the practical breadth and fullness of the principles of the Reformation as they are embodied in Luther's teaching. From the principle that, in the true Christian, faith must be at one with Scripture, flowed Luther's doctrine of the universal priesthood of all believers, a principle implying the rejection of the Romish theory of the priesthood, and of the sacrament of orders, the Roman Catholic basis of all the

sacraments. The immediate connection of each Christian with God through faith excluded all dominion over the faith on the part of man or any other creature, and consequently all reliance on and adoration of the saints: the meditation of a heavenly as well as that of an earthly *hierarchy* was banished. On the other hand, any meditation through certain *actions*, such, *e. g.*, as the Romish sacraments or other sacred actions, was of itself condemned by the principle of faith, because an effect produced *ex opere operato* would dispense with faith. Specially the sacrament of penance, the most practically and extensively efficacious of all in the Romish system, was completely transformed, or rather abolished, in consequence of the doctrine of faith; its first part, auricular confession, was paralyzed, partly because true humility and penitence, which belong to faith, must recognize the sheer impossibility of recollecting and confessing each single sin, partly because, even were such recollection and confession possible, it would be far too shallow a procedure to dwell on single acts, instead of examining one's state as to belief and unbelief, from which flow the isolated acts; and finally, with the mediatorial position of the priest falls away the necessity of confessing to a priest. *Satisfactions*, or works to satisfy or atone for sin, were disclaimed by the principle of faith, because grace was seen to be free, and to impart itself irrespective of works, either past or future. Finally, the *judicial* power of the priest, in the retaining or remitting of sins, gave way before the recognition of the fact that God proffers and promises grace to man through the Gospel, without requiring any human mediation, which might interfere with the validity of the proffer, or with the immediacy of the relation between God and us. The *administration* of the Gospel, its due and unadulterated proclamation, &c., is the only thing with which the Church is entrusted in this respect. Similarly, all individual or particular *vows*, *e. g.*, those of poverty, chastity, &c., are merged in the one vow which extends itself over the Christian's whole life, the vow of perfectly resigning himself to God in Christ.

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE.

"The Book of Proverbs, in an amended version, with an introduction and explanatory Notes. By JOSEPH MUENSCHER, D.D." is the title of a work in 12mo. recently published at Gambier, Ohio, in which, by a judicious use of the most important commentaries in Latin and English, the author has succeeded in giving an amended version of the book of Proverbs with accompanying notes, well worthy of the attention of those who wish to know the meaning and connection of this striking collection. The notes are generally brief, but often comprehensive and suggestive. The Hebrew criticisms are the least valuable part of the work. In too closely following Prof. Stuart, the author has sometimes been led into error. The pointing of the Hebrew words is also frequently erroneous, and in general, the style in which the mechanical part of the volume is executed is not equal to its literary merit.

Professor Phelps's recent contributions to the *Bibliotheca Sacra* on Regeneration, which have justly excited so much attention in the United States and Great Britain, have been just published, with an additional chapter, under the title "The New Birth; or the Work of the Holy Spirit." (12mo. pp. 253. $1.25). No theologian or minister of the Gospel should fail to read them

Mr. M. W. DODD, New York, has recently published the following interesting work for Sabbath School Libraries, which are for sale by Mr. F. T. Jarman, in New Haven; The Draytons and the Davenants, a graphic and touching story of the Civil Wars, 12mo. pp. 509; The Women of the Gospels, and other Poems, 18mo. pp. 273, both by the author of The Schönberg-Cotta Family: The Faire Gospeller, by the author of "Mary Powell," 18mo. pp. 273; The Brownings, a Tale of the Great Rebellion, 18mo. pp. 310; and The Brewer Family, by Mrs. Ellis, an effective temperance tale.

Dr. E. Hincks, one of the most successful students of the Assyrian cuneiform inscriptions, died December 3d, aged 74. The last forty-one years of his life, he spent as Rector of Killyleagh, in Ireland.

The following are the principal new publications in Theology and the kindred branches.

United States and Great Britain—SCHAFF, History of the Christian Church from Constantine the Great, to Gregory I., completing the History of Ancient Christianity, 2 vols. 8vo. $7.50. *March*, Walks and Homes of Jesus, 12mo. $2.50. *Ritter*, The Comparative Geography of Palestine and the Sinaitic Peninsula, translated by W. L. Gage, 4 vols. 8vo. $14.00. *Perrowne*, the Godhead of Jesus (Hulsean Lectures, 1866) 8vo. 5*s*. *Mackay*, The Eternal Gospel; or the idea of Christian Perfectibility, 12mo. 3*s*. *Smith*, Faith and Philosophy, Essays on some tendencies of the day, 8vo. 7*s*. 6*d*. *Vaughan*, The wholesome words of Jesus Christ: four Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge, in November, 1866, 12mo. 3*s*. 6*d*. *Thomas*, The Science of Moderation; or the quantitative analysis of the Good and the Beautiful—Formative Ethics, 8vo. 5*s*. *Martensen*, Christian Dogmatics, 8vo. 10*s*. 6*d*. *Monsell*, Religion of Redemption, 8vo. 12*s*. *Gilbert*, Five Discourses on Miracles, Prayer and the Laws of Nature.

XXVI.—THE MOVEMENTS OF OUR TIMES AND THEIR PROBABLE ISSUES—THE CRISIS AT ROME.*

Long ages ago, while the world was yet young, it was foretold that there awaited it a second youth—a grand era of moral renovation. The institutions under which society at the beginning was placed, were not designed to be perpetual, or to stand till the world's end. They were wholly temporary and provisional. The very quality which constituted their fitness for the time then being, rendered them unfit for the age that was to come, and accordingly all the prophets spoke of a great revolution that was to pass over the world. At what time that revolution should happen they did not say; but they strove to fix the eyes and the hopes of men upon it as a new and grander starting point in history—a second birth-day of the world.

This great change the prophets describe in metaphorical language. However desirous to have a close view of this new and better state, the world could not be told it in plain terms. It was not able to hear it. It was shown it through a glass darkly. Indeed, the prophets themselves were no wiser in this respect than those whom they addressed; but speaking by that Spirit who "knoweth the end from the beginning," they foretold "a new heavens and a new earth," which were to replace the old, and wherein should dwell righteousness and peace. This language shadowed forth, sublimely but dimly, the change that awaited the world; nevertheless it made two things unmistakably certain regarding it: *first*, that it would be a radical and universal change; and *second*, that it would a beneficent one. The world would find itself placed under happier conditions, and would enter upon a new and nobler existence. "The former things shall not be remembered or come into mind."

We pause here to note the fact, an instructive one surely, that it was from the mountain tops of Judea that this great coming day of renovation was first descried. It was seen across the

* From the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, January, 1867.

four great empires, not yet risen, but which, before that day should come, were to interject their long ages of oppression and suffering. But although at so vast a distance, the prophets of Israel had a clear, distinct, and sure vision of it, and they foretold its coming, not doubtfully, and after the fashion of the heathen oracles, with studied and impenetrable ambiguity, but in language as definite and plain as could then be made intelligible to view, and with imagery vivid and glowing, like persons who speak of what they know, and describe what they have seen. All this time, be it further remarked, while the prophets of Israel were standing in the light of that morning, their faces reflecting its glow, and their raiment glistening with its brightness, the seers of heathendom were groping in the night. Though they stood on tiptoe and strained their eyes, not a streak of light could they see on the horizon. To them all was dark, dark as to dwellers in a sepulcher. And surely it ought to count for something on the side of the Bible, that the first welcome to liberty was sung on the harp of the prophets. The poets of Greece and Rome were as yet inditing odes to war; or singing songs to the divinities of love or of the wine-cup; or basely pandering to tyrants; or which was as bad, ministering fuel to the guilty ambition of nations, or rather of one nation, for higher they never rose in their ideas of liberty than to the picture of Rome sitting in power predominant, while the nations of the world lay quieted, not liberated, beneath her iron scepter. This was the golden age they foretold; not such was the golden age of the prophets. Liberty, as they painted her, was no doubtful figure, making her advent amidst the lurid clouds of battle, attired in the stained raiment of conflict. She was the living morning, all freshness and song; descending from the skies, and treading in her golden sandals on the mountain tops. The finest odes to liberty ever written are the forty-first and forty-second chapters of Isaiah; the ninety-sixth and ninety-eighth Psalms. The conceptions of liberty, which these compositions embody, are so just; the sympathy which they breathe with it is so genuine and deep; and the joy with which they welcome it, is so rapt and passionate, setting all nature on fire, as it were, by their enthusiasm, and awakening into song valley and hill, ocean and dry land, the great cedar and the humble shrub, that they immeasurably surpass in sublimity and power, I do not say the

finest composition of the poets of Greece and Rome, but the grandest passages in the grandest poets of all time. And yet these unrivaled productions came from the Jew—the Jew, whose national history, whose territorial isolation, and whose very privileges nursed him in pride and exclusiveness, and unfitted him, one would have thought, for contemplating with a satisfaction so unfeigned and unbounded, the spectacle of all the nations of the earth equally enfranchised, dignified, and blessed with himself. So far had inspiration lifted him above his age, above his nation, above himself.

But we return. What are the signs that this great era of renovation draws nigh? To this topic we now restrict ourselves.

We must premise that the true starting point of modern history is the Reformation. Then society received into its bosom the seed of a new life. That seed was the word of God. That word taught men to seek renewal of heart and reformation of life, not from a rite or a ceremony, but from the Holy Spirit. The rite impotent and dead could impart no life to the soul; but the Spirit of God, to which men were now led by the word, could and did impart life. Here an individual, there a little community was found, whose spiritual nature had been quickened, and whose intellectual and social nature had shared in that quickening, and thus, in process of time, there came to be a new world In the ages previous to the Reformation, society had been cut off from the fountain of its being; it had lain benumbed and stagnant; but now this celestial breath entered into it and awoke it. Conscience, aforetime dethroned, resumed its office. In conscience there was furnished a basis for law; and under the ægis of law, liberty arose, and with liberty came letters, science, and all the industrial activities. In short, civilization, in all its beautiful forms and endless varieties, had a second morning as well as Christianity.

This new society could not come into existence without rending and dislocating the old out of which it arose. The latter half of the sixteenth century, and a good part of the seventeenth, were passed in terrible conflicts. Christendom became a scene of armies and battle-fields, of scaffolds and blazing states. The eighteenth century was one of rest. The combatants were exhausted. The nineteenth century saw the struggle renewed, but with other weapons and in a higher sphere. It was now seen,

that by some strange process which men could not explain, but which, nevertheless, they felt to be an undoubted actuality, the sword which appeared to be winning all was in reality losing all. The kingdoms arrayed, at the beginning of this great quarrel, on what appeared to be the winning side, were found at the end of the day on the losing side; superiority, prestige, and even empire had in large measure passed away from them. Holland and the rest of the Protestant states, on the other hand, after all the sackings, burnings, and slaughterings to which they were subjected, rose steadily in spirit, in wealth and in power, and were found to be stronger at the end of the struggle than they had been at its beginning. This was a startling discovery; and it suggested a change in the method of carrying on the war. The sword, which was dangerous only to the victor, must be laid aside, and other weapons, of more ethereal mold, and fitted to combat ideas and not bodies merely, must be had recourse to. This brings us to the struggle as carried on in our own century, and necessitates a survey of the principles which are at this hour struggling on the wide field of Christendom.

To enumerate them all or to dwell upon them individually, were impossible in so rapid a sketch. Our aim is to trace their combinations and to fix the eye upon their manifest convergence upon some grand issue at no great distance from the present hour. The one grand and prominent characteristic of our times is their broad and strongly marked dualism. It is an undoubted fact, that all the principles in conflict at this hour, multitudinous as they are, and diverse as they seem, are resolvable into two grand categories, and constitute unitedly but two great movements,—antagonistic of course—the one working persistently to pull the world down; the other working as persistently, and we dare hope more effectively, to lift the world up. This dualism was scarce perceptible before the Reformation. Then one principle stood up in over-mastering strength, and as a consequence it had the whole field to itself. Ever since the sixteenth century this dualism has been more or less marked. In our times it is strongly so; indeed, we may say, it is now perfected. It irresistibly suggests the idea of personal agency. In contemplating it, we feel as if watching the progress of two plans, the development of two sets of ideas. We see two minds, two beings in conflict. Necessarily two, because the movements are antagonistic, and the

ideas of which they are the expression, could not be the product of one and the same mind; and yet not more than two, because the characteristic of these movements is duality. We feel as if the veil was lifted, and the spiritual actors, in visible form, stood before us. Behind the thin curtain, we see mighty shades moving to and fro in the tide of battle. It is, as in the apocalyptic vision, when "there was war in heaven; Michael and his angels fought against the dragon, and the dragon fought and his angels." This dualism of itself indicates convergence, and most surely prognosticates a not distant crisis.

We turn first to the adverse side of this dual movement. Here we find two powerful principles in operation, infidelity and ritualism. The scepticism of our times is not a British manifestation merely, or an European manifestation only, it is world-wide. In countries lying far beyond the pale of Christendom has it broken out. But it takes different names in the different countries. It is known as Positivism in France, as Rationalism in Germany, as Materialism and Criticism in England, as Pantheism in India. But wherever we meet it, or by whatever name known, it is identically the same. There is but one scepticism in the world. It has myriads of acute minds in its service both in Europe and in India. It is creating new forms of thought; it is framing new codes of morality; it is inventing new theories of government; and is thus preparing in silence a great political and social revolution. This scepticism is in the air. It is confined no longer to the schools, it pervades all society. It is found in all churches, even the most orthodox; and where it may not be professed as a creed, it is felt as an influence. It is seen in the longing for one knows not what kind of liberty, for certainly that cannot be "free thought" which is not "*true thought.*" It is seen in the disposition to reject all previously ascertained and demonstrated truth, and go through the process for one's self. It is seen in the softening of the moral sense. Scepticism has unbound the loins of the age, hence gigantic fraudulencies in the commercial world, and a readiness, we fear to do equally gigantic and criminal deeds in the political, when occasion shall serve. Conscience as a power has vastly declined; with conscience has departed confidence, that cement which armies and force can so ill supply; the social machine begins to open, part falls away from part, and the yawning rents strike the minds of men with

terror, as betokening a general dissolution. The world say the continentals, has grown dim with age. The earth is rotten and has ceased to produce. They have a despairing sense of the need of some new vitalizing and purifying element. Meanwhile the darkness grows from one hour to another; and the men of modern Europe are oppressed by a foreboding not unlike that which Pliny tells us took possession of the Pompeians, when the shower of ashes fell upon them and they thought that that eternal night had come in which the world and the gods themselves were to perish.

Infidelity has always been a less formidable antagonist of Christianity than superstition, inasmuch as it lacks organization. An attempt was made by the late Auguste Compte, to remedy this great defect. He conceived the project of convening a conclave or synod of sceptical philosophers, who were to pass edicts and to carry them into effect, how, or by what means, he did not very clearly explain. Thus he hoped to constitute a new priesthood, who should be empowered to reform all the worships of earth, and reorganize all the governments of the world, and so supply what infidelity so much lacked, a capacity, namely, of combined action. In this way, Compte hoped, infidelity would dethrone the three great chiefs of the existing religions—Mahomet, the Pope, and Christ. Compte has gone to his grave; the conclave of the new priesthood has not yet holden its first sitting; but till it has done so, and till it has found the means of giving effect to its edicts, infidelity must be content to be simply the ally of some better organized power.

We come now to ritualism. We do not intend discussing it as a principle; what we design is to mark it out as an element in the combinations of our time. In ritualism we just witness a resuscitation of the spirit or essence of idolatry; for what is the main idea at the bottom of idolatry? Is it not this, that in the priest there resides a divine or superhuman power, in virtue of which he can impart to the rites he performs a certain ghostly or necromantic potency which operates a change upon the soul? In whatever clime we meet idolatry, whether in a Brahminic temple on the Ganges, in St. Peter's at Rome, or in St. Alban's in London, this is its own fundamental idea. It is a renewal by a rite, instead of renewal by the truth. It is salvation by the priest, instead of salvation by the Spirit.

On the continent, since 1830, the ritualism of one class has kept pace with the scepticism of another class. But the marvel is, that in England, of all countries, ritualism should have had so wide and conspicuous a revival. It is coming in like a flood; nay, not the rite only, but the thing which the rite signifies. It spreads like a creeping leprosy. To the eyes of the university youth, the "church" appears as the one depositary of "the faith," the only channel of grace. To deans and country squires the "sacrament" is an awful and mysterious thing. In short, they are insensibly sliding into the "real presence" in the popish sense. In the higher circles, how many are there who maintain that it is perfectly innocent and lawful to worship God through an image; and as they believe, so they practice! How many churches are there in England into which, were one led blindfolded, he would imagine himself in Italy? There one beholds pictures, images, flowers, tapers, crosses, vestments, mumblings, incensings, the elevation of the host; in short, a whole popery in, rite and doctrine. There is not in all Christendom so portentous a sign as is this revival of ritualism in England. It is the abomination of desolation, standing in the holy place. England was wont to be accounted the heart of Protestant Europe; but the heart of England is her church; and if that heart be smitten, how shall the body be preserved? or whence shall deliverance arise? To us it plainly appears that the battle which England began under Henry VIII, she has lost. True, she may fight another; but she cannot fight it with the same organization; for that organization is now in the hands of the enemy—not the outworks only, but the citadel. England can no longer, with hope of success, maintain the conflict under the old principle, which we may designate by the three-fold symbol, "the king, the prelate, and the liturgy." She must find a new principle: she must unfurl a new flag. Either way, there is before England and her church, revolution. If she sit still, there is before her, revolution in the Roman sense; if she bestir herself, there must come a separation of parties—a break-up; and a shock like this in a country which is the fountain-head of all the Christianizing and civilizing influences must needs communicate its vibrations to the ends of the earth.

It might seem at first sight that these two, infidelity and ritualism, are antagonistic principles, and mutually destructive. Is it

really so? No. On the contrary, both work in the same line, and tend to the same goal. Scepticism seeks the subjugation of the understanding; superstition aims at the subjugation of the conscience. Unitedly they would displace God from His supremacy over his creature, and bring the world into bondage to human authority. Thus their epochs of flourishing have often been contemporaneous. There is an amazing amount of incredulity in scepticism. They are in fact, twin-brothers, or rather, Siamese twins. Infidelity, while rejecting the truths of revelation, has commonly shown an extraordinary aptitude for crediting prodigies and fables. While rejecting the rational doctrine of the creation of the world by an eternal being, it has accepted the irrational doctrine of the existence of all things by an eternal chain of causes and effects. There have been men denying the existence of God, yet entertaining the dread of demons and ghosts; a fact which did not escape the notice of the old satirist who remarked that he knew of none who stood in such terror of the gods as the men who did not believe in them. The last days of paganism, be it also observed, were, like our own, days in which scepticism and superstition flourished together. "Christianity," it has been remarked, "did not all at once succeed to the inheritance of Olympus." There intervened a dreary period in which atheism vented its obscenities and paganism strove, by multiplying its prodigies, to revive its credit and retain its hold upon the mind of the world; and the contemporaneous outbreak of the two, which we now witness, would seem to be a historical parallel notifying the close of one age and the advent of another.

We turn now to the other half of this dual movement, that, namely, which is bearing the world upward—upward to a stable liberty and a higher unity. It is a doctrine of the Bible that all things have been put into subjection to Christ as mediator. This is not less a doctrine of Providence; for Providence is but a larger Bible. It is a re-exhibition, on a grander scale, of those same principles which Holy Writ had already announced. In proof, we shall take only the history of the past eighteen years. Among the things put under Christ as mediator, is war. Since 1848, we have had seven great wars, and it is instructive to mark that each has resulted in the enlargement of human freedom and the emancipation of the human conscience. Let us indicate in a few sentences what it would require a whole volume fully to discuss.

First of all came the Revolution of 1848. The wars consequent on that event planted constitutional government in Sardinia, and opened the door to the Bible in Piedmont. In 1854, came the war in Turkey. It had as its special issue the Sultan's firman proclaiming toleration in the Mohammedan empire, and repealing the death penalty attached to the profession of Christianity. In 1857 came the mutiny in India, followed by a great war. The British arms triumphed, and with that triumph came an edict of toleration to all the tribes and languages of that great continent, in the shape of the Queen's proclamation declaring Christianity to be the religion of that empire of which India had now become a part. Next, war broke out in the far East, and that war put an end to the complete isolation which China had maintained for so many centuries, and opened that distant land to the Bible and the missionary. Having touched the limits of the farthest East, war returned Westward on its steps, and in 1859 broke out again in July. This, the war of independence, as it has been termed, opened the whole country, from the Alps to Sicily, the Papal States excepted, to the circulation of the Scriptures and the preaching of the gospel. War had, for the time, accomplished its mission in the old world. It now crossed the Atlantic, and there, with its hoarse voice, it proclaimed liberty to the captive. Amid fields of unexampled carnage it struck down one of the most accursed systems of slavery the world ever saw. Having done its work in the new world, it returned again to the old, and its thunder peal was next heard in the heart of Germany. This very summer, after a campaign of only nine days, Austria was overthown, and ceased to exist as a German power; the last vestige of the once famous holy Roman Empire was swept out of existence, the strongest political bulwark of the papacy was thrown down, and by the rise of a great Protestant kingdom in Germany, the balance of political power was turned in favor of liberty and evangelical truth. This is a marvellous chain of events. It conspicuously reveals the foot-prints of Him who is the Church's Head and the world's King. Within the short period of eighteen years, Satan's kingdom of idolatry has been smitten all round, and toleration has been proclaimed as law to the ends of the earth, to be afterwards worked into the usages of Government and the opinions of the people.

Another sign of the near proximity of a great moral revolu-

tion, is the circumstance that the religious problem of Christendom has been worked out. That problem is, Which is the true Christianity; that professed by Rome, or that professed by the Protestant Church? At the era of the Reformation, Europe was parted in twain. Only the one half of its nations were able to enter upon the inheritance of the gospel. A mighty disaster it was thought to be, and a mighty disaster it certainly was, but this calamity an overruling Providence has converted into a blessing to the ages of the future. It has given us two witnesses for the gospel's truth: two demonstrations of the value of the Reformation—a positive one from the Protestant side, and a negative one from the Popish side. The Protestant nations, by their political freedom, mental culture, and social progress, have conclusively demonstrated the entire harmony of Reformed Christianity with the temporal interests of men. The Popish nations, by their intellectual decrepitude, political decay, and social barbarism, have just as conclusively demonstrated that the Papacy is at war with the whole temporal welfare of man. The Italians have accepted this demonstration, and openly avow their belief in the antagonism of the temporal Papacy to civilization. Here, then, is the problem worked out, so far, on both the Catholic and non-catholic sides. This is a mighty step in advance. And now matters seem ripe, as regards the convictions of the Catholic nations, for the destruction of the Pope's temporal sovereignty.

Since the year 1700, the temporal power has been tottering to its fall. It will fall to-day or to-morrow, or the day after, it was said; but still it did not fall. It reminded one of those feudal towers one may have seen, ragged a-top, and sorely worn at the foundation, maintaining their erect position amid blasts which laid more modern structures prostrate on the ground. So has stood the temporal power all through the storms of a century. Perhaps in the one case, as in the other, there was some marvelous quality in the lime that held the old fabric together. It owes its prolonged existence a good deal to the Jesuits, no doubt, and some little to the prudent and comparatively enlightened policy of two Popes, Lambertini (Benedict XIV), and Ganganelli (Clement XIV). In the beginning of the present century, Napoleon I. decreed the abolition of the temporal sovereignty, but the end was that Napoleon went as exile to St. Helena, and Pius VII. returned in triumph to Rome. A series of brilliant

pictures on the walls of the Vatican library commemorates this glorious victory of the vicar of Christ over his persecutor. In 1848, the sky again became overcast, and revolution, like a revolving storm, returned on Europe. The constituent Roman Assembly which now convened in the capitol, decreed, a second time, the abolition of the "temporal sovereignty;" but the result was, that that Assembly fell before the cannon of the French, and Pius IX. returned in triumph from Yaeta. Behold, it was said, how Providence has interposed to save from destruction "the church." A third time has the end of the "temporal power" been decreed; for the convention betwixt France and Italy for the complete evacuation of Rome by the French troops is designed on the part of these powers—on the part of Italy undoubtedly—to be the termination of the Pope's temporal sovereignty. Twice already has a great voice proclaimed, "It is fallen, it is fallen;" but it has risen again. Will it be so once more? or shall the Apocalyptic addition be now made to this third proclamation of its downfall, "and shall no more arise?"

In replying to this question, it has to be taken into account that the opinion of Popish Europe, and especially of Italy, is now ripe for the extinction of the temporal sovereignty. This never was the case till now. It is further to be borne in mind that Providence has manifestly paved the way for this great change. It has this very summer struck down Austria, the firmest bulwark of that soverignty, and made the balance of power to incline against the Latin races, and in favor of the Anglo-Saxon and Protestant nations. There is, moreover, the rise of the Italian kingdom, and the consolidation under one scepter of a nation parted for ages into factions, and divided by rivalries and strifes. Then there is the all-pervading desire of the whole Italian people to possess Rome and make it their capitol. All these providential circumstances, meeting at this hour, seem to set their seal, as with the force of fate, upon the purposed extinction of the temporal sovereignty of the popes. If anything were awanting to make the execution of this purpose imperative, it has been applied by the part acted by the Court of the Vatican. Every measure of regeneration adopted by the new Italian kingdom, the Pope has anathematized. The government of Victor Emmanuel planted communal schools all over Italy. The Pope anathematized them. The Italian government suppressed the

convents. The Pope anathematized the measure. The Italian government enacted "civil marriage." It is, cries the Pope, a scandal against morals. The Italian government annexed the Romagna, and Emelia, and other States of the Church. The Pope denounced this measure as horrible sacrilege. Thus has the Pope done his best to demonstrate that his government and the national government are antagonistic, and cannot possibly exist together. The Italians have accepted the demonstration, and are perfectly convinced that the two powers cannot bear rule in the same Italy, and that the Papal sovereignty must now take end.

The Franco-Italian Convention is a riddle unread. At the time it was entered into, no one could exactly tell what it meant, and even yet no one is much the wiser. A great variety of interpretations have been put upon it, but these only show that its terms are ambiguous, and were, perhaps, made so on purpose. It is extremely probable that Louis Napoleon himself, were he asked at this moment, could not, or would not, say precisely what it means, or what is the amount of action which it leaves to Italy. When the decisive hour comes, Napoleon will probably hold that it means the *extinction* of the temporal sovereignty, or the *conservation* of the temporal sovereignty, just as the one interpretation or the other will then be found to suit his interests and those of France. It is even possible that war may grow out of it. Before these lines can meet the eye of the reader, we may be able to see more day-light through it; but meanwhile we may venture to affirm that the French troops will evacuate Rome; that the Romans will vote the annexation of the "Eternal City" to Italy; that they will offer the crown to Victor Emmanuel; and that Victor Emmanuel will accept it. The Pope will then have two courses in his choice; he must either remain at Rome as the subject of Victor Emmanuel and first Bishop of Papal Christendom, or he must depart, carrying with him his chair, with all the regalities thereto appertaining, to some other spot of earth.

But say the Italians, and many besides the Italians, why should not the Papacy reconcile itself with Italy? This embroilment is all owing to the obstinacy of the Pope, who is so enamored of being a king, that he prefers to keep the world in hot water, to becoming simply the chief bishop of Christendom, and the first primate of Victor Emmanuel. Let us do the Pope

justice in this matter. He has many and cogent reasons why he should not be the simple bishop; and doubtless he is abler to weigh the force of these reasons than some of his advisers. First of all, there is a theological difficulty in the way; and secondly, there are great political difficulties. These difficulties are insuperable; at least no man on either side has yet shown how they are to be met. The dogma on which popery, both as a theology and as a hierarchy, is founded, is that of vicarship. This dogma incontestably implies the "temporal power." It makes it of the essence of the Papacy; for Christ,—and the Pope says he is Christ,—is a king as well as a priest. On this head there is a remarkable unanimity on the part of all the authorized writers of Rome. Bellarmine, the ablest of all the defenders of the Papacy, says, that the "pontificial supremacy" is the fundamental article of the Christian religion. The present Pope, in his encyclical of 1864, has endorsed Bellarmine's proposition. He says that the temporal power is a right inherent in the church, and an essential part of Christianity. How, then, does this place the Pope? In this position: Those who demand that he shall give up the temporal sovereignty, demand that he give up Christianity itself. They demand that he do an act tantamount to declaring that all canonized writers who have treated of the "temporal power," were in error; that all counsels which have ratified it were in error: that all Popes who have worn the temporal sword were in error; and that, when they carried on crusades against heresies and heretics, on the pretense that they were the chief magistrates of Christendom, were but homicides and murderers. Nay, it were an act tantamount to declaring that Popery itself has all along been standing on an error. That the Pope will ever make this admission we do not believe. The force of circumstances may strip him of his sovereignty, but that he will voluntarily lay it down, and become the simple bishop, we do not believe. It is a "non possumus." The Pope we take to be a man of very strong convictions indeed—a man sternly in earnest. He has not only subscribed his creed, he believes it, and will stand by it; and we can admire consistency and unflinching principle even at Rome. We can imagine the Pontiff, as he looks around on the men and times amid whom his lot has been cast, saying with Sir John Falstaff,

> "Plague on all cowards;
> There is not an honest man alive, save one:
> And he is waxen old."

But, moreover, this is one of those cases in which the only safety lies in courage. Suppose the Pope should lay down his tiara and become the simple primate, what follows? First of all, he inflicts a blow upon the political prestige of his system. He loses a throne, and a throne, however insignificant, is still a throne. He inflicts a blow, in the second place, upon the moral prestige of his system, for he gives the lie to all former edicts, encyclicals, and allocutions. The more cleanly life the Papacy might be compelled to live, by its exclusion from the political sphere, would scarce indemnify it for these losses. But the great danger which the Pope so clearly foresees—and is doubtless anxious to avert—is the destruction of Catholic unity, which would be inevitably consequent upon the step he is counselled to take. The one Catholic Roman church would soon come to be split up into a number of national churches independent of Rome and its bishop. Why should this follow? it is asked. It follows in this way. The primate of Victor Emmanuel, as head of the church, sends, we shall suppose, his bulls and briefs into France. These bear not only on matters of Christian duty, but on questions of political obedience. The Pontiff claims for them the force of law. He has the means of giving them the force of law, despite the government of the country. He has so, first, through the bishops of France, whom he appoints, and all of whom are bound by feudal oath to obey him. He has, secondly, the means of giving them the force of law through the confessional: a machine that works in silence. And, thirdly, he has the means of enforcing them through the belief of the infallibility, which to a Papist makes the commands of the Pope the commands of God, and binds the conscience of the nations to the Pope's footstool. How would Louis Napoleon like to have the government of his kingdom filched from him by the primate of Victor Emmanuel? "We have heard a good deal," would he say "of the French occupation of Italy; here have we the Italian occupation of France. No: this state of things was scarce bearable even when the Pope was an independent sovereign, and when we strove, though to little purpose, to regulate and restrict his jurisdiction by the 'Gallican liberties;' but it is altogether unbearable now that he is the primate of Victor Emmanuel, and may

be, indeed can scarce fail to be his tool." "This is a state of things," would he farther add, "bringing with it infinite hazard, should war ever break out betwixt Italy and France. I should find myself opposed at once by the soldiers of Victor Emmanuel, and the anathemas of his primate. No: we must separate from the communion of the Bishop of Rome; erect an independent church in France, and restore the election of the bishops to the chapters or the people, as in the early ages." Spain, for the same reasons, would adopt the same course; Austria would follow. And thus the church, Roman and universal, would come to exist only in fragments on the face of Europe, and the mighty charm of Catholic unity would have flown.

The Pope, therefore, after a brief and unquiet interregnum, will depart from Rome, leaving behind him, in the secret archives of the Vatican, as is usual in such cases, a formal protest, taking power to overturn, at a future day, all the proceedings of France and Italy. He will, we say, depart; and the question is, whither? Probably the Pontiff himself does not, as yet, know. One thing is clear, it must be to some spot outside the dominions of the Catholic sovereigns. The same objection applies to the Pope's living in France, or in Spain, or in Austria, which applies to his living in the dominions of Victor Emmanuel. His acts and edicts would instantly become suspect; the flavor of earth would mingle with that of heaven in all his edicts. They would sound to the faithful, not as the utterances of infallibility, but as the commands of the sovereign, who spoke through the Pope. Looking at what the Papal jurisdiction is, we agree with Guizot, that the Pope can have no independence but sovereignty.

Will the pilgrim Pontiff then turn his steps towards Britain, the world's asylum? Our gates stand open night and day to all whom the storms of fortune may compel to flee thither; and it has been asked, shall we close these gates against the fugitive Pope? I do not say that we ought, but there is a difference here which does not appear to have occurred to any one. When Louis Phillipe and other monarchs sought and found an asylum on our shores, they left their governments behind them. They came amongst us simply as private persons. The government of France was still in France, although Louis Phillipe lived in England. But the Pope, if he shall come to Britain, will bring his kingdom with him. He is the head of a hybrid monarchy,

the one-half spiritual and the other half temporal, covering more than a half of Europe, and of that monarchy he cannot divest himself, even were he willing. Where Peter is, there the church is. The dogma of vicarship ties all,—chair, tiara, and keys,—upon the Pope's back, and he cannot get rid of them, save by cutting the cord, which he is not likely soon to do. The whole machinery of his government is still existing and working, be he where he may; he is still its center and mainspring; and wherever he resides, whether in London, in Dublin, or in Malta, he must continue to direct and administer the government of his empire from thence all the world over. The true parallel lies in the supposition, that Louis Phillipe, still continuing king of the French, had taken a fancy to live in London, and from the British soil to make peace or war when and where he pleased. To have permitted such an arrangement would have been to draw down upon our own heads all the storms which it might please France to get up. If the king of this other monarchy which calls itself spiritual, but which is, and ever must be, far more largely political, shall seek our shores as a place of residence, he will come, not fleeing from a throne, but bringing his throne with him, and for the purpose of setting it up amongst us. Nay, farther, he will come with a claim to the submission of our own throne as lord paramount (and Romanists even now place the Pope first and the Queen second), with a right to define the civil duties of the subjects of the realm, and a power to annul all laws which do not accord with his pontifical will; and should we in aught resist him, he will raise the cry of persecution, and incite his foreign subjects to coerce us. In this case, assuredly, we shall not have our troubles to seek. We shall have no end of complications and misunderstandings with other powers. Already we are sufficiently embroiled; then it will be confusion worse confounded. Our soil will have become the grand focus of European intrigue.

What then will be the end of this matter? We believe that the temporal sovereignty of the Pope is on the eve of extinction; but the extinction of the temporal sovereignty is not the extinction of the Papacy, nor will Europe thus get rid of the perils growing out it. The spirit, the system will live, although it should be compelled to quit the political frame work it has so long inhabited. The logic of divine providence seems to require

that the Papacy should be allowed to display itself under a new phase before terminating its career. One step is yet wanting to complete that grand demonstration which God has been conducting for ages of the malignant nature of the Papacy. The missing step is, we apprehend, about to be supplied. The perfect antagonism which exists betwixt the Papacy and civilization, as the Papacy has been constituted these thousand years bygone, that is, as incorporated with, and wielding the organization of, a temporal government, has been conclusively demonstrated, and the Italians have accepted the demonstration, and are prepared to act upon it to the extent of extinguishing the temporal sovereignty of the Popes. But the Italians and the Popish nations generally, must go a step farther. They yet need to be shown, that it is not the temporal Papacy only that is in antagonism with civilization, but that this antagonism springs out of the *system*—out of the *religion*, and not merely out of the *government* of the popes; in short, they need to be shown that their great enemy, the real author of all the miseries and woes they have borne, is the spiritual Papacy. For this end the Papacy will be stripped of its earthly tenement, so to speak, and sent into the world as a disembodied, naked, spiritual existence; in short, as the pure Papacy. With myriads of secret societies in its service, with its spiritual machinery now so perfected, that a word can set it a-moving from the center to its vast circumference, it yet remains to be seen what a potency for evil the Papacy possesses, and what schemes of dire vengeance it can devise and execute. Rather than suffer itself to be destroyed, it will destroy society. Driven from Rome and from sovereignty, there remains to it but one stake more; a desperate one, it is true, but one it will not hesitate to play,—revolution; a complete, a universal, and it may be a sanguinary revolution of the papal world. It will then be seen that the great scourge and tyrant of the nations was, not the temporal, but the spiritual Papacy. When this has been demonstrated, all will have been demonstrated. The conclusion of that grand series of demonstrations, by which God has been opening the eyes of the nations, and leading the world out of this terrible bondage, will have been reached; and that Providence, which never destroys evils until they are ripe, but spares them not a day longer, will then overthrow the Papacy.

If this view of the matter be sound, there is still betwixt us and

the goal to which the aspirations of the world tend, a period of wide-spread, persistent, subtle and most audacious agitation on the part of Rome. That agitation will go deeper into the soul of man, and further into the heart of society, than any former agitation. All countries, Protestant and Popish, will be invaded by the myrmidons of the Papacy. The whole of society will be permeated by their infidel, immoral and seditious principles. This will bring on bitterer strifes and more terrible convulsions than any Europe has yet seen. Nations will be distracted, governments overthrown, and order itself undermined and destroyed. The antagonism of the Papacy to society will be demonstrated in the actual fact of the dissolution of society. This is the cataclysm in which Popery is destined to terminate its career—one vast ruin—the last and the greatest.

The world has come close up to this supreme hour. There is no power in man to make that hour pass. Circumstances are too strong for all parties. We know not when before in the history of the world, kings and nations stood so near to a great event, and yet were so utterly powerless to retard or modify it. As a snare has it come on all the earth. Every moment that passes sounds as a knell, for nearer every moment comes that event, and with it come perplexity and fear to the priesthood, publicity and fear to the kings, perplexity and fear to the nations. There weighs a mighty load at this hour upon the Popish world: men's hearts are failing them for fear, and for looking after those things which are coming on the earth. They can see nothing but the blackness of that cloud which hangs above the world. In its bosom there sleep thunders and lightnings and a great tempest. Not till it has passed, will come that blessed rain which is to refresh the world in the latter day. When the false vicar has taken his departure, then will come the true Vicar, even the Comforter, whom the Father will send nations, who is the Holy Ghost; He shall lead the nations into all truth.

XXVII—LIFE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ARCHBISHOP WHATELY.*

In reading the works and studying the life of Archbishop Whately, it is impossible not to be struck with the great originality of the man,—looking, of course, not merely to his intellectual, but also to his social and moral characteristics. Even if we look exclusively at the former, his peculiar combination of powers, and the degree in which they were severally possessed, mark him out almost as strongly from other men, as the most original genius in some one direction could have done. Many have, no doubt, been more inventive or more subtle, even in his favorite walks of speculation,—in theology, in moral philosophy, in political economy; but there are few who have brought to any one of them and still fewer to them all, his strength and acuteness, his powers of exposition and extraordinary aptitude for illustration; fewer still who could have employed his materials, even when not new, nor pretending to be so, in such a way as to give, as he has given to his principal writings, all the flavor and relish of novelty. The *building* is new, and has its own architectural beauty, even though the materials be old as the hills. In truth, the world isapt to make a common mistake on this point. It is disposed to restrict the name of *originality* to what is absolutely new in thought, and imagines that a new combination of partly familiar thoughts, a new logical structure of materials, is *not* original; nay, it sometimes lavishes the name, not only on what is new and true (to produce which is indeed the highest merit of a writer), but on what is "new" and *false;*—on some brilliant, but eccentric theory, for example, in metaphysical or moral philosophy, that comes and vanishes like a meteor. This is argued to indicate a splendid *original* genius for these departments of speculation, while the quality is denied, it may be, to works, which, in virtue of their general structure, are much better entitled to the name. He who first made bricks was, no doubt, a very clever

* Abridged from the *British Quarterly Review*, January, 1867.

fellow, and an exceeding benefactor of his species; but surely many an architect who gets his bricks ready-made, has made such use of them as to display equal originality with his. In all Butler's works, in all Johnson's, it would perhaps be hard to find a hundred absolutely new thoughts (we do not mean *new* illustrations of thought, for these are "legion,") but truths which are not to be found, even in germ, in previous writers. Suppose it, and what then? How would their originality be affected by it? Indeed, *this* sort of originality—originality of combination and method—must, as the world grows older and novelty and discovery become more difficult, be principally what is to be looked for in any author. We have not so much reason to complain (as Counsellor Pleydell thought) of our rascally *postnati*, who, he says, 'steal all our good things from us,' but rather as Ovid affirms, of our forefathers who have said all our good things before us. As long as minds are conspicuously original, whether by the ascendency of some one faculty, or by a combination of powers, the distinctive marks of originality will be on all they produce. The beauty of the carving and the chasing at least will disclose the skill of the artist, even though the materials are not created, but merely molded into new forms. And this will ever be the chief merit, both of poetry and prose, different as may be the costliness of the materials. Poetry, indeed, may work in silver or gold, but the chief value will still be what the artist gives it; and though a didactic work may be likened to a "beechen cup" in comparison, the carving will show whether an artist or rude hands have fashioned it. It is not difficult to point out in our own literature, and still more in that of a neighboring country, hundreds of books in philosophy and theology, substantially identical in materials, which might all have proceeded from the same mold, or which, even when the sentiments are *not* the same, are principally distinguished from one another by that circumstance alone. But when there is originality (and it is also a test of it, whether a work have much absolutely new material or not), the mind will impress its own "image and superscription" on its handiwork, and the *tout ensemble* shall be what it is in virtue of its specific action. This will be seen in the general method, the mode of combining and marshaling arguments, in the cast and color of the illustrations, in aptness and force of style. To the credit of English literature, it may perhaps be

affirmed with truth, that scarcely any can be said to possess so many great writers of prose, (as for poetry, all people are of one mind with Horace, that a *mediocre* poet is not to be tolerated by "gods, readers, or booksellers,") who, in virtue of their originality of self-representation, and apart from the profundity or novelty, or, it may be, in spite of the unsoundness of their peculiar speculations, have so impressed their whole image on their writings; in whom we see, as we read, the same mind perpetually mirrored to us, as the moon seems to accompany us as we wander by a stream. It is hardly possible to read any considerable passage in them without saying—even if some characteristic opinion, or doctrine, or crotchet, does not afford a clue—"This is Sir Thomas Browne, this is Locke, this is Bentley, this is Jeremy Taylor, this is Paley, this is Burke."

This originality of *manner*, (aided by a fair proportion of thoughts which are really 'new and true,' valuable contributions to the sum total of previous speculation on the subjects of which he treats) is eminently that of Archbishop Whately; and in *that*, as well as in the conspicuously practical character of his works, he resembles so many of his distinguished countrymen. The logical 'constructiveness' (as phrenologists say) of his mind is seen very prominently in all his principal writings; in his 'Historic Doubts,' his 'Errors of Romanism,' his Treatise on the 'Kingdom of Christ,' his 'Peculiarities of the Christian Religion.' They not only impress us in particular passages, with the sagacity and penetration of the author, with the vigor of the logic, the aptness of illustration, the lucid beauty of expression, but make us feel that all his powers are so articulated with one another, and so minister to his whole mode of viewing a subject and his plan of treating it, as to exhibit a distinct image of his mind, and make all the products of the man *sui generis*; original in this sense, that they are *his*; not to be easily confounded with any other writings, nor are any other writings with them. They are as much his own as those of Johnson or of Paley, both of whom the Archbishop strongly resembled in certain points, in the practical character of his intellect, and in some moral and social peculiarities; indeed, we have sometimes thought he might be almost called a *cross* between them.

Though the character of Whately's intellect became, in mature life, so determinately practical, it would not have been easy for

an observer of his early boyhood to say what would be its ultimate bent. At that time, it might have seemed that the tendency of the mind was almost equally towards either abstract science, or the sciences of observation; or that if there was any difference, it was rather in favor of the first. Thus he possessed, as a mere boy, prodigious aptitudes for the science of numbers, and performed feats of mental arithmetic which set all his friends wondering; feats, which, if his recollections of his childhood are not exaggerated, must almost have fitted him to compete with the celebrated 'Calculating boy.' He, at the same time, exhibited other traits which seemed equally to foreshadow his addictedness to pursuits of an abstract nature. He loved solitude intensely, and while yet a youth was often absorbed in silent musing on subjects of speculation far beyond his years, and revolved the problems connected with them with precocious eagerness. He seemed in many directions to have so little power of observation, —to be subject to such diversion of the *outward-looking* faculties, by mental introspection,—that he was continually manifesting the most palpable and ludicrous ignorance of ordinary matters, and making the most awkward blunders in consequence.

On this point occurs an amusing passage in his Common Place Book (1812) in which he thus laments his want of curiosity:—

"By this means" he says, "I believe I lose more amusement, and suffer more inconvenience, than if I was indifferent to many dignified and excellent subjects of inquiry which I delight in. I have no relish for ordinary chat, which consists in the reciprocal gratification of the above passion; nor, consequently, for the company of a great part of the world, who have little to say that has anything but novelty to recommend it. It gives me no pleasure to be told who is dead, and who married, and what wages my neighbor gives his servants. Then, for the inconvenience, I am ignorant of the streets, and shops of the neighboring villages of the town where I live. I very often know a man, without being able to tell any more about his country, family, &c., than if he had dropped from the skies. Nor do I even know, unless I inquire and examine diligently and with design, how far it is from one place to another, what hour the coach starts, or what places it passes through. I am frequently forced to evade questions in a most awkward manner, from not daring to own, nor indeed able to convince any one of, my own incredible ignorance. If I had no uncle or aunt, I should probably have been ignorant of my mother's maiden name."

On the other hand, he exhibited at the very same time, in *other* directions, the keenest powers of observation, and looked on all natural objects with the most intense interest. He loved to wander in the fields, and there kept the eyes which were seemingly closed to artificial life, most vigilantly open. The peculiarities and habits of plants and animals, afforded perpetual scope for sagacious and delighted observation; and the strong taste which he thus formed for Natural History and Botany, he retained to the close of life.

"He learned," says the Memoir, "to read and write very early, and read with avidity; but his great delight was in the observation of nature. He would spend hours in the garden, watching the habits of spiders, taming young ducklings, and carrying them in his hand to pick snails from the cabbages, learning to distinguish notes of birds, &c. And to the results of these early observations he would often allude in after years."

Fond, to his latest day, of making experiments in grafting and training plants, now in his own garden, now in those of his friends, he produced sometimes ingenious, and sometimes grotesque *lusus naturæ*, in his attempts to improve, or at least to innovate on her. His biographer says:—

"He delighted in experiments on the culture of plants and trees; in budding, grafting, inarching, and other modes of propagating plants. His fondness for arboriculture indeed was a constant resource and agreeable relaxation; and his combinations of one species of plant with another on the same stem by 'approach-grafting,' made his grounds at Redesdale a very chaos of whimsical curiosities.

* * * * "Nec longum tempus, et ingens
Exiit ad cœlum ramis felicibus arbos,
Miraturque novas frondes, et non sua poma."

"The grounds of the friends with whom he stayed bear marks to this day of his enchanter's hand and knife; and his friends cherish these diversions of his multiform genius with careful remembrance, recalling his wise observations or ingenious conjectures as he tried his experiments, or perpetuated his various outrages on nature."

These varying aspects of his early character, as we have said above, might have made even a keen observer doubtful as to its ultimate destination.

The wonderful faculty for arithmetic seems to have died out early, and so signally, that when he went to school he was considered rather slow, and little better than "a dunce" in this

department. Nor, fond as he was of mathematics, did he ever attain more than a respectable knowledge of them; though throughout life he loved to put and to solve ingenious problems in arithmetic. The sudden disappearance of his arithmetical faculty is so amusingly related by himself, that we must give the account in his own words. As latent powers of other kinds were developed, it seems to have been absorbed, so to speak. It was like a plant choked by the growth of taller and more luxuriant plants around it, or like a flower of spring, which blooms, fades and dies down to the roots, and gives place to other flowers, which tarry for a later season; or like some springs in volcanic soils, which, after bubbling for a while, suddenly vanish under the consuming heat of the subterraneous fire. His words are:—

"There certainly was something peculiar in my calculating faculty. It began to show itself between five and six, and lasted about three years. One of the earliest things I can remember is the discovery of the difference between even and odd numbers, whose names I was highly delighted to be told; I soon got to do the most difficult sums, always in my head, for I knew nothing of figures beyond numeration, nor had I any names for the different processes I employed. But I believe my sums were chiefly in multiplication, division, and the rule of three. In this last point, I believe I surpassed the famous American boy, though I did not, like him, understand the extraction of roots. I did these sums much quicker than any one could upon paper, and I never remember committing the smallest error. I was engaged either in calculation or in castle-building (which I was also very fond of) morning, noon, and night; and was so absorbed as to run against people in the streets, with all the other accidents of absent people. My father tried often, but in vain, to transfer my powers to written figures; and when I went to school, at which time the passion was worn off, I was a perfect dunce at cyphering, and so have continued ever since. Thus was I saved from being a Jedediah Buxton, by the amputation, as it were, of this overgrown faculty. For, valuable as it is in itself, it would have been a heavy loss to have it swallow up all the rest. It was banished by a kind of ostracism, as the best of the Athenian citizens were, for the benefit of the community."

It is certainly a curious psychological phenomenon, almost as curious as one which occurred in the history of a friend of ours,—one of the most extraordinary men, both for intellect and attainments, we have ever met with. From his childhood he exhibited the most intense activity of mind. Having taught himself to read when only about four, he was early instructed in the ele-

ments of Latin; at about ten he commenced Greek, and had got prosperously on as far as the verbs, in *μι*, when he had an unlucky fall out of the window, and either the terror or the concussion frightened or knocked all the *Greek* out of him, but left him in other respects just as it had found him; all his Latin, and all he had learned besides, being unimpaired. He told us he had to begin the Greek Grammar over again, and plod on just as if he had never learned a word of it; till one afternoon, all of a sudden, his truant Greek came rushing on him, like a spring tide, and in a moment reinstated him in all his knowledge. This we can vouch for as a fact, and like many other abnormal facts in psychology, it is one which the psychologist ponders in vain.

The reflection with which Whately closes the above recital is no doubt a sound one; he was the richer for his loss; and as for the world, certainly it would have been a bad exchange, had he developed into another calculating machine instead of the Archbishop of Dublin.

But even if he had retained the tendencies to abstract speculation, which in some respects marked his childhood, so prevailingly strong was the practical character of his intellect, that we doubt whether they would ever have been much indulged beyond the limits which a vigorous common sense, perpetually asking the *cui bono*, and inquiring whether or not problems are capable of solution, or can be of any practical application, would have imposed. As it is, it is quite curious to see not only with what instinctive judgment, but with what repugnance he resiles from all mere subtlety, and especially from all those questions which he suspects to be beyond the reach or decision of the human faculties; sometimes, it may be merely from want of relish for subtle speculation, but much more frequently from having well revolved the nature and limits of the human faculties, and well surveyed the frontier line which separates light from darkness.

His imagination, which was abundantly fertile, partook of the practical character of his intellect, and took its proper place as a ministering power to his strong logic; it was used, in obedience to the maxims of Aristotle, and to the rules prescribed so severely in his own "Rhetoric," to illustrate and point an argument, never as a mere ornament. His images, for the same reasons, were seldom of a purely poetic character, or impressive for the beauty of the conception, but had that homely aptness which exactly

fitted them for *didactic* purposes. The fertility of this faculty was immense, and one is often greatly impressed with the extreme remoteness, and yet felicity, of the analogies which are seized for the illustration of argument. Many specimens, as happy as any that are to be found in his writings, are to be met with in the "letters" which are published in these volumes; and these, being compositions written on the spur of the moment, show how prompt, as well as how fertile this faculty must have been. We shall beguile the reader's way through this analysis of his intellectual character, as well as gratify ourselves, by appending a few examples.

"I have no hope of making converts of those who have grown up in bigotry; their "carcasses must fall in the wilderness;" but the rising generation may be kept untainted and brought into "a good land." It is vain to pour water on the center of a conflagration; but by keeping the adjoining roofs wet, the fire may be prevented from *spreading*."

Speaking of the danger and evil of *mobs* he tells us:—

"I mean by a *mob*, *a large collection of people of whatever* rank; for then they always heat like new hay, and are governed by passion instead of reason. I verily think five common laborers deliberating together would be more likely to adopt wise and temperate measures than five thousand gentlemen."

The following passage is worth citing for the light it throws on some of his own characteristics, as well as for its liveliness of expression:—

"You have known me too long not to know how harrassing it is to me to have to make up my mind on a hundred different points every day, instead of concentrating my mind on a single pursuit, which is to others the severest kind of labor. What is properly called *business* is the specific poison to my constitution, and I apprehend will completely wear me out in a very few years, especially from the want of long vacations to recruit. And what is most provoking is, that * * * rank, state, pomp, precedence, &c.,—are to me just so much additional plague. I would rather work with Paul at his trade of tent-making, or have to go out fishing with Peter. And a formal dinner party, even at Oxford, is a bore which I would gladly commute for nine and thirty stripes. I do not know that I have less vanity than the generality of men, but mine is all of a *personal* kind, (I do not mean in respect of bodily person), not connected with *station*. The *offer* of Archbishop was gratifying to my organ of approbation, the *acceptance* of the office is martyrdom."

Speaking of Irish party bitterness:—

"Here *parcere subjectis* is unknown. They are never weary of tyrannizing over the conquered. The very name of Orangeman is a sign. It is chosen *on purpose* to keep up the memory of a civil war, which every friend of humanity would wish to bury in oblivion. It is doing what among the heathen was reckoned an accursed deed, keeping a trophy *in repair*. The English would have too much, if not of Christian feeling, at least of good taste, to assemble in Paris to celebrate the battle of Waterloo. Here we parade Orange flags, and decorate King William's statue, and play the tunes of insulting songs under the noses of the vanquished, till they are goaded to madness; and it is curious that they are more studious to provoke than to disable their enemies. They are like sportsmen who preserve foxes on purpose to hunt them."

On one occasion, addressing the young clergy, he said:—

"My younger brethren, if at any time you find your preaching productive of good, and that your congregations value your exertions, beware of being puffed up, and losing your balance. *Self-respect is valuable and useful; but as there will be a sufficient growth each day, cut it close every morning.* And when, through the goodness of God, you are successful in your ministry, enter into your closet, fall down on your knees before the throne, and to the Lamb ascribe all the praise, the honor and the glory."

This we venture to think as effective a "charge" as has been often given in a sermon an hour long. Of anti-reformers he says:

"But some very good men think themselves *bound* to resist to the last all alterations, even should they be certain of ultimate defeat; some again are strangely blind to the state of things; and some are alarmed indeed, but alarmed like a horse in a stable on fire, which cannot be brought to submit to be rescued."

The following miscellaneous extracts we give at random:—

"'This is my body,' seems—standing by itself—to favor the Roman Catholics, but not conjoined with 'I am the true vine,' 'Behold the Lamb of God.' The intelligent study of the Bible tends not indeed to make men join our church, (there is too much of old animosity), but to reform their own; for the yoke of Rome may come to be nominally borne, and yet be but a shadow."

"I hope the 'learning' and the 'architecture' of the Tractites will not lead you any further. For myself, I cannot make any such exception. Their learning and their churches both I utterly dislike. As to the latter, the party is 'edifying' in the wrong sense of the word. Their continual effort is to fix on the building

of stone, the veneration (as a temple) which belongs properly to the congregation—"the living stones;" and their learning again tends continually to a substitution of paper currency for gold—an attention to human writers which gradually absorbs and supercedes the study of Scripture."

"There is an account given in the Roman historians of a man who had been proscribed under one of the Triumvirates, and to save his life, disguised himself by wearing a black patch over one eye. A good while after, when the danger was past, he took off the patch, but in vain; the sight of the eye had gone. This is a type of a great number of 'sincere and conscientious men,' (that is, men who have come to be 'sincere'); they have so long resolved not to see, that they have become blind!"

"One class—the ascetic—are for cutting off everything that may be a *snare*. They have heard of the 'deceitfulness of riches,' and so they vow poverty, which is less trouble than watching your motives in gaining and spending money. And so of the rest. But if you would cut off *all* temptations, you must cut off your head at once."

"Certainly we must reckon among the obstacles to the attainment of truth, presumptious speculation on what is beyond our reach. Instead of ploughing a fertile soil, a man breaks his tools in attempting to dig a granite rock."

"When the moon shines brightly, we are taught to say, 'How beautiful is this *moonlight!*' but in the day-time, 'How beautiful are the trees, the fields, the mountains; in short, all the *objects* that are illuminated; we never speak of the sun that makes them so. The really greatest orator shines like the sun, and you never think of his eloquence; the second best shines like the moon, and is more admired as an orator."

We give these illustrations not as the best, but the briefest. But such will be found in profusion throughout the volumes. Some of the analogies in the above citations, while they illustrate the fertility of his imagination, furnish specimens also of his wit, which is another quality which Whately possessed in an extraordinary degree. Indeed, his *bon mots*, happy repartees, and conversational pleasantries of all kinds, were so numerous, that many witticisms, and some by no means worthy of him, have been unjustly fathered upon him.

But here, again, his wit very rarely displays itself, *except* for the practical purpose of illustrating or enforcing some truth or sentiment. We hardly recollect in the whole course of his writings, a single ludicrous image that is introduced because it *is* ludicrous. It is handed in by his ministering imagination, simply as suggested

by the exigencies of the argument, and for the purpose of illustrating it. It is the great glory of these faculties to be so employed. This is their truest and highest use. They should, at least, adorn, if they do not enforce truth; they should be the condiments, and not the *pièce de resistance* of the intellectual feast.

Perhaps there never was a mind whose whole character, native cast, and acquired habits, better qualified it to be *didactic*, than that of Whately. To teach, was with him a passion; he evidently loved it, and some singular traits of this tendency of his nature are found in various parts of his correspondence. "Teaching," says Mr. Merivale, "was indeed the occupation most peculiarly suited to his powers and tastes. He had a remarkable faculty of drawing out the mind of the learner, by leading him step by step, and obliging him to think for himself. . . . He possessed a remarkable power of discriminating and analyzing the characters of those with whom he was brought into contact as a teacher." All this, no doubt, is true. He was so fond of teaching, that if he had not had human beings to train, he would have taught any living thing—vegetable or animal—that came in his way, just as he *educated* plants, or taught his dog "Sailor" to climb the trees in Christ Church meadows.

"One of the few survivors," says the memoir, "among his near connections, records some pleasing reminiscences of his manner of teaching in private. 'I can speak,' she writes, 'of his kind and patient way of instructing me when a girl, always saying, 'Do not adopt my opinions because they *are mine*, but judge for yourself;' and of his pleasant, playful way of correcting foibles. I used to scribble sadly as a girl; and he wrote me a letter, beginning in a clear hand: 'My dear ——,' and then a page of scribble impossible to read; ending with, 'now you see the evil of writing unintelligibly.' He cured me of shyness, too. 'You are shy,' he would say, 'because you are thinking of the impression you are making. Think only of the pleasure you can give to others, and not of yourself.'"

Inspired himself by the most single-minded honesty in the quest after truth, his next feeling, on finding it, was to "call his neighbors and friends together to rejoice," and participate in the discovery. He conveyed knowledge, however, in the forms suggested by the instincts of a truth loving, didactic intellect. As it is *light* which he seeks to diffuse—as his object is to instruct and convince—his style is clear, cogent, lucid; in a word, has the highest qualities of pure didactic writing. But it is seldom ani-

mated by anything like passion; his page never "thunders and lightens;" his eloquence is not of the kind that hurries the soul away in that torrent of argument involved with passion, which he has himself described accurately enough in his work on "Rhetoric," and which must ever be the soul of the highest eloquence. It may, perhaps, be said that the judicial character of mind is yet higher than that of the pleader, and that the charge of a great judge is better worth listening to than the speech of a great barrister. This may be so, and we are not denying it; but it still remains true that the most powerful as well as the most persuasive eloquence must be steeped in passion as well as in argument.

Yet no one could more willingly admit this fact, or has more keenly analyzed the reasons of it, than he has done in his work on "Rhetoric." In the chapter on "Persuasion," which we think is the most philosophical analysis of that process that is to be found in any work on rhetoric in our language (or perhaps in any), he shows that he knew most exactly the elements which, over and above mere argument, must go to form a high order of eloquence; and has insisted with great truth on the paramount necessity of a vivid imagination both to the orator and the historian, and its true uses in reference to the excitement of emotion.

If it be asked how it is that one who knew so well all the conditions of a more impassioned eloquence than his own, and who has illustrated them with a profusion of those telling illustrations which are so effective and popular an element of such eloquence, did not more signally attain it, when speaking or writing on subjects which fully admitted of it, our obvious answer is, that the very qualities which enabled him to give so just an analysis of it were hardly compatible with the temperament it demands. Hardly can *abandon* to passion be expected, when the critical faculty exists in such ascendency as to be capable of giving,—we do not mean during the access of passion, for that of course would be a contradiction in terms,—but at *any* time, a perfect analysis of the phenomena of it. By no stretch of imagination can we imagine Demosthenes able to give so good an exposition of the elements of his own eloquence as Aristotle, and still less can we conceive Aristotle delivering the Phillipics of Demosthenes.

But this characteristic of his writing is also partly due to that ascendency of the didactic tendency, of which these powers of sound and acute critical analysis were themselves the great

instruments. His love of truth, as we have said, was intense; his quest of it proportionably earnest, and his efforts to *communicate* it untiring. But we can hardly imagine him going into a paroxysm of passion about it, or exhibit as much energy in *persuading* as in *convincing* his hearers. Having clearly stated, acutely argued, amply illustrated, and earnestly, but never passionately, enforced his theme, he seems to say, like the mathematical lecturer who leaves his instruction to be received or not, *ad modum recipientis*, Q. E. D.; "He that hath ears to hear let him hear." When, as he deems, he has clearly proved his point, he appears to think his work is done, and that to go further, and enlist passion, would derogate from the dignity of truth. And though none can have more clearly enunciated the contrary than himself, in the above-mentioned work, yet in his writings and speeches we may see (what is indeed almost avowed in some of his letters), that he deprecates all impassioned writing and speaking, as nearly certain to cover *ad captandum* shallowness and clap-trap. But within the circle in which he moved few writers are more effective than himself. He is certainly one of the greatest masters of a pure didactic style that ever used the English language.

Yet it would be a great mistake to suppose that though thus calmly didactic in his style, and little apt or inclined to use the language of passion, he was indifferent whether the truth he loved was victorious or not. He was not like the ostrich who lays its egg in the sand, and cares not whether it be hatched or crushed. On the contrary, few men ever took more pains, or made greater sacrifices (pecuniary and otherwise) to diffuse and enforce what he deemed truth. In fact, he was the center, during no inconsiderable part of his public life, of what may be called a system of literary propagandism—in which he enlisted whatever talent or influence he could anywhere command—for the diffusion of the doctrines and opinions he deemed true. This was especially seen in the series of able publications called "Cautions for the Times," commenced in 1852, in which he especially sought to arrest the progress of those Tractarian doctrines against which he had early lifted up a warning voice, and to which he was all his life ardently opposed. A comparatively small portion of these 'Cautions,' it appears, was composed by himself; meantime he was everlastingly busy in suggesting topics, in corresponding

with the writers, in correcting MS. for the press—in a word, in all the drudgery of an editor without salary; or rather at considerable personal expense, instead of salary; all this obscure labor too, undergone at the cost of time and toil which might have enabled him, had they been been given to original works, to add considerably to his own fame. It was the same thing always; to *teach* in some way was his delight; if he had not time himself to teach, he was willing to go on a recruiting service to provide a teacher, and, as his correspondence in these volumes shows, to suggest to any writer whom he knew, and thought fit for the task, the truths which he wished to see advocated, or the errors he wished to be exposed, and even to sketch out for them plans which he had not leisure himself to fill up. Many amusing exemplifications of this feature of his character will be found in these volumes.

So anxiously did he look about for advocates of what seemed to him important truth, that a great portion of his correspondence (entailing a large amount of unrequited toil) was devoted to this object. We speak from personal knowledge, when we say that he often applied to those who he thought might be capable of serving the cause of truth, though but little or not at all known to him, and who were not then, and who never were, under obligations of any kind to listen to his suggestions, except such as admiration of his character and a sense of his courtesy imposed.

The moral and social characteristics of Whately harmonized with his intellectual idiosyncracy, and conspired with it to form that *tout ensemble* of originality which has been ascribed to him. His strong sense, vigorous logic, and earnest desire to set everything in noon-day clearness, his aversion for the obscure and over-subtle, corresponded with the love of truth, the candor, the openness, the abhorrence of concealment and reserve, the hatred of all affectation, and the impatience of finesse, which ever distinguished him. His very *brusquerie*, (which often gave dire offense) arose, in part, from his logical down-rightness. To prove his point was everything; and the *suaviter in modo* was often sacrificed to the *fortiter in re*. Though always a fair and candid reasoner, he was fond of pressing home his arguments, and, like Socrates, did not stand much on ceremony in reducing an opponent to extremities. At all events, he did not understand the art of the renowned duelist, who boasted that he could run his rapier

through his adversary's body with such exquisite skill and grace that no pain in the world was felt in the operation.

For the rough and unceremonious manners, however, which, (together with his dress), fixed on him at college the *sobriquet* of the "white bear," and which, though softened in the course of years, in a measure distinguished him through life, he accounts in a very different and amusing manner. These peculiarities, he assures us, were in part a recoil from a painful sense of bashfulness, amounting in his early days to sheepishness. Assuredly, to look at him, it was difficult to fancy this; yet it is by no means impossible. It is certain that the consciousness of great but as yet unasserted powers, especially if conjoined with awkward and ungainly exterior, is apt to be accompanied with *mauvaise honte.* But few surely, have had the courage to quell it as Whately did; that is, by violently assuming the contrary quality, and putting on an air of affected effrontery!

"In the pages of his Common Place-Book," says his biographer, "he records how at last he determined to make a bold effort, and care nothing for what others might be thinking of him, and, to take his own words, 'If he must be a bear, to be at least as unconscious as a bear.' And the effort succeeded. The shyness passed away. . . . The distressing consciousness which made life a misery was gone."

Few, however, who study his character attentively will be satisfied that this is a full account of the matter. They will attribute the trait in question quite as much to the original tendencies of his nature as to any artificial assumption of effrontery. His high animal spirits, his powerful *physique*, his strong love for all athletic sports (in which he much excelled), his keen sense of the ludicrous and riotous enjoyment of it, his self-reliance, courage, and independence, do not permit us to suppose that there was much difficulty in overcoming any early tendencies to an inconvenient *mauvaise honte*, the existence of which, however, as a temporary phase of character, is quite compatible with all these qualities. Indeed he looked back with such pain on the torments of his youthful shyness, that he does not scruple to say in one of his letters, "supposing another world to be out of the question, the best thing that could be done for an intensely shy youth would be to shoot him through the head."

A curious instance is given of the strangely false impression his rough manners were capable of conveying:—

"He could be most touchingly gentle in his manner," says an old friend, "to those whom he liked, but I recollect a lady saying she would not for the world be his wife, from the way in which she had seen him put Mrs. Whately (the object all his life of his tenderest affection), into the carriage."

One of the most amiable traits of Whately was his strong attachment to his friends. His, for the most part, were lifelong friendships, and as ardent as they were durable. He not only gives his friends all the admiration they deserve, but often indulges in affectionate exaggeration, not merely of all their virtues, but, (which is not so often seen), of their intellectual endowments. So far from being actuated by any little envy or jealousy, he often speaks in terms in which it is impossible to go with him. If we cannot say, as some one said of him, that all his "geese are swans," it may certainly be said, that his "swans" are always *raræ aves*, and superior to all other swans. His tutor and lifelong friend, Copleston (no doubt a man of mark, but in our judgment much inferior to himself), becomes a sort of demigod; and Whately, who certainly was never given to flatter, utters in the amiable innocence of admiring love, what in other lips would be gross adulation.

His ordinary disregard of etiquette and conventionalism, his impatience of mere sentiment, and open contempt for many kinds of human infirmity, (in all which he reminds us of Johnson), often gave an impression of deficient sensibility, not diminished by the seemingly hard-hearted way in which he spoke of casual charity. But it would be most fallacious to infer any want of real sensibility from any such premises. It is evident that under that shaggy exterior, there beat a heart of great kindliness and even tenderness, capable of most generous, self-sacrificing attachments, and of the largest charity. Of his strong friendships we have already spoken, and the letters in these volumes abundantly confirm it, and so far from being chargeable with want of benevolence, whatever his hatred of ordinary mendicancy may have been, he was charitable even to munificence. Though he is said to have thanked God he had never given a half-penny to a street beggar in his life, yet it is certain that he gave away no less a sum than £40,000, and that he had (what the reckless giver to street beggars never can have), guarantees for its right appropriation. It seems also that he never saved anything for his family

out of his large Episcopal revenue, leaving them only his private fortune, and the provision of a life assurance.

It must be granted that his sayings about casual charity sound rather harsh. But any one who reflects must be convinced that it would be, on the whole, a most happy thing for the world if *everybody* could be induced to acquiesce in Whately's maxim. The best that can be said for him who gives to a beggar, of whom he knows nothing, is that he is 'tossing up' for the chance of doing a good action or the contrary; or rather (considering what the statistics of mendicancy are, and the proofs they furnish that what is given simply goes, for the most part, to the encouragement of hypocrisy, indolence, drunkenness, and all vice), he acts as he does with a hundred chances to one that his gift will not be real charity. Alms so given are, in general, so much of the fund of general benevolence taken from the deserving and given to the worthless. He who gives should know to whom and for what he bestows his bounty; and it is a part—and not the least part—of real charity to take guarantees that its alms are rightly appropriated. If a man cannot personally administer his charity himself, he should take care to provide proper almoners to disburse it. Whimsical and paradoxical as is one of Paley's reasons for sometimes bestowing casual charity, namely, that we may not become *selfish*—that is, that we are to give a penny to another (no matter whether it will prove a curse or blessing), just that we may get a penny worth of *something else* for ourselves; even this is better than the carelessness with which the 'charitable man' often throws about his bounty; when he has almost certainty that it directly goes to the increase of the sum-total of vice and misery. Whenever it is possible, though it may not always be so, he should endeavor at least to ascertain what is the real claim of the case on his charity, if only to secure for it a better relief than his eleemosynary half-penny. But the world would be much better if it could be got to act rigidly on Whately's principle; it would abolish two great evils—the abstraction of such large sums from the capital of benevolence just to subsidize vice, and that steeling of the heart of charity which is at last the result of being often deceived.

As Natural History was a favorite study with him, and gave ample scope to his remarkable quickness and accuracy of observation, so the intellectual and moral varieties of our nature seem to

have afforded him equal pleasure. It is a kind of knowledge which is oftener seen in the statesman than the philosopher; or if possessed by the latter, belongs principally to those who, like Whately, conjoin with their philosophy a large intercourse with the world. Johnson possessed the same skill in moral anatomy in still greater perfection. It is easy to see that the annotating of 'Bacon's Essays' was a task Whately took up and prosecuted *con amore*. The same tendency of mind is visible in the correspondence, which abounds in shrewd remarks, showing how sharply he had observed human nature, both in individuals and classes. His lecture on the tendencies of the several 'Professions' also indicates the same traits.

The closing scenes of Whately's life are deeply touching. He preached the Gospel yet more eloquently in his death than in his life. Like other Christians, he had doubtless been slowly growing for many years; growing in knowledge, in self-knowledge, in humility, in charity, in elevation of thought and feeling; and yet we doubt not, that during the last year or two, and especially during his long and most painful illness, he struck his roots deeper and shot up higher, than during any other equal period of his life. He was like some plant of slow growth, but vigorous nature brought out of the chilly atmosphere into the hot house; in that fierce heat, instead of drooping, and being consumed, he burst into tropical rapidity of growth, and put forth an unwonted luxuriance of leaf and flower. It is a phenomenon not seldom witnessed in the last scenes of a Christian's life. The process by which the child of dust is made meet for "the inheritance of the saints in light," by which this feeble plant is fitted for transplantation into the paradise of God, is at best a slow one. Long years of patient culture on the part of the Great Husbandman are expended upon it. Little by little, amidst many and humiliating lapses and failures, with line upon line, precept upon precept, and slow corrective discipline, are the habits formed and consolidated, by which man is fitted at last to be his own master in the highest sense; to become a denizen of any world to which the summons of God may call him; with all those habits of soul towards God and all God's creatures, which shall make him safe in the presence of all temptation; kept upright, not by bands and ligaments of outward constraint or artificial support, but by internal forces of moral equilibrium, by an intellect that *cannot*,

and a will that *will* not, see things other than they really are; and *therefore* safely poised from within; no statue of a man, set on a pedestal, and which, if a cramp or a nail give way, is at the mercy of the first breath that blows, but a living, conscious agent, with the power of adopting internal vital forces to the maintenance of equilibrium. The process, by which experience applied to self-discipline is to form that *character*, of which heaven will not be ashamed, and which will not be ashamed to find itself there,—which will be greeted, not shunned, by the "innumerable company of angels, and the spirits of the just made perfect,"—is at best a slow one; nor is any mortal able (as Butler says) to to pronounce, in relation to any individual, how long it is needful for the painful discipline to be continued in order to secure the result. The process by which the image of God is thus imprinted on the soul and wrought into it, is not like that which produces a photograph, struck off in a moment, impressed on perishable material, and laid in fading colors; but like that by which a great sculptor, slowly and by an infinite succession of touches, calls out of the solid marble a form of faultless grace and beauty; the tedious work of years indeed, but worth all the labor, for it is to be immortal.

Though the change be in general so slow as often to elude observation, even in him who is the subject of it; or can only be discerned, and not always very clearly even then, by taking some years to enable us to make the comparison, yet there are times in the history of many Christians, and more frequently in the closing scenes of life, or under the pressure of long-continued affliction, when the religious character seems visibly to dilate and grow; when the soul seems, as it were, putting on the 'beautiful garments' of its transfiguration, before 'the body of its humiliation' has ceased to invest it, and to be unfolding its light Psyche wings before it has thrown off the chrysalis. Nor perhaps need we wonder that so signal an advance is reserved till the time of departure is at hand; often, indeed, it must be so. For some of the most important changes that are to be effected on the character of many a good Christian man before he can be said to be 'perfected,' must be deferred to the time when he has no work to do in active life. The very qualities which need the pruning or the fostering of that hour, may be so intertwined with other qualities essential to success during the active period of life, that

they 'grow together' as long as that period lasts. Energy is apt to pass into unseemly self-assertion, zeal to betray into anger or bigotry, self-reliance and independence into pride, arrogance, and contempt of others; yet these qualities cannot be spared in the battle of life; when that is over, and when they can no longer be used here, they are purified from alloy. The excesses and defects observable in many, however inseparably connected with qualities which fit them to be of great service in the world nevertheless need to be corrected like every other, and so, when a man's life-work is done, and he can be *himself* the exclusive object of discipline, God seems to bring him into His inner school, and teaches him, as no other teacher can, and by strange methods, the remaining lessons which, once learned, are to issue in freedom from all painful discipline forever; teaches him above all, that childlike resignation to the will of God, that absorption of soul in Him, that deep, ineradicable trust in His goodness, in *spite* of His chastisements, which are the hardest lesson of all. When those *habits* of soul are fully formed, then shall we be enabled to bear, what it is clear we cannot bear *here*, cloudless happiness and never changing prosperity.

In the case of the good Archbishop, it is not difficult to believe that several traits of his character, which though allied to virtue, and 'leaning to virtue's side'—perhaps inseparable from his energetic nature, and even serviceable in the work he was called upon to do in the world—needed the 'refiner's fire' before the 'Refiner' himself (according to the beautiful image of the prophet), saw his own perfect image there, after which he might let the fire slacken and the furnace go out for ever. Certain it is, that the picture which his last days present to us is a very impressive one. The 'strong man' was now become 'as a little child;' patience, gentleness and humility had their 'perfect work;' and above all, he fully realized and bore his testimony to the practical value and reality of those great truths of the Gospel, which in all of us, while we are in health and prosperity, are too apt to shine as a clear, cold light in the understanding, without kindling a proportionable flame in the heart.

We insert a brief extract from the records of his last days. Mr. Dickinson writes: "His sufferings increased each day, and he felt very painfully his inability to come into town for the discharge of business. His 'uselessness,' as he called it, was the

especial trial to his active spirit. One day early in August, when I went out to see him, on my entering his study, he looked up, and said, with tears in his eyes, 'Have you ever preached a sermon on the text, 'Thy will be done?' How did you explain it?' When I replied, 'Just so,' he said, 'that is the meaning;' and added, in a voice choked with tears, 'but it is hard, very hard, sometimes to say it.'"

We again quote from the memoranda of Mr. Dickinson, who constantly took notes of an illness so affecting to all Whately's friends. In these notes we see the veil of reserve somewhat lifted, which hitherto had made the inner life a mystery—hidden even from those nearest to him.

"Through life he had stood forward as a powerful defender of the Christian faith, and now it was to be shown to all how the same simple trust in Christ as the only Saviour, which has smoothed so many a humble death-bed, was to be the stay and staff of the mighty thinker and writer while crossing 'the valley of the shadow of death.'"

"Sept. 12. This morning I read for the Archbishop the 69th Psalm. His appetite grows worse. When his dinner was brought he said, 'Oh, how I loathe the thought of eating!' Yet in these little things he shows very strongly the habit of forcing all his inclinations and actions under the rule of reason; and he is so considerate for others—so fearful of giving trouble. When he could scarcely bring himself to eat, he said to his attached servant, who seemed distressed, 'But pray do not think I am finding fault; I know the fault is in myself.' It has been extremely difficult to move him from the sofa to the bed; and it is touching to see how he tries to control the outward expression of suffering, lest he should cause distress to those about him. While the perspiration streamed down his face from agony, he restrained every murmur of impatience, and said to us repeatedly, 'Yes—yes, I know you do all you can. The pain cannot be helped.' During the night I heard him often murmur, 'Lord have mercy on me. Oh, my God, grant me patience.'"

"Sunday, Sept. 13. This morning he looked as though his last hour was drawing near. About one o'clock a friend standing near said, 'This is death.' Supposing that all was over, one of his daughters stooped down and kissed his forehead. He awoke, and in the confusion of sudden waking said, with a little nervous

irritation, 'Oh, you should never wake an invalid.' Some time afterwards he sent for his daughter, and said, 'I am afraid I spoke petulantly just now. I am very sorry for it—I beg your pardon.' If ever the fruits of the Spirit—'gentleness, patience'—were manifest in any one, they are in him. In the afternoon, he was rather better. Archdeacon West, his domestic chaplain, came out and read prayers with him. He said, 'Read me the eighth chapter of Romans.' When Dr. West had finished the chapter, he said, 'Shall I read any more?' 'No, that is enough at a time. There is a great deal for the mind to dwell on in that.' He dwelt especially on the thirty-second verse: 'He that spared not his own Son.' In the very last sermon he had preached, he had enlarged on this as the conclusive and satisfactory proof that afflictions were sent not in anger, but in *love;* and he now recalled, for his own comfort, the turn of thought by which he had so lately tried to comfort others. He has had this chapter read to him frequently during his illness.

"On the 14th of September he received the Lord's Supper. It was a scene never to be forgotten by any who witnessed it. A calm, earnest attention and solemn peace rested on his face; he spoke little, but evidently the soul was communing with God. A little before this, one of his friends in attendance on him had remarked that his great mind was supporting him; his answer, most emphatically and earnestly given, was, 'No, it is not that which supports me: it is *faith in Christ.* The life I live is by Christ alone.'"

"Sept. 15th. This morning his son read to him the 4th chapter of the 2d of Corinthians. He followed the chapter with tears and silent prayer, and at the end pronounced an emphatic amen. Towards evening he said, 'This has been a terrible day. Oh, the tenacity of life is a great trial. Do pray for my release, if it be God's will.'"

"Sept 16th. After breakfast I read to him Hebrews xi. He was much moved, and when I ended said with emphasis, 'Every chapter in the Bible you read seems as if it were written on purpose for me.'"

"Sunday, Sept. 27th. In the evening there was a hemorrhage from the leg. A messenger was immediately dispatched into town for the physician. He lay quite calm and still, asking, after ten minutes, 'Is the bleeding still going on? I hope so.' He

evidently felt thankful, believing that his release was near. The bleeding had greatly abated before the doctor arrived. When he came in he said, 'I think we can stop it, my lord.' The Archbishop answered, in his old natural manner, 'I am afraid so.' When the doctor left, having succeeded in stopping the hemorrhage, the Archbishop said to me, 'Is not this a very unusual hour for the doctor to come?' I answered, 'Yes, but we sent for him expressly when the bleeding began.' And he replied, 'Oh, you had not told me of that. Did you suppose I was afraid to die?'"

"Oct. 1st. This morning he listened attentively while several Psalms were read to him. He was moaning very restlessly, in the night, and once when I went to his bedside and asked, 'Is there anything you wish for, my lord?' he answered, 'I wish for nothing but death.' It was on the night following this that another of his chaplains was watching beside him, and in making some remark expressive of sympathy with his distressing sufferings and helplessness, quoted the words from Phil. iii, 21, 'Who shall change our vile body:' the Archbishop interrupted him with the request, 'Read the words.' His attendant read them from the English Bible; but he reiterated, 'Read *his own* words.' The chaplain, not being able to find the Greek Testament at the moment, repeated from memory the literal translation, 'This body of our humiliation.' 'That's right,' interrupted the Archbishop, 'not *vile*—nothing that He made is vile.'"

With these records of his last hours before us, we have no heart and as little need, to ascertain the exact whereabouts, the precise latitude and longitude of his theological position. Whether, as is often said, his religion was of a too intellectual cast—whether any of his opinions had a 'cold, rationalistic tendency'—whether he was a bigot to a 'narrow and rigid orthodoxy'—whether he was deficient in the 'æsthetic' elements of religion, and wanting in 'reverence'—whether he was semi-heretical in the article of the Trinity, we shall not discuss; but one thing is plain, that he had now got not only beyond 'cold rationalism,' but beyond 'cold orthodoxy' too; and that if religion, with him, (doubtless from his undemonstrative nature), had the appearance of dwelling in the head only, it is plain that it had taken full possession of his heart.

XXVIII.—THE CHANGE OF THE SABBATH FROM THE SEVENTH TO THE FIRST DAY OF THE WEEK.

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I consider the Sabbath as holding coeval relations with revealed religion in its progressive development among men, and with the Church of God, in its gradual growth from its first simple rudiment in Eden, to its present organized forms in the world. Religion without a Sabbath tends towards an abstraction without realization; and a *Church* without a Sabbath would soon become as poor as a Church without a ministry, and as diseased as a Church without morals. As they at first existed, religion and the Church had but few and simple forms; and, correspondingly, the Sabbath was doubtless a day of few and simple duties. As, however, the ages rolled by, these things of God took on more and more of organized form and movement. The Sabbath in Eden must have been a sort of "Love Feast" between God and His two unsinning worshipers. Afterwards it took on sacrifice with confession and prayer, as the offering of sinners to a withdrawn, because offended Maker. Later still, it gathered into itself a fuller and more richly significant ceremonial, as the specially enjoined worship of a chosen and peculiar people. And, finally, it became the day of the Lord of the whole earth, full of the memories of all His works in creation, in redemption and in grace; and hallowed to the honor of His name, Father, Son and Holy Ghost; a day for their most exalted and effective fellowship with the heirs of Heaven, the candidates for an eternal Sabbath. From the first, the Sabbath has been God's assessment on the time-estate granted to man; God's tax on time, to remind man that the whole of it is His gift; God's token to man that He fills *all* time with items for a future reckoning. All knowledge comes from God to man under the two conditions of *space* and *time*. All knowledge is a cognition of what exists some-*where*, and of what has happened some-*while*. In *space*, then,

God has manifested Himself to man by innumerable signs. The universe is full of His tokens, insomuch that the most "invisible things of Him, ever since the creation of the world, even His eternal power and Godhead," as well as the numberless visible manifestations of His wisdom and goodness, "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." In *time*, also, He hath not left Himself wholly without witness. The year and its seasons, day and night, speak something of Him and for Him. But their voices are silent and easily unheeded. Somewhat more special, more personal, in its appeal to the conscience and religiousness of man was evidently needed, that God might not be practically banished from the memories of time, and thus the more certainly become virtually unheeded amid the wonders of *space:* something whereby a God in time, as well as a God in space, might make himself seen and heard and felt, as the rightful possessor of all things and the rightful Lord of all times; and as claiming distinct, conscious, willing tribute from them all. And so, as soon as He had made the *worlds*, He made the *Sabbath* also; that, thus, every week of time, as well as every work in space, might speak for its Maker and show God every-*where* and every-*while;* a God ceaselessly manifest in time, as well as ubiquitously manifest in space; and making time and space, "and all that in them is," constant and effective monitors for Him, that He might not seem wholly withdrawn from sinners, but that, through the curtains of darkness, which He had drawn before His awfully holy face, there might be, every-where and always, light enough to show whither He had retired, and what were His ulterior designs of wisdom and of mercy towards His offending ones. The Sabbath is a revelation of *God* for all *time*, leading man towards a *Saviour* for all *eternity*. But, if these things be so, if the Sabbath be not an exclusively Mosaic institution, but a day for Christian observance as well, then another view of the subject comes forward and presses its claims upon our consideration. Why, when the Mosaic economy closed, and when Christ ushered His Church into a new dispensation, was the *seventh* day of the week passed over, and the *first* observed in its stead? This question presents a difficulty which is important, not because it cannot be removed, but because it has furnished one of the most plausible of the reasons urged by the opponents of the perpetuity of the institution. By its very plausibility, it

has caught and satisfied many minds less disposed to think justly than to live carelessly. I do not mean that the respectable and distinguished authors, who have written against the perpetual obligations of the Sabbath, such as Archbishop Bramhall, Bishops Prideaux and Cosin, Richard Baxter, Archdeacon Paley, and Dr. Hessey, are less disposed to think justly than to live carelessly. All these, and others of their class, were doubtless in general very just thinkers, and very Christian livers; but, for that very reason, their opinions, when erroneous, have been all the more mischievous in their influence on the many who neither think justly nor live carefully. And, that their opinions on this point *are* erroneous, can, I think, easily be sufficiently demonstrated.

Dr. Paley, who expresses the views of this class of authors, in his usually clear and terse style, contends: that "if the command by which the Sabbath was instituted, be binding on Christians, it must be binding as to the *day*, the *duties*, and the *penalties*—in none of which is it received." Now, if there was ever a case in which a generally sound thinker was led by his theory to think unsoundly, we have it in the brief sentence thus quoted. I venture to say that the position here taken is unsound in every one of its three points. To take them up in their inverse order:

1. The *penalty* by which, under the Mosaic law, the Sabbath was enforced, was temporal death. But is the penalty by which a law is enforced, inseparable from the law itself? By no means. Take, for illustration, the common law on murder. Its penalty has generally been temporal death; and yet, in various instances, government has abolished this penalty, and substituted the milder one of imprisonment, leaving the law itself untouched and in full force. This shows that law and penalty are not inseparable; and that a law may be perpetually binding, while its penalty is discretionally changeable. Illustrations of this might be multiplied; but a single one in addition will be enough. The penalty by which the fifth commandment was enforced under the Mosaic law, was temporal death. The disobedient child was ordered to be stoned. (Deut. xxi: 18—21; Mark vii: 10). And yet, we are under this commandment. Are we under its ancient penalty also? Must our irreverent and disobedient children be stoned to death? No: because the precept and the penalty have no invariable connection. We may live under the one as a permanent

duty, and yet not lie under the other, as an unchangeable sanction. The same, then, is true of the fourth commandment. This precept, and the penalty by which for a time it was enforced, are not inseparable. That penalty was peculiar to the Mosaic law. The precept was of primal authority and of perpetual obligation. When, therefore, that penalty was dropped with the dispensation to which it belonged, the precept lived on, as common to all dispensations. Under the Gospel, Sabbath-breaking, like all other sins, is threatened, not with present temporal, but with future eternal pains.

2. Again: the *duties* assigned to the Sabbath are, in like manner, separable from the Sabbath itself: or rather, some duties may be assigned to it under one dispensation, and yet, be separated from it under another. There are, indeed, Sabbath duties which are of universal importance and obligation; duties which always *have*, and always *will* go, with the day: and herein Dr. Paley's position is right in *principle:* but, manifestly, *other* duties, temporary both in their importance and in their obligation, may, from time to time, have been assigned to the day; and yet, when the exigency that called for these duties had passed by, these duties themselves may have been dropped without touching either the divine authority or the universal obligations of the day itself. This, in fact, has been the case; and herein Dr. Paley's position was wrong in *application.* Under the patriarchal dispensation, the duties of the Sabbath were few and simple; keeping the day holy in memory of God's work of creation; with, doubtless, prayer and sacrifice in memory of man's work of transgression. Under the Mosaic dispensation, these duties were increased. Is the keeping of the day holy, in memory of God's work of creation, with prayer and sacrifice in memory of man's work of sin, were added a commemoration of the Exodus, or of God's work in bringing his chosen people out of Egyptian bondage, a multiplication of typic sacrifices and symbolic purifications, the weekly ceremony of the shew-bread, and other things which it is not necessary to mention. Under what may be called the dispensation of Tradition, while the Mosaic economy was "waxing old," a long list of ceremonies was brought in by superstitious formalism, until the Sabbath became encumbered with "a yoke," which, as the first Apostolic Council observed, "neither they nor their fathers were able to bear." And finally, under the Christian dispensation, still other duties have been added; a

commemoration of God's greatest of all works, that of *Redemption*, or the bringing of His "peculiar people" out from the bondage of sin; the preaching of the Gospel of the Crucified; and the administration of His ordained sacraments. All this shows, that the duties to which from time to time, the Sabbath may be appropriated, are no inseparable parts of the institution itself. When, therefore, it is remembered that the Mosaic economy was emphatically one of ceremonies, typical of something better to come, it is easy to see that when that something better had actually come, and when that typic dispensation had thus been brought to its close, all its ceremonial duties would, of course be dropped, or, that what was spiritual and permanent in the ancient divine institutes might pass into the Christian Church without carrying with it what was merely typical and temporary; and that what was thus typical and temporary might be dropped without impeding the onward progress of what was spiritual and permanent. To this latter category belongs the Sabbath. Like the Church itself, the principle of a ministry, and the essence of worship, *this* is common to *all* dispensations; it passed with the Church from the old economy to the new; but the numerous rites of typic sacrifice, of symbolic purification, of the shadowing shew-bread, and all else whereby the traditionists had made "the yoke" of ceremony too "grievous to be borne," belonged to but *one* dispensation. With that one system of sign and ceremony, they all began, continued and ended. These special duties fell off from Christianity as blossoms fall when the fruit is come. The blossoms of symbol and type, and shadowy forms dropped, and left a simple spiritual Christianity to ripen amid the restful airs and the devout breathings of a correspondingly simple and spiritual Sabbath, and we can only wonder that writers of generally great acuteness, like those to whom we have alluded, should have been so biased by their theory as to lose sight of a distinction so palpable as that which has now been pointed out.

3. We come then to the third point assumed in the position before us; that if the command by which the Sabbath was instituted be binding upon Christians, it must be binding as to the day. This is the main point which I propose to examine in the present article. As a stated season of holy rest, the Sabbath is in the nature of things separable from the particular day in the seven on which it is to be observed. The institution consists of two parts:

a holy rest to God, and the divinely fixed day on which it is to be kept. The former, a holy rest, constitutes the body of the ordinance, and never has been abolished. The latter, a divinely-fixed day for its observance, is, as we have already shown, a necessary adjunct, but in the nature of things susceptible of change, by either express or virtual divine authority from one day in the seven to another. "Six days" says the fourth commandment, "shalt thou labor and do all thy work; but the seventh day is the Sabbath," or rest; the two words Sabbath and rest being synonymous. Six days of this world's labor, followed by a seventh for holy rest is, so far as *time* is concerned, the main point of order and proportion sought to be established. Six days shalt thou labor; on the seventh day thou shalt rest. This point of order and proportion has never been violated. Whether the *day* has ever been *changed*, is the inquiry now before us; and to this inquiry I proceed through some preparatory observations.

1. The first which I have to offer is this: Christ never, either expressly or by implication, *abolished* a divinely instituted Sabbath.

Many writers indeed upon this subject assert that the Sabbath is abolished under Christianity; but this is an assertion without proof, and it is a plain begging of the very question here at issue. The argument of these writers when reduced to form is this: Whatever was peculiar to the Mosaic economy as typical of something then to come, was abolished by its successor, the substance of all these types. The Sabbath was one of those peculiarities of the Mosaic economy; being simply a type of spiritual rest in Christ, and of final rest in heaven. The Sabbath, therefore, as such a type, was abolished by Christianity, the predestined substance of all the old typic forms and observances. The only Sabbath now is spiritual rest in Christ, anticipation of eternal rest in heaven. Such being the form of the argument, our logical refutation of it is, a simple denial of the minor premise in the syllogism. The Sabbath was *not* a peculiarity of the Mosaic economy. It was *not* therefore *abolished* by Christianity. As I have already shown, it was not only pre-Mosaic but ante-Patriarchal. Like marriage, it was one of the oldest of all religious institutions, as old as the human race itself, and like marriage it has never been abolished, by any implication, with a vanished economy. To say that the Sabbath was a peculiarly *Mosaic* institution, is to make an assertion without proof; and I venture

to add, is to make an assertion contrary to proof. To say therefore that the Sabbath is *abolished* is simply to argue from a mistaken theory; and to plead, however unintentionally, in the interest of those who love not holy restraint. The peculiarities of the Mosaic economy which were abolished by Christianity were such as the Passover, the Feast of the Weeks, the Feast of Tabernacles, the Aaronic High Priesthood, the annual atonement, the various offerings and oblations, the shew-bread, the ceremonial purifications, the special penalties by which certain laws were enforced and the burdens of Jewish tradition. These and the like were allowedly parts of a temporary ritual, mere "shadows of good things to come," which all vanished when the substance came and stood in their place. But the Sabbath, like marriage, the elements of moral law, the covenant of grace, the Church, the principle of a ministry and such like, were permanences of religion before Moses was born. Under the Mosaic economy they were more distinctly recognized and more fully developed; and under the Gospel they were modified or at least purified from the corrupt glosses of Jewish tradition; but they were never done away. *Expressly* abolished no one pretends that they were. *Implicitly* abolished no one can show them to have been. And this is as true of the Sabbath as it is of marriage, the moral law, the covenant of grace, the Church or the ministry.

It is true that two pre-Mosaic institutes were also abolished by Christianity. The one was *animal sacrifice*, which was evidently instituted immediately after the fall; since we learn that "*by faith* Abel offered unto God a more acceptable *sacrifice* than Cain"—*faith's* firstling of the flock being more acceptable than *unbelief's* "first fruits of the ground." The other was *circumcision*—the ancient form of the seal affixed to God's covenant with Abraham, when specially foreshowing to him the coming of the promised *seed*. But there are plain reasons why these two pre-Mosaic institutes in particular should have been done away with under the Gospel. When Christ came and offered the only true availing sacrifice for sin, by dying "the just for the unjust that He might bring us to God," of course all animal sacrifice forever ceased; and when the promised seed was born, and God's covenant of peace received its living guaranty, the old bloody seal of circumcision lapsed into the new unbloody seal of baptism; so that thenceforward, *Christ* became, objectively, the *only* sacrifice, and baptism outwardly the *only* circumcision to all believers. But as a

pre-Mosaic institute, the Sabbath found no such obliterating antitype under the Gospel, nor, on earth will it ever find such. It will never vanish till it lapses into its *only* antitype, the Sabbath in Heaven.

2. I observe, secondly, that Christ in His teaching undeniably recognized the *Decalogue*, not excepting the Fourth Commandment, as the great moral law of God. Thus, when the "lawyer," with the crafty design of inducing Christ to draw an invidious distinction between the different parts of the Decalogue, asked Him, "Master, which is the greatest commandment in the Law?"—He gave an answer which unquestionably included the whole divine code: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment, and the second is like unto it: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets." That is: "the *first* and great commandment" is a scriptural summary of the first *four* in the Decalogue; it regulates our duty to God; and it was designed to cultivate and secure to Him *supreme* love; and "the *second* like unto it" is a similarly scriptural summary of the last *six*. It regulates our duty to *man;* and it was designed to cultivate and secure to him *universal* benevolence. In giving this answer, Christ in effect addressed the designing Pharisee thus: "You wish me to exalt one part of the great moral law above another, in order that you may entrap me in my speech; but I make no such distinction. They are *all* commandments from God; they lie at the foundation of His revealed will both in the law and the prophets. They are all therefore, of equal authority, and thus far of equal importance."

Thus too when the "young man" asked him, "What shall I do that I may have eternal life?"—He replied, "Keep the commandments:" and when the youth inquired "Which?" he specified the last six. But why? Because there were none other? or because these were more important than the first four? or because obedience to the second table alone would insure to him eternal life? Clearly no: but because He wished to assure the youthful querist that he had failed of keeping even the lowest parts of the law, and that he was in imminent danger of losing eternal life by depending for it on any of his own doings. Hence when he boasted, "All these have I observed from my youth," Jesus

rejoined—"One thing thou lackest: go thy way, sell whatsoever thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in Heaven; and come, take up thy cross and follow me." The spirit of the whole passage is this: "Keep *all* the ten commandments as of equal authority, but trust for eternal life to the keeping of *none;* for instead of really obeying *all*, you have left out the very spirit of what the *lower* table requires—true practical love for your poor fellow-creatures; and you have failed in *this*, because you have much more failed in that which the *higher* table demands, supreme love to your great Creator, God, as enjoined, and to be expressed in keeping the first four precepts of this law."

Instead then of intimating that the divine authority of the Sabbath was drawing to an end, we see that Christ undeniably recognized the ten commandments, the *fourth* as well as the rest, as the great moral law of God, that imperishable code upon which, as their foundation, rest all His other requirements, whether in the law or in the prophets. Would He have done this if He had designed to abrogate the original authority and obligation of the Sabbath? Clearly no. He knew that the precept which enjoins the observance of that day had been enrolled and repeatedly enrolled with the other nine in the Decalogue, amid every solemnity of circumstance, and every peculiarity of distinction, which could mark its inseparable connection with that indestructible law; and therefore, if He had not intended to transmit the institution untouched in its divine authority to the Christian church, He would have expressly abolished it. He would have erased it from the Decalogue. He would have pointed out its mere casual connection with that universal law. And thus He would have delivered all succeeding generations from the danger of falling into a serious error concerning the religious institutes of His Church. But this He has not done. On the contrary, He has clearly recognized the authority of the entire Decalogue. It is, therefore, evident that He intended to transmit the Sabbath, with its essential character unimpaired, to the observance of the Christian church; and to leave it in its original genius untouched, among the institutes of His own Gospel kingdom.

3. I observe, thirdly, that Christ, as if for preservation, *purified* the Sabbath from the corrupt, or superstitious glosses of Jewish tradition.

"Is it lawful," said he "to do good on the Sabbath days, or to

do evil; to save life or to kill?" This was said while His enemies were "watching Him whether he would heal on the Sabbath day, that they might accuse Him." Then said He "to the man which had the withered hand, stand forth. And when He had looked round about on them with anger, being grieved for the hardness of their hearts, He saith unto the man, stretch forth thine hand. And he stretched it out; and his hand was restored whole as the other." Mark iii, 2–6.

Again: while they were watching Him, as a man which had the dropsy stood before Him in the house of "one of the chief Pharisees," "Jesus spake unto the lawyers and Pharisees, saying: Is it lawful to heal on the Sabbath day? and they held their peace. And He took and healed him, and let him go; and answered them saying: Which of you shall have an ass or an ox fallen into a pit, and will not straightway pull him out on the Sabbath day? And they could not answer Him again to these things." Luke xiv, 1–6.

Once more: when the "woman which had a spirit of infirmity eighteen years, and was bowed together and could in no wise lift up herself," came before Him on the Sabbath day, Jesus said unto her, "Woman, thou art loosed from thine infirmity. And He laid His hands on her; and immediately she was made straight and glorified God. And the ruler of the synagogue answered with indignation, because that Jesus had healed on the Sabbath day. And he said unto the people, There are six days in which men ought to work; in them, therefore, come and be healed, and not on the Sabbath day. The Lord then answered him and said: Thou hypocrite! doth not each one of you, on the Sabbath, loose his ox, or his ass from the stall, and lead him away to watering? And ought not this woman, being a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo! these eighteen years, be loosed from this bond on the Sabbath day? And when He had said these things, all His adversaries were ashamed; and all the people rejoiced for all the glorious things that were done by Him." Luke xiii, 11–17.

And finally: when another man, "which had his hand withered," came under His notice, "They asked Him, saying, Is it lawful to heal on the Sabbath day? that they might accuse Him. And He said unto them, What man shall there be among you, that shall have one sheep, and if it fall into a pit on the Sab-

bath day, will he not lay hold on it and lift it out? How much, then, is a man better than a sheep? Therefore, it *is* lawful to do well on the Sabbath day. Then saith He to the man, Stretch forth thine hand. And he stretched it forth, and it was restored whole like the other." Matt. xii: 10–13.

Now, in all these cases, it is plain that the Jews, by the corrupt glosses of their tradition, had loaded the Sabbath with burdens not imposed by the spirit of the fourth commandment; and that Christ was authoritatively taking these burdens off, and showing the true meaning of that precept. As the law of the Sabbath, it enjoined a suspension of all ordinary week-day work, for the purposes of a holy rest; but they had superstitiously added a prohibition of all works, even of necessity and mercy. And yet, practically, they violated their own traditions, and only used them as a snare for Him, whom they wished to entrap and bring into condemnation. Hence, His righteous anger at their hypocrisy; and hence His authoritative correction of their perversion of the Sabbath day. Manifestly, he was not preparing to abolish the institution, but was merely disabusing it of their perversions, and purifying it for His own simple and spiritual dispensation.

One further instance of this manifested design of Christ, demands a more particular examination. It is recorded in Mark ii: 23–28, and parallel passages: "And it came to pass, that He went through the corn-fields on the Sabbath day; and the disciples began, as they went, to pluck the ears of corn. And the Pharisees said unto Him, Behold why do they on the Sabbath day that which is not lawful? And He said unto them, Have ye never read what David did when he had need and was an hungered and they that were with him? How he went into the House of God in the days of Abiathar the High Priest, and did eat the shew-bread, which it is not lawful to eat but for the Priests, and gave also to them that were with him? And He said unto them, The Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath. Therefore the Son of Man is Lord also of the Sabbath."

This has been regarded by writers against the perpetual obligation of the day, as an intimation that the Sabbath was to be done away under the Christian economy; that Christ disregarded the requirements of the law on this point, to show that the Sabbath was coming to an end. A careful attention to the passage, however, will show that it has a directly contrary bearing.

If, then, Christ had intended, by His actions, to intimate the transitory obligations of the Sabbath, why did He not directly violate its unquestionable requirements by encouraging His disciples to engage in their ordinary week-day work on that day? Why did He not go out fishing with them on the lake? If He had been practically legislating against the perpetual obligations of the day, why did He merely allow His disciples to do that for which He could cite a good scriptural precedent? Why did He simply allow that which was necessary to keep His disciples from perishing by hunger? This surely does not look like an intended slight upon an originally divine but now dying ordinance.

But let us study a little the whole transaction. It is but a simple story. The indigent disciples of Christ, while following Him, probably on His way to some synagogue, happened to pass, on a Sabbath, by a cornfield, and being destitute of other means to satisfy the strong demands of hunger, they ventured to pluck and eat some of the ears as they passed. For this, as an alleged breach of the Sabbath, the Pharisees rebuked them. Christ, however, at once vindicated their conduct by reference to that of David, on a well-known occasion, and then added the important words—"The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath: therefore the Son of Man is Lord also of the Sabbath."

By this language, as well as by His more immediate vindication of His disciples, He taught the Pharisees that their traditions had put a wrong construction upon that part of the law which defined the duties of the Sabbath under the Mosaic economy; that these duties, being intended to secure the benefits of the institution, were all to be performed on all ordinary occasions; but that, on occasions extraordinary, when necessity or mercy required, any one of those duties might be dispensed with, while yet the real sanctity of the day remained unviolated; and that He, as "Lord even of the Sabbath," was clothed with full authority to define and limit its duties, and to decide the manner in which, amid changing circumstances, it ought to be observed. The Pharisees seemed to think that "man was made for the Sabbath," or that the Sabbath was the superior in importance; and that therefore *all* its duties must be performed under *all* circumstances, whatever might be the consequences to man: but He taught them that "the Sabbath was made for man;" or that man was superior in importance; and that, therefore, when his real welfare would

be sacrificed by a strict observance of *all* the duties of the day, an omission of any of those duties was no violation of its sanctity.

Viewed in this light, the passage virtually recognizes the institution of the Sabbath at the era of the creation of man. "The Sabbath was made for man; and not man for the Sabbath." That is: Man was not created for the purpose of honoring the Sabbath; but as soon as created, the Sabbath was made to promote the best welfare of man, and, therefore, to his best welfare it must ever be held subordinate. It was made *for man;* not for any particular nation, but for *the race;* for the spiritual benefit of *mankind.*

On such an occasion, then, and with such a teaching, when Christ calls Himself "Lord of the Sabbath," instead of intimating thereby that he was about to exercise His Lordship in *abolishing* it, He rather declares His intention to continue it in all its essential authority, and divine obligation. The very act of authoritatively regulating the duties of the Sabbath, while it doubtless implies an authority to abolish the institution, was really an authoritative recognition of it. As the authority was *not* used in *abolishing*, its effect was to *confirm* the ordinance. It was, in fact, an official purification from abuse of that, which Christ designed to retain for proper and perpetual observance. The notion that He was merely defining the manner, in which a Jew ought to observe the day, while at the same time, He intimated His intention to set it aside under the Gospel, is manifestly at variance with the spirit of the passage. If "the Sabbath was made for *man*," we can see no reason why it should be confined to the *Jew;* but we can see abundant reason why it should be stripped of Jewish *abuse*, and left to stand, in its divine simplicity, purity and blessing, to the end of time and for the universal church.

But before I shall feel entitled in my further argument on this point to use the force of the foregoing demonstrations, there is one passage which demands a few moments attention. I have said that Christ never, either expressly or by implication abolished a divinely instituted Sabbath. To this it may be answered—"Though he never did so personally, yet has he not done so by a divinely inspired Apostle? Does not St. Paul say—"Let no man therefore judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of an holy day, or of the new moon, or of the *Sabbath* days, which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ?" Col. ii:

16, 17. And does not this show that the Sabbath as well as meats and drinks and holy days, and new moons was, as part of the shadow of things to come, abolished by the actual coming of the things of which they were a shadow? And of this answer great use is made by those who contend for the abolition of the Sabbath, as a mere temporary, shadowing ordinance, belonging exclusively to a temporary and shadowing economy. But to my mind it is an answer of merely seeming force.

That the things specified in Col. ii: 16, 17, and many others in the Mosaic economy, were all parts of one great divinely significant shadow, cast forward on the then coming age, by the as yet unseen body of Christ, we see by looking at Heb. viii: 5, ix: 9, x: 1, where we find that the High Priest, the holy of holies, and the sacrifices under the law, as well as "meats and drinks and diverse washings and carnal ordinances" belonged to this one great shadow from the past upon the future; and so far as that shadow limned the then viewless Christ, it of course terminated in Him. There can be no shadow upon the spot where the substance itself is standing. But though many things in the Mosaic economy were thus shadowy, yet was there in it nothing permanent? Was it *all* shadow? Did the Church and the ministry and the Sabbath and worship, all literally and wholly die out when Christ came? And did he literally and wholly begin all things new? Or were there permanent as well as transient elements among the pre-Christian institutes? Who doubts the truth of the latter part of this alternative?

What then is the force of this passage, Col. ii: 16, 17? I will endeavor as briefly as possible to show.

Attentive readers of the book of Acts and of the Epistles are aware that when Christianity began to make converts from among the Gentiles as well as from among the Jews, there at once sprang up between these two elements a strenuous controversy. The strife of parties widened into what may be called the Pauline and the Jacobian divisions of the Church; the Christian and the Judaizing teachers with their respective disciples. This was the earliest and the saddest breach upon the harmony and peace of the young Christian household. It led to the calling of the first Christian Council; and it left very distinct marks on the Epistolary writings of St. Paul.

Those who represented the Judaizing tendency demanded the

continuance in the Christian Church of certain features of their ancient ritual. They recognized the abolition of their Passover and their animal sacrifices; at least we hear nothing of their insisting on these things as matter for Christian observance; but they demanded the continuance of circumcision, of the distinction between things clean and unclean, and of the *seventh* day as the day of the Sabbath. They seem not to have objected to the *first* as the day for Christian worship; but they contended for the continuance of the *seventh* as the true day of the Sabbath. Against this whole demand, however, St. Paul, as the Apostle of the Gentiles, strenuously set himself. So far as they sought to enforce those Ritualisms on the Gentile converts, he would not "give place" to them, "no, not for an hour." He was willing that the Jewish converts should, if they preferred, continue for the time, their own observances in connection with the Christian; knowing that those observances would of themselves vanish when those so fond of them should have passed from the stage: but the moment they attempted to "compel Titus" or any other Greek "to be circumcised," or to Judaize in any other respect that "they might glory in his flesh,"—in his conformity to their carnal ordinances and their fading Ritualism,—the Apostle stood up and repelled the attempt. Circumcision, meats clean and unclean, holy days, and *seventh* day Sabbaths, had now become matters of indifference; and Jewish disciples might observe or neglect them as they pleased, so long as such things interfered not with the living reception of the vital truths of the Gospel. But those who would force such Judaism on Gentile Christians, he treated as "false brethren unawares brought in that they might spy out our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus that they might bring us into bondage." To such he "gave place by subjection, no not for an hour;" that the truth of the Gospel might continue with the Gentiles in unencumbered purity and power.

These remarks show the state of the question as it affected the *Sabbath*. What the Jewish converts wished was—to continue the observance of the *seventh* day with all its traditionary burdens. St. Paul was willing that they themselves should, for the time, continue such observance, so long as they refused not to join with other Christians on the now *first* day of rest of the Church; it was a matter of indifference, and therefore he would not insist on its non-observance: but he would not have it forced upon the

Colossians, nor on any other Gentile disciples. "Let no man therefore judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of an holy day, or of the new moon, or of the *Sabbath*" as a *seventh* day ordnance; that day is no longer the day of the Church; the *first* has come in its place, and no follower of Christ shall be compelled to observe any other day.

Such is evidently the true reading of this passage, placed in the light of St. Paul's own Epistles, and of contemporary Church history. The notion, conceived by some, that St. Paul taught, that under Christianity there was to be no distinction between one day and another is manifestly unfounded. He undoubtedly taught that the *seventh* day and other days in the Jewish Ritual had become to the Jewish converts matter of indifference; and that of these converts one might esteem one of his days above another and another "esteem every (such) day alike," with liberty to each to be "fully persuaded in his own mind;" and he as undoubtedly taught that to the Gentile Christians all those days of the old economy were matters of no obligations: but that the Christian Church was to have no day of divine rest, no weekly hallowing of one day above another—there is not a shadow of evidence in all of his Epistles. On the contrary he recognized the change from the old seventh, to the new first day of the week for all Christian purposes of holy time.

These comments might be amplified; but amplification is needless. It is enough simply to refer to St. Paul's own discussion of the subject in the fourteenth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, in the eighth chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, and in the first eleven verses of the fourth chapter of the epistle to the Galatians.

4. And now, having shown that Christ never, either expressly or impliedly, by Himself or by His apostles, abolished the Sabbath, as a weekly divine rest unto God; but that, on the contrary, He distinctly recognized the Decalogue, including the precept of that rest, as the great moral law of Jehovah; and that He authoritatively purified the institution from Jewish corruptions, as an ordinance to be observed in its true spirit; I proceed to speak more directly of the change of the day.

I have already said that the Sabbath, as a holy rest unto God, is distinguishable from the day, on which it is observed. To show this more clearly, however, I remark; that it is possible to bring

the holy rest upon different days of the week, even while keeping the most accurate account of time.

Let two Christian circumnavigators leave the same port on the same day, and pass round the globe in opposite directions; let each observe the Sabbath with the strictest accuracy as to time; and finally, let them meet together at the port of their departure: they would find, at meeting, that the Sabbath of the one was two days asunder from that of the other; the one having gained, and the other having lost a day, by the contrary directions in which they sailed. This is not mere theory. It has been put into fact. An English ship, some years since, touching at Pitcairn's Island, in the Pacific, on *Saturday* according to its reckoning, found the islanders keeping *Sunday*. The reason was that the ship and the islanders had reached the island by sailing in opposite directions. Each had observed accuracy in the calculation of time; each was right in the day observed as Sunday: and yet each observed it on a day different from that of the other. They had practically effected a change in their day of rest. Again; There is some reason for believing that the *original* seventh day, counting from the close of Creation, was changed at the time of the Exodus from Egypt. The account of the giving of the manna in Exodus xvi, is at least compatible with the supposition that the Israelites were acquainted with the *existence* of the Sabbath, but had become, amid the idolatries of Egypt, careless of *the day*, on which it was to be observed. The fourth commandment as given on Mount Sinai, shows that the Sabbath was originally observed on the *seventh* day, in remembrance of God's work of creation; but when that commandment was repeated, nearly forty years afterwards, it appears that the institution had been more specially enjoined on that people in commemoration of their deliverance from Egyptian bondage. "Remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the Lord thy God brought thee out thence, through a mighty hand and by a stretched-out arm: *therefore* the Lord thy God commanded *thee* to keep the *Sabbath* day." It is worthy of observation, that Moses here says, not the *seventh* day, but the *Sabbath*, the day of *rest*. It is possible, indeed, that the day then observed as a Sabbath, was coincident with the original seventh day of the week; but it is quite *as* possible that, by a divine intimation to Moses, the day commemorative of their deliverance from Egyptian bondage was

fixed on a *different* day of the week. In truth this supposition would account more easily than that suggested above, for the doubt, which evidently disturbed the minds of "the rulers of the congregation," when they found the people gathering, on a particular day, a double portion of the manna. They "came and told Moses," as if they supposed a mistake about the day had been made. Then Moses "said unto them; this is what the Lord hath said; to-morrow is the holy rest of the Sabbath unto the Lord." On the ground of this supposition, then, it follows, that while, under the Patriarchal dispensation, the Sabbath was observed on the *original* seventh day, in commemoration of God's rest from His work of creation; under the Mosaic economy it was observed on a *new* seventh day, commemorating still the work of creation, but taking also into remembrance the new and special work of delivering a nation from ignoble servitude; suggesting thus the probability, that, by a still further change under the Christian dispensation, it would be observed on a yet different day of the week; a day not unmindful of either the glorious work of creation, or the providential work of a people's deliverance, but commemorative especially of the divinest of all works, the gracious work of *redemption;* at once a new moral creation, and a deliverance from the bondage ot *sin* and *death.* In this view, each of the three grand dispensations, under which the Church of God has existed, will be found to have its own day for the Sabbath, and its peculiar reason for that day:—the proportion of time divinely ordained for a holy rest, viz., every *seventh* day, keeping up under *all* dispensations, the memory of the primal creation; and the different days, successively fixed for that rest, keeping up also, under *each* dispensation, the memory of each particular work of the divine ordainer.

5. The day, then, for the divine rest being changeable, and having possibly been changed before the introduction of Christianity, let us now look at the reasons why a still further change should have been made, when the Church again passed from an old to a new dispensation.

At the opening, then, of the Christian economy, the whole state of the Church underwent a revolution. In some way, or to some extent, almost every thing was changed. The Mediator was changed, Moses for Christ. The law was changed, the Levitical for the Evangelical. The High Priesthood was changed,

that of Aaron for that of Jesus. The promises were changed, those which looked primarily to temporal blessings, for those which looked directly to eternal. The worship was changed, the stately and splendid rites of the Temple, for the simple and spiritual forms of the Church. The Sacraments were changed, the Passover for the Lord's Supper, and the bloody seal of circumcision for the unbloody laver of baptism. The whole dispensation was changed, that of the law and works, for that of "grace and truth." With all these changes, then, every thing else made thus new, is it wonderful that the *day* of the Sabbath also was changed? The *mode* of its observance was certainly changed. What wonder, then, if we find a change in the *day* also for its observance?

But as the main part of the reason why the *day* for the divine rest should have been changed, the events, which gathered around the closing work of redemption, were such as to render the change in the highest sense proper. Why was the divine rest originally fixed on the *seventh* day of the week? Because on that day God *rested* from His work of creation, and ushered in the first age, or dispensation of His Church. And if, as we have seen it to be probable, when the Sabbath was revived in the wilderness, the old seventh day was changed for a new, of what event was this new day of rest commemorative? Of that wonderful event, in which God rested from His work of breaking the yoke of Egyptian bondage, and thus ushered in the second age, or dispensation of His Church. On what day, then, and in commemoration of what event should the Christian rest have been fixed, but the day and the event, in which the Lord rested from the work of His new and spiritual creation, the work of delivering mankind from the thralldom of *sin*, and thus ushered in the third age or dispensation of His Church?

That this is one satisfying reason for the change of the day of rest, will appear evident when we consider the superior importance and glory of the work of redemption over that of either the creation of the world, or the redemption from Egypt. For, in all these works, the agent was the same. The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments furnish abundant proof, that the Son of God was the agent by whom the world was created, and who led His Church out of bondage towards the promised land. He, too, is the agent by whom the work of our redemption from

the bondage of sin and death was achieved. In a weekly commemoration therefore of all these events, the same Being is honored. But in the first two, part only of the character of God is unfolded. In the last, the whole of that character is displayed, and that in its most glorious effulgence, and especially in those attributes, which most nearly concern us as sinners. Moreover, by the work of creation, man was merely brought into being: and by the redemption from Egypt, a little people, only, was delivered from temporal bondage. But, by the work of our redemption, man is brought into a new and spiritual being, and a world redeemed from the bondage of sin and death. The work of creation, is, moreover subject to change and decay. The very earth which we inhabit shall be changed, and all "the works that are therein, shall be burned up:" and the redemption from Egypt, was but a transient type of the infinitely greater redemption from sin and death. But this work of our redemption, shall be gathering to itself, and around the character of God, brighter and brighter glories, forever. In the unchangeable grandeur of its beneficence, it shall stand through all eternity, the marvel of angels and of men. With the fullest propriety, therefore, was the day on which Christ "entered into his rest," from the labors of redemption, the day of His resurrection, the *first* day of the week, thenceforward set apart as the day of the weekly divine rest unto God, a memorial to the end of time, of the grandest and most blessed of all the works of Jehovah. It stands at the head of its dispensation, as each of the other days stands at the head of its own; commemorating a divine trinity of works, and honoring the Holy Trinity of God.

This, however, is not the whole of the reason which we are now considering. Other events of peculiar significance stand around the close of the great work of man's redemption. We see there the crucifixion and the entombment, the cross and the grave! And these, immediately preceding, and completely filling the old *seventh* day, render it as unfit for a Christian Sabbath, as that resurrection of which I have spoken, renders the *new first* day appropriate to that divine rest. From the beginning, the divine rest was a *festival*, a day of *holy joy*. But on the old seventh day the crucified body of Jesus lay in the sepulchre, and His infant church uttered its low, sad wail, "wrapped in its swaddling clothes" of fasting and of mourning. From that moment

it became a totally unfit day for the celebration of a weekly and joyful holy rest. On the next, however—the glad *first* day of the week,—Jesus rose, by Divine power, from the dead, and reanimated His wailing church to joy and gladness, and from that moment the *first* became the only fit day of the week for the celebration of this feast of rest, both on account of the preëminently joyful event which happened on it, and because of the preëminent glory of the work which it commemorates. No "joining together" by the ministry of God has ever more earnestly bidden man to beware of "putting the twain asunder." This was the reason why the first Christians never observed the old *seventh*, but immediately began to keep the new *first* of the week as their peculiar religious day. From the mass of ancient authorities on this point, it is needless to quote at length. Two will suffice. In his epistle, Barnabas, who lived in the apostolic age, writes thus: "We joyfully celebrate the eighth day," that is the first of the week, "in memory of the resurrection of our Saviour; because it was on this day that He rose again:" and Ignatius, the martyr, the disciple and friend of an apostle, "would have us honor this day of the Lord, this day of the resurrection, as the most excellent of days."

6. And now that we have looked at some of the *reasons* for the change, let us attend a moment to the *warrant* for it.

I have already intimated that when the day of the divine rest has once been fixed by divine authority, it requires the sanction of the same authority to effect a change. I have also intimated that this sanction may be given in either of two ways: by express *precept*, or by divine *example*, and approbation. I have still further remarked, that so far as we know, the original act itself, of the institution, was by *example*, and not by precept. *God's resting* for example to man, was itself the divine power that "blessed the Sabbath," or feast of *rest*, and "hallowed it" for all coming ages. Now that we have no express precept for the change, is readily granted: and the reason why we have not, so far as such reason is needed, will soon be given. But we have divine *example* and approbation, equivalent in authority to express precept; and these are the example and approbation of *Christ himself*, the supreme law-giver of Christianity. The time during which His crucified body lay in the grave, was in great part, that of the seventh day: and for the whole of that day His disciples were in

deep fasting and mourning. Thenceforward that day was never regarded as a proper day for Christian observance. But the *resurrection* came! and by it, as a divine example, Christ "entered into His" final "*rest*," and hallowed the first day as a true Sabbath for all after ages. By His continued example, also, He still further hallowed the change. Hence, "on the *first* day of the week, when the doors were shut, where the disciples were assembled for fear of the Jews, came Jesus and stood in the midst, and said unto them, Peace be unto you. And when He had so said, He shewed unto them His hands and His side. Then were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord." Their enemies sought their lives; but He came among them on that blessed first day, and gave them the "peace" of a diviner Sabbath, than even that of the first morning to man: a peace, sealed by the blood of redemption, from His hands and His side; by the labors and the love, the work and the heart, of a suffering and a conquering Saviour! Hence, "after eight days again," the *next first* of the week, "His disciples were within, and Thomas with them. Then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace be unto you. Then saith He to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand and thrust it into my side; and be not faithless but believing. And Thomas answered and said unto Him, My Lord and my God! Jesus saith unto Him, Thomas, because thou hast *seen* me, thou hast believed." Thomas, absent from Jesus, doubts: so all disciples while far from a Saviour, are prone to doubt: but Jesus, the manifested God-man, divine though wounded,—Jesus, present to Thomas, drives away his doubts and taking him to the bottom of His divinely healing wounds, gives *him too* a Saviour's Sabbath, a "Peace of God passing all understanding;" and through him, sends down a sacred rest for *us*, for *all*, who "seeing not, yet believe, and rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory," in an unseen but never absent Jesus. And hence, weeks later still, on the first day of the week, the day of Pentecost, the disciples again "were all with one accord in one place," and then Jesus, the divine dispenser of all heavenly gifts, shed down on His assembled church the promised Comforter, the fullness of the Divine Spirit, with all the marvels of that most glorified Sabbath, —a divine rest, now sacred to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, gathering into itself the memory of the three great works of the

Trinity, and pouring forth for Christians the fullness of His manifold grace.

Thus by His *example* did Jesus hallow the *first* day of the week, as a divine rest to Christians, throughout the evangelic age, and by the authority of a God, *sanctioned* the change so made.

And what He thus gave, in and through His inspiring *example*, His apostles kept and perpetuated, in and through the example of their inspired *practice*. Hence, during the ministry of Paul, the disciples following the now clearly indicated will of their master, "came together on the *first* day of the week, to break bread," and to listen to the preaching of the Gospel. Hence, the Corinthians, in their evidently stated assemblies for Christian worship and instruction, were directed to "lay by in store, on the *first* day of the week," a provision for those saints, whom persecution was making needy, and who were thus to taste some of the first fruits of that bounty, which Christian charity early learned to consecrate, by association with that day of joy. And hence, finally, the divine John, when he was about to receive the revelations of Christ, "was in the spirit, on *the Lord's day*;" the day of the Lord's resurrection from the dead, the *first* day of the week, a day already grown into notoriety and crowned with its appropriate name.

In all these facts we have satisfying proof that the first day of the week was, immediately and uniformly after the resurrection of Christ, set apart as the weekly divine rest of the Christian Church; and thus set apart with a decided expression of the divine sanction. For the author of this change was "the Lord of the Sabbath" Himself. And to show that His sanction was regarded as authoritative, His example was at once and everywhere followed by those inspired apostles, who were His agents in setting in order the affairs of the new dispensation. The Christian assemblies on the first day of the week, were honored by the repeated presence of Christ, and by three of His most solemn acts; the issuing of His final and full commission to the Christian ministry, the manifestations of His Deity to doubting Thomas, and the outpouring of the spirit on His chosen twelve. And the day thus set apart, was signalized by the conversion at one time of three thousand souls, by the administration of the Lord's Supper, and by the preaching of the Gospel. The old seventh day, the Temple and the Synagogue were indeed

occasionally noticed by the apostles as the times and places for the Jews' assemblies, and as affording fair opportunities for bringing their countrymen to a knowledge of the Gospel: but they were never honored as the times and places of Christian assemblies for their own peculiar rites and worship; these were always on the new, the *first* day of the week. Now, I ask, why was all this? Why was the old seventh day thus dropped; and the new first day thus adopted and thus consecrated? No other satisfying answer can be given than this: that the facts, which have been mentioned, constituted a clear utterance of the *divine sanction*, removing the divine rest, from its old, unfit, and now obsolete day, to its new, appropriate, and henceforth hallowed *first* of the week.

Then, again, I have already mentioned the divine *approbation*, as concurring with the divine *example*, in the utterance of this sanction. Some instances of that approbation have just been given: but there is another set of facts carrying the same import.

When God originally instituted His divine rest, He "*blessed* the Sabbath day," as well as "sanctified it;" or made it a blessing to *man*, as well as holy to Himself. So, too, when he became "God, manifest in Christ," and, in that capacity, re-purified the institute, he repeated the instruction; "The Sabbath was made for *man*," for a blessing to the race. In beautiful accordance with this, the institution, since the resurrection of Christ, and as observed on the first day of the week, has been blessed as a season of the richest and most copious mercies to the Church and to the world; and that, just in proportion as a right sanctification of the day has prevailed. There can be no doubt, indeed, that the Lord's day has been awfully abused, just as the Sabbath of the seventh day was; and that, by two opposite extremes of perversion; directly, by the wantonness of the dissolute, and indirectly by the burdens of the over-strict. It is a trite remark, that the best things, are susceptible of the worst abuse; and it is a truth justly appreciated by the candid, that the abuse of a thing is no argument against the thing itself. The remark applies even to that best of things Christianity, and to the fearful abuses of it, by the wickedness of the world on the one hand, and by the blindness of the Church on the other. The evils hence resulting, are God's judgments on the sin of the world, and on the blindness of the Church; and, at the same time, God's proofs that

both the Church and the Sabbath are his institutes; since "the gates of hell," with all their outpourings of the floods of darkness and of hate, never have prevailed, as they never shall prevail, against either, in the truths and the blessings, which their right use bears to a needy race. It is, moreover, an interesting fact, that the evils, resulting from both extremes of abuse, are ultimately identical. The dissolute and the over-strict, have ever seen the same stream of mischiefs flowing in their track; the former criminally inviting that stream, the latter weakly unable to prevent its rush. In the prophets' time, the ungodly willfully turned the old Sabbath, into a day of voluptuousness and of traffic; and in the times of the Pharisees, the heavy burdens, which they imposed, but which they attempted not to "lift with one of their fingers," drove the worldly, through very weariness, into the same perversions In later periods also, those trained in the school of King James's "Book of Sports" for the Lord's day, and those disgusted with the severe austerities of the Scotch kirk, filled the weekly rest with equal profaneness, and made it as much of a worldly holiday, as it has ever become in either infidel or papal Paris. When I speak then of the Christian Sabbath, as a blessing to the Church and to the world, I speak of it as received in its true spirit, and as sanctified to its right end; and looking at it in this reception and sanctification, I repeat, the Sabbath of the first day has ever been blessed as a season of the richest and most abundant mercies to the Church and to the world. On this day, more specially than on any other, has God refreshed His Church by the outpouring of His spirit, and blessed His word to the salvation of unnumbered multitudes, and set forward toward their ultimate triumph, the kingdom and the glory of Christ; and through this day, as through a consecrated channel, has He poured upon the world more temporal benefits than the world will ever thank Him for, or can ever number. If, then, as I think it has been clearly proved, the Sabbath as a divine rest, is an ordinance of perpetual obligation, designed for observance under the Christian, as well as under the Mosaic economy, the fact now mentioned is an undeniable and protracted utterance of the divine approbation of the *change* of the Sabbath from the seventh to the *first* day of the week. Either this change has been sealed with full divine approbation, or we must admit that, for eighteen hundred years, God has bestowed

marked honor and blessings on an act, in which the whole Christian Church, in the most favored age of the world, have agreed together to alter a fundamental divine institution. The latter part of the alternative is an absolutely inadmissible supposition: the former part is, therefore, true. The change of the divine rest from the seventh to the *first* day of the week had originally the *sanction* of Christ, and has ever since worn the seal of His divine *approbation.*

7. But one question further still calls for an answer. I have shown that the Sabbath, as a holy rest, is unchangeable; but that the day, on which it is observed, is changeable, and under divine sanction has been actually changed.

I have also stated the reasons for this change and given the warrant under which it was effected. But here arises the inquiry; if there was to be a true Sabbath under the Christian economy, and if the day for its observance has been changed from the seventh to the first day of the week, why is there no mention of this in the writings of the New Testament, no precept enjoining and no comment accrediting the change?

To this question, which after all presents the main difficulty of the case, I reply: No precept enjoining the change and consequently no comment recognizing the fact was given in the New Testament, evidently because the divine wisdom saw that it was not best to issue such a precept. And this, looking below the surface of things, appears to be wonderfully and beautifully clear.

The Jews as the remnant of the chosen people had long been in outward covenant with God, and for long generations the subjects of his wonderful dealings. It was therefore ordained that they should have the first and a full opportunity for embracing their Messiah and the salvation which he brought. Hence his first proffers of eternal life were to them, and hence his Apostles were restrained from turning to the heathen, so long as there appeared the shadow of a hope that any further and considerable number of the Jews could be persuaded to receive the Gospel. But against this Gospel, and against the Messiah whom it revealed, they were exceedingly prejudiced. Look at the whole history of his life, and see how often they were enraged against him for what, under their bondage to tradition, they considered violations of the Sabbath; and how eager they were, for those

supposed violations, to put him to death. What, then, would have been the effect on their feelings towards him, and on the question of their final salvation, had he, by express precept, ordered a change in the day, of their superstitiously cherished institution? Judge by their conduct towards him on the occasion of his saying "the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath;" when the consequence of infringing, even under the pressure of necessity, on one of the duties, connected with the institution by the law of Moses, was to draw forth against him their bitterest persecutions. Judge by the analogous case, growing out of the Apostles' attempt to set aside the obsolete rite of circumcision. The result was a serious contention and division among the Jewish converts, which could be composed by nothing less than an Apostolic council. Nothing can be more manifest than that if Christ, or the Apostles, under his inspiration had issued an express precept for a change in the day of rest, it would have embittered against them, and against the Gospel, the feelings of the whole nation, and thus have prevented the salvation of many, who afterwards repented and believed.

But look now at the actual operation of the mode in which the change was really effected. It was exactly analogous to the change in the passover for the Lord's supper, and of circumcision for baptism. No precept for the abolition of either the passover or circumcision was ever issued; but both were suffered to stand side by side among the Jewish converts with the Lord's supper and with baptism. Those converts were willing to observe the Christian rites, provided they might be allowed to observe also the passover and circumcision to which, even as manifestly dying ceremonies they still so eagerly and so fondly clung. They were similarly willing to observe the Lord's day, provided that they might be allowed to observe also their ancient Sabbath. All these things therefore they were, with a divine wisdom permitted to do, and with them, in doing so, the Apostles as *Jews* occasionally mingled. And thus the Christian sacraments and Sabbath, gradually, silently and inoffensively grew into credit and reverence; till finally the mighty judgments of God came over the unbelieving body of the nation, swept their loved city and their lingering tribes from their ancient resting place, and left their empty rites and silent Sabbath, without observers, to drop away

and vanish from the new and growingly vigorous fabric of the Christian institutes, which then, with their included sacraments and Sabbath rose peacefully and unopposed, into universal observance in the Church.

Instead then of finding matter for difficulty in the absence of express precept on this point, I find in it the strongest reasons for satisfaction. In this witholding of precept I see the very hand of God. I see in it bright traces of infinite wisdom and mercy, adopting a course by which the *day* of divine rest was changed consistently with the best, the eternal good of many of God's ancient people. The course was that of *silent change* initiated by the Divine Head of the Church, and perfected by the force of noiselessly growing and divinely guided custom; a change which fixed itself more and more securely in the affections and habits of the whole Christian church, till finally, before the Apostles were all called to their peaceful rewards, it became triumphant: The Lord's Day received its appropriate name: and Jesus stood at the head not only of His spiritual body, the church, but also of its purified divine rest, *the Sabbath of the first day.*

Let me now put into brief summary the points which I venture to think established on this whole subject.

The Sabbath as a divine rest was instituted immediately after the creation of man.

It was renewedly recognized and enjoined on a peculiar people in connection with some new and peculiar duties, at the time of the giving of the manna and of the law in the wilderness.

It was still further recognized and regulated by Christ when he began to prepare the world for his new and better dispensation of "grace and truth" as distinguished from all that was merely temporary and ceremonial under the old economy of typic law.

And it was finally transferred from the *seventh day* of the week, the time originally fixed for its observance, to the *first*, in memory of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, and under the sanction of his divine example and approbation.

The steps by which we reach and demonstrate this change may thus be recapitulated.

1. Christ never, either expressly or impliedly, abolished the Sabbath as a divine rest.

2. He did repeatedly recognize the decalogue, including the precept of the Sabbath as the moral law of God.

3. He purified the Sabbath as if for preservation, from the superstitious glosses of Jewish tradition.

4. Having done this, He spent His last *seventh-day Sabbath* in the grave; and then the mere *day* of the divine rest died with Him: and when He arose and "entered into His final rest"—His rest from the greatest of all His works,—the Sabbath rose alive with Him on the first day of the week.

5. Thenceforward neither He nor His disciples ever kept the seventh day as a divine rest to Christians; but all their Sabbath-keepings were on the *first* day of the week.

6. On the day of Pentecost, the first day rose into its highest eminence, a Sabbath hallowed by the outpouring of the promised Comforter on the new-born church, the thrice-hallowed Sabbath of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, commemorating the three divine works of Jehovah, the work of the prime creation of the world before all time; the work of the new creation of man by the redemption through Christ Jesus; and the work of the spiritual creation of believers unto eternal life by the Holy Ghost.

Now all these are works of one and the same God. Do all His acts then, as we have traced them, in adaptation to these successive works, mean nothing to our purpose? They mean everything. They mean just this: the Sabbath has never been abolished; the Sabbath has been officially purified; the Sabbath has been authoritatively changed. The mere *day* for its observance was transferred from the last of the old dispensation to the first of the new. There was no need of *words* to enact the change: it was legislated into practice by DIVINE ACTION. The Sabbath was first instituted by example and not by precept: by example and not by precept it was changed from the old and last seventh day of the grave, to the new and first of the resurrection. He who instituted and He who changed was one and the same. His example, both in instituting and changing, has one and the same power,—one and the same authority. The last Sabbath of the seventh day was the dying Sabbath of a "dead Christ;" the first Sabbath of the *first* day is the live Sabbath of the RISEN JESUS. He "entered into His *rest*" on it; and thus made it the Sabbath of the CHRISTIAN AGE.

XXIX—THE ARCHITECTURAL METAPHORS OF ST. PAUL.*

BY REV. J. S. HOWSON.

A previous paper on the military metaphors of St. Paul had especial reference to the middle portion of the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians. The present paper will deal with the *architectural metaphors* of the same Apostle, with prominent but not by any means exclusive reference to a passage in the third chapter of the second Epistle to the Corinthians.

The thought which lies at the basis of such papers is this: that in order to understand an ancient writer it is not enough to study his words, but necessary also to know something of the fashion of his times,—not safe simply to work from the dictionary, without some regard to the records of Monumental History,—without some effort to reproduce and realize manners and customs, and the outward expression of the old social life. Even in order to understand the bare meaning of the words, we must know something of the life. Much more, when we desire to appreciate the nicer shades of meaning, and to enter into the full force of imagery. For this purpose we have need of Archæology as much as of Philology. The two cannot prudently be dissevered. And more than this. Unless our Archæology is correct,—our Philology, being connected with anachronisms, will lead us into positive errors.

These observations, true of ancient writers in general, are quite as true of sacred as profane. Moses and Luke, Ezra and Paul, did not write independently of the circumstances with which they were surrounded, or of the tastes, pursuits and habits of their time. If they had done so, they would have been unintelligible when they wrote. And they will only be approximately intelligible to us, unless we have the means of re-setting the words in their true associations. When a man has once seen a really Oriental city, and made himself familiar with the sights and smells of a bazar, walked on the flat roofs, or stood among

* From the *Sunday Magazine*, January, 1867.

the camels, he has acquired a power of appreciating the Old Testament, such as no dead lexicon could ever give him. And how great a help for the New Testament is gained,—when, in some good museum, a man has taken into his hand a silver denarius, and looked at the fine features of Tiberius—worthy of a nobler character—and turned the coin round, and read the Latin inscription, and reflected on the possibility that this might have been the very piece of money that was shown to our Saviour, on the high probability that it was minted at the same time, and on the certainty that it was exactly like it, in size and material, in the "image and superscription!"

These are only superficial illustrations: but they are illustrations of a principle:—and the application of the principle becomes important, exactly in proportion as the writer in question, whoever he may be, has some favorite classes of imagery drawn from the circumstances of his time,—and in proportion as those circumstances, from which the imagery is drawn, are in themselves peculiar and removed from the sphere of our own customary thoughts.

Now thus much may be said, without any danger of dispute, concerning St. Paul's favorite images, that they are drawn, not from the operations and uniform phenomena of the natural world, but from the activities and outward exhibition of human society, from the life of soldiers, the life of slaves, from the market, from athletic exercises, from agriculture, from architecture.

That there is a strong tendency to architectural metaphors in St. Paul's Epistles no one will dispute. But it is worth while to notice that this tendency to refer to buildings may be observed not only there, but in his speeches too. Let us call to mind two speeches, uttered in busy centers of population, and in the midst of those who had glorious architectural works every day before their eyes. At Athens how grandly does the Apostle point mentally, if not literally, to the Parthenon and Propylæa and their associated statues on the Acropolis, telling his hearers that God, "seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in *temples made with hands*," and that the Godhead is not "like unto gold, or silver, or *stone*, graven by art and man's device!"* And at Miletus how significantly and strongly does he conclude his address to those who had come from Ephesus, where Diana's

* Acts xvii: 24, 29. See verses 16 and 23.

temple was the most magnificent and prominent object,—"Now, brethren, I commend you to God, and to the word of his grace, which is *able to build you up!*"* How or why St. Paul's style had this tendency it is needless to determine. It might be a matter of temperament or of education. He might have a taste for architecture, natural or acquired. That he was a man of fine perceptions and strong social feelings cannot be doubted. And to such men it is natural to enter into the spirit of a great city and its outward expression as given in its buildings. Again, we are told that Gamaliel, under whom the Apostle was instructed, was a man of enlarged mind and by no means destitute of sympathy with the culture of the Greeks. However this may be, St. Paul, writing under divine inspiration, does use ideas drawn from buildings, as vehicles of instruction. Architectural phraseology is inwoven into the texture of his Epistles, and to a much larger extent than would at first sight be supposed.

Let us take, in the first place, in elucidation of this topic, a single word, the word "*edify.*" This verb, or its substantive, "*edification*," occurs in some form or other twenty-two times in the New Testament; and in every instance, except one, it is used by St. Paul; and that exception is in the Acts of the Apostles,† a book written almost certainly under St. Paul's superintendence. This fact is remarkable, and well adapted to arrest the attention. But it becomes still more marked, when we observe that on proceeding to look for the Greek word, of which "edify" is the English translation, (or rather the Latin translation, introduced from the Vulgate by Wiclif), we find that other passages must be added to the list, and all in the same Apostle's writings. To quote the places where "edify" and "edification" occur in the English would be needless. They are all ready in our memories for use when occasion requires. But in order to transfer our associations to the Greek word which is actually St. Paul's word, and to which they more properly belong, I may notice that the language is precisely the same, when he lays down the principle of non-interference with another Apostle's work—"I will not build (edify) on another man's foundation"‡—that the same favorite image occurs, when he expresses the utter inconsistency involved in a return from Christianity to Judaism: "If I proceed to build up the edifice which I took so much pains to pull

* Acts xx: 32. † Acts ix: 31. ‡ Rom. xv: 20.

down, I make myself a transgressor,"*—and that with regard to moral practice he uses "build up" in a bad sense as well as a good one, when he says after laying down the truth that it is Christian love which "builds up,"† that if the strong brother approaches too near association with idolatry, the conscience of the weak brother may be "built up"‡ so as to eat that which is sacrificed to idols, may become in fact a structure of sin. In this passage the authorized version has "edify" in the margin; and this is the word in Wiclif's version. His word is "build" in the other two passages which I have just quoted. It is evident that even then the words "*edify*" and "*edification*" were narrowing themselves to their theological sense, while "*edifice*" has still continued to have its widest sense. Not that the narrowing process was completed for some considerable time. Spenser uses "edify" in the sense of building: and I find it said of the Castle of Corfu in Hakluyt's travels (under the date 1555)—"It is not only of situation the strongest I have seen, but also of *edification*."

We might follow this disquisition on a single word into results of considerable interest.

The question has a bearing on *Christian Evidence*. It is something that the same prevalent metaphor is used, and in the same kind of way, in several of the Epistles which bear the name of St. Paul. Unity of style tends to prove unity of authorship. If one man wrote all these Epistles, then all are authentic. So again it is always interesting to find a peculiarity which marks the Epistles marking also the speeches which are assigned to this apostle in the Acts. It helps to prove that the Paul of the letters is the Paul of the narrative: and this too is something. Here it must in candor be added that this argument, if applied to the Epistle to the Hebrews, tends to separate it from the Epistles which were undoubtedly written by St. Paul. On many grounds I am strongly inclined to believe that he did write the Hebrews: but this argument, so far as it goes, has a tendency the other way. In those passages—"He who hath builded the house hath more honor than the house: for every house is builded by some one; but he that built all things is God,"§—and "a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not of this building"‖—and again, "Abraham looked for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God"¶—in these passages it is remarkable

* Gal. ii: 18. † 1 Cor viii: 1. ‡ 1 Cor. viii: 10. § Heb. iii: 3, 4. ‖ Heb. ix: 11. ¶ Heb. xi: 10.

that the original words are quite different from those which are customary with St. Paul when he speaks of building or edifying.

But again, the topic before us has a bearing on *Christian Doctrine.* I have an impression that we have acquired the habit of using the word "edify" in a way slightly different from that of St. Paul, from whom we borrow it. We give it an individual application. We say that this or that—a book read in private—a sentence from a sermon—a providential occurrence—is edifying to the individual Christian, without reference to his social position in the Church. But "edify" with St. Paul is always a social word,—having regard to the mutual improvement of members of the Church, and the growth of the whole body in faith and love. "The *Churches* in Judea and Galilee and Samaria," it is said, "had rest and were edified." * Paul says to the Corinthian Church, "We do all things for your edifying." † He says to the members of the Thessalonian Church, "edify one another." ‡ And he tells the Ephesian Church that various ministrations are given—"for the edifying of the body of Christ § . . . from whom the whole maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love." ‖ So too he says that Christians are collectively as well as individually the *temple* of God. There are two passages,¶ one in the first and one in the second Epistle to the Corinthians, which may be instructively compared in reference to this point. Now all this, if we consider the matter closely, is almost implied in the word, and in the metaphor which it represents. A building is an aggregate thing. And believers are not buildings, but parts of a building. St. Peter calls them "living stones." I think we are sometimes too apt to forget this, and to treat Christianity (if I may use the expression) as if it were *monolithic.* We may lose in precision by not attending to the metaphors which are involved in Scripture words, and thus the proportions of our doctrine may be disturbed. It is not too much to say that, with regard to the point before us, we might out of St. Paul's use of the word "edify" or "build," get a whole commentary on that article of the Creed, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church."

However this may be, nearly all will agree that such passages as these have a very important bearing on *Christian Practice.*

* Acts ix: 31. † 2 Cor. xii: 19. ‡ 1 Thess. v: 11 § Eph. iv: 12.
‖ Eph. iv: 16. ¶ 1 Cor. vi; 19; 2 Cor. vi: 16.

"All things may be lawful to me, but all things do not *edify*."* "We ought not to please ourselves, but let every one please his neighbor for his good unto *edification*."† "Let us follow after the things which make for peace and things wherewith one may *edify* another."‡ The force of this last passage is much enhanced by the words which follow—"For the sake of meat do not run the risk of pulling to pieces the work—the building—of God." The word here translated "destroy" in the English version is not that which is so rendered a few verses above ("for meat destroy not him for whom Christ died")—but it is the contrasted word opposed to "build," just as in that phrase quoted before from another Epistle (again an instance of the unity of St. Paul's style)—"If I build up again what once I pulled down or pulled to pieces." How vividly do we see this momentous duty of respecting scruples and prejudices, of forbearance in social intercourse, of controlling our vehemence and censoriousness—when we think of those around us as parts with ourselves of a building, which ought to be advancing in beauty and solidity! Those disorderly tempers disturb the proportion, that selfishness of ours mars the unity, those hasty words, those careless acts, are the pickaxes which loosen the mortar. And so with regard to public ministrations—"He that speaketh in a tongue, *buildeth up* himself: he that prophesieth *buildeth up* the Church"§—"forasmuch as ye are zealous of spiritual gifts, seek that ye may excel to the *building up* of the Church,"‖—"Verily thou giveth thanks well, but the other is not *built up*."¶ If we neglect the principle involved in such a context as this, if we are bent on display and power and self-advancement, well may the Church be *dilapidated* instead of *built*. So again of the contrast of knowledge and love: "Knowledge inflates"—it only produces a bubble that will burst; but love edifies—it constructs what is solid—its work is to be patiently building a noble and enduring palace.

But it is time that we advance from words to sentences. Let us examine a few passages where the architectural metaphor is more fully devoloped. We will follow a natural order, and take first the foundation, then the step, and then the furniture, of the house.

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* 1 Cor. x: 23. † Rom. xv: 2. ‡ Rom. xiv: 19, 20. § 1 Cor. xiv: 3, 4, 5.
‖ 1 Cor. xiv: 12. ¶ 1 Cor. xiv: 17.

We have seen that St. Paul says he will not build on another man's foundation, when he means to say that he will not trespass on another man's missionary province. But he uses the same image in a deeper sense in various emphatic passages. In two of them there is the same juxtaposition of what is agricultural and what is architectural, which we have in this third chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians—"Ye are God's husbandry, ye are God's building."* Just so, on turning to Ephesians and Colossians (again an illustration of the unity of authorship), we find in one—"That ye, having your root and your *foundation* in love—your root as a tree, your foundation as a building†—may be able to know what is the love of Christ"—and in the other—"As ye have received Christ, so walk in him, having your root struck down deep into him and raising up the building on him as your foundation."‡ A glance at the Greek shows that the language is the same in both passages. The only difference is, that in the former the Ephesians are addressed as having been set on a safe foundation, the Colossians are reminded of the duty of raising up the structure so founded. Nor is this the only place in the Epistle to the Colossians where reference is made to the foundation.§

But let us turn to two other passages, where the imagery is presented to us in detail. Both are good illustrations of what Paley calls St. Paul's peculiarity of "going off at a word." In the nineteenth verse of the second chapter of Ephesians, after he has happened to use the word "household," it seems as if the whole house rose before him, from foundation to roof, and transformed itself into a temple. The chapter concludes thus: "Ye are built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone; in whom all the building fitly framed together groweth unto an holy temple in the Lord: in whom ye also are builded together for an habitation of God through the Spirit."‖ Now, all I will observe on this quotation is this: that I do not believe that the Apostles and Prophets are the foundation of which St. Paul speaks; but that Jesus Christ is foundation-stone and corner stone in one. I would render it thus, "Built on the apostolic and prophetic foundation-stone"—the stone which apostles and prophets laid, and on which they themselves rest—for "other foundation can no man lay, than that

* 1 Cor. iii: 9. † Eph. iii: 17. ‡ Col. ii: 6. 7. § Col. i: 23 ‖ Eph. ii: 20–22.

is laid," viz., Christ. The other passage is in the second Epistle to Timothy. Having spoken of the overthrowing of the faith of some, the Apostle adds: "Nevertheless, the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his. And, Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity." * What two grand inscriptions! Two eternal principles, one expressing the immutability of God, to drive away despair, the other describing the character of God's people, to drive away presumption. Well may they be indelibly cut on the apostolic and prophetic foundation.†

I said I would pass from the foundation to the step. The text to which I refer is again in one of the Pastoral Epistles:—"They that have used the office of a deacon well, purchase to themselves a good degree." ‡ This is an interesting passage, and I hardly think it is to be interpreted as it is commonly explained. The English word "*degree*" is correctly used in the sense of *a step for further progress*, as it is used in Shakspeare's "Julius Cæsar" of the climber up ambition's ladder:—

> "But when he once attains the utmost round,
> He then unto the ladder turns his back,
> Looks in the clouds, scorning *the base degrees*
> By which he did ascend."

I do not say that the words just quoted from St. Paul are generally interpreted in the spirit of this speech of Brutus; but the popular interpretation involves some risk of taking this direction. I cannot but hesitate to believe that St. Paul urges deacons to a discharge of duty either by the prospect of promotion, or by the charm of a higher position in the esteem of men. I should rather suppose that he alludes to their making sure of a firm spiritual standing, as before God and in prospect of the great day. This is more in harmony with the context. The "good degree" is coupled with "great boldness in the faith." All this they secure "to themselves." Besides doing service to the Church, they advance more and more in the confidence of their own spiritual life. Here I think it is useful to compare what is said at the end of this Epistle, though there perhaps the metaphor is mixed, of the "laying up in store for ourselves a good foundation against the time to come, that we may lay hold on eternal life." § And

* 2 Tim. ii: 19. † Rev. xxi: 14. ‡ 1 Tim. iii: 13. § 1 Tim. vi: 19.

it is certainly a coincidence of some interest that all the passages which I have just been adducing in reference to the foundation and basement of buildings, are from Epistles addressed to Ephesus—where that celebrated Temple was, on the substructions of which immense labor and expense had been lavished, that temple which was full in sight when the mob cried out for two hours—"Great is Diana of the Ephesians."

But let us enter the house under the Apostle's guidance, and see what spiritual application he makes of the *furniture* which we find there. I follow the context of a chapter which has already been partially quoted. In the second Epistle to Timothy, in the second chapter, having described the foundation, he passes on to say—"But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honor and some to dishonor. If a man, therefore, purge himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honor, sanctified, and meet for the master's use, and prepared unto every good work." * In the nineteenth verse he seems to set before us the Church in its essential character, as resting on an exclusive basis and marked by eternal principles: here, in what follows, he seems to set the Church before us in its mixed and outward character, lest erroneous conclusions should be drawn from the preceding. We have here a parable like the parable of the net: but we have something more than in the parable of the net. Not only are there two classes—vessels of rich material to honor, and vessels of mean material to dishonor,—but there are gradations in each class, gold and silver in the one, wood and earth in the other, not all among the good equally good, not all among the bad equally bad. A great house has a vast variety of furniture. In the twentieth verse we have the duty and the responsibility which arise from this solemn consideration.

Our thoughts are carried, by natural association, from this passage to another of still more solemn import, where the same imagery is employed. I mean those verses in the ninth of Romans, avowedly difficult even to the sternest Predestinarian, where the vessels of wrath are contrasted with the vessels of mercy—the former fitted (not by God) to destruction, the latter expressly prepared (by God) unto glory.† I think we gain something, in the exposition of this passage, by following the lines of

* 1 Tim. ii: 20, 21. † Rom. ix: 21, 22.

St. Paul's metaphorical language, and by placing the words in the Romans side by side with the more explicit words addressed to Timothy. In that place we see that the Apostle does not urge his illustration beyond the point of contrast and classification. He does not say that because the furniture in a great house is separated into great classes, with subordinate gradations in each, therefore the members of the Church on earth are irrevocably so divided. He adds, that if a man keeps himself clear from association with the meaner vessels, he will himself become one of the nobler. So in the Romans we have the two classes set before us; the sure tendency of the one to destruction, unless there is a recovery; the great truth that the glorious condition of the other is due to God only. All else is left open and untouched. The language is not so much argumentative as illustrative. It is of great importance, in the interpretation of Scripture, not to press a metaphor beyond the point which it was intended to elucidate, and not to deal with allegory as though it were logic.

Now, in drawing towards the conclusion of this paper, I wish to revert to a remark which I made at the outset, viz., that a careful notice of the significance of imagery is all the more incumbent on us, in proportion as the circumstances from which that imagery is drawn may be peculiar. We ought to keep in mind the distinctive character of Classical architecture, and to remember that it was from *that* architecture that St. Paul drew his illustrations. We are apt to give too Oriental a coloring to the New Testament, and this for an obvious reason. The Classical world has passed away. We must reproduce it if we wish to see it as it was. But to realize the outward circumstances of the Old Testament, we need only read the books of travellers and study the pictures of modern artists. We see Abraham in every sheik; Rebecca is at the well near the village; the climate and the seasons are in the main unaltered. But the colonial lictors at Philippi, the Prætorium at Rome, Pilate with his official chair on the piece of tesselated pavement—these must be reinstated in the scene, if we are to see them at all. The materials for reproducing the life exist in abundance in literature and museums. But the life itself does not exist; and the work of reproducing it requires the union of exact scholarship rightly applied, with a lively imagination under the control of judgment. Now the

imagery which St. Paul draws from human habitations is not drawn from the wilderness—not from the transient dwellings of nomadic life, but from the solid cities of the Greeks and Romans. We might quote, in illustration of this, a passage where he uses that very contrast to heighten the emphasis which he wishes to give to a forcible passage: "I know that if this earthly dwelling, which is only a tent, is taken to pieces, I have a *building* of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens."* Nor is it from any Eastern kind of architecture, but from Classical architecture, that St. Paul draws his metaphors of this class. There is one passage which might at first sight be thought an exception; but it is not really such. I allude to that place in the Ephesians where he says that Christ has "broken down the middle wall of partition, that he might reconcile both Jews and Gentiles unto God in one body."† I imagine there is a tacit reference to that partition wall in the Jewish Temple, on which notices were put up forbidding Gentiles to enter the inner court. But then Herod's Temple was of Classical architecture, like the great structures in Athens and Ephesus; not, as Solomon's may have been, of some eastern Phœnician style, like the buildings of Tyre. Josephus gives us a full description of the Corinthian columns. Even the notices on the partition wall were in Latin and Greek. The complexion of Palestine in St. Paul's day was probably European rather than Asiatic; and we should be quite in error if we were to imagine the monotony of a modern Eastern town to be the type of what he habitually saw in Cæsarea, or even in Jerusalem.

Now are there any peculiarities of Classical architecture, which we ought to take into account when we comment on any of the illustrations which for our instruction St. Paul was inspired to draw from that source? I think there are two. One is this: that all conspicuous Greek buildings, and most of the conspicuous Roman buildings, of his time, were characterized by vertical columns, supporting a horizontal entablature.

The significant application of this peculiarity is seen at once in that passage, where, in a time of controversy, he adduces the support of James and Cephas and John, who had the recognized reputation of being "pillars" in the Church.‡ Here the Church is evidently treated as a building—a palace, or temple, or the

* 2 Cor. v: 1. † Eph. ii: 14, 16. ‡ Gal. ii: 9.

like; and these three men are spoken of, not simply as stones in the building, just as ordinary Christians might be, but as characteristic and essential parts, as both ornaments and supports.* Now apply this to another context, concerning which some controversy has almost always existed: "These things I write, that thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth." † I hold it to be an indefensible distortion of the passage, from polemical reasons, to take these last words and connect them with what follows: "The pillar and ground of the truth, and without controversy great, is the mystery of godliness." I see no reason why the Church should not be called a pillar and support of the truth. What, indeed, would become of the light without the candlestick? But I am very much disposed, notwithstanding, to think that this is not the meaning of the passage. I am inclined to believe that Paul says this to Timothy: "I write to thee, seeing that thou hast a prominent and responsible place in the house of God, in order that thou mayest fill that place aright, and be thyself indeed a pillar and support of the truth." In favor of this view, we have the analogy of the passage just adduced from the Galatians. We have also this consideration, that the Church is a building, not a pillar, while a pillar is a partial support of a classical building, and one ornament out of many. It is in the criticism of just such a passage as this that I would claim for Archæology its right to be combined with Philology. Not that there is any grammatical objection to the interpretation I am advocating. Nor is the sanction wanting of early commentators, whose instinctive sense in a case of this kind is of considerable moment.

The other architectural feature of ancient cities, to which I desire to invite attention, brings us at once to the passage from that third chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, to which reference was made at the outset. I believe that in such cities as Ephesus, where the letter was written, or Corinth, to which it was addressed, there was a signal difference (far greater than in modern European cities) between the gorgeous splendor of the great public buildings, and the meanness and squalor of those streets where the poor and profligate resided. The former were constructed of marble and granite; the capitals of their columns

* See Rev. iii: 12. † 1 Tim. iii: 15.

and their roofs were richly decorated with silver and gold: the latter were mean structures, run up with boards for walls, with straw in the interstices, and thatch on the top. This is the contrast on which St. Paul seizes—slabs and pillars of marble and granite, and gold and silver, on one hand,—wood, hay, stubble, on the other—to set forth two very different results of the spiritual edification (I use the word in its neutral sense) which goes on in the Church. Sometimes the passage is treated as though the image presented were that of a dunghill of straw and sticks, with jewels, such as diamonds and emeralds, among the rubbish. But such an image would be utterly improbable in itself, and out of harmony with all the context. The whole allegory is strictly and consistently architectural.

In order to enter into the full significance of the allegory we should look at the context. St. Paul is addressing those who were addicted to the spirit of party, and is speaking of the right estimate of Christian ministers. He first uses an agricultural metaphor, and then he passes to an architectural. Our approach to the architectural structure lies as it were, through a garden or orchard. Here Paul has planted the precious trees. Apollos, and probably others with him, as subordinates and successors to Paul, are watering them. Suddenly the image changes to a new one, more capable of being turned to what the Apostle wishes to enforce. A building in progress rises before us. Paul has laid the foundation—laid it once for all, and laid it well. He has no objection to say this, for it has been done by the grace of God. On this foundation Apollos and others are building. As to building on another foundation, this is set aside at once. The work is going on, and will go on indefinitely in the future; but it will be tested. A day will come when the fire will burn up those wretched edifices of wood and straw, and leave unharmed in their glorious beauty those that were raised of marble and granite, and decorated with silver and gold. Those who raised such structures as these shall not only be safe, but rewarded; those who lost their time on the others shall just escape out of the conflagration, because they built on the right foundation, but their escape shall be barely an escape.

It is a most serious admonition to the minister of the gospel "to take heed how he buildeth," that is, with what materials—what kind of teaching, what kind of parochial arrangements,

what kind of provision for the young, what kind of care for tender consciences or for desperate guilt. He should consider, too, what his materials have cost him. If they are cheap and worthless, the first that came to hand, what fate can he expect for his building in the day of trial? Is it not well worth his while to see that the quarry is worked for the stone, and the mine explored deep for the silver and the gold, that all his materials may be precious, solid, and good, and may survive the fire, as the temples of Corinth itself survived the conflagration of Mummius, which burnt the hovels around?

It will be gathered that I think the building itself in this passage is not simply the development of doctrine and the promotion of sound practical truth. These I look on as the materials of building. The building itself I should regard, in analogy with all that has preceded, as the *persons*, or rather I ought to say the *characters*, which result from this good or bad edification.

But still the passage may be lawfully applied to remind us of the importance of regular and systematic instruction in religious truth. And hence a lesson may be drawn, which has reference to the responsibility of the recipients, not the givers of instruction. And we may conclude with an extract from the first of the Catechetical Lectures of St. Cyril, which he delivered about the year 347 A. D. in the grand Basilica, erected by Constantine the Great. "Consider catechising to be a kind of building. Unless we dig deep, and lay the foundation,—unless by successive fastenings in the masonry we bind the framework of the house together, that no opening be detected, nor the work be left unsound, nought avails all our former labor. But stone must succeed stone in course, and corner must follow corner, and, inequalities being smoothed away, the masonry must rise regular. In like manner, we are bringing to thee stones, as it were, of knowledge. Thou must hear concerning the living God; concerning the Judgment; concerning Christ; concerning the Resurrection: and many things are made to follow one the other, which, though now dropped one by one, at length are presented in harmonious connection. But if thou wilt not connect them into one whole, and remember what is first, and what is second, the builder indeed buildeth, but the building will be unstable."

XXX—THE THEORY OF RITUALISM.*

This little essay is an attempt to realize the theory of that party in the Church of England which is represented by the ritualists, and to show the truth upon which it is based. Ridicule has been directed against them, whereas in fact those practices of theirs which have been turned into jest may, I think, be considered merely as an indication of much that can hardly be laughed at by professing Christians, since it is devoutly held by a large, probably the largest portion of Christendom, which includes not merely the superstitious or unthinking crowd, but some of the most logical minds of the day. Those who smile at the importance attached by leading ritualists to the details of ecclesiastical ornament and dress, forget that these things are but the blossom of doctrine, and that, however feeble they may seem to the uninitiated, they represent the stern belief of those who uphold them, as truly as a scrap of fluttering silk upon a stick represents the sentiment and devotion of an army. It is easy to say, with a sneer, that such and such a priest would go to the stake for a stole; but we do not laugh when we hear that an officer has died in defense of the colors of his regiment. Eucharistic vestments are now the colors of a division in the Church of England, and if we really care to get to or towards the bottom of the theological strife of the day, we shall not misdirect our inquiries by setting off with a jest at the symbols of the doctrine which is indicated by extreme ritual. It is to be believed that many who hold the doctrine and have no natural antipathy to æsthetics, do not fly its colors; but I think we shall see that the only reason why they do not, arises from the belief that the people under their spiritual charge are not sufficiently instructed in doctrine to accept them with respect, or that the spread of the doctrine is endangered by the ridicule pointed by the profane at its symbols. Many have the same radical desire; but while some think it most advisable to unfurl the flag and strike up the music at once, believing that this will bring recruits into the ranks, others devote themselves

* Abridged from the *Contemporary Review*, December, 1866.

to silent but accurate drill, hoping thus to build up an army which may at some future time be furnished with uniform, banners, and band. They consider the adoption of these things to be a matter of mere expediency, and though some sharp disputes may arise between the advocates of the several courses, they are agreed in the main as to the doctrine which extreme ritualism symbolizes. Some again who use its terms and like its tendency may not fully realize the principles of their teaching and its ultimate logical results, but they class themselves generally with the party out of which the ritualists have arisen.

Before I proceed to examine the doctrine of that party, I must give my reason for attempting to do so in popular language. One obstacle to an understanding of the questions now disputed in the Church of England is the nature of the terms which are used by controversialists. They are often so professional that they fail to convey a meaning to those who are accustomed to common English.

I make no apology for this little tribute to current theology, for we must feel, in our most honest and earnest moods, that though any strife has its painful phase, none is worse than that which is carried on in the dark. The strife has arisen now. It cannot be smothered or dismissed. And if this essay helps but two or three to realize what is going on in the English Church, I shall feel that I have not written it altogether without some useful end.

The general view of the "Holy Catholic Church" taken by those of whom I speak, agrees with that held by many who profess a dislike of extreme ritualism. They believe it to be a body put into spiritual union with Christ by baptism, and that the new life thus created is supported by spiritual food, conveyed to the soul through the Holy Communion. Then, seeing that baptism and the Lord's supper are the two foci round which the Church, as a body witnessing to the unseen, revolves, they proceed to shape this fact into a system which shall present it logically to the people. In pursuing this object, they reject every view which interferes with its symmetry and compactness, until at last their chief regard is bestowed upon the Holy Communion. That is the central point towards which all the lines upon which the soul travels converge, and from which supplies diverge to sustain the army of the faithful. While they lay vital stress upon the necessity of baptism, that is after all but the entrance

into a community which is kept alive by the food supplied through the Holy Communion. Then, having put a lower value upon all other means of contact with God, or assigned them a position which shall assist a right reception of the Holy Communion, they bring their desires for a compact system into a focus upon this sacrament.

The ritualistic party have now reached a point at which they are compelled to give an explanation of the machinery by which reciprocal relations are established between God and man in the Holy Communion. Committed to the construction of a compact theory of worship, this top-stone must be carefully shaped. It is said that in order that the recipient may communicate with intelligence, it is necessary for him to know precisely what he is about. He is going to receive spiritual food. He is not merely the subject of religious emotion excited by the thought that he is humbly straining himself to realize his near relation to God. He is not refreshing his historical belief in the atoning death of Christ by a ceremony which recalls the last meal which Jesus took with his disciples. He is "verily and indeed" to eat the flesh and drink the blood of Christ. Professing to reject the dogma of the Romanist, which gets over all difficulty by asserting that the bread and wine, when consecrated, becomes literally and actually flesh and blood, which conveys spiritual strength, the ritualist adopts the alternative that, at the moment of consecration, Christ descends into the bread and wine; that, though intangible, He is really there; that, though invisible, He has come from a distance into the visible elements; that He restricts his presence to that portion of the bread and wine upon which the priest has laid his hand, and that the least crumb and drop of this contains Christ so literally, that in eating and drinking it the communicant eats His flesh and blood, which, without any more exercise of the recipient's faith than a belief that he is eating it, coupled with a fervent desire to receive the benefit conveyed, nourishes his soul as truly as bread and wine nourishes the body. It cannot be said that I have exaggerated or misrepresented the theory which he holds. The printed details in the "Directorium," which professes to instruct him in the right conduct of the ceremony, and which he has not repudiated, bear out all I have stated.

But two chief things flow from this theory of the ritualist. If Christ be there in person, within the elements of bread and wine,

He may be adored as truly as if He were present, in human form, upon the altar. The congregation are as near Him as the multitude were who sat upon the shore while He taught them out of the boat. The attendant priests and deacons are as near Him as the apostles were at the Last Supper.

We must allow that there is an apparent distinctiveness in this theory, which utterly pales any other conception of the Holy Communion to those who can hold it. It gives a freshness and a force to the act of communication which makes the celebration of the Eucharist more than the crown and flower of the service. It is thrilling, awful. Up to the moment of consecration, Christ is not unmindful of his people's prayers, but he is far off. But then, directly the mystic words have passed the celebrant's lips, with an unseen flash from heaven the Son of God alights upon the altar and enters the bread and wine. Who can believe this without feeling a reality in the Holy Communion such as he never conceived before? No wonder the ritualist loves to express his sense of respect by accumulating around the altar every act of ceremonious reverence which shall distinguish the hour of communion from the other periods of divine service. No wonder that enthusiasts, who yearn for something definite, some objective act which shall transmute Christian sentiment into reality, hail this development of doctrine with delight. They had long fretted at the sense of incompleteness which marked the difference between the Church of England and that of Rome. This, they think, is now removed. They have found the keystone to their system, and, lo! strength and symmetry is spread throughout the fabric. They feel that other points of difference between them and Roman Catholics are dwarfed in the common possession of the "real presence." They dream of a larger catholicism, a union between the Churches. They look out over the whole Anglican fold and think, "These thousands of priests and people, though they have not yet appreciated the pearl of great price which is found in the doctrine of the 'real presence,' have it yet. Christ comes to every altar, however sad the blindness of the recipient, however dull and slovenly the priest may be."

Meanwhile, the Romanist smiles and thinks, "Poor people! you have made a great mistake. Your acts would be valid if you had a true succession in your ministers. But as it is, this cele-

bration, of which you make so much, is no more a celebration than a battle on the stage is a real battle. You act the thing aptly, but it is a drama, not real life. Your so-called primate, with all his bishops about him, cannot do what the poorest missionary monk does when he sets up his portable altar under a tree in a heathen village. He cannot call down God. Your grandest celebration is a magnificant sham. If you wish it to be effective, come to us for ordination."

This is bitterly felt, at times, by the ritualist. Though occasionally carried away by his consciousness of the respect he feels for much that is radically characteristic of Romanists, every now and then he has a glimpse of the enormous gulf between him and them, a gulf so serious that he would have to admit the invalidity of all his priestly acts before he could cross it.

Thence comes the second great claim involved in his theory of divine communion. He demands that the people should accept his ordination as precisely analogous to that of the Romanist. "You are," he says, "a true branch of the one Catholic and Apostolic Church. My priestly power is equal to that of the Romanist. We differ in the definition of the process by which the flesh and blood of Christ is conveyed to the communicant, but it is virtually the same, only we give you more than he, since he denies the cup to the laity."

And in his struggles to convince the people that his spiritual pedigree is as unbroken as that of the Romish priest, he forms his priestly character upon the Romish pattern. He protests against the connection between Church and State, straining every nerve to get the settlement and custody of doctrines into ecclesiastical hands. He pleads for a closer professional training. In some instances he urges the celibacy of the clergy, and dresses at the Romish priest. He creates as close an imitation as he can of the order of nuns. He has tried the revival of monasteries. Above all, he claims the office of individual directorship, and his ideal of a well-governed parish is that the people should resort to him for confession at stated times, especially in preparation for the reception of the Holy Communion.

And there is a charm in all this which gives delight and energy to large numbers of persons, especially among the young. This is heightened by the fact that the ritualist labors with extreme self-denial. No one is more constant and earnest in parochial

visitation. He comforts the sick and teaches the young with tenderness and energy. He gives himself heartily to his work, and provides, so far, some of the most prominent examples of pastoral devotion to be found among the clergy of the English Church.

And his disciples catch his spirit. It would not, I think, be an over statement of the fact if I were to say that he influences and conducts a very considerable part of the missionary energy at present exhibited by the Church at home.

And all this comes, in great measure, from the fact that he has an apparently compact theory of Christian worship and service. A man who lays down the law, and gives distinct directions to those who desire to believe and do something definite, is sure to be obeyed by many. And however instinctive a dislike an Englishman has to theories, he honors practical results. He may not, *e. g.*, quite approve of the dress of the sisters of charity, but he sees ladies willing to devote themselves to the most wearisome and repulsive work without reward, and he says, "God bless them in their toil." He looks tenderly on what he suspects to be mistakes in their theology, and gives his tribute of admiration to their personal sincerity and self-denial.

Meanwhile, many a thoughtful man, who sees much of the enthusiasm of young England directed into the ritualistic channel, and feels that a fresh action has been set up in the Church, which promises to result in a far wider adoption of the extreme sacerdotal and sacramental theory than prevails at present, is profoundly moved, and, especially if himself a clergyman, he asks how far the movement is consistent with the principles of that Reformation which gave a distinct existence to the Anglican Church, and the obligations of his own office. He sees that the real question is not the choice of an outsider between the Church of England and that of Rome, nor indeed between parties in the Church. A chief point which the extreme party places before him is, whether a union can be effected between the Churches as they now are; or, if it could cause the separation of the Church and State, it could then represent the branch of the Holy Catholic Church in England, and so join Rome.

The difficulties in the way of a corporate union of any Anglican Church with Rome increase the more they are looked at. Rome will not yield an inch. She demands re-ordination and

re-baptism from every one who would be a priest and layman in her communion. She sets down as a delusion the whole fabric of the ritualists. They must be content to make the bitter admission that they are and have been radically in the wrong before she could approach an acceptance of their proposals to join her. Their whole past must be wiped out, and their spiritual life begun again, or rather begun for the first time. They are not even in the case of one who has lived in spiritual concubinage with another which could be set right by a marriage. The two parties have had no intercourse, illicit or admitted. They are strangers. The most the Romanist could admit to the Anglican is that he has affected a forbidden distasteful identity of interests which did not exist.

I question whether a large body of English Churchmen, with all their latent English instincts, which would be stirred when the terms of union had seriously to be considered, could be found ready to join the Romish Church as a body. It is different in the case of an individual, but the corporate going over of a large party, in the face of criticism, could not be contemplated without a full discussion of all the *pros* and *cons;* and then it would be seen that fusion, not union, is what Rome would require.

Thus the very strength and confidence of the ritualistic party is at present its greatest hindrance to this junction with Rome. It is learning to depend upon itself. It feels or fancies itself in a position from which it can open proposals for reconciliation: but the very basis upon which it stands is that which Rome would require to be surrendered before it could be admitted. As a party, the ritualists could not treat with Rome. If it goes, it must go after dissolution, or in driblets. Rome would receive ten thousand souls to-morrow, but though they go in a crowd they must go as individuals. There can be no connection between the two Churches. *The Pope has his hierarchy here already.* The whole land is divided into Popish dioceses and parishes. He would say, "If you join us, well; but you are only more flesh on my bones. The only body I can recognize is already in your country; I will eat you up and grow fatter thereby, but I will not make friends with you." The Pope is not in the position of a general addressed by a division of volunteers, which might be attached to his army and yet retain a distinctive existence. He would rather reply, "You call yourself a division, and presume to say that you are willing to act in concert with me; but let me

tell you that you are all virtually bound to serve under me already, and there are depôts in the place you come from. If you want to join me, disband and enlist. I have skeleton regiments there which want filling up. Enter them. At present you are no better than a mob of deserters, and I would punish every one of you if I could. Talk of a parcel of renegades treating with me, their proper commander! Nonsense. The proposal is an insult. If you want to return to your colors, do so; but all you have to do is to return. I have nothing to say to you. Go to the depôt nearest your own home; my officers there in command will take down your names, and know what to do with you. Union between the Churches!—Pooh!"

I believe that if the ritualists were ever to gain sufficient influence over the authorities of the Anglican Church as to induce them to send a mission to Rome in the name of the Church as now constituted, or if they were to separate themselves from the State and claim a distinct corporate existence in England as the true representatives of the Church Catholic in this country, and as such seek for union with Rome, that is the answer they would get.

It is to be feared, that some extreme ritualists have gone beyond the broad limits of the English Church, into a development of their theory of the Holy Communion which resolves it into spiritual mechanism. It seems to me that they have gone beyond symbolism in this matter. Bread and wine have ceased to be symbols when every crumb and drop of them is supposed to have a mystically medicinal property. Cannot Christ himself reach the heart of the devout communicant, and thrill him with fresh life in the very act of the reception of the bread and wine, without entering the elements (I shrink from the wording of my question, though I feel it to be a just one, and I do not know how to express it otherwise, and yet convey my meaning) as a sort of ghost, or portion of imponderable air, limited to the form of the fragment or the drops taken into the mouth of the recipient? Is God's way to the heart of the believer, in his most solemn act of worship, down the throat? That theory of the true presence which attaches such reverence to the consecrated element as to involve a direction that, if any of the wine be spilled upon the floor, the stain shall be burnt out and the ashes treated with respect, leaves us in the face of such a conclusion.

It is one, however, which excludes the idea of symbolism, for it

makes the bread and wine not signs, but vehicles, in a way similar to that which is taught in the Church at Rome. The Romanist professes to believe that he eats flesh and blood, which are such materials as the body is composed of, and that his soul is consequently blessed with the grace residing in Christ's body. That Anglican notion of the Holy Communion which I refer to differs from the Romish only by supposing the bread and wine to be externally present as well as the body of Christ. First there is the bread and wine, then there is the body of Christ, both external, and both therefore necessarily received in the hand and mouth of the communicant, whether he be good or bad. But how does this agree with our definition of a sacrament, that it is an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace, and that the inward part or thing signified is such as the faithful alone partake of? It is manifestly the intention of the Church of England to say that what the communicant eats with his mouth is the outward and visible sign of what he feeds upon in his soul, and that the body of Christ is the thing signified, not the thing literally eaten. The bread and wine are taken and received physically with the mouth; the body and blood of Christ, or the inward and spiritual grace, "verily and indeed," with the soul. This is true symbolism, a symbolism which is lost sight of, if Christ is supposed to be present in the elements, and not rather in the soul of the devout communicant.

Is it altogether vain to hope that the extreme ritualist may be led by realizing the mechanical definiteness of the theory he holds of the real presence, to see that he is departing from the symbolism which characterizes the real sacramental teaching of the Church of England?

Again, to look at the other dogma, which the ritualists hold as essential to the notion of the real presence, viz., the authority of the priest, the same reasoning will hold. The acts of the priest are either symbolical of God's acts, or they are really God's. The act of consecration, *e. g.*, is symbolical of the sanctifying and sending into the world that Man who is the Saviour of sinners. The breaking of the bread is symbolical of the death of that Man. But if the act of the priest is supposed to make Christ present in person, the consecration of the bread and wine is virtually a repetition of the incarnation, and the breaking of the bread a repetition of his death. All symbolism is lost sight of if the body of Christ is presented, and his sacrifice repeated.

Will the ritualist be led on to say, "I reject symbolism," and face the fact that his ultimate theory of the priestly office is identical with that of the Romanist, *i. e.*, that every priestly act is an exercise of spiritual mechanism, and not the sign of God's will?

It would be easy to pursue the argument further,—to show its applicability to the whole range of the priest's offices; and I think that a man might be led to see that, according to the sacerdotal and sacramental teaching of the Church of England, the priest does not create, but reveal, and yet that the basis of truth is retained upon which the Romanist has built his attractive logical fabric.

What, then, remains to us? may the ritualist ask. What but symbolism; *i. e.*, the representation, not the physical realization of a fact; and that decent order of which the Romish system is a mechanical caricature? This leaves the priest with a very high office. He is not indeed the magically prepared conductor of grace which refuses to flow except through such a channel. He may not push the fact of his commission from God into a theory which clothes every one of his acts with a mystically operative power. While his idea of a priest is that of one in direct relationship to and communication with God, towards whom he is charged to draw men's minds, he must not abuse this commission by yielding to the desire of devout minds for finally definite religious directions, charming the superstitious and spiritually romantic with the assertion of miraculous powers, offering to the logical a compressed and exclusive theory, which is minutely consistent with itself, and to those who love order and work, a system of exact regulations instead of a constant waiting upon God. While he will not try to crystallize and invest with an air of final authority those laws which concern the mere shape and arrangement of ecclesiastical machinery, and adaptation of the formularies of the visible Church to the necessities of the people, he has left to him the high calling of bringing men unto God, according to his knowledge of those truths, to which the decent order and offices of the Church are a significant witness, and in proportion to his faith in God, whose cleansing grace is symbolized in baptism, cheering strength in the wine and bread of the Holy Communion, and mercy in the declaration of the priest, that "He pardoneth and absolveth all them that truly repent, and unfeignedly believe his Holy Gospel."

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE.

The first number of the American edition of Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible*, revised and edited by Prof. H. B. Hackett, D. D., with the co-operation of Mr. Ezra Abbott, assistant librarian of Harvard University, and the assistance of a number of American scholars, has been issued. The entire work will comprise about thirty numbers, making the price of the whole when completed about $22.50. This will undoubtedly be the best edition by far of this valuable work.

"*The Ritualism of Law in the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States*," by the Rev. C. M. Butler, D. D., (18mo. p. 180), is an out-spoken and vigorous protest against the Ritualistic movement, as inconsistent with the true position of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and dangerous to practical religion and spiritual life.

Rev Henry N. Day, D. D., late Professor in Western Reserve College, has just issued an elaborate work on Logic, designed to furnish a needed help to the training of thought for effective speaking and writing, entitled "Elements of Logic, comprising the doctrine of the laws and products of thought, and the doctrine of method, together with a logical praxis," (12mo. pp. 237). Although making free use of the labors of Sir William Hamilton, he has endeavoured to advance the science by his own contributions, which can hardly fail to attract the attention of cultivators of logic.

M. Cousin has not only bequeathed his magnificent library of 14,000 volumes to the Sorbonne, but has made arrangements in his will by which it is to remain in its present locality. The rooms which he occupied are to be added to the library apartments of the Sorbonne, and all the furniture, engravings, etc. are to remain intact. He further endows the Sorbonne with an annual income of 10,000 francs to defray the expense of keeping his library, appoints M. St. Hilaire chief librarian, and leaves him all his papers, on condition that he is to write the testator's biography. *Athenæum.*

The *Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen* for July and December, 1866, has a very full and satisfactory article on the State of Hebrew instruction in the German schools.

Dr. J. H. Plath has an interesting article on "the doctrine of immortality among the ancient Chinese" in the *Zeitchrift des Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, in which he takes ground somewhat different from *Wuttke* who in his "History of Heathenism" affirms that "the Chinese system has no immortality." Dr Plath's view is that the most ancient Chinese believed in a life after death, but that in the time of Confucius it was thrown into the back-ground by the prominence given to mere ethics, and that subsequently Buddhism with its doctrine of transmigration entered China from India and ma le the people familiar with the idea of future joys and sufferings.

The British Quarterly Review expresses the humiliating apprehension that the knowledge of Hebrew necessary for using with profit Delitzsch's Commentary on Job recently translated for Clark's Foreign Library is not possessed to any considerable extent by English ministers of the Gospel.

The subjects of interest at present in the theological world abroad as represented in the January number of the leading European periodicals are as follows: In the *British Quarterly Review;* Froude's Reign of Elizabeth; the Chinese Classics; Ritualism, past and present; Shakespeare in domestic life; Archbishop Whately; George Eliot; the United States since the War; Bishop Cotton; Reform; Contemporary Literature.

Journal of Sacred Literature; The Historical Character of the Gospels tested by an examination of their contents; Karen traditions and opinions; the Coming One; Elias who was to come; Difficult passages in Job; Hymns of the Abyssinian Church and prayers; Remarks on the "Eirenicon"; Candlemas day, a mystery; Two Epistles of Mar Jacob, in the Syriac text; Correspondence; Notices of books.

British and Foreign Evangelical Review; Pelagianism; University Studies, Scottish and English; Murphy's Commentary on Exodus; Human Responsibility as related to Divine Agency in Conversion (from the Bibliotheca Sacra, by Prof. Phelps); Archbishop Whately; Bishop Wordsworth's Synodical Addresses; The Movements of our Times and the probable issues; Thomas Hobbs, the Moral Philosopher; Dr. Williams' New Translation of the Hebrew prophets, (from the Princeton Review); General Literature; American Periodicals; Critical Notices.

London Quarterly Review (Methodist); Religious Prospects in France; Scientific farming; The Civil Service of the British Empire; Apollonius of Tyana; Swiss Lake Dwellings; Smile's Lives of the Engineers; Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately; Literary Notices.

Revue Chrétienne; Variations of Conscience, by Ernest Naville; The Recitals of a Sister; The care of discharged prisoners; Obituary Notice of Henry Hollard; Letters from Rome; Review of the month.

Bulletin Theologique; History of the doctrine of Redemption, by de Pressense; The doctrinal principle of the Lutheran Reformation, by Dorner; The Conclusions to be drawn in regard to the nature of Jesus Christ, and the Holy Supper as exhibited in the Synoptical Gospels; The different French translations of the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah.

Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire du Protestantisme Français; Historical essay on Charlotte de La Tremoile, countess of Derby; Unpublished documents—The last prayer of Edward VI. King of England, Letters on the Reformation in Italy, 1608–32, etc.; Miscellanies; Bibliography; Correspondence.

Le Crétien Évangelique (Monthly); Biography of Moshesh, an African king; Thoughts on preaching; Geneva and Separatism; Religious Chronicle; Correspondence; Bibliographical Bulletin.

Theologische Studien und Kritiken (April); The Bridal Procession in Solomon's Song, by Schlottmann; The meaning of vocation and ordination, by Jacobson; Justification by faith, by Romang; The *Crux Interpretum* Gal. iii: 20; Reviews of Frank's History of the Protestant Theology, by Tholuck; Reuter's History of Alexander the Third and the Church of his time; Keim's Christ of History.

Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie; The Old Testament doctrine of the Spirit of God, by Kleinert; The Theology of Justin Martyr, by Weizsacker; The doctrinal bearing of the New Testament teaching of a two-fold resurrection, by Schultz; Notices of New Publications.

Zeitschrift für die lutherische Theologie und Kirche; Exegetical essay on Gal. iii: 15–29; Observations on a passage in the Formula of Concord; The Christian doctrine of Justification before God in its high significance for morality; What is the legacy which Jesus would leave to his disciples in the Lord's Supper? The importance of the Lord's Supper to the salvation of believers; General critical bibliograhy of the most recent theological literature.

(Hengstenberg's) *Evangelische Kirchen Zeitung;* The usual introduction for the year, containing thoughts on Matt. xxv; the war with Austria; the right and wrong in the same; the Church and politics; causes of the judgment upon Austria; the ecclesiastical significance of the war; the labors of Christian love; field preachers; deaconesses; the theological faculty at Halle; Appeal to the consciences of pastors in respect to solemnizing unlawful marriages; Religious state of Switzerland, etc.

Waarheid in Liefde; The character, advantages, disadvantages and dignity of the ethical theology, by Prof. De Groot of Groningen; The style of religious thought among the Israelitish people in the time of Christ; Reviews of Hollandish publications.

From the notices in the British and Continental journals of recent British and Foreign works in exegetical theology, we select the following, generally somewhat abridged.

Of the second edition (London, 1866) of Dr. Wilson's "English, Hebrew, and Chaldee Lexicon and Concordance," the *London Quarterly Review* (Methodist) says: Dr. Johnson or Wesley would clap his hands for joy at the sight of this volume. It must henceforth be considered the book of the class to which it belongs. Both Messrs. Bagster's very valuable "Englishman's Concordance," and the former edition of Dr. Wilson's own work, must now yield the palm to this. To give a general idea of its plan, take the word "sacrifice" for instance in Exodus iii: 18. The author tells us not merely what Hebrew word stands in this passage for "sacrifice," but likewise in what grammatical form it appears, and what is its strict and proper value as determined by the best critical authorities. Moreover he gives a complete list of the instances in which the English expression, whether noun or verb is used in the authorized version as the counterpart of the same Hebrew. He informs us also, that eight other words are translated "sacrifice" in the ver-

sion. He distinguishes the meaning of these several words, and furnishes exact catalogues of the places in which they may be found. Last of all, he explains, whether the Hebrew terms in question are invariably represented in the English by the word "sacrifice," or whether other terms are employed to denote them, and if so, what terms, and in how many cases they are used. Particles and pronouns are excluded from his plan for reasons which are obvious.

Fischer et Gelbe, *Joannis Buxtorfii Lexicon Chaldaicum, Talmudicum et Rabbinicum denuo editum et annotatis auctum* (1866, Fasc. I 4to, 15 Sgr) is the title of a new edition of the great Chaldee and Talmudic lexicon of Buxtorf, (1639) which has never been surpassed and is still indispensable, edited by two scholars, of whom one is a Jew and the other a Christian. Their success is doubtful; for in the first place, it will be difficult (as the errors in the number already published show) to equal the original work in accuracy, especially in the Hebrew words, the correct printing of which is so seriously imperilled by the present rapidity in the press-work; and secondly, the recent progress in philology, and particularly in the linguistic elements of the Talmud drawn from foreign sources calls for thorough elaboration, a labor too gigantic for the editors to venture upon. *Zeitschrift für die lutherische Theologie und Kirche.*

In the "Chaldee Lexicon of the Targums and a large part of the Rabbinic literature," by Dr. J. Levy, Rabbi in Breslau (*Chaldäisches Wörterbuch über die Targumim* etc, 1866, 4to. Lief. I. II. a 1 Thlr) we have an original work on which years of careful labor have been expended. It is a real contribution to Semitic philology, and can be recommended to thorough students of Syriac, and to all who would make themselves familiar with the Targums. *Zeitschrift für die lutherische Theologie und Kirche.*

"The Bible Word Book: a Glossary of old English Bible Words, by J. Eastward and M. A. Wright," (London, 1866) is highly commended by the London Quarterly Review, (Methodist). It says: Intelligent students of the English Bible, whether ministers or others, will thank us if they are led by our recommendation to purchase this cheap, handsome and very useful book. Its object is to "explain and illustrate all such words, phrases and constructions in the authorized version of the Old and New Testament and the Apocrypha, and in the book of Common Prayer, as are obsolete or archaic." It is not the first time that a work of this sort has been published, but we know of none that will compare with this for exact learning, judicious treatment, and simple and effective presentation of its manifold particulars. The illustrations are taken chiefly from writers of the sixteenth century. Mr. Wright justly observes, that, "in considering the language of our English Bible, we must bear in mind that it has become what it is by a growth of eighty-six years—from the publication of Tyndale's New Testament in 1525 to that of the authorized version in 1611. Further it must be remembered, that our translators founded their work upon the previous versions, retaining whatever in them could be retained, and amending what was faulty. The result was therefore of neces-

ity a kind of Mosaic, and the English of the authorized version represents, not the language of 1611 in its integrity, but the language which prevailed from time to time during the previous century." Accordingly the golden age of our English literature is made to give forth its lights, and the result is an illumination of dark places of the English Scriptures, such as will be gratefully welcomed by a crowd of struggling readers.

Bleek's Lectures on the Epistles to the Colossians, Philemon and the Ephesians, (*Vorlesungen über die Briefe an die Kolosser*, etc. 1866, 308 S) are published in essentially the same state in which they were delivered in the winter of 1853–54, with some valuable additions and corrections made since his decease by the editor. They exhibit the well-known characteristics of the author, extensive learning, candor in exhibiting and discussing the views of others, carefulness in selecting whatever promised to be of use in explaining biblical terms, and modesty and seriousness in pronouncing a final decision. In consequence of the form in which they were prepared. however, they are far less full and exhaustive than his great work on the Epistle to the Hebrews, and hence will be found better adapted to students in the earlier part of their studies than to the learned. *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie.*

"A Critical Exposition of the third chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, by James Morison, D. D.," (London and Glasgow) is a remarkable production of one who seems to have read and quoted well nigh all the authors who have written on the same subject. Manuscripts, versions ancient and modern, commentators and editors, ancient and modern, all pay tribute, and the result is one of the most comprehensive expository monographs which we have seen upon a single chapter. Luther said of one part of this chapter, "It is the central and most important passage of the Epistle, and indeed of the entire Scriptures." Calvin coincides with Luther, and many others have expressed a similar opinion. We have been pleased with the author's outspoken utterances, even when we have not fully agreed with him. The book deserves real commendation, and any young minister especially would be greatly profited by a close, discriminating and continuous study of it. *Journal of Sacred Literature.*

Dr. Lightfoot's "Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians," a second edition of which has recently appeared in London, the British Quarterly Review thinks will do much to wipe out the reproach often cast by continental scholars on the biblical learning of the Anglican Church. He has attempted with much success to present the true thought of the apostle, and discusses with rare learning the questions which modern criticism has provoked. The dissertation entitled "St. Paul and the Three" which extends to seventy closely printed pages is a master-piece of Biblical analysis, and countermines the entire position of the Tübingen school. In showing that the portrait of Paul in the Acts is corroborated in his undoubtedly authentic epistles, he has forearmed the exegetical students of the present day against theories of which we shall hear a great deal in the course of the next few years.

The "Commentary on the Gospel according to Luke, by James Stark, M.D."

in which the author proposes to show "the doctrines taught by Jesus Christ, and how far these agree with the doctrines taught by Paul and other apostles, and by modern churches" (two vols. London, 1866), the *Journal of Sacred Literature* pronounces a thoroughly unsatisfactory book. The author believes, though this is by no means the most magnificent piece of originality which he complacently attributes to himself, that Luke was a constant attendant on Jesus, and that his narrative is the direct testimony of a conscientious man who himself relates what he saw with his own eyes and heard with his own ears.

The aim of "The Haram of Jerusalem and the Temple-site of Moriah" (*Das Haram von Jerusalem, etc.* 1866, pp. 65,) by G. Rosen, Prussian consul for Palestine, is to prove, in opposition to the view of Ferguson, that the present Mohammedan Haram in its whole extent occupies the site of the temple and its courts in the time of Herod the great. The author has resided many years in Jerusalem, and is gifted with uncommon powers of observation. His exhibition of the results of personal inspection is unsurpassed in clearness and vividness, but he attributes higher authority to Josephus than all will be willing to allow. *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie.*

The most important works recently published are:—

United States:—Sermons by the late Alexander McClelland, D. D., 12mo. $2—Guettee, The Papacy: its Historic origin, and primitive relations with the Eastern Churches, translated from the French, 12mo. $1.75. Stone, The Christian Sacraments, or Scriptural Views of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, 8vo. $3. Atwater, Manual of Elementary Logic, 16mo. Ecce Deus, Essays on the Life and Doctrine of Jesus Christ, 12mo. $1.50.

Great Britain:—Apocryphal Gospels and other documents relating to the History of Christ. Translated from the originals with notes etc., by B. Harris Cowper, 7*s.* 6*d.* *Fleming*, Manual of Moral Philosophy, 7*s.* 6*d.* *Luthardt, Kahnis and Brückner*, The Church, its Origin, History, and present position; translated from the German, 5*s.* *Ellicott*, St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, 4ed. corrected, 8*s.* 6*d.* *Ellis*, Madagascar Revisited, 16*s.* *Wallace*, Representative Responsibility, a law of the divine procedure in Providence and Redemption, 4*s.* *Macleod*, Reminiscences of a Highland Parish, 10*s.* 6*d.* *De Montalembert*, The Monks of the West, from St. Benedict to St. Bernard, vol. 3d, 10*s.* *Harrison*, Whose are the Fathers? or, the teaching of certain Anglo-Catholics on the Church and its ministry contrary alike to the Holy Scriptures, to the fathers of the first six centuries and to those of the Reformed Church of England, 16*s.*

France:—*Bonnet*, Le miracle dans la vie du Sauveur. 2 fr. *D'Arsac*, La Papauté, ses ennemis et ses juges. 3 fr. 50. *Dupanloup*, L'Athéisme et le péril social. 1 fr. 50. *Monod*, Adolphe. Explication de l'épître de saint Paul aux Ephésiens. 6 fr. *Nicolas*, L'art de croire, ou préparation philosophique à la foi chrétienne. 2 vol. 12 fr.

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